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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program

Uriah Kriegel

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Since the late seventies, the main research program for understanding intentionality has been based on the attempt to naturalize intentionality by identifying a natural relation that holds between ... More


Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

Adam Pautz

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The chapter criticizes the thesis that “cognitive phenomenology” might help ground mental content. Criticisms concern what the chapter calls “altered cognitive qualia cases”, “absent cognitive qualia ... More


The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which all original intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. It argues that PIT succeeds precisely where its main ... More


Phenomenal Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel (ed.)

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Recent work on the nature of intentionality has focused on the connection between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. The notion of phenomenal intentionality, in particular, has surfaced in ... More


Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account

Farid Masrour

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. ... More


Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects

Frederick Kroon

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter attempts to adjudicate the disagreement between familiar realist ways of understanding intentionality and the anti-realist way favored by phenomenal intentionalists. It begins this task ... More


Thought

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Thoughts present a challenge for PIT. They seem to represent various contents, including rich descriptive contents, broad contents, and object-involving contents, but it is not clear how PIT can ... More


Nonconscious States

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Nonconscious states, like standing beliefs and nonconscious states involved in early visual processing, pose a challenge for PIT: They seem to be intentional but not phenomenal. This chapter ... More


PIT’s Status as a Theory of Intentionality

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers several objections that aim to challenge PIT's status as a theory of intentionality, including the objections that PIT should not be considered a theory of intentionality in ... More


Reference and Sense

Katalin Farkas

in The Subject's Point of View

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Even philosophers who are sympathetic to internalism believe that a full account of intentionality or representation requires two kinds of intentionality: phenomenal and externalistic; or two kinds ... More


Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color

Terry Horgan

in Does Perception Have Content?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
December 2014
ISBN:
9780199756018
eISBN:
9780199395255
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter sets forth and defends a position concerning the content of visual color-experiences, the content of color-attributing judgments, and the metaphysics of color. Color experiences have ... More


Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content?

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues against the relation view of intentionality, on which intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents, and for the alternative aspect view, on which intentionality is ... More


Introduction to Part II

Katalin Balog

in Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780199673353
eISBN:
9780191758935
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Brian Loar’s central concern in his essays in the philosophy of mind was how to understand consciousness and intentionality from the subjective perspective, and especially, how to understand ... More


Constructing a World for the Senses

Katalin Farkas

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. The chapter calls this feature ’perceptual intentionality’. ... More


The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Angela Mendelovici

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is ... More


Intellectual Gestalts

Elijah Chudnoff

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. ... More


Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel

in Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198791485
eISBN:
9780191850493
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198791485.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues for two main claims. First, it is argued that, unlike the notion of intentionality central to modern philosophy of mind, Brentano’s notion of intentionality has nothing to do with ... More


Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This concluding chapter reviews the view of intentionality argued for in this book, which is an aspect-theoretic version of strong identity PIT. On this view, roughly, every intentional state is ... More


Representationalism

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

in Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that the representational view of sensory experience has a ready-made solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle. Sensory experience can ground concepts of mind-independent objects because it ... More


Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Sensory experience seems to be the foundation of our knowledge of mind-independent things. But how can that be? Sensory experience provides knowledge of nothing but sensory experience itself. What ... More


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