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Realization of Qualia

Sydney Shoemaker

in Physical Realization

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199214396
eISBN:
9780191706738
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214396.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that qualia — the properties that give experiences their phenomenal character — are physically realizable. Although individual qualia are not functionally definable, the relations ... More


Naive Realism: The Theory and Its Motivations

William Fish

in Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780195381344
eISBN:
9780199869183
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces the thesis of naive realism, which claims that the conscious aspects of our experiences are shaped by the external world. It clarifies the terminology of phenomenal character ... More


Red and ‘Red’

Galen Strawson

in Real Materialism: and Other Essays

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199267422
eISBN:
9780191708343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues for the claim that although colour words like ‘red’ are essentially ‘phenomenal-quality’ words — i.e., words for properties whose whole and essential nature can be and is fully ... More


Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology

Maja Spener

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Many philosophers claim that ordinary visual experience is as of mind-independent things. This is a claim about the phenomenal character of experience. It tends to be regarded as a simple ... More


Perceptual Experience

Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds)

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199289769
eISBN:
9780191711046
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The topic of perceptual experience lies at the center of a number of important debates in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the psychology of perception. In recent years, it has become one of ... More


Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal

Jonathan Ellis

in Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199737666
eISBN:
9780199933372
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Employing themes from Wittgenstein, the chapter argues against a standard assumption which he takes to be at the center of contemporary philosophy of mind. According to this assumption, held by ... More


Perception

William Fish

in Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780195381344
eISBN:
9780199869183
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter develops a naive realist theory of veridical perception. It begins from the thought that the phenomenal character of our visual experiences is simply a matter of the scene before us but ... More


Hallucination

William Fish

in Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780195381344
eISBN:
9780199869183
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter develops a theory of hallucination with which to legitimate the disjunctivist claim that hallucinations may be indiscriminable from veridical perceptions while being a fundamentally ... More


Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination

William Fish

in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199231546
eISBN:
9780191716126
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Critics of disjunctivism have argued that the disjunctivist needs to provide a plausible explanation of just how two distinct mental states might be indistinguishable for their subject without simply ... More


Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality

Charles Siewert

in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199272457
eISBN:
9780191709951
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau–Ponty holds that sensory consciousness of place exhibits an indeterminacy that shows it is, in a sense, non-representational. But he thinks this does not ... More


 Historical Precedent

Daniel Stoljar

in Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780195306583
eISBN:
9780199786619
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195306589.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter proceeds by pointing out that the epistemic view is known to be correct for older philosophical problems that are structurally analogous to the logical problem, problems which concern ... More


Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism

Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199231546
eISBN:
9780191716126
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This introductory chapter argues that there are a number of different varieties of disjunctivism. But it is suggested that a mark of disjunctivism, in all of its varieties, is a refusal to credit a ... More


Not All Perceptual Experience Is Modality Specific

Casey O’Callaghan

in Perception and Its Modalities

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2014
ISBN:
9780199832798
eISBN:
9780199381609
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199832798.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Recent science demonstrates that the senses do not act merely in parallel or in isolation from each other. Different senses interact and influence each other in ways that affect perceptual ... More


Our Knowledge of the Internal World

Robert C. Stalnaker

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199545995
eISBN:
9780191719929
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

On the traditional Cartesian picture, knowledge of one's own current inner experience is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. The philosophical problem is to explain how we move beyond ... More


On the Phenomenology of Thought

Joseph Levine

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This paper distinguishes weaker and stronger versions of CP (the Cognitive Phenomenology Hypothesis) along two dimensions: first, whether cognition contributes to phenomenal character only by way of ... More


Higher Order Theory

J. Christopher Maloney

in What It Is Like To Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780190854751
eISBN:
9780190854782
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, ... More


Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism

Michael Tye

in Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262012737
eISBN:
9780262255172
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter begins with an exploration of how one can be conscious of what it is like to undergo a certain experience. It seems that there is some sense in which one could not be wrong at all about ... More


Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience

Martine Nida-Rümelin

in The Case for Qualia

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262232661
eISBN:
9780262286497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter discusses qualia but uses the terms “phenomenal character,” “phenomenal differences,” and “phenomenal kinds” in its stead. The differences of phenomenal character are dependent upon the ... More


Experience

Casey O'Callaghan

in A Multisensory Philosophy of Perception

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198833703
eISBN:
9780191872129
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833703.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that perceptual experience is richly multisensory. In particular, phenomenal consciousness is constitutively and irreducibly multisensory. The reason is that the phenomenal ... More


The Strong Content View Revisited

Susanna Siegel

in The Contents of Visual Experience

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780195305296
eISBN:
9780199894277
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305296.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The Strong Content View is re-evaluated in this chapter in light of earlier conclusions. It is found that the previous conclusions defended in the book do not warrant endorsing it.


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