Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on ‘private language’. It makes detailed use of Stanley ...
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This book presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on ‘private language’. It makes detailed use of Stanley Cavell's interpretations of these remarks. It relates disputes about the interpretation of this aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to a recent, highly influential controversy about how to interpret Wittgenstein's early text, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by drawing and testing out a distinction between resolute and substantial understandings of the related notions of grammar, nonsense and the imagination. Throughout, the book seeks to elucidate Wittgenstein's philosophical method, and to establish the importance of the form or style of his writing to the proper application of this method.Less
This book presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on ‘private language’. It makes detailed use of Stanley Cavell's interpretations of these remarks. It relates disputes about the interpretation of this aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to a recent, highly influential controversy about how to interpret Wittgenstein's early text, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by drawing and testing out a distinction between resolute and substantial understandings of the related notions of grammar, nonsense and the imagination. Throughout, the book seeks to elucidate Wittgenstein's philosophical method, and to establish the importance of the form or style of his writing to the proper application of this method.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on ...
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Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.Less
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.
Catherine Conybeare
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199262083
- eISBN:
- 9780191603761
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926208x.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This book explores the earliest works of St. Augustine to discover the anti-dogmatic Augustine, one who gives questioning, uncertainty, and human limitations their due role in his theology. These ...
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This book explores the earliest works of St. Augustine to discover the anti-dogmatic Augustine, one who gives questioning, uncertainty, and human limitations their due role in his theology. These early works are considered performances, through which multiple questions can be raised and multiple options explored, both in words and through their dramatic framework. It is shown that the very idiosyncrasy of Augustine’s arguments and his manner of pursuing them are of immense significance, which suggests possibilities for interpretation of the more idiosyncratic riches in his later works. The book is divided into three parts. Part I analyzes Augustine’s use of the genre of philosophical dialogue, why he may have chosen the genre, and what he achieves with it. Part II discusses the roles played by Augustine’s mother. Part III focuses on the dialogue, the Soliloquia.Less
This book explores the earliest works of St. Augustine to discover the anti-dogmatic Augustine, one who gives questioning, uncertainty, and human limitations their due role in his theology. These early works are considered performances, through which multiple questions can be raised and multiple options explored, both in words and through their dramatic framework. It is shown that the very idiosyncrasy of Augustine’s arguments and his manner of pursuing them are of immense significance, which suggests possibilities for interpretation of the more idiosyncratic riches in his later works. The book is divided into three parts. Part I analyzes Augustine’s use of the genre of philosophical dialogue, why he may have chosen the genre, and what he achieves with it. Part II discusses the roles played by Augustine’s mother. Part III focuses on the dialogue, the Soliloquia.
Marie McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199244447
- eISBN:
- 9780191714146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244447.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond and James ...
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Discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond and James Conant. This book aims to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea central to the metaphysical reading that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into how language functions. It takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein’s early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. The anti-metaphysical interpretation presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein’s remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein’s approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task.Less
Discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond and James Conant. This book aims to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea central to the metaphysical reading that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into how language functions. It takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein’s early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. The anti-metaphysical interpretation presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein’s remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein’s approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task.
Stephen Edmund Lahey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195183313
- eISBN:
- 9780199870349
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183313.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
The 14th-century English philosopher and theologian John Wyclif (d. 1384) has been described as a forerunner of the Reformation, but is better understood as the last important thinker of Oxford’s ...
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The 14th-century English philosopher and theologian John Wyclif (d. 1384) has been described as a forerunner of the Reformation, but is better understood as the last important thinker of Oxford’s “Golden Age” of theology. Rather than describing him in terms of what would occur a century and a half after his death, this book describes Wyclif as coming at the end of a period of great intellectual activity. His logic, epistemology, and metaphysics emerge from academic discourse engendered by Ockham’s conceptualism and sharpened by the semantic analysis of the Mertonian Calculators. The theological innovations for which Wyclif is best known, including a heightened emphasis on Scripture in Christian life, his rejection of transubstantiation, and his program for ecclesiastical reform, are best understood in terms of the philosophical theology that he developed during his years at Oxford. This book attempts such an understanding by correlating the substance of these theological ideas to Wyclif’s philosophical works, showing how they articulate his scriptural hermeneutics and homiletics, his understanding of predestination, and his criticism of the doctrine of transubstantiation.Less
The 14th-century English philosopher and theologian John Wyclif (d. 1384) has been described as a forerunner of the Reformation, but is better understood as the last important thinker of Oxford’s “Golden Age” of theology. Rather than describing him in terms of what would occur a century and a half after his death, this book describes Wyclif as coming at the end of a period of great intellectual activity. His logic, epistemology, and metaphysics emerge from academic discourse engendered by Ockham’s conceptualism and sharpened by the semantic analysis of the Mertonian Calculators. The theological innovations for which Wyclif is best known, including a heightened emphasis on Scripture in Christian life, his rejection of transubstantiation, and his program for ecclesiastical reform, are best understood in terms of the philosophical theology that he developed during his years at Oxford. This book attempts such an understanding by correlating the substance of these theological ideas to Wyclif’s philosophical works, showing how they articulate his scriptural hermeneutics and homiletics, his understanding of predestination, and his criticism of the doctrine of transubstantiation.
W. J. Mander
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230303
- eISBN:
- 9780191710643
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230303.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Best known today as one of the earliest critics of John Locke, John Norris (1657-1711) incorporated ideas of Augustine, Malebranche, Plato, the Cambridge Platonists, and the scholastics into an ...
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Best known today as one of the earliest critics of John Locke, John Norris (1657-1711) incorporated ideas of Augustine, Malebranche, Plato, the Cambridge Platonists, and the scholastics into an original synthesis that was highly influential on the philosophy and theology of his day. This book presents a study of this unjustly neglected thinker, and the different perspectives he offers on this seminal period in philosophical history.Less
Best known today as one of the earliest critics of John Locke, John Norris (1657-1711) incorporated ideas of Augustine, Malebranche, Plato, the Cambridge Platonists, and the scholastics into an original synthesis that was highly influential on the philosophy and theology of his day. This book presents a study of this unjustly neglected thinker, and the different perspectives he offers on this seminal period in philosophical history.
Stephen Wilkinson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199273966
- eISBN:
- 9780191706585
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273966.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
To what extent should parents be allowed to use selection technologies (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) to determine the characteristics of their children? And is there something morally ...
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To what extent should parents be allowed to use selection technologies (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) to determine the characteristics of their children? And is there something morally wrong with parents who wish to do this? Choosing Tomorrow's Children provides answers to these questions. In particular, the book applies the techniques of philosophical bioethics to address issues raised by selective reproduction, the practice of choosing between different possible future persons by selecting or deselecting (for example) embryos, eggs, and sperm. It offers answers to questions including the following. Do children have a ‘right to an open future’ and, if they do, what moral constraints does this place upon selective reproduction? Under what circumstances (if any) should sex selection be allowed? Should we ‘screen out’ as much disease and disability as possible before birth, or would that be an objectionable form of eugenics? Is it acceptable to create or select a future person (a ‘saviour sibling’) in order to provide life-saving tissue for an existing relative? Is there a moral difference between selecting to avoid disease and selecting to produce an ‘enhanced’ child? And should we allow deaf parents to use reproductive technologies to ensure that they have a deaf child? The book does not provide one overarching conclusion but rather assesses each argument-type on its merits. Insofar as it is possible to generalise though, Choosing Tomorrow's Children concludes that most of the arguments usually provided against selective reproduction are flawed in one way or another.Less
To what extent should parents be allowed to use selection technologies (such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis) to determine the characteristics of their children? And is there something morally wrong with parents who wish to do this? Choosing Tomorrow's Children provides answers to these questions. In particular, the book applies the techniques of philosophical bioethics to address issues raised by selective reproduction, the practice of choosing between different possible future persons by selecting or deselecting (for example) embryos, eggs, and sperm. It offers answers to questions including the following. Do children have a ‘right to an open future’ and, if they do, what moral constraints does this place upon selective reproduction? Under what circumstances (if any) should sex selection be allowed? Should we ‘screen out’ as much disease and disability as possible before birth, or would that be an objectionable form of eugenics? Is it acceptable to create or select a future person (a ‘saviour sibling’) in order to provide life-saving tissue for an existing relative? Is there a moral difference between selecting to avoid disease and selecting to produce an ‘enhanced’ child? And should we allow deaf parents to use reproductive technologies to ensure that they have a deaf child? The book does not provide one overarching conclusion but rather assesses each argument-type on its merits. Insofar as it is possible to generalise though, Choosing Tomorrow's Children concludes that most of the arguments usually provided against selective reproduction are flawed in one way or another.
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199229826
- eISBN:
- 9780191710766
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229826.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Cursory allusions to the relation between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are common in philosophical literature, but there has been little in the way of serious and comprehensive commentary on the ...
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Cursory allusions to the relation between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are common in philosophical literature, but there has been little in the way of serious and comprehensive commentary on the relationship between their ideas. This book attempts both to close this gap and to offer important independent readings of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of philosophy and religious belief. Chapter 1 carefully documents Kierkegaard's influence on Wittgenstein, while Chapters 2 and 3 provide trenchant criticisms of two prominent attempts that have been made to compare the two thinkers — those of D. Z. Phillips and James Conant. Chapter 4 develops Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's concerted criticisms of certain standard conception of religious belief, and defends their own positive conception against the common charges of ‘fideism’ and ‘irrationalism’. As well as contributing to the contemporary debate about how to read Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's work, this book addresses issues of central concern not only to scholars of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, but to anyone interested in issues surrounding the philosophy of religion, or the ethical aspects of philosophical practice as such.Less
Cursory allusions to the relation between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are common in philosophical literature, but there has been little in the way of serious and comprehensive commentary on the relationship between their ideas. This book attempts both to close this gap and to offer important independent readings of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of philosophy and religious belief. Chapter 1 carefully documents Kierkegaard's influence on Wittgenstein, while Chapters 2 and 3 provide trenchant criticisms of two prominent attempts that have been made to compare the two thinkers — those of D. Z. Phillips and James Conant. Chapter 4 develops Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's concerted criticisms of certain standard conception of religious belief, and defends their own positive conception against the common charges of ‘fideism’ and ‘irrationalism’. As well as contributing to the contemporary debate about how to read Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's work, this book addresses issues of central concern not only to scholars of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, but to anyone interested in issues surrounding the philosophy of religion, or the ethical aspects of philosophical practice as such.
Keith Hossack
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206728
- eISBN:
- 9780191709777
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. ...
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This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.Less
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.
Peter Forrest
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214587
- eISBN:
- 9780191706523
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214587.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion
This book is a speculative philosophical theology based on three themes: that a version of materialism is a help, not a hindrance, in philosophical theology; that God develops; and that this ...
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This book is a speculative philosophical theology based on three themes: that a version of materialism is a help, not a hindrance, in philosophical theology; that God develops; and that this development is kenotic, an abandonment of power. The materialism considered in this work is non-reductive: of metaphysical necessity, the mental supervenes on the physical. Materialism leads to the thesis that the primordial God is metaphysically necessary, the limiting case of supervenience. It is speculated that the brain-analogue of the primordial God consists of all the possibilities for creation. It is also speculated that God changes. In the beginning there was a God which loved no one and which was not lovable, but was all-powerful and all-knowing. A sequence of acts resulted in a community of divine love, the Holy Trinity, and a world with many creatures who were autonomous agents. God loved us so much that one Divine Person became fully human and was willing to suffer to show us divine love. This is the kenotic development of God from Pure Will to Unbounded Love. In addition, kenosis provides a new resource for understanding evil. The Primordial God is good but in an inhuman way; why should anyone expect otherwise? But as a result of God's kenotic development, God is now like a loving parent, as the great monotheistic religions teach.Less
This book is a speculative philosophical theology based on three themes: that a version of materialism is a help, not a hindrance, in philosophical theology; that God develops; and that this development is kenotic, an abandonment of power. The materialism considered in this work is non-reductive: of metaphysical necessity, the mental supervenes on the physical. Materialism leads to the thesis that the primordial God is metaphysically necessary, the limiting case of supervenience. It is speculated that the brain-analogue of the primordial God consists of all the possibilities for creation. It is also speculated that God changes. In the beginning there was a God which loved no one and which was not lovable, but was all-powerful and all-knowing. A sequence of acts resulted in a community of divine love, the Holy Trinity, and a world with many creatures who were autonomous agents. God loved us so much that one Divine Person became fully human and was willing to suffer to show us divine love. This is the kenotic development of God from Pure Will to Unbounded Love. In addition, kenosis provides a new resource for understanding evil. The Primordial God is good but in an inhuman way; why should anyone expect otherwise? But as a result of God's kenotic development, God is now like a loving parent, as the great monotheistic religions teach.
Ward E. Jones and Samantha Vice (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195320398
- eISBN:
- 9780199869534
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320398.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Ethics at the Cinema is a collection of original philosophical papers on film. Contributors were invited to engage with ethical issues raised within, or within the process of viewing, a ...
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Ethics at the Cinema is a collection of original philosophical papers on film. Contributors were invited to engage with ethical issues raised within, or within the process of viewing, a single film; they were given the freedom to write on a topic and film of their choice. All contributors have previously written in ethics and/or the philosophy of film, but they come from a wide range of traditions and backgrounds within both. The collection is divided into two parts: ‘Part 1: Critique, Character, and the Power of Film’, and ‘Part 2: Philosophical Readings’. The papers in Part 1 engage explicitly with meta-issues surrounding film, film narratives, and film viewing. The papers comprising Part 2 are engaged less with issues about film than with the details of their chosen film: its characters, its plot, and its particular uses of images.Less
Ethics at the Cinema is a collection of original philosophical papers on film. Contributors were invited to engage with ethical issues raised within, or within the process of viewing, a single film; they were given the freedom to write on a topic and film of their choice. All contributors have previously written in ethics and/or the philosophy of film, but they come from a wide range of traditions and backgrounds within both. The collection is divided into two parts: ‘Part 1: Critique, Character, and the Power of Film’, and ‘Part 2: Philosophical Readings’. The papers in Part 1 engage explicitly with meta-issues surrounding film, film narratives, and film viewing. The papers comprising Part 2 are engaged less with issues about film than with the details of their chosen film: its characters, its plot, and its particular uses of images.
Paisley Livingston
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570171
- eISBN:
- 9780191721540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570171.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, General
The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in ...
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The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in many cases, it is the philosophical commentator and not ‘the film itself’ that is the actual source of the philosophizing attributed to a movie. In some cases, however, it is the film-maker who, by working with a background of specific philosophical sources, creates a work that expresses philosophical ideas. With this possibility in mind, the second part of the book outlines a ‘partial intentionalist’ approach. In response to a series of objections, the book defends underlying assumptions about interpretation, expression, and authorship. The book's partial intentionalist approach is exemplified in the third part of the book, which focuses on the work of Ingmar Bergman. The book argues that Bergman was profoundly influenced by a Finnish philosopher, Eino Kaila. Bergman proclaimed that reading Kaila's book on philosophical psychology a tremendous philosophical experience for him and that he ‘built on this ground’. With reference to unpublished materials in the newly created Ingmar Bergman archive in Stockholm, the book shows how, in works such as Wild Strawberries, Persona, and In the Life of the Marionettes, the Swedish director took up and responded to Kaila's views on motivated irrationality, inauthenticity, ethics, and the problem of self-knowledge.Less
The first part of this book critically assesses some of the bold claims that have been made about films' contributions to philosophy and defends a balanced perspective on the topic. It argues that in many cases, it is the philosophical commentator and not ‘the film itself’ that is the actual source of the philosophizing attributed to a movie. In some cases, however, it is the film-maker who, by working with a background of specific philosophical sources, creates a work that expresses philosophical ideas. With this possibility in mind, the second part of the book outlines a ‘partial intentionalist’ approach. In response to a series of objections, the book defends underlying assumptions about interpretation, expression, and authorship. The book's partial intentionalist approach is exemplified in the third part of the book, which focuses on the work of Ingmar Bergman. The book argues that Bergman was profoundly influenced by a Finnish philosopher, Eino Kaila. Bergman proclaimed that reading Kaila's book on philosophical psychology a tremendous philosophical experience for him and that he ‘built on this ground’. With reference to unpublished materials in the newly created Ingmar Bergman archive in Stockholm, the book shows how, in works such as Wild Strawberries, Persona, and In the Life of the Marionettes, the Swedish director took up and responded to Kaila's views on motivated irrationality, inauthenticity, ethics, and the problem of self-knowledge.
J.L. Austin
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245537
- eISBN:
- 9780191680861
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This work sets out the author's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an examination of his already well-known ...
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This work sets out the author's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an examination of his already well-known distinction between performative utterances and statements, he finally abandons that distinction, replacing it with a more general theory of ‘illocutionary forces’ of utterances, which has important bearings on a wide variety of philosophical problems.Less
This work sets out the author's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an examination of his already well-known distinction between performative utterances and statements, he finally abandons that distinction, replacing it with a more general theory of ‘illocutionary forces’ of utterances, which has important bearings on a wide variety of philosophical problems.
Christopher Shields
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253074
- eISBN:
- 9780191598401
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253072.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his ...
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Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.Less
Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.
Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199288878
- eISBN:
- 9780191594304
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the ...
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Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition – for our two questions are among the oldest of philosophical issues, and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. Fifteen contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy and original answers to debates that have been the focus of a tremendous amount of interest in the last three decades, both within philosophy and the culture at large.Less
Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition – for our two questions are among the oldest of philosophical issues, and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. Fifteen contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy and original answers to debates that have been the focus of a tremendous amount of interest in the last three decades, both within philosophy and the culture at large.
Brian Davies
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199790890
- eISBN:
- 9780199914418
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790890.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book offers an in-depth study of Saint Thomas Aquinas's thoughts on God and evil, revealing that Aquinas's thinking about God and evil can be traced through his metaphysical philosophy, his ...
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This book offers an in-depth study of Saint Thomas Aquinas's thoughts on God and evil, revealing that Aquinas's thinking about God and evil can be traced through his metaphysical philosophy, his thoughts on God and creation, and his writings about Christian revelation and the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The book first gives an introduction to Aquinas's philosophical theology, as well as a nuanced analysis of the ways in which Aquinas's writings have been considered over time. For hundreds of years scholars have argued that Aquinas's views on God and evil were original and different from those of his contemporaries. The book shows that Aquinas's views were by modern standards very original, but that in their historical context they were more traditional than many scholars since have realized. The book also provides insight into what we can learn from Aquinas's philosophy.Less
This book offers an in-depth study of Saint Thomas Aquinas's thoughts on God and evil, revealing that Aquinas's thinking about God and evil can be traced through his metaphysical philosophy, his thoughts on God and creation, and his writings about Christian revelation and the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The book first gives an introduction to Aquinas's philosophical theology, as well as a nuanced analysis of the ways in which Aquinas's writings have been considered over time. For hundreds of years scholars have argued that Aquinas's views on God and evil were original and different from those of his contemporaries. The book shows that Aquinas's views were by modern standards very original, but that in their historical context they were more traditional than many scholars since have realized. The book also provides insight into what we can learn from Aquinas's philosophy.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240174
- eISBN:
- 9780191680106
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240174.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Aristotle's teaching on the subject of happiness has been a topic of intense philosophical debate. Did he hold that happiness consists in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, or ...
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Aristotle's teaching on the subject of happiness has been a topic of intense philosophical debate. Did he hold that happiness consists in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, or that supreme happiness is to be found only in the practice of philosophical contemplation? The question is vital to the relevance of his ethics today. The author of this title helped to set the terms of this debate a quarter of a century ago. Later, in The Aristotelian Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1978), he argued that Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics had no less a claim than the better-known Nicomachean Ethics to be taken as a late and definitive statement of Aristotle's position. This new book refines a view of the relationship between the two treatises and shows how to reach a consensus on the interpretation of the texts. Aristotle's admirers struggle to read a comprehensive account of the supreme happiness into the Nicomachean Ethics: this book argues that those who are prepared to take the neglected Eudemian Ethics with equal seriousness are able to preserve their admiration intact without doing violence to any of the relevant texts.Less
Aristotle's teaching on the subject of happiness has been a topic of intense philosophical debate. Did he hold that happiness consists in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, or that supreme happiness is to be found only in the practice of philosophical contemplation? The question is vital to the relevance of his ethics today. The author of this title helped to set the terms of this debate a quarter of a century ago. Later, in The Aristotelian Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1978), he argued that Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics had no less a claim than the better-known Nicomachean Ethics to be taken as a late and definitive statement of Aristotle's position. This new book refines a view of the relationship between the two treatises and shows how to reach a consensus on the interpretation of the texts. Aristotle's admirers struggle to read a comprehensive account of the supreme happiness into the Nicomachean Ethics: this book argues that those who are prepared to take the neglected Eudemian Ethics with equal seriousness are able to preserve their admiration intact without doing violence to any of the relevant texts.
Michael Freeden
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294146
- eISBN:
- 9780191599323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829414X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Philosophical liberalism poses a challenge for the ideological analyst since it illustrates the divide between ideology and political philosophy discussed in Part I of the book, even though at least ...
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Philosophical liberalism poses a challenge for the ideological analyst since it illustrates the divide between ideology and political philosophy discussed in Part I of the book, even though at least one of its most representative formulators (R. Dworkin) refers to its distinct ideological features. It is almost entirely ahistorical despite superficial allusions to the historical liberal tradition, and adopts the conceptual purism of some philosophers in its attempts to isolate the synchronic constitutive principles of liberalism ‘as such’; it is formalistic and rule bound. It is currently the most carefully argued and academically the most widely discussed liberal theory, and moreover, follows the academic trend of resurrecting major ideologies—Marxism is the best‐known example—within the confines of philosophical discourse and, like twentieth‐century Marxism, it exhibits the scholastic tendency of relatively circumscribed circles to focus detailed and often repetitive debate on a small number of texts, so that liberal principles are stated in such a way as to blur the distinctions between the theory and the ideology. Significantly, American philosophical liberalism is both similar to and different from other American liberal counterparts and a comparison between the two is therefore of some interest. Philosophical liberalism, it is contended, has borrowed a false horizon for American liberalism, stretching back to Kant but unrelated to the thought‐behaviour of American liberals; the hitherto existing horizons of those liberals, whether accumulative or diminishing, and whether compatible or incongruous, hark back instead to Locke, to progressivism and the New Deal, and to the civil rights movement of the 1960s.Less
Philosophical liberalism poses a challenge for the ideological analyst since it illustrates the divide between ideology and political philosophy discussed in Part I of the book, even though at least one of its most representative formulators (R. Dworkin) refers to its distinct ideological features. It is almost entirely ahistorical despite superficial allusions to the historical liberal tradition, and adopts the conceptual purism of some philosophers in its attempts to isolate the synchronic constitutive principles of liberalism ‘as such’; it is formalistic and rule bound. It is currently the most carefully argued and academically the most widely discussed liberal theory, and moreover, follows the academic trend of resurrecting major ideologies—Marxism is the best‐known example—within the confines of philosophical discourse and, like twentieth‐century Marxism, it exhibits the scholastic tendency of relatively circumscribed circles to focus detailed and often repetitive debate on a small number of texts, so that liberal principles are stated in such a way as to blur the distinctions between the theory and the ideology. Significantly, American philosophical liberalism is both similar to and different from other American liberal counterparts and a comparison between the two is therefore of some interest. Philosophical liberalism, it is contended, has borrowed a false horizon for American liberalism, stretching back to Kant but unrelated to the thought‐behaviour of American liberals; the hitherto existing horizons of those liberals, whether accumulative or diminishing, and whether compatible or incongruous, hark back instead to Locke, to progressivism and the New Deal, and to the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199270200
- eISBN:
- 9780191699467
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199270200.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Liberal theory seeks agreement on political principles in spite of the moral, religious, and philosophical diversity of contemporary societies. This book breaks new ground in developing principles ...
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Liberal theory seeks agreement on political principles in spite of the moral, religious, and philosophical diversity of contemporary societies. This book breaks new ground in developing principles from research on liberal citizens' attitudes towards rights and liberties, distributive justice, and religious beliefs. Because liberal citizens do not generally accept strong individual rights or strongly egalitarian principles of distributive justice, the principles of liberal consensus must be based on almost universal support for democratic political systems and democracy as a value. The details of central liberal principles, including those bearing on democracy itself, must be worked out by appropriate democratic procedures.Less
Liberal theory seeks agreement on political principles in spite of the moral, religious, and philosophical diversity of contemporary societies. This book breaks new ground in developing principles from research on liberal citizens' attitudes towards rights and liberties, distributive justice, and religious beliefs. Because liberal citizens do not generally accept strong individual rights or strongly egalitarian principles of distributive justice, the principles of liberal consensus must be based on almost universal support for democratic political systems and democracy as a value. The details of central liberal principles, including those bearing on democracy itself, must be worked out by appropriate democratic procedures.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our ...
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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
