David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on our knowledge of consciousness. The special phenomenal concepts of Chapter 8 lead to a distinctive class of “direct phenomenal beliefs,” which are argued to have many ...
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This chapter focuses on our knowledge of consciousness. The special phenomenal concepts of Chapter 8 lead to a distinctive class of “direct phenomenal beliefs,” which are argued to have many interesting epistemological properties. For a start, they support a sort of infallibility thesis: direct phenomenal beliefs cannot be false. This thesis can do only limited epistemological work, but analysis of these beliefs leads to a more substantial epistemological view that involves a central role for acquaintance. The framework is used to analyze two important issues in the epistemology of consciousness: epistemological arguments against nonreductive views of consciousness, as well as Wilfrid Sellars's arguments against the “given.”. The chapter concludes with some morals about the general role of consciousness in epistemology.Less
This chapter focuses on our knowledge of consciousness. The special phenomenal concepts of Chapter 8 lead to a distinctive class of “direct phenomenal beliefs,” which are argued to have many interesting epistemological properties. For a start, they support a sort of infallibility thesis: direct phenomenal beliefs cannot be false. This thesis can do only limited epistemological work, but analysis of these beliefs leads to a more substantial epistemological view that involves a central role for acquaintance. The framework is used to analyze two important issues in the epistemology of consciousness: epistemological arguments against nonreductive views of consciousness, as well as Wilfrid Sellars's arguments against the “given.”. The chapter concludes with some morals about the general role of consciousness in epistemology.
David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter develops an account of the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts, grounded in part in an analysis of the epistemological and conceptual observations that drive the arguments against ...
More
This chapter develops an account of the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts, grounded in part in an analysis of the epistemological and conceptual observations that drive the arguments against materialism. It argues that phenomenal concepts behave in a way that is quite unlike most other concepts, involving a very strong sort of direct reference, on which the phenomenal qualities that are the referents of the concepts are also somehow present inside their sense. Here, the two-dimensional framework is again a useful tool in analyzing the phenomenon. The account in this chapter is in principle compatible with materialism; in recent years some materialists have developed closely related accounts, but think the account itself is considered fairly neutral.Less
This chapter develops an account of the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts, grounded in part in an analysis of the epistemological and conceptual observations that drive the arguments against materialism. It argues that phenomenal concepts behave in a way that is quite unlike most other concepts, involving a very strong sort of direct reference, on which the phenomenal qualities that are the referents of the concepts are also somehow present inside their sense. Here, the two-dimensional framework is again a useful tool in analyzing the phenomenon. The account in this chapter is in principle compatible with materialism; in recent years some materialists have developed closely related accounts, but think the account itself is considered fairly neutral.
Terry Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter’s project is to critically scrutinize the idea that because the intrinsic character of phenomenal consciousness is self-presenting, introspection concerning current phenomenal character ...
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This chapter’s project is to critically scrutinize the idea that because the intrinsic character of phenomenal consciousness is self-presenting, introspection concerning current phenomenal character is an extremely reliable belief-forming process, perhaps even an infallible one. The chapter argues that there are (at least) three kinds of introspectively produced phenomenal beliefs: (1) ones that are especially reliable, (2) ones that are outright infallible, and (3) ones that are not reliable on the basis of introspection alone. To illustrate type (3), the chapter argues that introspection by itself is virtually impotent as way to form certain sorts of beliefs about the intrinsic character of agentive phenomenology.Less
This chapter’s project is to critically scrutinize the idea that because the intrinsic character of phenomenal consciousness is self-presenting, introspection concerning current phenomenal character is an extremely reliable belief-forming process, perhaps even an infallible one. The chapter argues that there are (at least) three kinds of introspectively produced phenomenal beliefs: (1) ones that are especially reliable, (2) ones that are outright infallible, and (3) ones that are not reliable on the basis of introspection alone. To illustrate type (3), the chapter argues that introspection by itself is virtually impotent as way to form certain sorts of beliefs about the intrinsic character of agentive phenomenology.
