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Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts

Papineau David

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on the topic of phenomenal concepts. It develops and extends the comparison of phenomenal concepts with so-called “perceptual concepts,” to throw the nature of phenomenal ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

David J. Chalmers

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Philosophers have reacted in different ways to the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an ... More


 What Is a Phenomenal Concept?

Janet Levin

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Torin Alter and Sven Walter

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint

Joseph Levine

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter raises a problem for the phenomenal concept strategy. The problem is framed partly in terms of the explanatory gap, which is roughly the claim that the existence or nature of phenomenal ... More


The Content of Phenomenal Concepts

David J. Chalmers

in The Character of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195311105
eISBN:
9780199870851
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter develops an account of the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts, grounded in part in an analysis of the epistemological and conceptual observations that drive the arguments against ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

David J. Chalmers

in The Character of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195311105
eISBN:
9780199870851
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some ... More


Phenomenal Concepts

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243822
eISBN:
9780191598166
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243824.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, ... More


Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243822
eISBN:
9780191598166
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243824.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Many scientists hope that brain research will identify the material nature of conscious states. Papineau argues that when it comes to the “hard problem” of identifying the material referents of ... More


Renewed Acquaintance

Brie Gertler

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter elaborates and defends a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what is called the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of ... More


 What RoboMary Knows

Daniel Dennett

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when ... More


Thinking about Consciousness

David Papineau

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243822
eISBN:
9780191598166
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can ... More


The Argument from Consciousness Revisited

Kevin Kimble and Timothy O'Connor

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199603213
eISBN:
9780191725388
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The argument from consciousness maintains that correlations between brain states and conscious states of persons require explanation but cannot be given an adequate scientific explanation. The ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

Derk Pereboom

in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199764037
eISBN:
9780199895243
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 2 considers an important objection to the response to the knowledge argument developed in Chapter 1: it misconstrues the nature of our paradigmatic phenomenal concepts. In the response, I ... More


Physicalism and the Appeal to Phenomenal Concepts

Michael Tye

in Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262012737
eISBN:
9780262255172
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the phenomenal-concept strategy and to show some serious difficulties that it encounters. Physicalists have thought that they were wedded to phenomenal ... More


Conceptual Dualism

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243822
eISBN:
9780191598166
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243824.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The best argument for the existence of phenomenal concepts is Frank Jackson's “knowledge argument”. Contra Jackson, this does not establish ontological dualism, but it does establish conceptual ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Argues for the need to recognise higher-order perceptual experiences and briefly argues for the superiority of the author’s own dispositional HOT version of higher-order perception (HOP) theory (here ... More


The Justification of Introspective Beliefs

Richard Feldman

in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199253722
eISBN:
9780191601361
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253722.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Addresses an important challenge to any evidentialist view of the justification that conscious states provide. The challenge strongly suggests that something other than evidence plays a central role ... More


Conceivability Arguments and Qualitative Inaccuracy

Derk Pereboom

in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199764037
eISBN:
9780199895243
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 3 develops a response to David Chalmers’s conceivability argument against (ordinary) physicalism analogous to the objection to the knowledge argument set out in Chapter 1. The conceivability ... More


Phenomenal States

Brian Loar

in Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780199673353
eISBN:
9780191758935
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter addresses antiphysicalist arguments such as the knowledge and conceivability arguments, which argue from the premise that there is an epistemic/conceptual/explanatory gap between ... More


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