Philip Burton
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199266227
- eISBN:
- 9780191709098
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266227.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This book argues that Augustine's Confessions may fruitfully be read as a series of encounters with language and signs: as a baby learning to speak, as a schoolboy orator, student, professor of ...
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This book argues that Augustine's Confessions may fruitfully be read as a series of encounters with language and signs: as a baby learning to speak, as a schoolboy orator, student, professor of rhetoric, and Christian exegete. While language is a universal human characteristic, the fact of languages tends to divide humans into arbitrary and uncomprehending communities; and even in individual communities, language can be manipulated or simply misunderstood. On the theological level, Augustine faces question of how to describe (and invoke) an absolute and immutable God in language that is necessary arbitrary and mutable. This book seeks to explore these questions through a close analysis of specific linguistic features of the work, such as his use of the language of Roman comedy, his attitudes towards Greek, or his use of biblical Latin. Consideration is given also to such ‘paralinguistic’ activities as singing or laughing, and to the relationship between the spoken and the written word.Less
This book argues that Augustine's Confessions may fruitfully be read as a series of encounters with language and signs: as a baby learning to speak, as a schoolboy orator, student, professor of rhetoric, and Christian exegete. While language is a universal human characteristic, the fact of languages tends to divide humans into arbitrary and uncomprehending communities; and even in individual communities, language can be manipulated or simply misunderstood. On the theological level, Augustine faces question of how to describe (and invoke) an absolute and immutable God in language that is necessary arbitrary and mutable. This book seeks to explore these questions through a close analysis of specific linguistic features of the work, such as his use of the language of Roman comedy, his attitudes towards Greek, or his use of biblical Latin. Consideration is given also to such ‘paralinguistic’ activities as singing or laughing, and to the relationship between the spoken and the written word.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means ...
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This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.Less
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.
Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231195
- eISBN:
- 9780191710810
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231195.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book examines what happens when language becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are habitual users of various ...
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This book examines what happens when language becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are habitual users of various meta-linguistic devices, but reliance on these devices begins early — kids are told, “That's called a rabbit”. It's not implausible that a primitive capacity for the meta-linguistic kicks in at the beginning stages of language acquisition. But no matter when or how frequently these devices are invoked, one thing is clear: they present theorists of language with a complex data pattern. This book shows that the study of these devices and patterns not only represents an interesting and neglected project in the philosophy of language, but also carries important consequences for other parts of philosophy. Part I is devoted to presenting data about various aspects of our meta-linguistic practices. In Part II, the book examines and rejects the four leading meta-linguistic theories, and offers a new account of our use of quotation in a variety of different contexts. But the primary goal of this book is not to promote one theory over another. Rather, it is to present a deeply puzzling set of problems and explain their significance.Less
This book examines what happens when language becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are habitual users of various meta-linguistic devices, but reliance on these devices begins early — kids are told, “That's called a rabbit”. It's not implausible that a primitive capacity for the meta-linguistic kicks in at the beginning stages of language acquisition. But no matter when or how frequently these devices are invoked, one thing is clear: they present theorists of language with a complex data pattern. This book shows that the study of these devices and patterns not only represents an interesting and neglected project in the philosophy of language, but also carries important consequences for other parts of philosophy. Part I is devoted to presenting data about various aspects of our meta-linguistic practices. In Part II, the book examines and rejects the four leading meta-linguistic theories, and offers a new account of our use of quotation in a variety of different contexts. But the primary goal of this book is not to promote one theory over another. Rather, it is to present a deeply puzzling set of problems and explain their significance.
Keith Hossack
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206728
- eISBN:
- 9780191709777
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. ...
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This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.Less
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
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So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
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The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
José Luis Bermúdez (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199248964
- eISBN:
- 9780191719387
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is ...
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This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The chapters, all newly written for this book, explore different aspects of Evans's philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The book includes an introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans's thought and places the chapters in context.Less
This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The chapters, all newly written for this book, explore different aspects of Evans's philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The book includes an introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans's thought and places the chapters in context.
Morwenna Ludlow
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199280766
- eISBN:
- 9780191712906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280766.003.0017
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This chapter deals with a reading of Gregory's apophaticism which is particularly focused on his philosophy of language. In his interpretation, Scot Douglass builds on the work of patristic scholars ...
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This chapter deals with a reading of Gregory's apophaticism which is particularly focused on his philosophy of language. In his interpretation, Scot Douglass builds on the work of patristic scholars such as Mariette Can évet, Ekkehard Mühlenberg, and Alden Mosshammer; he brings to his analysis, however, a profound interest in post-Heideggerian philosophy and his approach assumes that Gregory still has profound and interesting things to say about the nature and purpose of theology. The chapter first outlines Douglass's account of Gregory's philosophy language. It then indicates how Douglass makes connections between this and the rest of Gregory's theology, in particular Gregory's notions of divine presence through revelation and incarnation; the specific nature of theological discourse and the nature of the soul's encounter with that of which it cannot speak. It then comments on the connections that Douglass draws between Gregory's theology and Heidegger, Derrida, and Marion and the conclusions he subsequently draws about the nature of theology as the Cappadocians saw it.Less
This chapter deals with a reading of Gregory's apophaticism which is particularly focused on his philosophy of language. In his interpretation, Scot Douglass builds on the work of patristic scholars such as Mariette Can évet, Ekkehard Mühlenberg, and Alden Mosshammer; he brings to his analysis, however, a profound interest in post-Heideggerian philosophy and his approach assumes that Gregory still has profound and interesting things to say about the nature and purpose of theology. The chapter first outlines Douglass's account of Gregory's philosophy language. It then indicates how Douglass makes connections between this and the rest of Gregory's theology, in particular Gregory's notions of divine presence through revelation and incarnation; the specific nature of theological discourse and the nature of the soul's encounter with that of which it cannot speak. It then comments on the connections that Douglass draws between Gregory's theology and Heidegger, Derrida, and Marion and the conclusions he subsequently draws about the nature of theology as the Cappadocians saw it.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy ...
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This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.Less
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.
Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239450
- eISBN:
- 9780191716997
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of ...
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This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.Less
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.
G. E. R. Lloyd
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199654727
- eISBN:
- 9780191742088
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654727.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human ...
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This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.Less
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.
Kent Greenawalt
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199756131
- eISBN:
- 9780199855292
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756131.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter considers related subjects about which scholars in the philosophy of language, and in the related discipline of linguistics, write. The first of these is a reflection on the nature of ...
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This chapter considers related subjects about which scholars in the philosophy of language, and in the related discipline of linguistics, write. The first of these is a reflection on the nature of linguistic and other human communication. The broad second subject includes standards of linguistic meaning and the pragmatics of communication—how listeners understand speakers, the relevance of context, and what is implied by what is expressed. The chapter then turns to philosophic writing about vagueness, and its possible relevance for legal interpretation.Less
This chapter considers related subjects about which scholars in the philosophy of language, and in the related discipline of linguistics, write. The first of these is a reflection on the nature of linguistic and other human communication. The broad second subject includes standards of linguistic meaning and the pragmatics of communication—how listeners understand speakers, the relevance of context, and what is implied by what is expressed. The chapter then turns to philosophic writing about vagueness, and its possible relevance for legal interpretation.
KEN HIRSCHKOP
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198159612
- eISBN:
- 9780191673641
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198159612.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
The chapter focuses on Mikhail Bakhtin as a social critic. He wrote critically about the history of the European novel, the epistemology of the human sciences, ethics, and the philosophy of language. ...
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The chapter focuses on Mikhail Bakhtin as a social critic. He wrote critically about the history of the European novel, the epistemology of the human sciences, ethics, and the philosophy of language. Bakhtin examined the communication of his day and of the past with a careful eye and critical intent. In a lifetime of writing, Bakhtin argued for the redemptive potential of the culture embodied in works of modern verbal art. He made a case ‘for the novel’ or ‘artistic prose’. There was an evident gap between public culture and actual subjectivity that moved him to write. He interpreted the social crisis following the First World War as a crisis of responsibility in Towards a Philosophy of the Act. The move from dialogue to dialogism was an awkward and incomplete gesture in Bakhtin’s work. But it thematized tensions between modernity, democracy, and dialogue.Less
The chapter focuses on Mikhail Bakhtin as a social critic. He wrote critically about the history of the European novel, the epistemology of the human sciences, ethics, and the philosophy of language. Bakhtin examined the communication of his day and of the past with a careful eye and critical intent. In a lifetime of writing, Bakhtin argued for the redemptive potential of the culture embodied in works of modern verbal art. He made a case ‘for the novel’ or ‘artistic prose’. There was an evident gap between public culture and actual subjectivity that moved him to write. He interpreted the social crisis following the First World War as a crisis of responsibility in Towards a Philosophy of the Act. The move from dialogue to dialogism was an awkward and incomplete gesture in Bakhtin’s work. But it thematized tensions between modernity, democracy, and dialogue.
Martin Lenz
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780197265499
- eISBN:
- 9780191760310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265499.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
What determines the meaning of linguistic expressions: the mental states of language users or external factors? John Locke is still taken to hold the simple thesis that words primarily signify the ...
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What determines the meaning of linguistic expressions: the mental states of language users or external factors? John Locke is still taken to hold the simple thesis that words primarily signify the ideas in the mind of the speaker and thus to commit himself to an untenable mentalism. This chapter challenges this widespread view and sketches an argument to the effect that Locke should be seen as defending a kind of social externalism, since, for him, it is primarily the speech community that plays the essential role in determining meaning.Less
What determines the meaning of linguistic expressions: the mental states of language users or external factors? John Locke is still taken to hold the simple thesis that words primarily signify the ideas in the mind of the speaker and thus to commit himself to an untenable mentalism. This chapter challenges this widespread view and sketches an argument to the effect that Locke should be seen as defending a kind of social externalism, since, for him, it is primarily the speech community that plays the essential role in determining meaning.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245871
- eISBN:
- 9780191598630
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245878.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular ...
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The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular understanding of the radical break Wittgenstein made with what is still the conventional understanding as to what it is for a representation to be true—an understanding manifest in standard treatments of the relation between meaning and truth. On the new view, for any specifiable way things may be represented as being, there are various possible understandings as to what it is for things to be that way; in representing things as that way, one may so represent them on any of these understandings. So it is only where there is a given occasion for representing things in that way that such a representation may bear the sort of understanding that permits engagement with truth. This view of how representation works allowed Wittgenstein a new and fruitful view of scepticism of various forms—metaphysical as well as epistemological. The book sets out in detail what that new view comes to.Less
The Uses of Sense presents a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, concentrating on themes concerning representation, truth, and objectivity. It offers a particular understanding of the radical break Wittgenstein made with what is still the conventional understanding as to what it is for a representation to be true—an understanding manifest in standard treatments of the relation between meaning and truth. On the new view, for any specifiable way things may be represented as being, there are various possible understandings as to what it is for things to be that way; in representing things as that way, one may so represent them on any of these understandings. So it is only where there is a given occasion for representing things in that way that such a representation may bear the sort of understanding that permits engagement with truth. This view of how representation works allowed Wittgenstein a new and fruitful view of scepticism of various forms—metaphysical as well as epistemological. The book sets out in detail what that new view comes to.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195123357
- eISBN:
- 9780199872114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195123352.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is ...
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Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.Less
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.
Sharon L. Crasnow and Anita M. Superson (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199855469
- eISBN:
- 9780199932788
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Philosophy is by its very nature a critical discipline. Due to its critical nature, all philosophy is progressive, building on the lessons of the past, offering new ways of thinking about the present ...
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Philosophy is by its very nature a critical discipline. Due to its critical nature, all philosophy is progressive, building on the lessons of the past, offering new ways of thinking about the present and the future. Recent debates within analytical philosophy have become very rigorous and fine-tuned, with great attention to detail, resulting in much progress. But social progress, the progress that feminists and other critical philosophers have made or are trying to make toward the goal of “better” knowledge, knowledge that is not only true but relevant for improving our lives, has been for the most part left out of traditional analytical philosophy. The effects of social progress can be tradition-changing at various levels, bringing traditional philosophy “out from the shadows.” The 18 papers (all but two previously unpublished) in this volume, spanning most areas of philosophy, address the social progress being made by analytical feminism in its attempt to bring traditional issues out from the shadows into the light of feminist critique. The volume represents current discussions on topics that have not been previously addressed by feminists, and further discussions on topics that feminists have already addressed but are here themselves critiqued.Less
Philosophy is by its very nature a critical discipline. Due to its critical nature, all philosophy is progressive, building on the lessons of the past, offering new ways of thinking about the present and the future. Recent debates within analytical philosophy have become very rigorous and fine-tuned, with great attention to detail, resulting in much progress. But social progress, the progress that feminists and other critical philosophers have made or are trying to make toward the goal of “better” knowledge, knowledge that is not only true but relevant for improving our lives, has been for the most part left out of traditional analytical philosophy. The effects of social progress can be tradition-changing at various levels, bringing traditional philosophy “out from the shadows.” The 18 papers (all but two previously unpublished) in this volume, spanning most areas of philosophy, address the social progress being made by analytical feminism in its attempt to bring traditional issues out from the shadows into the light of feminist critique. The volume represents current discussions on topics that have not been previously addressed by feminists, and further discussions on topics that feminists have already addressed but are here themselves critiqued.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though ...
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This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.Less
This is the second of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the Philosophical Investigations and other writings from 1929 onwards. Though more selective in its coverage than the first volume (it deals mainly with Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and the ego, the possibility of a private language and rule‐following), the book reveals with great clarity the style, method, and content of Wittgenstein's later thought. While this volume is independently comprehensible, Pears remains largely within the structural framework of the first volume and uncovers thereby the general overall configuration and internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and ...
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This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.Less
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.
Frederick C. Beiser
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691555
- eISBN:
- 9780191731839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691555.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a detailed examination of the intellectual development of Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of history. It treats Humboldt's shifting intellectual interests as different approaches to the ...
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This chapter is a detailed examination of the intellectual development of Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of history. It treats Humboldt's shifting intellectual interests as different approaches to the problems of history. Humboldt's classicism, anthropology and philosophy of language are examined insofar as they affect his view of history. The final section is an account of Humboldt's famous essay on the task of the historian. Humboldt is treated as a transitional figure insofar as he belongs to, yet sees beyond, the naturalistic tradition of anthropology.Less
This chapter is a detailed examination of the intellectual development of Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of history. It treats Humboldt's shifting intellectual interests as different approaches to the problems of history. Humboldt's classicism, anthropology and philosophy of language are examined insofar as they affect his view of history. The final section is an account of Humboldt's famous essay on the task of the historian. Humboldt is treated as a transitional figure insofar as he belongs to, yet sees beyond, the naturalistic tradition of anthropology.
