Bimal Krishna Matilal
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239765
- eISBN:
- 9780191680014
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a defence of the form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyāya–Vaíṣsika school in classical India. The book presents the Nyāya view and critically examines it against ...
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This book is a defence of the form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyāya–Vaíṣsika school in classical India. The book presents the Nyāya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. This reconstruction of Nyāya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists.Less
This book is a defence of the form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyāya–Vaíṣsika school in classical India. The book presents the Nyāya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. This reconstruction of Nyāya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that ...
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Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. The same goes for the view that he is a phenomenalist about physical objects. He makes an epistemological claim about all we can know about objects, not about what objects are, let alone about what objects knowably are. It's true that Hume defines causation as regular succession, but he uses ‘definition’ like his contemporaries Burke and Priestley when they write (respectively): ‘A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined’, and ‘A definition of any particular thing cannot be anything more than an enumeration of its known properties’.Less
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. The same goes for the view that he is a phenomenalist about physical objects. He makes an epistemological claim about all we can know about objects, not about what objects are, let alone about what objects knowably are. It's true that Hume defines causation as regular succession, but he uses ‘definition’ like his contemporaries Burke and Priestley when they write (respectively): ‘A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined’, and ‘A definition of any particular thing cannot be anything more than an enumeration of its known properties’.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that ...
More
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. Sceptics do not claim to know the ultimate nature of (non-mental) reality. Hume does hold that ‘regular succession’ is all we can legitimately and positively contentfully mean by the word ‘causation’ when we use it in philosophy, since this is the only clear and distinct meaning we can give to the word on his empiricist principles, and philosophy is committed to using only clear and distinct ideas. At the same time, he is clear on the point that there is something like natural necessity in the world, as many quotations show, including quotations from his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Less
Hume is not a ‘Humean’ about causation. His key thesis is epistemological; he claims that all we can know of causation is regular succession. His claim is not ontological; he does not hold that regular succession is (knowably) all that causation is. The ontological claim is dogmatic metaphysics, and is as such wholly incompatible with Hume's scepticism. Sceptics do not claim to know the ultimate nature of (non-mental) reality. Hume does hold that ‘regular succession’ is all we can legitimately and positively contentfully mean by the word ‘causation’ when we use it in philosophy, since this is the only clear and distinct meaning we can give to the word on his empiricist principles, and philosophy is committed to using only clear and distinct ideas. At the same time, he is clear on the point that there is something like natural necessity in the world, as many quotations show, including quotations from his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Phillip Wiebe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195140125
- eISBN:
- 9780199835492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140125.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter, central to this book, elaborates on the theory of spirits that has been advanced to explain numerous kinds of phenomena, a few of which were sampled in the first two chapters. The ...
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This chapter, central to this book, elaborates on the theory of spirits that has been advanced to explain numerous kinds of phenomena, a few of which were sampled in the first two chapters. The importance of abductive argument in advancing the existence of unobservable beings or objects, as opposed to deductive and probabilistic reasoning, is defended. The theory of spirits is construed as empiricist in character, whose descriptions are sometimes theory-laden and whose postulated beings are contextually defined primarily by the causal roles these postulated beings play in the theory. The view of physical objects advanced by phenomenalism, such as that found in many logical positivists, is examined, with a view to explaining how it illuminates challenges that beset an empirical approach to religion. The boundary of naturalism is discussed, especially inasmuch as the spirits postulated to exist in religion are definable by their causal links to phenomena or objects that are unquestionable naturalistic.Less
This chapter, central to this book, elaborates on the theory of spirits that has been advanced to explain numerous kinds of phenomena, a few of which were sampled in the first two chapters. The importance of abductive argument in advancing the existence of unobservable beings or objects, as opposed to deductive and probabilistic reasoning, is defended. The theory of spirits is construed as empiricist in character, whose descriptions are sometimes theory-laden and whose postulated beings are contextually defined primarily by the causal roles these postulated beings play in the theory. The view of physical objects advanced by phenomenalism, such as that found in many logical positivists, is examined, with a view to explaining how it illuminates challenges that beset an empirical approach to religion. The boundary of naturalism is discussed, especially inasmuch as the spirits postulated to exist in religion are definable by their causal links to phenomena or objects that are unquestionable naturalistic.
Paul Marshall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279432
- eISBN:
- 9780191603440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279438.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Although empty of contents, pure consciousness formed the basis of W. T. Stace’s explanation of content-rich extrovertive mystical experience, an explanation in which spirit and nature were radically ...
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Although empty of contents, pure consciousness formed the basis of W. T. Stace’s explanation of content-rich extrovertive mystical experience, an explanation in which spirit and nature were radically separated. However, Stace’s approach is complicated by his borrowings from philosophical ideas that are not entirely harmonious, empirico-phenomenalist, Kantian, and Hegelian. The result is somewhat confused and fails to address important extrovertive characteristics. It is shown that Stace’s explanations of mystical experience can be fully understood only when the development of his metaphysical thought is taken into account. More recently, Robert Forman has also raised pure consciousness, but in a way that departs from Stace’s spirit-nature dualism. The possibility of a permanent extrovertive state, allegedly attainable through Transcendental Meditation and other spiritual practices, is considered.Less
Although empty of contents, pure consciousness formed the basis of W. T. Stace’s explanation of content-rich extrovertive mystical experience, an explanation in which spirit and nature were radically separated. However, Stace’s approach is complicated by his borrowings from philosophical ideas that are not entirely harmonious, empirico-phenomenalist, Kantian, and Hegelian. The result is somewhat confused and fails to address important extrovertive characteristics. It is shown that Stace’s explanations of mystical experience can be fully understood only when the development of his metaphysical thought is taken into account. More recently, Robert Forman has also raised pure consciousness, but in a way that departs from Stace’s spirit-nature dualism. The possibility of a permanent extrovertive state, allegedly attainable through Transcendental Meditation and other spiritual practices, is considered.
David Liggins
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Truthmaker theory promises to do some useful philosophical work: equipping us to argue against phenomenalism and Rylean behaviourism, for instance, and helping us decide what exists. But it has ...
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Truthmaker theory promises to do some useful philosophical work: equipping us to argue against phenomenalism and Rylean behaviourism, for instance, and helping us decide what exists. But it has proved hard to formulate a truthmaker theory that is both useful and believable. This chapter outlines some of the most prominent accounts of truthmaking in the current literature, and argues that a neglected approach to truthmakers — that of Ian McFetridge — can surmount some of the problems that make other theories of truthmaking unattractive. McFetridge's version of the truthmaker principle invokes the concept of explanation: for every true sentence, it demands an explanation of why that sentence is true. It is argued that McFetridge's principle is intuitively plausible, powerful enough to argue against behaviourism and phenomenalism, and immune to some of the difficulties faced by the most prominent theories of truthmaking.Less
Truthmaker theory promises to do some useful philosophical work: equipping us to argue against phenomenalism and Rylean behaviourism, for instance, and helping us decide what exists. But it has proved hard to formulate a truthmaker theory that is both useful and believable. This chapter outlines some of the most prominent accounts of truthmaking in the current literature, and argues that a neglected approach to truthmakers — that of Ian McFetridge — can surmount some of the problems that make other theories of truthmaking unattractive. McFetridge's version of the truthmaker principle invokes the concept of explanation: for every true sentence, it demands an explanation of why that sentence is true. It is argued that McFetridge's principle is intuitively plausible, powerful enough to argue against behaviourism and phenomenalism, and immune to some of the difficulties faced by the most prominent theories of truthmaking.
Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins by considering the aforementioned Stroudian critique of transcendental arguments. Some doubts are raised about whether Stroud has succeeded in giving a fully general argument ...
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This chapter begins by considering the aforementioned Stroudian critique of transcendental arguments. Some doubts are raised about whether Stroud has succeeded in giving a fully general argument against the possibility of transcendental arguments. Then Peter Strawson's reconstruction of what he takes to be Kant's anti-sceptical reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction is considered, via the lense of Richard Rorty's reconstruction of Strawson's reconstruction of Kant. What emerges is a ‘conceptual presupposition’ strategy for addressing the sceptic. It is argued that this strategy falls prey to the Stroudian critique.Less
This chapter begins by considering the aforementioned Stroudian critique of transcendental arguments. Some doubts are raised about whether Stroud has succeeded in giving a fully general argument against the possibility of transcendental arguments. Then Peter Strawson's reconstruction of what he takes to be Kant's anti-sceptical reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction is considered, via the lense of Richard Rorty's reconstruction of Strawson's reconstruction of Kant. What emerges is a ‘conceptual presupposition’ strategy for addressing the sceptic. It is argued that this strategy falls prey to the Stroudian critique.
Daniel Garber
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199566648
- eISBN:
- 9780191722035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199566648.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter explores some of the phenomenalistic strains in Leibniz's thought in the middle period. While these positions suggestive of the monadological metaphysics that Leibniz will later adopt, ...
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This chapter explores some of the phenomenalistic strains in Leibniz's thought in the middle period. While these positions suggestive of the monadological metaphysics that Leibniz will later adopt, none of them is exactly what Leibniz will come to adopt in later years when he interprets the world of bodies in terms of the infinity of mind-like monads. A number of different varieties of phenomenalism are distinguished. One variety, human-mind phenomenalism, which resembles what Berkeley will later propose, comes out of doubts about the existence of an external world. This derives from Leibniz's exchanges with Simon Foucher, and while it is suggested, it is rarely if ever actually affirmed. The view closest to the monadology among the views that have been examined is the so-called extended-mind phenomenalism, the view that bodies are to be understood in terms of the coherent perceptions of an infinity of minds, including human minds as well as others ‘of a nature different than ours’. But this is only suggested in the texts, and never affirmed. Different in this regard is aggregate phenomenalism, the view that aggregates of corporeal substances are phenomenal insofar as conscious minds are responsible for their unity, a view that Leibniz clearly asserts. He also holds for a number of reasons that there is a sense in which extension and its modes are also phenomenal. This is what is called primary-quality phenomenalism.Less
This chapter explores some of the phenomenalistic strains in Leibniz's thought in the middle period. While these positions suggestive of the monadological metaphysics that Leibniz will later adopt, none of them is exactly what Leibniz will come to adopt in later years when he interprets the world of bodies in terms of the infinity of mind-like monads. A number of different varieties of phenomenalism are distinguished. One variety, human-mind phenomenalism, which resembles what Berkeley will later propose, comes out of doubts about the existence of an external world. This derives from Leibniz's exchanges with Simon Foucher, and while it is suggested, it is rarely if ever actually affirmed. The view closest to the monadology among the views that have been examined is the so-called extended-mind phenomenalism, the view that bodies are to be understood in terms of the coherent perceptions of an infinity of minds, including human minds as well as others ‘of a nature different than ours’. But this is only suggested in the texts, and never affirmed. Different in this regard is aggregate phenomenalism, the view that aggregates of corporeal substances are phenomenal insofar as conscious minds are responsible for their unity, a view that Leibniz clearly asserts. He also holds for a number of reasons that there is a sense in which extension and its modes are also phenomenal. This is what is called primary-quality phenomenalism.
Georges Dicker
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381467
- eISBN:
- 9780199897124
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381467.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
If bodies are only ideas in our minds, then how can they continue to exist when we don't perceive them? Berkeley's favorite answer to this “intermittency objection” is that God always perceives them, ...
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If bodies are only ideas in our minds, then how can they continue to exist when we don't perceive them? Berkeley's favorite answer to this “intermittency objection” is that God always perceives them, and sometimes he argues, circularly, that their continued existence proves God's existence. This chapter argues that, to avoid this circularity, Berkeley's reply to the intermittency objection and his case for God must both be made to rest on the passivity argument alone, but that this argument fails, for reasons akin to Hume's objections to the teleological argument. Dicker nonetheless examines Berkeley's theological response to the intermittency objection in detail, especially as it is interpreted by Ken Winkler, who draws on Berkeley's treatment of the Mosaic account of creation in the Dialogues. The chapter also offers an extended discussion of the nontheological, phenomenalist responses, found in Mill and by Ayer, which Berkeley hinted at but didn't advocate.Less
If bodies are only ideas in our minds, then how can they continue to exist when we don't perceive them? Berkeley's favorite answer to this “intermittency objection” is that God always perceives them, and sometimes he argues, circularly, that their continued existence proves God's existence. This chapter argues that, to avoid this circularity, Berkeley's reply to the intermittency objection and his case for God must both be made to rest on the passivity argument alone, but that this argument fails, for reasons akin to Hume's objections to the teleological argument. Dicker nonetheless examines Berkeley's theological response to the intermittency objection in detail, especially as it is interpreted by Ken Winkler, who draws on Berkeley's treatment of the Mosaic account of creation in the Dialogues. The chapter also offers an extended discussion of the nontheological, phenomenalist responses, found in Mill and by Ayer, which Berkeley hinted at but didn't advocate.
J. J. Valberg
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242918
- eISBN:
- 9780191680625
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242918.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the Kantian and the Phenomenalist conception of externality. The Phenomenalist wants to rid philosophy of a false conception of externality and to recapture true conception, ...
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This chapter considers the Kantian and the Phenomenalist conception of externality. The Phenomenalist wants to rid philosophy of a false conception of externality and to recapture true conception, the conception we actually use. Kant maintains that we have two conceptions of externality: an everyday ‘empirical’ conception and a ‘transcendental’ conception. These are both valid conceptions with different domains of application. The former applies to what Kant often calls ‘outer appearances’, the latter to ‘things-in-themselves’.Less
This chapter considers the Kantian and the Phenomenalist conception of externality. The Phenomenalist wants to rid philosophy of a false conception of externality and to recapture true conception, the conception we actually use. Kant maintains that we have two conceptions of externality: an everyday ‘empirical’ conception and a ‘transcendental’ conception. These are both valid conceptions with different domains of application. The former applies to what Kant often calls ‘outer appearances’, the latter to ‘things-in-themselves’.
GRAHAM ODDIE
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273416
- eISBN:
- 9780191602658
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273413.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops a promising reduction of value to desire. The guiding principle is not the simple idea that the valuable is what we happen to desire in fact (that is, perhaps, a value analogue ...
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This chapter develops a promising reduction of value to desire. The guiding principle is not the simple idea that the valuable is what we happen to desire in fact (that is, perhaps, a value analogue of Berkeleian idealism), but the more sophisticated and plausible idea that the valuable is what we would desire were we to refine our actual desires into a completely coherent set (a value analogue of phenomenalism). It is shown that the map of value which this refinement account delivers is surprisingly close to the realist's map over large stretches of the terrain — much closer than realists would have believed possible, or their antirealist rivals could have reasonably hoped for.Less
This chapter develops a promising reduction of value to desire. The guiding principle is not the simple idea that the valuable is what we happen to desire in fact (that is, perhaps, a value analogue of Berkeleian idealism), but the more sophisticated and plausible idea that the valuable is what we would desire were we to refine our actual desires into a completely coherent set (a value analogue of phenomenalism). It is shown that the map of value which this refinement account delivers is surprisingly close to the realist's map over large stretches of the terrain — much closer than realists would have believed possible, or their antirealist rivals could have reasonably hoped for.
Stephen Buckle
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199271146
- eISBN:
- 9780191699498
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271146.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
David Hume begins with a distinction that everyone will readily allow, that there is a difference of intensity between feelings and sensations on the one hand, and the deliverances of memory and ...
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David Hume begins with a distinction that everyone will readily allow, that there is a difference of intensity between feelings and sensations on the one hand, and the deliverances of memory and imagination on the other. The latter may mimic or copy the former, but, unless people are disordered by disease or madness, they never reach such a pitch of vivacity to rival them. The point is that while people take their thoughts to be wholly mental events, whereas people take their sensations to be of external objects, people's means of distinguishing the two is wholly in terms of the vividness of their different perceptions, and vividness per se justifies no external reference. Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that sensations are of external objects after all: phenomenalism stands at the door.Less
David Hume begins with a distinction that everyone will readily allow, that there is a difference of intensity between feelings and sensations on the one hand, and the deliverances of memory and imagination on the other. The latter may mimic or copy the former, but, unless people are disordered by disease or madness, they never reach such a pitch of vivacity to rival them. The point is that while people take their thoughts to be wholly mental events, whereas people take their sensations to be of external objects, people's means of distinguishing the two is wholly in terms of the vividness of their different perceptions, and vividness per se justifies no external reference. Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that sensations are of external objects after all: phenomenalism stands at the door.
Ross Harrison
- Published in print:
- 1974
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245070
- eISBN:
- 9780191680830
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245070.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The next question to be considered is whether the general model world at its present second level of necessity or austerity contains some feature which means that it is impossible for a world just of ...
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The next question to be considered is whether the general model world at its present second level of necessity or austerity contains some feature which means that it is impossible for a world just of sensations to be a comprehensible one. This question is obviously of central importance to many theories and worries about perception. It also derives the feature that it must be possible for the protagonist to be in error in some of his present tense judgements about the world. It is hoped that establishing this feature will form an intermediate step in the derivation of the impossibility of a world consisting just of sensations, and so this feature will be dubbed the intermediate feature. In addition, the consequences of the possibility of error in present judgements are presented. The chapter also covers the formal argument for same conclusion. Next, it explores the phenomenalism and knowledge by acquaintance. The desired conclusion that a world just of sensations would not be a comprehensible one has therefore finally been reached.Less
The next question to be considered is whether the general model world at its present second level of necessity or austerity contains some feature which means that it is impossible for a world just of sensations to be a comprehensible one. This question is obviously of central importance to many theories and worries about perception. It also derives the feature that it must be possible for the protagonist to be in error in some of his present tense judgements about the world. It is hoped that establishing this feature will form an intermediate step in the derivation of the impossibility of a world consisting just of sensations, and so this feature will be dubbed the intermediate feature. In addition, the consequences of the possibility of error in present judgements are presented. The chapter also covers the formal argument for same conclusion. Next, it explores the phenomenalism and knowledge by acquaintance. The desired conclusion that a world just of sensations would not be a comprehensible one has therefore finally been reached.
W. J. Mander
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240907
- eISBN:
- 9780191680298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240907.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
F. H. Bradley's philosophical system involves the condemnation of the entire world of common-sense experience and reflection. Things and their properties, terms and their relations, space, and time, ...
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F. H. Bradley's philosophical system involves the condemnation of the entire world of common-sense experience and reflection. Things and their properties, terms and their relations, space, and time, and the whole host of things whose analysis involves these notions are all claimed to belong, not to reality, but to the realm of appearance. This is a strange and counter-intuitive position which has not as yet been fully elucidated. Bradley's reasons for denying the ultimate reality of these things have already been discussed, but it is not clear what he means by calling them ‘appearance’. The concept of appearance plays a very important role in Bradley's thought; however, his use of the term is somewhat technical and idiosyncratic. This chapter explores Bradley's account of the Absolute and its appearances, phenomenalism and things-in-themselves, and degrees of truth and reality. A solution to the problem of appearance and reality is considered.Less
F. H. Bradley's philosophical system involves the condemnation of the entire world of common-sense experience and reflection. Things and their properties, terms and their relations, space, and time, and the whole host of things whose analysis involves these notions are all claimed to belong, not to reality, but to the realm of appearance. This is a strange and counter-intuitive position which has not as yet been fully elucidated. Bradley's reasons for denying the ultimate reality of these things have already been discussed, but it is not clear what he means by calling them ‘appearance’. The concept of appearance plays a very important role in Bradley's thought; however, his use of the term is somewhat technical and idiosyncratic. This chapter explores Bradley's account of the Absolute and its appearances, phenomenalism and things-in-themselves, and degrees of truth and reality. A solution to the problem of appearance and reality is considered.
Bimal Krishna Matilal
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239765
- eISBN:
- 9780191680014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The first section of this chapter discusses three rival ontologies in the Indian context. The Buddhist envisions a world populated by phenomenal particulars. These are called the svalaḳsạnas, ...
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The first section of this chapter discusses three rival ontologies in the Indian context. The Buddhist envisions a world populated by phenomenal particulars. These are called the svalaḳsạnas, ‘self-characterized’. They include both physical phenomena such as colour-patches and mental phenomena, cognitive events and other ‘mental’ bits concomitant with them (mimi). The Nyāya–Vaíṣsika world is populated with three main types of particulars, certain (real) universals and one genuine relation. The particulars are substances, quality-instances, and action-moments. The third ontology is holistic. This is the view that says that the ultimate reality is one unbreakable, unstructured whole, which is the ultimate reference of all linguistic expressions and all thoughts. The second section discusses phenomenalism and atomism. The last section examines direct realism.Less
The first section of this chapter discusses three rival ontologies in the Indian context. The Buddhist envisions a world populated by phenomenal particulars. These are called the svalaḳsạnas, ‘self-characterized’. They include both physical phenomena such as colour-patches and mental phenomena, cognitive events and other ‘mental’ bits concomitant with them (mimi). The Nyāya–Vaíṣsika world is populated with three main types of particulars, certain (real) universals and one genuine relation. The particulars are substances, quality-instances, and action-moments. The third ontology is holistic. This is the view that says that the ultimate reality is one unbreakable, unstructured whole, which is the ultimate reference of all linguistic expressions and all thoughts. The second section discusses phenomenalism and atomism. The last section examines direct realism.
J. N. Findlay
- Published in print:
- 1981
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246381
- eISBN:
- 9780191680960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246381.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the following: (i) The Kantian concept of the Transcendental Object, and of its relation to that of the Noumenon and the Thing-in-itself; (ii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot ...
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This chapter discusses the following: (i) The Kantian concept of the Transcendental Object, and of its relation to that of the Noumenon and the Thing-in-itself; (ii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be positivistically interpreted, but requires underlying unities that hold appearances together, and which, by their identity, give the latter constancy of character; (iii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be idealistically interpreted, since it accepts the reality of a Transcendental Subject and of transcendental acts that exist beyond experience and knowledge, and are constitutive of it. It also accepts the reality of many Transcendental Objects that affect our subjectivity and which have characters and relations not given to the latter, at best corresponding to phenomenal characters and relations; (iv) Kant's phenomenalism is more radical than other phenomenalisms in that it accepts space and time only as ordering forms for phenomena. But it advances important arguments, based mainly on ontological criteria, for restricting them to what is thus phenomenal; (v) The regular connection among the appearances of objects is the necessary empirical surrogate for the unity of the objects from which they spring. Kant therefore makes use of his metempirical presuppositions to illuminate phenomenal data.Less
This chapter discusses the following: (i) The Kantian concept of the Transcendental Object, and of its relation to that of the Noumenon and the Thing-in-itself; (ii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be positivistically interpreted, but requires underlying unities that hold appearances together, and which, by their identity, give the latter constancy of character; (iii) Kant's theory of knowledge cannot be idealistically interpreted, since it accepts the reality of a Transcendental Subject and of transcendental acts that exist beyond experience and knowledge, and are constitutive of it. It also accepts the reality of many Transcendental Objects that affect our subjectivity and which have characters and relations not given to the latter, at best corresponding to phenomenal characters and relations; (iv) Kant's phenomenalism is more radical than other phenomenalisms in that it accepts space and time only as ordering forms for phenomena. But it advances important arguments, based mainly on ontological criteria, for restricting them to what is thus phenomenal; (v) The regular connection among the appearances of objects is the necessary empirical surrogate for the unity of the objects from which they spring. Kant therefore makes use of his metempirical presuppositions to illuminate phenomenal data.
Bimal Krishna Matilal
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239765
- eISBN:
- 9780191680014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The problems of perception are generally discussed in the Western context with reference to three main theories. These theories are about what one can directly know, and how one knows it. They are ...
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The problems of perception are generally discussed in the Western context with reference to three main theories. These theories are about what one can directly know, and how one knows it. They are naïve or direct realism, representationalism, and phenomenalism. The second section of this chapter discusses the Nyaysutra definition of perception. The third section looks at Vasubandhu's illusionism. The fourth section considers a case where the external world does not exist. The fifth section considers as case where the external world does exist. The sixth section examines the Abhidharma phenomenalism. The seventh section discusses nominal existence and substantial existence. The last section explores colour and shape with regards to Molyneux's question.Less
The problems of perception are generally discussed in the Western context with reference to three main theories. These theories are about what one can directly know, and how one knows it. They are naïve or direct realism, representationalism, and phenomenalism. The second section of this chapter discusses the Nyaysutra definition of perception. The third section looks at Vasubandhu's illusionism. The fourth section considers a case where the external world does not exist. The fifth section considers as case where the external world does exist. The sixth section examines the Abhidharma phenomenalism. The seventh section discusses nominal existence and substantial existence. The last section explores colour and shape with regards to Molyneux's question.
Michael Dummett
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236214
- eISBN:
- 9780191597350
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236212.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Disputes about realism should be construed as disputes not about a class of entities, but about the truth‐value of the statements in a given class. For what reality consists in is not determined just ...
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Disputes about realism should be construed as disputes not about a class of entities, but about the truth‐value of the statements in a given class. For what reality consists in is not determined just by what objects there are, but by what propositions hold good: the world is the totality of facts, not of things. However, the rejection of bivalence is not a sufficient ground for rejecting realism. A genuine rejection of realism amounts to the view that logical constants classically understood do not make sense.Less
Disputes about realism should be construed as disputes not about a class of entities, but about the truth‐value of the statements in a given class. For what reality consists in is not determined just by what objects there are, but by what propositions hold good: the world is the totality of facts, not of things. However, the rejection of bivalence is not a sufficient ground for rejecting realism. A genuine rejection of realism amounts to the view that logical constants classically understood do not make sense.
Ilkka Niiniluoto
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251612
- eISBN:
- 9780191598098
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251614.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Ontological realism claims that at least a part of reality is ontologically independent of human minds. This view is compatible with physicalism (eliminative and reductive materialism), emergent ...
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Ontological realism claims that at least a part of reality is ontologically independent of human minds. This view is compatible with physicalism (eliminative and reductive materialism), emergent materialism, and dualism, and even objective idealism, but incompatible with subjective idealism (solipsism, phenomenalism). This chapter defends ontological realism by interpreting Popper's doctrine of three worlds as a form of emergent materialism, which allows for the existence of human‐made cultural and social entities. Against nominalism and universalism, and contrary to essentialist assumptions about natural kinds, it is suggested that the basic furniture of the world consists of dynamically developing tropes or property instances.Less
Ontological realism claims that at least a part of reality is ontologically independent of human minds. This view is compatible with physicalism (eliminative and reductive materialism), emergent materialism, and dualism, and even objective idealism, but incompatible with subjective idealism (solipsism, phenomenalism). This chapter defends ontological realism by interpreting Popper's doctrine of three worlds as a form of emergent materialism, which allows for the existence of human‐made cultural and social entities. Against nominalism and universalism, and contrary to essentialist assumptions about natural kinds, it is suggested that the basic furniture of the world consists of dynamically developing tropes or property instances.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244868
- eISBN:
- 9780191598210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824486X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Pears examines Wittgenstein's views on sensations and their types in the light of classical phenomenalism. He argues that Wittgenstein never subscribed to phenomenalism with an empirically fixed ...
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Pears examines Wittgenstein's views on sensations and their types in the light of classical phenomenalism. He argues that Wittgenstein never subscribed to phenomenalism with an empirically fixed baseline and outlines the relation between Wittgenstein's critique of ego‐based solipsism and such a phenomenalism.Less
Pears examines Wittgenstein's views on sensations and their types in the light of classical phenomenalism. He argues that Wittgenstein never subscribed to phenomenalism with an empirically fixed baseline and outlines the relation between Wittgenstein's critique of ego‐based solipsism and such a phenomenalism.
