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Conceptual Preliminaries

Uriah Kriegel

in Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199570355
eISBN:
9780191721625
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter draws a number of conceptual distinctions between kinds of consciousness. First is a distinction between four kinds of consciousness: transitive state consciousness, intransitive state ... More


Realization of Qualia

Sydney Shoemaker

in Physical Realization

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199214396
eISBN:
9780191706738
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214396.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that qualia — the properties that give experiences their phenomenal character — are physically realizable. Although individual qualia are not functionally definable, the relations ... More


Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Uriah Kriegel

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199570355
eISBN:
9780191721625
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? This book offers an answer. It attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the feature that all and ... More


The Phenomenal Conception

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, ... More


On Being Alienated

M. G. F. Martin

in Perceptual Experience

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199289769
eISBN:
9780191711046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Disjunctivist theories advocate a type of naïve realism about veridical perception in that they support the common understanding that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent ... More


Phenomenal Thought

Charles Siewert

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Does phenomenal consciousness include conceptual thought, or is it limited to merely sensory features? The answer can significantly affect theories of consciousness. This article's case for including ... More


Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence

Terry Horgan

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter’s project is to critically scrutinize the idea that because the intrinsic character of phenomenal consciousness is self-presenting, introspection concerning current phenomenal character ... More


What Has To Be Done

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199285488
eISBN:
9780191603150
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285489.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on the nature of perceptual-phenomenal consciousness. This is the ‘what-is-it problem’, and contrasts strongly with the ‘what-is-it-like problem’. A solution to the latter cannot ... More


Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Peter Carruthers

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book is a collection of essays about consciousness and related issues. It focuses mostly on developing, defending, and exploring the implications of one particular sort of reductive explanation ... More


The Self‐Representational Theory of Consciousness

Uriah Kriegel

in Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199570355
eISBN:
9780191721625
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter provides a bird's‐eye view of the book's central thesis and the case for it. It distinguishes different aspects of consciousness, and focuses on subjective character as the central ... More


Introduction

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Elaborates some of the background assumptions made by the chapters that follow and situates the theory that the author espouses (dual-content theory) within a wider context and range of alternatives. ... More


Natural Theories of Consciousness

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of ... More


Four Puzzles for Consciousness

Craig Delancey

in Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195142716
eISBN:
9780199833153
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195142713.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

After a basic review of the contemporary debate about phenomenal consciousness, four puzzles about emotional experience are discussed. First, emotions appear to be essentially motivational states, ... More


A Simple Theory of Introspection

Declan Smithies

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection, according to which one has introspective access to the fact that one is in a certain mental state just by virtue of being in that mental state. ... More


On the Phenomenology of Introspection

Charles Siewert

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

An account of introspection is proposed that features notions of phenomenal consciousness and attention. Though it rejects theories of inner sense, it aims to do justice to the source of their ... More


Physicalist Responses to the Argument against Physicalism

Gregg Rosenberg

in A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780195168143
eISBN:
9780199850075
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The argument against physicalism is an argument against the claim that the physical facts entail the facts about phenomenal consciousness. To be able to explain why orthodox physicalist's approaches ... More


Suffering without Subjectivity

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Takes up the same topic as the previous one – the appropriateness of sympathy for non-human animals – but argues for a similar conclusion in a very different way. The focus of the chapter is on forms ... More


Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of ... More


Zapping the Zombie Idea

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199285488
eISBN:
9780191603150
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285489.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Although the zombie idea seems to fit in with some ‘natural and plain’ intuitions (Chalmers), it conflicts with others. Reinforced by the ‘jacket fallacy’, it both feeds on and feeds an incoherent ... More


Which Animals Are Sentient?

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199758784
eISBN:
9780199949465
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy

While the ability to feel pain is not, strictly speaking, a necessary condition for sentience or phenomenal consciousness, it is a serviceable criterion for moral standing in good intuitive level ... More


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