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The Content of Phenomenal Concepts

David J. Chalmers

in The Character of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195311105
eISBN:
9780199870851
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter develops an account of the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts, grounded in part in an analysis of the epistemological and conceptual observations that drive the arguments against ... More


Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal

Jonathan Ellis

in Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199737666
eISBN:
9780199933372
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Employing themes from Wittgenstein, the chapter argues against a standard assumption which he takes to be at the center of contemporary philosophy of mind. According to this assumption, held by ... More


Real Acquaintance and Physicalism

Philip Goff

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

‘Real acquaintance’ is a special kind of intimate relationship subjects bear to their phenomenal qualities, in virtue of which: (i) a psychologically normal subject can know the real nature of one of ... More


Introduction

Austen Clark

in Sensory Qualities

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198236801
eISBN:
9780191679360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236801.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The qualities that characterize the smell of the lilacs, sensation of the sun, or taste of the honey are all what this book calls sensory qualities. Broadly speaking, such qualities characterize what ... More


Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Paul Coates and Sam Coleman (eds)

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

We are made aware of phenomenal qualities in perceptual and other experiences of various kinds and—perhaps—in all conscious states. They are present when we are in states with phenomenal character ... More


Phenomenal Qualities: What They Must Be, and What They Cannot Be

Howard Robinson

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

An extremely modest and, hence, uncontentious version of the transparency of experience entails that phenomenal qualities are amongst the fundamental building blocks of our, lived, manifest or ... More


Projection, Revelation, and the Function of Perception

Paul Coates

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends a projectivist account of perception. Distinctions are drawn between theories of perception, the philosophical pictures that motivate such theories, and the functions of ... More


The Problems of Structural Discrepancy

Luke Roelofs

in Combining Minds: How to Think about Composite Subjectivity

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
February 2019
ISBN:
9780190859053
eISBN:
9780190859084
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers a particular set of combination problems facing panpsychism, based on the apparent structural discrepancy between human consciousness and the microphysical structure of the ... More


Agency, Mind, and Reductionism

Timothy O'Connor

in Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195153743
eISBN:
9780199867080
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515374X.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Many contemporary theorists reject the notion of agent causation on the grounds that it conflicts with metaphysical Naturalism, a.k.a. the emerging scientific picture of the world. There is little ... More


Experience and Representation

William S. Robinson

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter describes representation as a way of encapsulating obvious facts, such as the food on one’s plate and the wine in one’s wineglass. Humans do not infer a world from our experience; ... More


The Content of Perceptual Experience

Jonardon Ganeri

in Attention, Not Self

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780198757405
eISBN:
9780191817304
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198757405.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Attention performs two constitutive roles in perceptual experience. This chapter argues that this claim is motivated by a need to respect two apparently competing insights about experience, one ... More


Disjunctivism, Discrimination, and Categorization

Diana Raffman

in Does Perception Have Content?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
December 2014
ISBN:
9780199756018
eISBN:
9780199395255
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The chapter has several goals. First, it exposes some misconceptions about the perceptual indiscriminability relation as it figures in recent treatments (pro and con) of disjunctivism by M. G. F. ... More


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