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This chapter discusses the philosophy of religion during the twentieth century. The influence of Immanuel Kant and David Hume on the discussion of theological and religious issues by philosophers is examined in the first section. The dual role of philosophy and the main forms of interaction between philosophy and theology are discussed in the next section. The chapter also examines three main themes: the nature and significance of religious experience, the attempts in the twentieth century to deal with some of the links between religion and reason, and the interaction between religious and moral beliefs.

Several pieces Barth wrote dealing with theology and philosophy in the late 1920s are analyzed in Chapter Four. Dissatisfied with certain elements of the correspondence thesis, in the later 1920s Barth undertakes four different, and not necessarily compatible, ‘experiments’ regarding theology and philosophy. This chapter first covers Barth’s understanding of theological and philosophical ethics in his Ethics and the 1929 essay, ‘Theologische und Philosophische Ethik.’ It then handles Barth’s interpretations of Kant and Herder in Protestant Theology in the nineteenth century as well as his theological response to idealist and realist philosophies in the essay ‘Fate and Idea in Theology.’ Some of John Milbank’s criticisms of Barth on theology and philosophy are handled as well.

The Conclusion first offers a summary of Barth’s development as regards the relationship between theology and philosophy, giving particular attention to the correspondence thesis and the issue of theology’s independence from other disciplines. Several implications of this study for Barth studies and modern theology more generally are discussed, as well as the question of Barth’s break with nineteenth-century liberal theology. The last section of the Conclusion is devoted to detailing a constructive and synthetic account of theology and philosophy after Barth under the rubric of ‘positive protest.’

Chapter Three follows Barth’s earlier ‘correspondence’ thesis into the 1924–6 Göttingen Dogmatics and the 1927 Christliche Dogmatik. While Barth is growing more cautious about the correspondence thesis, and even critical of some of its presuppositions, its presence is still felt and noted in his works, as is the desire for theology’s ‘independence.’ Barth is also beginning to the expansive scope of theology’s domain. Likewise, a new theme regarding theology and philosophy which Barth raises at this time is also covered: the relationship between philosophy and biblical interpretation. Barth’s praise and criticisms of Wilhelm Herrmann are discussed, as well as Barth’s interactions in the mid 1920s with Emil Brunner and Rudolf Bultmann concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy.

The relationship between theology and philosophy in Barth’s third theological prolegomena, Church Dogmatics I, is the focus of Chapter Five. The first half of the chapter is a presentation and analysis of Barth’s attempt in Church Dogmatics I/1 to establish both the independence of theology and its relationship to other disciplines through labeling theology a ‘science.’ One can see in this work that Barth stresses the independence of theology to such an degree that the correspondence thesis is left to atrophy. A response is then offered to Milbank’s criticisms of Barth’s understanding of theology and philosophy. The second half of the chapter deals with Barth’s account of the relationship between philosophy and biblical interpretation in Church Dogmatics I/2 and his further interactions with Bultmann over philosophy and biblical interpretation. It also covers Barth’s response to the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany and Barth’s reception amongst philosophers as a critic of the Nazis, especially the common comparisons between Barth’s and Heidegger’s different responses to the Nationalist Socialist Party.

The standard modern approach to the patristic idea of the divine (im)passibility is to draw a sharp distinction between the unemotional and uninvolved God of the Greek philosophers and the passionate God of the Bible. The allegedly biblical vision of an emotional and suffering God is then taken as a norm by which the whole development of patristic theology is judged. The verdict is that on the whole, patristic theology was a departure from this vision. The author argues that this approach, the attraction of its simplicity notwithstanding, is fundamentally flawed and misleading both with regard to the opinions of the philosophers and with regard to the biblical material.

This Introduction presents many of the common ideas surrounding Karl Barth and the relationship between theology and philosophy. It opens with an analysis of a 1933 debate about Barth’s theology in the Société française de Philosophie, tracks the sentiments that Barth was anti-philosophy or too indebted to it, and then considers three of the more sophisticated accounts of Barth on theology and philosophy offered by Jörg Salaquarda, Henri Delhougne, and Johann Friedrich Lohmann. It closes with a discussion of the overall argument of the book, some of the terms used, and the texts to be analyzed.

The goal of the first chapter is to present Barth’s early theology (1909–14) and his understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy. After considering the nineteenth-century intellectual background to Barth’s theology, and in particular the influence of Wilhelm Herrmann, Barth’s ‘correspondence’ or ‘congruence’ understanding of modern Protestant theology and modern critical philosophy is presented as well as the importance of religion’s ‘independence’ for the young Barth. The early Barth’s high views of Socrates, Plato, and Kant are discussed as well as his criticism of metaphysics. This ‘correspondence’ understanding of theology and philosophy is then traced through several early works not yet translated into English and through Barth’s alleged rupture with liberalism in late 1914. Questions are raised concerning the accounts of Barth’s break with liberalism offered by Bruce McCormack and Ingrid Spieckermann.

The first part of Chapter Seven covers Barth’s 1960 essay ‘Philosophy and Theology’ and shows that many of the essay’s key themes can already be found in the 1924–6 Göttingen Dogmatics, albeit in milder forms. The second part deals with theology and philosophy in the last lectures Barth gave before his retirement, lectures subsequently published as Evangelical Theology. The third part presents and analyzes Barth’s understanding of theology and philosophy in his retirement years through a glance at roundtable discussions and question and answers period held at Princeton, Chicago, and several other places in Europe. Robert Jenson’s and Ingolf Dalferth’s accounts of Barth on theology and philosophy are also discussed.

The first part of Chapter Six deals with the relationship between theological and philosophical ethics in Church Dogmatics II/2. Comparisons to Barth’s Ethics and the essay ‘Theologische und Philosophische Ethik’ are offered in an attempt to show Barth’s increased confidence in the scope and ability of theological ethics. Subsequent sections of the chapter deal with Barth’s doctrine of creation in Church Dogmatics III and the unexpected appearance of long sections dealing with philosophers and philosophical texts within it. A rationale for Barth’s engagements with philosophers is offered and attention is paid to the brief reprisal of the correspondence thesis. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s criticisms of Barth on theology and philosophy are also covered.

The first six chapters of the Treatise explicate the revealed teaching of the Bible, focusing on what it does not require. The middle section of the work now challenges the views of the Reformed Church (and others) about how the Bible should be interpreted, and elaborates the hermeneutic method that Spinoza has so far been relying on. This chapter explicates and contextualizes Spinoza's view that biblical interpretation is a form of enquiry grounded on imagination, a version of what Descartes calls analysis and Bacon calls history, and explores its relation to the rational method of philosophical reasoning. On the one hand, Spinoza argues, interpreting Scripture is a rational process that anyone can in principle engage in. On the other hand, and contrary to the scandalous view of his friend Loedwijk Meyer, Scripture cannot be entirely understood by means of a strictly philosophical method. Theology and philosophy therefore remain distinct.

Many modern theologians advocate the claim that God suffers and are convinced that divine impassibility is untenable on philosophical, exegetical, and broadly religious grounds. As a result, the scholars often interpret the patristic notion of divine apatheia as a Greek philosophical axiom the acceptance of which led to a distortion of the biblical image of the (allegedly) suffering God. This dominant interpretation is flawed. The problems with the unrestricted divine passibility are equally serious. Passibility and impassibility are correlative concepts, both of which must have their place in any sound account of divine agency. The introduction also provides a summary of the book.

Spinoza now sets out to explicate the religious doctrine taught by Scripture and to reinforce his claim that it does not threaten the division between theology and philosophy or challenge the freedom to philosophize. Following a line of ecumenically inclined writers (Arminians, Socininans and Mennonites among them), the Treatise advocates a minimal theology. All that the Bible teaches is that we must love our neighbours by treating them justly and charitably. Biblical doctrine is thus compatible with religious pluralism and does not pronounce on philosophical matters. This chapter examines Spinoza's nuanced defence of this position. It explores the affective basis of his account of a truly religious life, identifies the distinctive role that he allots to tenets of faith, and traces the challenges he mounts to the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Spinoza's positive account of the divine law is an extremely radical one, almost uniquely so in the context of seventeenth‐century debate. God is not a legislator who issues decrees and punishments, and prescriptions only become laws when they are ordained by a human agent. Human beings must therefore take responsibility for the laws under which they live. This chapter analyses Spinoza's complex defence of this position, tracing his distinctions between divine law, divine natural law, and revealed law. It also explains how the Treatise employs these resources to defend a number of controversial claims. Some of these are positive—for example, philosophy rather than Scripture yields the clearest understanding of what divine law prescribes. Many of them are negative—for example, Spinoza's account of law is designed to undermine the providentialism around which Calvinist theology is organized. Here we see Spinoza articulating the practical implications of his own philosophy.

This chapter explains Spinoza's reasons for writing and publishing the Treatise. His central goal is, as he says, to establish that the freedom to philosophize is compatible with the peace and piety of the republic, and to show that, without this freedom, peace and piety cannot be maintained. An understanding of these insights is currently blocked by superstitious forms of religion, which rely on misinterpretations of the Bible to subordinate philosophy to theology, and condemn philosophizing as politically dangerous. The Treatise will uncover the errors and suspect motivations on which these claims are based. Spinoza begins by setting out the traditional conception of superstition (espoused by Plutarch and Bacon among others) that he will discredit, and implicitly accuses the Dutch Reformed Church of upholding it. By explaining what it is directed against, he sets the stage for his own argument.

The main focus of Chapter Two is Barth’s 1919 and 1922 commentaries on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. In addition to providing some historical background to the commentaries, this chapter follows the ‘correspondence’ thesis regarding theology and philosophy in both commentaries. Equally, Barth’s use of different philosophers and philosophical works within the commentaries is discussed. Attention is given to Barth’s positive views of Socrates, Plato (in particular his comparisons of Socrates and Plato to Old Testament prophets), and Kant. The chapter closes with an overview of the reception of Barth’s commentaries among philosophers, especially Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.

How does Aquinas conceive of the connections between faith and theological contemplation? How does he defend the scientific nature of theology? What is the role of the assent of faith, and is Aquinas guilty of voluntarism? Aquinas’s espousal of the notion of theology as a science sub-alternated to divine scientia allowed him to defend a non-charismatic notion of theology (i.e. one that does not depend on the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit to assist us in grasping the articles of faith). The chapter further argues that all rational disciplines (with the exception of those that operate with principles that are known per se) rely on first principles that cannot be argued for within the relevant discipline itself. Finally, the chapter argues that Aquinas’s view that we cannot both know and believe something at the same time actually softens the boundary between theology and philosophy, which is of considerable importance when we address the perennial question as to how Aquinas conceives of the relation between theology and other disciplines.