Rosemary A. Kelanic
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781501748295
- eISBN:
- 9781501749216
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter traces U.S. coercive vulnerability, which fluctuated across six distinct cases from 1918 until the volatile 1970s. Though blessed with generous oil resources, the United States ...
More
This chapter traces U.S. coercive vulnerability, which fluctuated across six distinct cases from 1918 until the volatile 1970s. Though blessed with generous oil resources, the United States nevertheless encountered periods where its oil security was threatened by a substantial petroleum deficit, a possible disruption of Persian Gulf oil, or both, creating a need for strategic anticipation. The United States never resorted to direct control because, thanks to its singular oil endowment, coercive vulnerability never exceeded moderate levels. This remained true even when the United States assumed the mantle of defender of Europe after World War II, which substantially increased its petroleum demand. Yet, the United States did pursue a sustained policy of indirect control to protect Free World access to Middle East oil from potential Soviet interference. The country also embraced self-sufficiency at two junctures of lesser vulnerability, when flawed geological studies suggested that a mild petroleum deficit would soon emerge.Less
This chapter traces U.S. coercive vulnerability, which fluctuated across six distinct cases from 1918 until the volatile 1970s. Though blessed with generous oil resources, the United States nevertheless encountered periods where its oil security was threatened by a substantial petroleum deficit, a possible disruption of Persian Gulf oil, or both, creating a need for strategic anticipation. The United States never resorted to direct control because, thanks to its singular oil endowment, coercive vulnerability never exceeded moderate levels. This remained true even when the United States assumed the mantle of defender of Europe after World War II, which substantially increased its petroleum demand. Yet, the United States did pursue a sustained policy of indirect control to protect Free World access to Middle East oil from potential Soviet interference. The country also embraced self-sufficiency at two junctures of lesser vulnerability, when flawed geological studies suggested that a mild petroleum deficit would soon emerge.
Rosemary A. Kelanic
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781501748295
- eISBN:
- 9781501749216
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter explains the book's theory and identifies the two independent variables that drive the choice of anticipatory strategies: the petroleum deficit and the threat to oil imports. When ...
More
This chapter explains the book's theory and identifies the two independent variables that drive the choice of anticipatory strategies: the petroleum deficit and the threat to oil imports. When combined, these two independent variables determine the state's overall coercive vulnerability. The chapter also discusses how the military value of oil is a necessary condition to explain great power behavior. The economic value of oil, while important, is not sufficient to explain why states pursue anticipatory strategies. The chapter then looks at the three categories of anticipatory strategy from which states select: self-sufficiency, indirect control, and direct control. Ultimately, a state will choose the lowest cost anticipatory strategy capable of fulfilling its oil security needs, given its degree of vulnerability. Finally, the chapter considers whether oil is “different” from other resources.Less
This chapter explains the book's theory and identifies the two independent variables that drive the choice of anticipatory strategies: the petroleum deficit and the threat to oil imports. When combined, these two independent variables determine the state's overall coercive vulnerability. The chapter also discusses how the military value of oil is a necessary condition to explain great power behavior. The economic value of oil, while important, is not sufficient to explain why states pursue anticipatory strategies. The chapter then looks at the three categories of anticipatory strategy from which states select: self-sufficiency, indirect control, and direct control. Ultimately, a state will choose the lowest cost anticipatory strategy capable of fulfilling its oil security needs, given its degree of vulnerability. Finally, the chapter considers whether oil is “different” from other resources.
Rosemary A. Kelanic
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781501748295
- eISBN:
- 9781501749216
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the book's theory further by using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis methods, which test for necessary and sufficient causal relationships using the logic of set ...
More
This chapter examines the book's theory further by using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis methods, which test for necessary and sufficient causal relationships using the logic of set theory. The data confirm the hypothesis that both the petroleum deficit and the threat to imports must be substantial to trigger anticipatory strategies. Thus, the results reinforce the findings from the previous chapters that coercive vulnerability, as determined by the petroleum deficit and import disruption threat, spurs great powers to adopt anticipatory strategies to reduce the danger of oil coercion. Moreover, the severity of the strategy chosen is consistent with the level of coercive vulnerability faced by the state. The more extreme the deficit and import disruption threat, the more extreme the strategy chosen; the less extreme the deficit and threat, the less extreme the strategy chosen.Less
This chapter examines the book's theory further by using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis methods, which test for necessary and sufficient causal relationships using the logic of set theory. The data confirm the hypothesis that both the petroleum deficit and the threat to imports must be substantial to trigger anticipatory strategies. Thus, the results reinforce the findings from the previous chapters that coercive vulnerability, as determined by the petroleum deficit and import disruption threat, spurs great powers to adopt anticipatory strategies to reduce the danger of oil coercion. Moreover, the severity of the strategy chosen is consistent with the level of coercive vulnerability faced by the state. The more extreme the deficit and import disruption threat, the more extreme the strategy chosen; the less extreme the deficit and threat, the less extreme the strategy chosen.
Rosemary A. Kelanic
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781501748295
- eISBN:
- 9781501749216
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter discusses British oil policy before World War I. In the decade before World War I, the British government was becoming increasingly aware of the importance of oil for military power. But ...
More
This chapter discusses British oil policy before World War I. In the decade before World War I, the British government was becoming increasingly aware of the importance of oil for military power. But few officials anticipated that oil would become so indispensable to war that a country would be unable to prevail in a conflict without it. The chapter then analyzes Britain's choice to pursue a direct-control strategy in late 1918 by invading Mesopotamia. Dire vulnerability, underpinned by a yawning petroleum deficit and Britain's severe susceptibility to blockade as an island nation, spurred the government to accept the high costs and risks of securing oil with this most extreme strategy.Less
This chapter discusses British oil policy before World War I. In the decade before World War I, the British government was becoming increasingly aware of the importance of oil for military power. But few officials anticipated that oil would become so indispensable to war that a country would be unable to prevail in a conflict without it. The chapter then analyzes Britain's choice to pursue a direct-control strategy in late 1918 by invading Mesopotamia. Dire vulnerability, underpinned by a yawning petroleum deficit and Britain's severe susceptibility to blockade as an island nation, spurred the government to accept the high costs and risks of securing oil with this most extreme strategy.
Rosemary A. Kelanic
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781501748295
- eISBN:
- 9781501749216
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This concluding chapter explores the implications of the theory for great power politics as China continues to rise in the twenty-first century. If significant quantities of Persian Gulf oil could be ...
More
This concluding chapter explores the implications of the theory for great power politics as China continues to rise in the twenty-first century. If significant quantities of Persian Gulf oil could be realistically transported overland, away from U.S. naval interference, then the future threat to Chinese imports would remain low. Combined with a petroleum deficit that is likely to be large, Chinese coercive vulnerability could be held to a moderate level. Moderate coercive vulnerability should induce China to pursue indirect control as it emerges as a great power. Thus, the theory predicts that China is likely to eventually forge alliances with major oil-producing countries and transit states to keep oil in “friendly hands.” As yet, China is too militarily weak to shield friendly oil-producing states from interference by the United States or other potential rivals, but the beginnings of an alliance-based strategy appear to be taking shape under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), described by some analysts as a nascent framework for twenty-first-century Chinese grand strategy.Less
This concluding chapter explores the implications of the theory for great power politics as China continues to rise in the twenty-first century. If significant quantities of Persian Gulf oil could be realistically transported overland, away from U.S. naval interference, then the future threat to Chinese imports would remain low. Combined with a petroleum deficit that is likely to be large, Chinese coercive vulnerability could be held to a moderate level. Moderate coercive vulnerability should induce China to pursue indirect control as it emerges as a great power. Thus, the theory predicts that China is likely to eventually forge alliances with major oil-producing countries and transit states to keep oil in “friendly hands.” As yet, China is too militarily weak to shield friendly oil-producing states from interference by the United States or other potential rivals, but the beginnings of an alliance-based strategy appear to be taking shape under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), described by some analysts as a nascent framework for twenty-first-century Chinese grand strategy.
Rosemary A. Kelanic
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781501748295
- eISBN:
- 9781501749216
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book seeks to explain why great powers adopt such different strategies to protect their oil access from politically motivated disruptions. In extreme cases, such as Imperial Japan in 1941, great ...
More
This book seeks to explain why great powers adopt such different strategies to protect their oil access from politically motivated disruptions. In extreme cases, such as Imperial Japan in 1941, great powers fought wars to grab oil territory in anticipation of a potential embargo by the Allies; in other instances, such as Germany in the early Nazi period, states chose relatively subdued measures like, oil alliances or domestic policies, to conserve oil. What accounts for this variation? Fundamentally, it is puzzling that great powers fear oil coercion at all because the global market makes oil sanctions very difficult to enforce. This book argues that two variables determine what strategy a great power will adopt: the petroleum deficit, which measures how much oil the state produces domestically compared to what it needs for its strategic objectives; and disruptibility, which estimates the susceptibility of a state's oil imports to military interdiction—that is, blockade. Because global markets undercut the effectiveness of oil sanctions, blockade is in practice the only true threat to great power oil access. That, combined with the devastating consequences of oil deprivation to a state's military power, explains why states fear oil coercion deeply despite the adaptive functions of the market. Together, these two variables predict a state's coercive vulnerability, which determines how willing the state will be to accept the costs and risks attendant on various potential strategies. Only those great powers with large deficits and highly disruptible imports will adopt the most extreme strategy: direct control of oil through territorial conquest.Less
This book seeks to explain why great powers adopt such different strategies to protect their oil access from politically motivated disruptions. In extreme cases, such as Imperial Japan in 1941, great powers fought wars to grab oil territory in anticipation of a potential embargo by the Allies; in other instances, such as Germany in the early Nazi period, states chose relatively subdued measures like, oil alliances or domestic policies, to conserve oil. What accounts for this variation? Fundamentally, it is puzzling that great powers fear oil coercion at all because the global market makes oil sanctions very difficult to enforce. This book argues that two variables determine what strategy a great power will adopt: the petroleum deficit, which measures how much oil the state produces domestically compared to what it needs for its strategic objectives; and disruptibility, which estimates the susceptibility of a state's oil imports to military interdiction—that is, blockade. Because global markets undercut the effectiveness of oil sanctions, blockade is in practice the only true threat to great power oil access. That, combined with the devastating consequences of oil deprivation to a state's military power, explains why states fear oil coercion deeply despite the adaptive functions of the market. Together, these two variables predict a state's coercive vulnerability, which determines how willing the state will be to accept the costs and risks attendant on various potential strategies. Only those great powers with large deficits and highly disruptible imports will adopt the most extreme strategy: direct control of oil through territorial conquest.