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Grasping Phenomenal Properties

Martine Nida‐Rümelin

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via ... More


The Subject's Point of View

Katalin Farkas

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but ... More


The Intelligibility of Consciousness I: How Experience Relates Us to the World

Harold Langsam

in The Wonder of Consciousness: Understanding the Mind through Philosophical Reflection

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015851
eISBN:
9780262298438
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015851.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses how the intelligible features of conscious states can be discovered by reflecting on the familiar intrinsic properties of conscious states made known to man through ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

Derk Pereboom

in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199764037
eISBN:
9780199895243
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I ... More


Indiscriminability

Katalin Farkas

in The Subject's Point of View

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The following terminology is introduced in this chapter: ‘indiscriminability’ is a possibly non-transitive epistemic relation; ‘sameness of appearance’ is the transitive relation of the identity of ... More


The Knowledge Argument and Introspective Inaccuracy

Derk Pereboom

in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199764037
eISBN:
9780199895243
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 1 contends that it is a serious open possibility that introspection misrepresents phenomenal properties as having qualitative natures that they really lack, and that this possibility supplies ... More


Grammatical Illusions

J.T. Ismael

in The Situated Self

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195174366
eISBN:
9780199872121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195174366.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines a grammatical illusion generated by the formal interaction between reflexive devices and the nonreflexive apparatus of a medium that lies behind another influential batch of ... More


The Internal and the External

Katalin Farkas

in The Subject's Point of View

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces the Twin Earth argument for externalism about content. A precise definition of the external/internal distinction is sought by focusing on the relation between the twin ... More


Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Derk Pereboom

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199764037
eISBN:
9780199895243
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book explores how physicalism might best defended and formulated. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. The first draws on the open possibility that ... More


Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience

Torin Alter

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter discusses phenomenal knowledge and how some thinkers, such as Daniel Dennett and Pete Mandik, suggest that it undermines the knowledge argument against physicalism. Phenomenal knowledge ... More


The Wonder of Consciousness: Conclusions

Harold Langsam

in The Wonder of Consciousness: Understanding the Mind through Philosophical Reflection

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015851
eISBN:
9780262298438
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015851.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses how consciousness attaches itself to other properties in the world. The wonder of consciousness lies in how it intelligibly relates us to the world and thereby enables the ... More


The Representational View of Experience

Berit Brogaard

in Seeing and Saying: The Language of Perception and the Representational View of Experience

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190495251
eISBN:
9780190495275
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190495251.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

In chapter 3, the author presents two arguments for the view that visual experience is representational. The first shows that phenomenal ‘look’ and ‘seem’ reflect phenomenal, representational ... More


Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge

Robert Audi

in Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds, and Intellectual Virtue

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780190221843
eISBN:
9780190221867
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter addresses in detail the questions, What is moral perception? and How does it provide a basis for moral knowledge? Moral perception cannot be well understood, however, apart from an ... More


Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World

Robert Audi

in Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780197503508
eISBN:
9780197503539
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197503508.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter shows how perception is experiential, relational, and representational: in broad terms, a phenomenally representational, discriminative, non-deviant causal relation to an object. In ... More


Experience and Representation

William S. Robinson

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter describes representation as a way of encapsulating obvious facts, such as the food on one’s plate and the wine in one’s wineglass. Humans do not infer a world from our experience; ... More


Transparency and the Unity of Experience

John O’Dea

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The main focus of this chapter is the theory of phenomenal unity as proposed by Michael Tye. Michael Tye is a representationalist who holds the view that phenomenal properties are intentional ... More


Consciousness

Jonardon Ganeri

in Attention, Not Self

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780198757405
eISBN:
9780191817304
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198757405.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Two accounts of consciousness collide in the work of the fifth-century Buddhist philosopher Buddhaghosa, where they co-exist incompletely integrated and perhaps incompatibly with one another. They ... More


Conclusion

Eli Alshanetsky

in Articulating a Thought

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780198785880
eISBN:
9780191881411
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785880.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Once we are done articulating the thought, we can easily articulate it again, using different words with the same meaning. But the thought may become difficult to articulate again, with time. In many ... More


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