William F. Bristow
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290642
- eISBN:
- 9780191710421
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290642.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter argues that Kant's articulation of norm-governed agency that we find nearly explicit in the transcendental deduction of the categories and more fully explicit in his account of the ...
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This chapter argues that Kant's articulation of norm-governed agency that we find nearly explicit in the transcendental deduction of the categories and more fully explicit in his account of the structure of human practical reason in his practical writings, is already implicit in the epistemological project of a critique of pure reason. Hence, Kant's subjectivism is but an expression of his revolution in philosophical methodology. The epistemological demand expressed in Kant's critical project is to validate the authority of the norms of reason in a process of reflection on our cognitive faculties. This demand already implies a highest principle of reason, namely, the conformity of externally given content to the principle expressing the formal self-relating activity of the subject.Less
This chapter argues that Kant's articulation of norm-governed agency that we find nearly explicit in the transcendental deduction of the categories and more fully explicit in his account of the structure of human practical reason in his practical writings, is already implicit in the epistemological project of a critique of pure reason. Hence, Kant's subjectivism is but an expression of his revolution in philosophical methodology. The epistemological demand expressed in Kant's critical project is to validate the authority of the norms of reason in a process of reflection on our cognitive faculties. This demand already implies a highest principle of reason, namely, the conformity of externally given content to the principle expressing the formal self-relating activity of the subject.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter studies philosophical methodology, which is considered as one of the most popular topics in philosophy. It considers the proper role for the sciences in philosophical inquiry and tries ...
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This chapter studies philosophical methodology, which is considered as one of the most popular topics in philosophy. It considers the proper role for the sciences in philosophical inquiry and tries to understand the debate over intuitions. The chapter also supports the importance of a partly science-based approach to the study of intuitions.Less
This chapter studies philosophical methodology, which is considered as one of the most popular topics in philosophy. It considers the proper role for the sciences in philosophical inquiry and tries to understand the debate over intuitions. The chapter also supports the importance of a partly science-based approach to the study of intuitions.
Christopher Shields
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253074
- eISBN:
- 9780191598401
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253072.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his ...
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Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.Less
Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our ...
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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter provides an overview of the chapters collected in the volume. It describes how each of the chapters in Part I addresses the question of how thought experiments and appeals to intuition ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the chapters collected in the volume. It describes how each of the chapters in Part I addresses the question of how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms for supporting or refuting scientific or philosophical claims. It explains how each of the chapters in Part II explores, more generally, how engagement with subject matter that we take to be imaginary may affect our actions and perceptions. And it shows how each of the chapters in the volume both explicitly concerns itself with philosophical methodology as a subject of investigation and self‐consciously exhibits a particular philosophical methodology: one that recognizes a continuity between classic texts in the Western philosophical tradition—particularly the work of Aristotle and Hume—and contemporary empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience.Less
This chapter provides an overview of the chapters collected in the volume. It describes how each of the chapters in Part I addresses the question of how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms for supporting or refuting scientific or philosophical claims. It explains how each of the chapters in Part II explores, more generally, how engagement with subject matter that we take to be imaginary may affect our actions and perceptions. And it shows how each of the chapters in the volume both explicitly concerns itself with philosophical methodology as a subject of investigation and self‐consciously exhibits a particular philosophical methodology: one that recognizes a continuity between classic texts in the Western philosophical tradition—particularly the work of Aristotle and Hume—and contemporary empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? ...
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This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.Less
This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This ...
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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and what role they play in philosophical practices such as the method of cases, thought experimentation and conceptual analysis. It outlines two key arguments that can be appealed to in favor of Centrality: the first is based on how philosophers use “intuitions”-vocabulary, and the second on the kind of judgements that philosophers’ make about cases. Part I of the book explores the first argument and Part II the second.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and what role they play in philosophical practices such as the method of cases, thought experimentation and conceptual analysis. It outlines two key arguments that can be appealed to in favor of Centrality: the first is based on how philosophers use “intuitions”-vocabulary, and the second on the kind of judgements that philosophers’ make about cases. Part I of the book explores the first argument and Part II the second.
Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Knowledge ascriptions, such as ‘Sam knows that Obama is president of the United States’, play a central role in our cognitive and social lives. For example, they are closely related to epistemic ...
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Knowledge ascriptions, such as ‘Sam knows that Obama is president of the United States’, play a central role in our cognitive and social lives. For example, they are closely related to epistemic assessments of action. As a result, knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. The line-up for this collection of chapters on knowledge ascriptions consists of world-class philosophers who offer novel approaches to this long-standing topic. The contributions exemplify three recent approaches to knowledge ascriptions. First, a linguistic turn according to which linguistic phenomena and theory are an important resource for providing an adequate account of knowledge ascriptions. Second, a cognitive turn according to which empirical theories from, for example, cognitive psychology as well as experimental philosophy should be invoked in theorizing about knowledge ascriptions. Third, a social turn according to which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions to both individuals and groups are central to understanding knowledge ascriptions. In addition, since knowledge ascriptions have figured very prominently in discussions concerning philosophical methodology, many of the contributions address or exemplify various methodological approaches. The book includes an introduction that gives an overview of the various approaches to this complex debate, their interconnections, and the wide-ranging methodological issues that they raise.Less
Knowledge ascriptions, such as ‘Sam knows that Obama is president of the United States’, play a central role in our cognitive and social lives. For example, they are closely related to epistemic assessments of action. As a result, knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. The line-up for this collection of chapters on knowledge ascriptions consists of world-class philosophers who offer novel approaches to this long-standing topic. The contributions exemplify three recent approaches to knowledge ascriptions. First, a linguistic turn according to which linguistic phenomena and theory are an important resource for providing an adequate account of knowledge ascriptions. Second, a cognitive turn according to which empirical theories from, for example, cognitive psychology as well as experimental philosophy should be invoked in theorizing about knowledge ascriptions. Third, a social turn according to which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions to both individuals and groups are central to understanding knowledge ascriptions. In addition, since knowledge ascriptions have figured very prominently in discussions concerning philosophical methodology, many of the contributions address or exemplify various methodological approaches. The book includes an introduction that gives an overview of the various approaches to this complex debate, their interconnections, and the wide-ranging methodological issues that they raise.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
When should we trust our judgments about far‐fetched imaginary cases? This chapter argues that if the imaginary scenario is adduced to illuminate a concept structured around a set of necessary and ...
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When should we trust our judgments about far‐fetched imaginary cases? This chapter argues that if the imaginary scenario is adduced to illuminate a concept structured around a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and if these conditions play a role in how we identify candidates as falling under that concept, then our judgments about the far‐fetched imaginary cases may help us to separate essential features of the concept from accidental ones. But if the concept is not structured in that way, or if the features in question do not govern our application of the concept, then our judgments about imaginary cases are likely to be misleading. The chapter then argues that the concept of personal identity falls into the second of these classes, and hence that far‐fetched thought experiments may not illuminate the concept in the way that they have been purported to. The chapter includes detailed discussions of John Locke's Prince and Cobbler case, Derek Parfit's case of teletransportation, and Bernard Williams's A‐body/B‐body case.Less
When should we trust our judgments about far‐fetched imaginary cases? This chapter argues that if the imaginary scenario is adduced to illuminate a concept structured around a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and if these conditions play a role in how we identify candidates as falling under that concept, then our judgments about the far‐fetched imaginary cases may help us to separate essential features of the concept from accidental ones. But if the concept is not structured in that way, or if the features in question do not govern our application of the concept, then our judgments about imaginary cases are likely to be misleading. The chapter then argues that the concept of personal identity falls into the second of these classes, and hence that far‐fetched thought experiments may not illuminate the concept in the way that they have been purported to. The chapter includes detailed discussions of John Locke's Prince and Cobbler case, Derek Parfit's case of teletransportation, and Bernard Williams's A‐body/B‐body case.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that judgments about far‐fetched thought experiments are not helpful in illuminating the concept of personal identity. This is because certain patterns of features that coincide ...
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This chapter argues that judgments about far‐fetched thought experiments are not helpful in illuminating the concept of personal identity. This is because certain patterns of features that coincide only fortuitously may nonetheless play a central role in the organization of our concepts, and to the extent that imaginary scenarios involve disruptions of these patterns, our first‐order judgments about them may be distorted or even inverted. The core of the essay consists of a detailed assessment and critique of Derek Parfit's widely discussed contention that fission cases reveal that “personal identity is not what matters.” It suggests that Parfit's argument rests on a subtle misapplication of Mill's Method of Agreement.Less
This chapter argues that judgments about far‐fetched thought experiments are not helpful in illuminating the concept of personal identity. This is because certain patterns of features that coincide only fortuitously may nonetheless play a central role in the organization of our concepts, and to the extent that imaginary scenarios involve disruptions of these patterns, our first‐order judgments about them may be distorted or even inverted. The core of the essay consists of a detailed assessment and critique of Derek Parfit's widely discussed contention that fission cases reveal that “personal identity is not what matters.” It suggests that Parfit's argument rests on a subtle misapplication of Mill's Method of Agreement.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144955
- eISBN:
- 9781400845989
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144955.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness features of particular mental states. ...
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Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. However, it has played no real role in philosophical semantics, which is surprising. This is the first book to examine through a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection—about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. This book maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results—directed content—is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. The book represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language.Less
Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. However, it has played no real role in philosophical semantics, which is surprising. This is the first book to examine through a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection—about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. This book maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results—directed content—is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. The book represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter attempts to show that a particular intuition that has played a central role in discussions of epistemology for roughly a quarter‐century is highly unstable. This is the intuition that, ...
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This chapter attempts to show that a particular intuition that has played a central role in discussions of epistemology for roughly a quarter‐century is highly unstable. This is the intuition that, in so‐called fake barn cases, the subject does not know that he is seeing a barn. By presenting a range of examples that share the structural features of Alvin Goldman's original fake barn case, but differ from it in terms of their content, the chapter provides grounds for thinking that the fake barn intuition is not one around which a theory of knowledge can aptly be built.Less
This chapter attempts to show that a particular intuition that has played a central role in discussions of epistemology for roughly a quarter‐century is highly unstable. This is the intuition that, in so‐called fake barn cases, the subject does not know that he is seeing a barn. By presenting a range of examples that share the structural features of Alvin Goldman's original fake barn case, but differ from it in terms of their content, the chapter provides grounds for thinking that the fake barn intuition is not one around which a theory of knowledge can aptly be built.
Susanna Rinard
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672707
- eISBN:
- 9780191751905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every ...
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In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose premises is just as worthy of belief as the scientist’s philosophical assumptions. If so, then the purely philosophical argument will also succeed. In part two I consider three motivations, each of which comprises a distinct philosophical methodology, for the opposing view: (1) the Moorean idea that common sense enjoys greater plausibility than philosophy; (2) case judgments should trump general principles; (3) reflective equilibrium and conservatism. I argue that all three motivations fail.Less
In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose premises is just as worthy of belief as the scientist’s philosophical assumptions. If so, then the purely philosophical argument will also succeed. In part two I consider three motivations, each of which comprises a distinct philosophical methodology, for the opposing view: (1) the Moorean idea that common sense enjoys greater plausibility than philosophy; (2) case judgments should trump general principles; (3) reflective equilibrium and conservatism. I argue that all three motivations fail.
David K. Henderson and John Greco (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199642632
- eISBN:
- 9780191807145
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological ...
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This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several chapters explicitly address this methodology. Other chapters focus on advancing some application of it. For example, some of the chapters focus on the implications for purposeful epistemology for contextualism about epistemic evaluation and for the idea that such evaluation involves “pragmatic encroachment.” Others explore the idea that purposes allow one to understand various conceptual demands on knowing, such as the demand that knowers can give reasons. The text explores how purposeful epistemology might shed light on the debate between internalist and externalist epistemologies. One way in which one might develop a purposeful epistemology is to think of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm in which agents manage to coordinate their individual and group pursuit of true belief. One chapter develops such an approach. Finally, many of the chapters take direction from reflection on Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature. For example, one chapter develops ideas in Craig to apply purposeful epistemology to issues regarding testimonial knowledge.Less
This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several chapters explicitly address this methodology. Other chapters focus on advancing some application of it. For example, some of the chapters focus on the implications for purposeful epistemology for contextualism about epistemic evaluation and for the idea that such evaluation involves “pragmatic encroachment.” Others explore the idea that purposes allow one to understand various conceptual demands on knowing, such as the demand that knowers can give reasons. The text explores how purposeful epistemology might shed light on the debate between internalist and externalist epistemologies. One way in which one might develop a purposeful epistemology is to think of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm in which agents manage to coordinate their individual and group pursuit of true belief. One chapter develops such an approach. Finally, many of the chapters take direction from reflection on Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature. For example, one chapter develops ideas in Craig to apply purposeful epistemology to issues regarding testimonial knowledge.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199695331
- eISBN:
- 9780191758218
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the more visible recent developments in philosophical methodology is the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. On its surface, the experimentalist challenge looks like a dramatic threat to the ...
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One of the more visible recent developments in philosophical methodology is the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. On its surface, the experimentalist challenge looks like a dramatic threat to the apriority of philosophy; ‘experimental’ is nigh on antonymic with ‘aprioristic.’ This appearance, I suggest, is misleading; the experimentalist critique is entirely unrelated to questions about the apriority of philosophical investigation. There are many reasons to resist the skeptical conclusions of negative experimental philosophers, but even if they are granted—even if the experimentalists are right to claim that we must do much more careful laboratory work in order legitimately to be confident in our philosophical judgments—the apriority of philosophy is unimpugned. The kinds of scientific investigation that experimental philosophers argue to be necessary involve merely enabling sensory experiences in a sense to be articulated; although they are not enabling in the sense of permitting concept acquisition, they are enabling in another epistemically significant way that is also consistent with the apriority of philosophy.Less
One of the more visible recent developments in philosophical methodology is the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. On its surface, the experimentalist challenge looks like a dramatic threat to the apriority of philosophy; ‘experimental’ is nigh on antonymic with ‘aprioristic.’ This appearance, I suggest, is misleading; the experimentalist critique is entirely unrelated to questions about the apriority of philosophical investigation. There are many reasons to resist the skeptical conclusions of negative experimental philosophers, but even if they are granted—even if the experimentalists are right to claim that we must do much more careful laboratory work in order legitimately to be confident in our philosophical judgments—the apriority of philosophy is unimpugned. The kinds of scientific investigation that experimental philosophers argue to be necessary involve merely enabling sensory experiences in a sense to be articulated; although they are not enabling in the sense of permitting concept acquisition, they are enabling in another epistemically significant way that is also consistent with the apriority of philosophy.
Jonathan M. Weinberg and Joshua Alexander
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609192
- eISBN:
- 9780191758973
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical discussions often involve appeals to verdicts about particular cases, sometimes actual, more often hypothetical, and usually with little or no substantive argument in their defense. ...
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Philosophical discussions often involve appeals to verdicts about particular cases, sometimes actual, more often hypothetical, and usually with little or no substantive argument in their defense. Philosophers — on both sides of debates over the standing of this practice — have often called the basis for such appeals ‘intuitions’. But, what might such ‘intuitions’ be, such that they could legitimately serve these purposes? Answers vary, ranging from ‘thin’ conceptions that identify intuitions as merely instances of some fairly generic and epistemologically uncontroversial category of mental states or episodes to ‘thick’ conceptions that add to this thin base certain semantic, phenomenological, etiological, or methodological conditions. As this chapter discusses, thick conceptions turn out to have their own methodological problems; some may even leave philosophers in the methodologically untenable position of being unable to determine when anyone is doing philosophy correctly.Less
Philosophical discussions often involve appeals to verdicts about particular cases, sometimes actual, more often hypothetical, and usually with little or no substantive argument in their defense. Philosophers — on both sides of debates over the standing of this practice — have often called the basis for such appeals ‘intuitions’. But, what might such ‘intuitions’ be, such that they could legitimately serve these purposes? Answers vary, ranging from ‘thin’ conceptions that identify intuitions as merely instances of some fairly generic and epistemologically uncontroversial category of mental states or episodes to ‘thick’ conceptions that add to this thin base certain semantic, phenomenological, etiological, or methodological conditions. As this chapter discusses, thick conceptions turn out to have their own methodological problems; some may even leave philosophers in the methodologically untenable position of being unable to determine when anyone is doing philosophy correctly.
L. A. Paul and Ned Hall
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199673445
- eISBN:
- 9780191751899
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673445.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Many believe that the causal relation is not directly observable, but that we nevertheless can somehow detect its presence in the world, and much work in ...
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Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Many believe that the causal relation is not directly observable, but that we nevertheless can somehow detect its presence in the world, and much work in the natural and social sciences relies on our ability to detect it. Yet neither common sense, scientific investigation, nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Contemporary philosophical debates about causation are driven by opposing motivations, conflicting intuitions, and unarticulated methodological assumptions. Causation: A User’s Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing landscape. The book guides the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples as landmarks. Special attention is given to counterfactual and related analyses of causation. Using a methodological principle based on the close examination of potential counterexamples, the book clarifies the central themes of the debate about causation, develops an account of the methodological rules one should follow when conducting a philosophical exploration of causation, and covers questions about causation involving omissions or absences, preemption and other species of redundant causation, and the possibility that causation is not transitive. Along the way, the authors examine several contemporary proposals for analyzing the nature of causation and assess their merits and overall methodological cogency, including proposals based on counterfactual analyses, regularities, causal modeling, contrasts, de facto accounts, and transference of conserved quantities. The book is designed to be of value both to trained specialists and those coming to the problem of causation for the first time. It provides the reader with a broad and sophisticated view of the metaphysics of the causal relation.Less
Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Many believe that the causal relation is not directly observable, but that we nevertheless can somehow detect its presence in the world, and much work in the natural and social sciences relies on our ability to detect it. Yet neither common sense, scientific investigation, nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Contemporary philosophical debates about causation are driven by opposing motivations, conflicting intuitions, and unarticulated methodological assumptions. Causation: A User’s Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing landscape. The book guides the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples as landmarks. Special attention is given to counterfactual and related analyses of causation. Using a methodological principle based on the close examination of potential counterexamples, the book clarifies the central themes of the debate about causation, develops an account of the methodological rules one should follow when conducting a philosophical exploration of causation, and covers questions about causation involving omissions or absences, preemption and other species of redundant causation, and the possibility that causation is not transitive. Along the way, the authors examine several contemporary proposals for analyzing the nature of causation and assess their merits and overall methodological cogency, including proposals based on counterfactual analyses, regularities, causal modeling, contrasts, de facto accounts, and transference of conserved quantities. The book is designed to be of value both to trained specialists and those coming to the problem of causation for the first time. It provides the reader with a broad and sophisticated view of the metaphysics of the causal relation.
Michael Macovski
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195069655
- eISBN:
- 9780199855186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195069655.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism
The final chapter reasserts that a proper study of Romantic rhetoric should involve an analysis of the evolution of rhetoric dialogue, from the works of first-generation poets to more current ...
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The final chapter reasserts that a proper study of Romantic rhetoric should involve an analysis of the evolution of rhetoric dialogue, from the works of first-generation poets to more current literary pieces. Recognition of the great diversity in the style of these literary works should also be made in order to generate more meaningful and unbounded interpretations. A summary of the differing styles of the works discussed in the previous chapters is provided. The dialogic discourse revealed therein then provides information not only on inherent structures but also on interrelationships with knowledge, interpretation, and the heuristic method. The final assertion put forth in the book concerns the status of dialogue as an investigative tool for “otherness” in allowing main characters to view themselves from the outside or the so-called “third perspective.” Thus, the study of literary dialogue also has implications for the related fields of philosophical methodology and cultural anthropology.Less
The final chapter reasserts that a proper study of Romantic rhetoric should involve an analysis of the evolution of rhetoric dialogue, from the works of first-generation poets to more current literary pieces. Recognition of the great diversity in the style of these literary works should also be made in order to generate more meaningful and unbounded interpretations. A summary of the differing styles of the works discussed in the previous chapters is provided. The dialogic discourse revealed therein then provides information not only on inherent structures but also on interrelationships with knowledge, interpretation, and the heuristic method. The final assertion put forth in the book concerns the status of dialogue as an investigative tool for “otherness” in allowing main characters to view themselves from the outside or the so-called “third perspective.” Thus, the study of literary dialogue also has implications for the related fields of philosophical methodology and cultural anthropology.
Marcel van Ackeren
Marcel van Ackeren and Lee Klein (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780197266298
- eISBN:
- 9780191872891
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266298.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of current philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. In this Introduction, I first explain the main questions ...
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Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of current philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. In this Introduction, I first explain the main questions of this debate: Does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to philosophy? What is this contribution? Is there a specific method relating the historical perspective to current philosophy? What does this mean for our view on philosophy in general? Second, I critically discuss doubts about the usefulness of the debate and defend its importance. Third, I briefly discuss the relation of the historical perspective and its relation to the philosophy of philosophy, and finally I summarize the evolution of the debate and some of its main positions.Less
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of current philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. In this Introduction, I first explain the main questions of this debate: Does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to philosophy? What is this contribution? Is there a specific method relating the historical perspective to current philosophy? What does this mean for our view on philosophy in general? Second, I critically discuss doubts about the usefulness of the debate and defend its importance. Third, I briefly discuss the relation of the historical perspective and its relation to the philosophy of philosophy, and finally I summarize the evolution of the debate and some of its main positions.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter concerns a particular kind of ‘intuition’-talk that is not easy to charitably account for using the strategies outlined in the previous chapter. Many philosophers engage in an activity ...
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This chapter concerns a particular kind of ‘intuition’-talk that is not easy to charitably account for using the strategies outlined in the previous chapter. Many philosophers engage in an activity they describe as ‘explaining away intuitions’. This chapter argues that philosophers are under no obligation to explain away intuition, even though there are constructive activities that are mistakenly classified as such.Less
This chapter concerns a particular kind of ‘intuition’-talk that is not easy to charitably account for using the strategies outlined in the previous chapter. Many philosophers engage in an activity they describe as ‘explaining away intuitions’. This chapter argues that philosophers are under no obligation to explain away intuition, even though there are constructive activities that are mistakenly classified as such.
