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Nearly a century ago, French physicist Pierre Duhem offered a characteristically lucid and provocative articulation of the challenge to the power of scientific methods to uncover theoretical truths about the natural world. What seems to have worried Duhem is the eliminative character of many important scientific inferences: often in science, perhaps even typically, we arrive at a decision to accept or believe a given theory because we take ourselves to have convincingly eliminated or discredited any and all of its proposed rivals or competing explanations of the available evidence. But as Duhem saw, such an eliminative inferential procedure will only guide us to the truth about nature if the truth is among these competitors in the first place. It is argued that eliminative inferences are only reliable when we can be reasonably sure that we have considered all of the most likely, plausible, or reasonable alternatives before we proceed to eliminate all but one of them (or, in the limiting case, simply rest content with the lone contender). But the history of science shows that we have repeatedly failed to conceive of (and therefore consider) alternatives to our best theories that were both well confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently plausible as to be later accepted by actual scientific communities. The historical record suggests that in science we are typically unable to exhaust the space of likely, plausible, or reasonable candidate theoretical explanations for a given set of phenomena before proceeding to eliminate all but a single contender, but this is just what would be required for such eliminative inferences to be reliable.

This chapter begins with a basic list of intuitively plausible principles of intergenerational justice, against which Rule Consequentialism can be measured. It then establishes the Rule Consequentialist commitment to political liberty and shows how that commitment is strengthened in the intergenerational case. It is shown that Rule Consequentialism copes with the possibility of future declines in aggregate well-being much better than its opponents, such as Rawls’s liberalism. This is illustrated using the current dispute between growth optimists and ecological pessimists.

Research on the transition of countries in post-Communist Europe towards democracy mostly indicates that there is more political and institutional trust in Western democratic countries than in the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Questions about citizens' trust and distrust in the newly formed institutions and about the trustworthiness of these institutions seem to be just as compelling today as they were in the early 1990s. In the context of the rapid socio-political and economic changes that influence citizens' daily lives, political trust and distrust appear to fluctuate alongside the rise and fall of optimism and pessimism. Among the unquestioned consequences of totalitarianism, the profound demoralization of citizens, learned helplessness, undemocratic thinking, and distrust of institutions have been generally diagnosed as being the most significant. Research on trust and democratic transition in post-Communist Europe has involved, over a number of years, into the exploration of both public opinions and social representations. This chapter examines trust and distrust in old and new democracies as well as the link between political revolutions and human psychology.

This chapter first responds to the objection that the book's conclusions should be rejected on the grounds that they are counter-intuitive. The chapter then responds to the optimist and defends pessimism. It is also argued that anti-natalism does not imply that death is never bad or that everybody ought to practice suicide. Nor are the conclusions of this book necessarily incompatible with religious views. Finally, it is argued that although there are excellent misanthropic reasons for not producing more people, the arguments in this book are philanthropic.

This chapter deals mainly with the theological characteristics of the sermons, and briefly with the use that Wesley makes of his sources, especially the scriptures. The sermons are examined in two groups, the early and the later, and set in the context of Wesley's evangelical conversion experience of May 1738. The way in which the gloom and soteriological pessimism of the early work seems to give way, though with some relapses, to a greater confidence is examined. The relationship between works and faith in Charles’ thought is briefly examined, and the fact that he remained always a thoroughgoing Arminian is noted.

Rousseau is often celebrated or cursed as an exemplar Enlightenment philosopher who declared that although humans are naturally good, society tampers with us and thereby corrupts us. Although Rousseau's complex and even contradictory writings engender disagreement among his interpreters, all seem to agree that Rousseau spurned any notion of original sin – of innate corruption – and that he blamed corrupt, irrational social institutions for the majority of our miseries. Ch. 6 argues, however, that this standard interpretation of Rousseau's account of evil is too facile. Rousseau positioned himself at the crossroads of Enlightenment and Augustinian thought, and this awkward position enabled him to produce a rich and complex view on the nature of evil and human culpability. We will see that, in Rousseau's view, humans naturally gather and court harm, and that, in spite of this pessimism, Rousseau could also optimistically declare God's creation and human existence to be good.

Psalms 77 and 104 present opposing worldviews: pessimism and optimism. Beliefs about reality are shaped by the circumstances of ordinary existence, which in turn become occasions for existential anxiety arising from moral, natural, and religious evil. Their consequences, suffering and death, evoke a defense of God in the pious. Theodicy, the impulse to defend a deity, who is believed to be both merciful and just in Exod 34:6–7, and its many manifestations is the subject of this book.

The concept of ‘evil’ appears to have led many people to look beyond commonly discussed social problems such as drugs, poverty or social exclusion, to express more fundamental, less tangible fears about the nature of society and how it is changing. The debate about contemporary social evils did not reveal any strong discomfort with modernity, or nostalgic desire to go back in time. Inviting contemporary views of social evil risked, as one commentator put it, ‘swimming in a sea of social pessimism’. Notwithstanding, the additional difficulties that the recession has created in people's lives, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF)'s inquiry into the nature of social evil demonstrates a desire to grapple with difficult issues, a commitment to identify the common good in shaping a better society and a passionate conviction that the unsustainable present offers an unreliable route map for the future.

Investors are slow to learn that security analysts do not always mean what they say. What investors hear is not always what analysts mean. This is partly because analysts do not always mean what they say. They frequently say “hold” but mean “sell, ” or say “buy” when they believe “hold. ” As a result, Wall Street analysts came under fire after the collapse of the 1990s technology bubble. Major brokerage firms were fined. Individual security analysts were barred from the industry for life. Moreover, analysts are prone to bias and error. And some managers and investors appear to exhibit frame dependence as well, with reference point effects in the earnings game. However, the main behavioral bias seems to be excessive optimism.

Option markets reflect all three behavioral themes. The chapter is organized around the way options are (1) used; (2) priced; and (3) reflect investor sentiment. The chapter begins with the popular ways investors use options, where frame dependence figures prominently. The focus is on covered call writing, but also discusses how employees make decisions about exercising company stock options. In discussing pricing, the discussion emphasizes the relationship between investors' expectations about future volatility, so called “implied volatility,” and actual volatility. The point here is that heuristic‐driven bias moves implied volatility away from its objective counterpart. In other words, heuristic‐driven bias causes option markets to be inefficient. The chapter discusses two related phenomena that stem from the effect the 1987 stock market crash had on implied volatility. One is known as “crashophobia,” and the other is known as the “crash premium.” The chapter ends with a discussion about the influence investor sentiment has had on patterns of option trading.

The previous chapters focused on the position of television drama in the mainstream of postwar British culture. An attempt to align the critical vocabulary of television drama with its cultural centrality and aesthetic complexity has also been presented in the preceding chapters. This chapter discusses the highlights of Adorno’s reproach—the cultural pessimism and the stylized barbarity of the culture industry—in an endeavour to establish the aesthetic, cultural, and political values that present television dramas possess.

This chapter presents an overview of Schopenhauer's thought, explaining the main themes and arguments of his major works: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; The World as Will and Representation; Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will; and On the Basis of Morality. Schopenhauer's views on explanation, causation, animal intelligence, reason, understanding, freedom, determinism, motivation, pessimism, the metaphysics of will, and the ethics of compassion are all presented briefly and clearly.

This chapter considers Schopenhauer's pessimism and his doctrine of salvation as denial of the will. Schopenhauer's “single thought,” the insight at the heart of his philosophy, is supposedly revealed both in aesthetic experience and in such salvation. This thought cannot be expressed directly in language, since it touches on the thing-in-itself. Parallels between this doctrine and Wittgenstein's remarks on the “unsayable” are explored. Also, an investigation into Schopenhauer's psychology is undertaken, utilizing facts recorded in his biography and memoirs. Schopenhauer clearly suffered from depression, and it is argued that this experience contributed significantly to his pessimism, but that his pessimism as a philosophical orientation is as objectively justified as its opposite, optimism, and is not necessarily pathological. The pessimistic “wisdom of Silenus” is discussed, according to which “never to be born is best.” The danger of the fundamental attribution fallacy is discussed. It is argued that salvation can be understood as recovery from depression through affirmation of the will. Schopenhauer himself indicates awareness of this variety of salvation in his discussion of the “acquired character.”