Harry Brighouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257874
- eISBN:
- 9780191598845
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257876.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's ...
More
Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's rights include a right to personal autonomy. The book argues that school reform must always be evaluated from the perspective of social justice and applies the theory, in particular, to school choice proposals. It looks at the parental choice schemes in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in England and Wales, and argues that they fall short of the requirements of justice, but that not all such schemes must do so. It elaborates an abstract voucher scheme that would combine choice with justice, and offers ways by which actual choice‐based reform can be modified to meet the requirements of justice.Less
Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's rights include a right to personal autonomy. The book argues that school reform must always be evaluated from the perspective of social justice and applies the theory, in particular, to school choice proposals. It looks at the parental choice schemes in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in England and Wales, and argues that they fall short of the requirements of justice, but that not all such schemes must do so. It elaborates an abstract voucher scheme that would combine choice with justice, and offers ways by which actual choice‐based reform can be modified to meet the requirements of justice.
Harry Brighouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257874
- eISBN:
- 9780191598845
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257876.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The first potentially powerful objection to school choice is that it might efface the right a child has to personal autonomy. This chapter argues for the right to an autonomy‐facilitating education ...
More
The first potentially powerful objection to school choice is that it might efface the right a child has to personal autonomy. This chapter argues for the right to an autonomy‐facilitating education on the child‐centred grounds that it is highly instrumental for individual flourishing. It also explores the educational requirements of the liberal legitimacy, which dovetail with the demands of an autonomy‐facilitating education. It contrasts these requirements with Amy Gutmann's curricular proposals.Less
The first potentially powerful objection to school choice is that it might efface the right a child has to personal autonomy. This chapter argues for the right to an autonomy‐facilitating education on the child‐centred grounds that it is highly instrumental for individual flourishing. It also explores the educational requirements of the liberal legitimacy, which dovetail with the demands of an autonomy‐facilitating education. It contrasts these requirements with Amy Gutmann's curricular proposals.
Harry Brighouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257874
- eISBN:
- 9780191598845
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257876.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Elaborates an ideal school choice scheme that, using vouchers, would succeed in meeting the constraints set by the principles of educational equality and personal autonomy. The scheme is modelled on ...
More
Elaborates an ideal school choice scheme that, using vouchers, would succeed in meeting the constraints set by the principles of educational equality and personal autonomy. The scheme is modelled on a similar proposal made by Herbert Gintis. The chapter goes on to propose a series of reforms in existing choice schemes that would move them closer to meeting the demands of social justice.Less
Elaborates an ideal school choice scheme that, using vouchers, would succeed in meeting the constraints set by the principles of educational equality and personal autonomy. The scheme is modelled on a similar proposal made by Herbert Gintis. The chapter goes on to propose a series of reforms in existing choice schemes that would move them closer to meeting the demands of social justice.
Rob Reich
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199253661
- eISBN:
- 9780191601972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253668.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The essays in Part III of the book, on liberal constraints and traditionalist education, argue for a more regulatory conception of liberal education and emphasize the need for some controls over ...
More
The essays in Part III of the book, on liberal constraints and traditionalist education, argue for a more regulatory conception of liberal education and emphasize the need for some controls over cultural and religious educational authority. Rob Reich’s essay, on multicultural accommodations in education, proposes that the liberal state needs to rethink its commitment to cultural groups whose educational agendas advance the integrity of the group over and against the freedom and equality of its members, and that thus educate in ways that place strict limits on the autonomy and critical thinking skills of their members. He aims to examine two prominent defenses of multiculturalism, showing how each pays insufficient attention to the tension between cultural groups: Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal argue that, because individuals have a ‘right to culture’, the state must grant groups a status that may flout the rights of some individuals, conditioned on the ability of those individuals to exit; Will Kymlicka, in a far more sophisticated version of multiculturalism, defends cultural rights, and accommodations, but only for those cultural groups that are themselves internally liberal (except in rare circumstances) and that take seriously the value of personal autonomy. Reich contends that, while the freedom to exit from a group is important, the group rights supported by Margalit and Halbertal may serve to disable or severely impoverish the ability of children to exit from groups; further, he contends that, while personal autonomy is important, Kymlicka’s conception of autonomy is unsatisfactory and, moreover, his defense of rights to separate schooling for national minorities and to educational exemptions for some polyethnic groups leaves him open to the same critique about exit that Reich levies against Margalit and Halbertal. Along the way, Reich comments on the odd fixation of multiculturalists on rights of exit.Less
The essays in Part III of the book, on liberal constraints and traditionalist education, argue for a more regulatory conception of liberal education and emphasize the need for some controls over cultural and religious educational authority. Rob Reich’s essay, on multicultural accommodations in education, proposes that the liberal state needs to rethink its commitment to cultural groups whose educational agendas advance the integrity of the group over and against the freedom and equality of its members, and that thus educate in ways that place strict limits on the autonomy and critical thinking skills of their members. He aims to examine two prominent defenses of multiculturalism, showing how each pays insufficient attention to the tension between cultural groups: Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal argue that, because individuals have a ‘right to culture’, the state must grant groups a status that may flout the rights of some individuals, conditioned on the ability of those individuals to exit; Will Kymlicka, in a far more sophisticated version of multiculturalism, defends cultural rights, and accommodations, but only for those cultural groups that are themselves internally liberal (except in rare circumstances) and that take seriously the value of personal autonomy. Reich contends that, while the freedom to exit from a group is important, the group rights supported by Margalit and Halbertal may serve to disable or severely impoverish the ability of children to exit from groups; further, he contends that, while personal autonomy is important, Kymlicka’s conception of autonomy is unsatisfactory and, moreover, his defense of rights to separate schooling for national minorities and to educational exemptions for some polyethnic groups leaves him open to the same critique about exit that Reich levies against Margalit and Halbertal. Along the way, Reich comments on the odd fixation of multiculturalists on rights of exit.
K. Anthony Appiah
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199253661
- eISBN:
- 9780191601972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253668.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Anthony Appiah’s essay on liberal education in the United States begins by identifying a distinctive feature of classical liberalism – namely, that the state must respect substantial limits with ...
More
Anthony Appiah’s essay on liberal education in the United States begins by identifying a distinctive feature of classical liberalism – namely, that the state must respect substantial limits with respect to its authority to impose restrictions on individuals, even for their own good. Nevertheless, Appiah points out, the primary aim of liberal education is to ‘maximize autonomy not to minimize government involvement’. Most of the essays in this volume, including Appiah’s, are attempts to address the question of what the liberal commitment to maximize personal autonomy means when it comes to the teaching of what Appiah refers to as ‘identity-related claims’. The aim of this chapter is to suggest how one might begin to think about some questions in the philosophy of education, guided by the liberal thought that education is a preparation for autonomy, and to show that this tradition is both powerful enough to help with this difficult question and rich enough to allow answers of some complexity.Less
Anthony Appiah’s essay on liberal education in the United States begins by identifying a distinctive feature of classical liberalism – namely, that the state must respect substantial limits with respect to its authority to impose restrictions on individuals, even for their own good. Nevertheless, Appiah points out, the primary aim of liberal education is to ‘maximize autonomy not to minimize government involvement’. Most of the essays in this volume, including Appiah’s, are attempts to address the question of what the liberal commitment to maximize personal autonomy means when it comes to the teaching of what Appiah refers to as ‘identity-related claims’. The aim of this chapter is to suggest how one might begin to think about some questions in the philosophy of education, guided by the liberal thought that education is a preparation for autonomy, and to show that this tradition is both powerful enough to help with this difficult question and rich enough to allow answers of some complexity.
Esha Niyogi De
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198072553
- eISBN:
- 9780199080915
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072553.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Women's Literature
Drawing lessons from the intersection of literature, photography, cinema, television, dance-drama, and ethnography, this book presents a unique analysis of Indian activist thought spread over two ...
More
Drawing lessons from the intersection of literature, photography, cinema, television, dance-drama, and ethnography, this book presents a unique analysis of Indian activist thought spread over two centuries. It discusses two presuppositions of liberal individualism: personal autonomy and ethical autonomy. Besides, it argues that the ‘individual’ has been creatively indigenized in modern non-Western cultures: thinkers attentive to gender in postcolonial cultures embrace selected ethical premises of the Enlightenment and its human rights discourse while they refuse possessive individualism. Debating influential schools of postcolonial and transnational studies, the chapter provides radical argument through a rich tapestry of gender portrayals drawn from two moments of modern Indian thought: the rise of humanism in the colony and the growth of new individualism in contemporary liberalized India. From autobiographical texts by nineteenth century Bengali prostitutes, point-of-view photography, as well as women-centred dance-dramas and essays by Rabindranath Tagore to representation of Tagore's works on mainstream television, video, and stage; feminist cinema, choreography and performance by Aparna Sen and Manjusri Chaki-Sircar respectively—the book makes use of such and much more to creatively engage with empire, media, and gender.Less
Drawing lessons from the intersection of literature, photography, cinema, television, dance-drama, and ethnography, this book presents a unique analysis of Indian activist thought spread over two centuries. It discusses two presuppositions of liberal individualism: personal autonomy and ethical autonomy. Besides, it argues that the ‘individual’ has been creatively indigenized in modern non-Western cultures: thinkers attentive to gender in postcolonial cultures embrace selected ethical premises of the Enlightenment and its human rights discourse while they refuse possessive individualism. Debating influential schools of postcolonial and transnational studies, the chapter provides radical argument through a rich tapestry of gender portrayals drawn from two moments of modern Indian thought: the rise of humanism in the colony and the growth of new individualism in contemporary liberalized India. From autobiographical texts by nineteenth century Bengali prostitutes, point-of-view photography, as well as women-centred dance-dramas and essays by Rabindranath Tagore to representation of Tagore's works on mainstream television, video, and stage; feminist cinema, choreography and performance by Aparna Sen and Manjusri Chaki-Sircar respectively—the book makes use of such and much more to creatively engage with empire, media, and gender.
Marilyn Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138504
- eISBN:
- 9780199785902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138503.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter presents a variety of considerations suggesting that autonomy is a valuable ideal, focusing on its value for (many) women. The focus is on women for several reasons. First, autonomy has ...
More
This chapter presents a variety of considerations suggesting that autonomy is a valuable ideal, focusing on its value for (many) women. The focus is on women for several reasons. First, autonomy has not always been idealized for women. Even though autonomy is more widely encouraged and supported in women than ever before, it is still not regarded as a particularly feminine value or virtue. If a case for autonomy can be made out for women in particular against this history, then the case for autonomy in general should prove easier to secure. Second, feminist philosophers have figured prominently among those who have expressed doubts and reservations about the value of autonomy. Focusing on the case of women's autonomy in particular helps to answer those criticisms.Less
This chapter presents a variety of considerations suggesting that autonomy is a valuable ideal, focusing on its value for (many) women. The focus is on women for several reasons. First, autonomy has not always been idealized for women. Even though autonomy is more widely encouraged and supported in women than ever before, it is still not regarded as a particularly feminine value or virtue. If a case for autonomy can be made out for women in particular against this history, then the case for autonomy in general should prove easier to secure. Second, feminist philosophers have figured prominently among those who have expressed doubts and reservations about the value of autonomy. Focusing on the case of women's autonomy in particular helps to answer those criticisms.
Marilyn Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138504
- eISBN:
- 9780199785902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138503.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter surveys prominent feminist writings that call for a relational conception of autonomy and that criticize the philosophical mainstream for lacking such an account. It shows that prominent ...
More
This chapter surveys prominent feminist writings that call for a relational conception of autonomy and that criticize the philosophical mainstream for lacking such an account. It shows that prominent mainstream accounts of autonomy do acknowledge the importance of social relationships, thus tending to converge on this point with the prevalent feminist view. Feminists' objections to mainstream conceptions of autonomy are considered, focusing on the charge that mainstream accounts do not take account of social relationships.Less
This chapter surveys prominent feminist writings that call for a relational conception of autonomy and that criticize the philosophical mainstream for lacking such an account. It shows that prominent mainstream accounts of autonomy do acknowledge the importance of social relationships, thus tending to converge on this point with the prevalent feminist view. Feminists' objections to mainstream conceptions of autonomy are considered, focusing on the charge that mainstream accounts do not take account of social relationships.
Kai Möller
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199664603
- eISBN:
- 9780191745751
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664603.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent success of constitutional judicial review, one particular model of constitutional rights has had remarkable success, first in Europe and now ...
More
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent success of constitutional judicial review, one particular model of constitutional rights has had remarkable success, first in Europe and now globally. This global model of constitutional rights is characterised by an extremely broad approach to the scope of rights (sometimes referred to as ‘rights inflation’), the acceptance of horizontal effect of rights, positive obligations and increasingly also socio-economic rights, and the use of the doctrines of balancing and proportionality to determine the permissible limitations of rights. Drawing on analyses of a broad range of cases from the U.K., the European Court of Human Rights, Germany, Canada, the U.S., and South Africa, this book provides the first substantive moral, reconstructive theory of the global model. It shows that it is based on a coherent conception of constitutional rights which connects to attractive accounts of judicial review, democracy and the separation of powers. The first part of the book develops a theory of the scope of rights under the global model. It defends the idea of a general right to personal autonomy, that is, a right to everything which, according to the agent's self-conception, is in his or her interest. The function of this right is to acknowledge that every act by a public authority which places a burden on a person's autonomy requires justification. The second part of the book provides a theory of the structure of this justification by proposing original and useful accounts of the important doctrines of balancing and proportionality.Less
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent success of constitutional judicial review, one particular model of constitutional rights has had remarkable success, first in Europe and now globally. This global model of constitutional rights is characterised by an extremely broad approach to the scope of rights (sometimes referred to as ‘rights inflation’), the acceptance of horizontal effect of rights, positive obligations and increasingly also socio-economic rights, and the use of the doctrines of balancing and proportionality to determine the permissible limitations of rights. Drawing on analyses of a broad range of cases from the U.K., the European Court of Human Rights, Germany, Canada, the U.S., and South Africa, this book provides the first substantive moral, reconstructive theory of the global model. It shows that it is based on a coherent conception of constitutional rights which connects to attractive accounts of judicial review, democracy and the separation of powers. The first part of the book develops a theory of the scope of rights under the global model. It defends the idea of a general right to personal autonomy, that is, a right to everything which, according to the agent's self-conception, is in his or her interest. The function of this right is to acknowledge that every act by a public authority which places a burden on a person's autonomy requires justification. The second part of the book provides a theory of the structure of this justification by proposing original and useful accounts of the important doctrines of balancing and proportionality.
Marilyn Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138504
- eISBN:
- 9780199785902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138503.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter presents the author's basic account of autonomy, considering its social context and dimensions. It then explores the difference between a substantive and a content-neutral conception of ...
More
This chapter presents the author's basic account of autonomy, considering its social context and dimensions. It then explores the difference between a substantive and a content-neutral conception of autonomy, opting for the latter. This is followed by some thoughts about the prospects for autonomy under dangerous or oppressive conditions. The chapter concludes with some remarks about possible counterexamples to the conception of autonomy presented.Less
This chapter presents the author's basic account of autonomy, considering its social context and dimensions. It then explores the difference between a substantive and a content-neutral conception of autonomy, opting for the latter. This is followed by some thoughts about the prospects for autonomy under dangerous or oppressive conditions. The chapter concludes with some remarks about possible counterexamples to the conception of autonomy presented.
Marilyn Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138504
- eISBN:
- 9780199785902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138503.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter develops a point made in preceding chapters that autonomy, although socially grounded, has an individualizing dimension — a dimension that is defend against the worries of critics. The ...
More
This chapter develops a point made in preceding chapters that autonomy, although socially grounded, has an individualizing dimension — a dimension that is defend against the worries of critics. The main thesis is that: at the same time that we embrace relational accounts of autonomy, we should also be cautious about them. Autonomy increases the risk of disruption in interpersonal relationships. While this is an empirical and not a conceptual claim about autonomy, nevertheless, the risk is significant and its bearing on the value of autonomy is therefore empirically significant. It makes a difference in particular to whether the ideal of autonomy is genuinely hospitable to women.Less
This chapter develops a point made in preceding chapters that autonomy, although socially grounded, has an individualizing dimension — a dimension that is defend against the worries of critics. The main thesis is that: at the same time that we embrace relational accounts of autonomy, we should also be cautious about them. Autonomy increases the risk of disruption in interpersonal relationships. While this is an empirical and not a conceptual claim about autonomy, nevertheless, the risk is significant and its bearing on the value of autonomy is therefore empirically significant. It makes a difference in particular to whether the ideal of autonomy is genuinely hospitable to women.
Katerina Deligiorgi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199646159
- eISBN:
- 9780191741142
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Chapter 6 starts by locating the theory of autonomy presented here in the contemporary discussion about personal autonomy using the issues raised by Schiller as a conceptual bridge. Whereas the ...
More
Chapter 6 starts by locating the theory of autonomy presented here in the contemporary discussion about personal autonomy using the issues raised by Schiller as a conceptual bridge. Whereas the theory avoids some of the familiar pitfalls, the question of the metaphysics of freedom, postponed from Chapter 3, returns here with considerable force. This is first addressed through an examination of the substantive model defended by Hegel, who, in common with some contemporary theorists, seeks to defend a socially embedded conception of agency. It is argued that what is gained in terms of substance is lost in terms of morality and also in terms of freedom. On the other hand, the Kantian conception of freedom relies on the obscure and controversial concept of a ‘causality of reason’. Drawing on earlier discussions from Chapters 3 and 5, it is shown how the concept can be understood as asserting agential control. The chapter concludes with a discussion of consistency in ethics that leads to the broader topic of the ‘scope’ of autonomy broached in earlier chapters, appreciation of which is essential if we are properly to recognize the importance of autonomy to our moral lives.Less
Chapter 6 starts by locating the theory of autonomy presented here in the contemporary discussion about personal autonomy using the issues raised by Schiller as a conceptual bridge. Whereas the theory avoids some of the familiar pitfalls, the question of the metaphysics of freedom, postponed from Chapter 3, returns here with considerable force. This is first addressed through an examination of the substantive model defended by Hegel, who, in common with some contemporary theorists, seeks to defend a socially embedded conception of agency. It is argued that what is gained in terms of substance is lost in terms of morality and also in terms of freedom. On the other hand, the Kantian conception of freedom relies on the obscure and controversial concept of a ‘causality of reason’. Drawing on earlier discussions from Chapters 3 and 5, it is shown how the concept can be understood as asserting agential control. The chapter concludes with a discussion of consistency in ethics that leads to the broader topic of the ‘scope’ of autonomy broached in earlier chapters, appreciation of which is essential if we are properly to recognize the importance of autonomy to our moral lives.
Lucas Swaine
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190087647
- eISBN:
- 9780190087678
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190087647.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter elaborates a conception of personal autonomy as individual self-rule. The conception fits with a more general understanding of autonomy as self-rule, and it is not heavily moralized. ...
More
This chapter elaborates a conception of personal autonomy as individual self-rule. The conception fits with a more general understanding of autonomy as self-rule, and it is not heavily moralized. Autonomy as self-rule is preferable to alternative conceptualizations such as autonomy as self-governance or autonomy as living under one’s own laws. Personal autonomy is different from individual freedom, and it is not identical to the absence of social control. There are several notable grounds for valuing personal autonomy; this chapter describes them, giving a fuller sense of the significance and attractiveness of autonomy of the personal kind.Less
This chapter elaborates a conception of personal autonomy as individual self-rule. The conception fits with a more general understanding of autonomy as self-rule, and it is not heavily moralized. Autonomy as self-rule is preferable to alternative conceptualizations such as autonomy as self-governance or autonomy as living under one’s own laws. Personal autonomy is different from individual freedom, and it is not identical to the absence of social control. There are several notable grounds for valuing personal autonomy; this chapter describes them, giving a fuller sense of the significance and attractiveness of autonomy of the personal kind.
Kai Möller
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199664603
- eISBN:
- 9780191745751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664603.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This chapter proposes an account of the point and purpose of judicial review under the global model, which reflects attractive conceptions of the values of democracy (political autonomy) and the ...
More
This chapter proposes an account of the point and purpose of judicial review under the global model, which reflects attractive conceptions of the values of democracy (political autonomy) and the separation of powers. It argues that constitutional rights and policy-making are both oriented towards personal autonomy and that, in particular, policies ought never to be concerned with the well-being of the citizens. Relying on a reinterpretation of Mattias Kumm's work, the chapter shows that for a policy to be constitutionally legitimate and democratic properly understood, it must represent a reasonable, as opposed to the one correct, specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens. It further shows that there is no need for a free-standing right to equality or a right to non-discrimination. Finally, the chapter argues that it is plausible to assume that courts will possess the institutional competence of assessing constitutional legitimacy under the reasonableness standard required by the global model; and the implications of this result for a doctrine of deference are explored.Less
This chapter proposes an account of the point and purpose of judicial review under the global model, which reflects attractive conceptions of the values of democracy (political autonomy) and the separation of powers. It argues that constitutional rights and policy-making are both oriented towards personal autonomy and that, in particular, policies ought never to be concerned with the well-being of the citizens. Relying on a reinterpretation of Mattias Kumm's work, the chapter shows that for a policy to be constitutionally legitimate and democratic properly understood, it must represent a reasonable, as opposed to the one correct, specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens. It further shows that there is no need for a free-standing right to equality or a right to non-discrimination. Finally, the chapter argues that it is plausible to assume that courts will possess the institutional competence of assessing constitutional legitimacy under the reasonableness standard required by the global model; and the implications of this result for a doctrine of deference are explored.
Lucas Swaine
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190087647
- eISBN:
- 9780190087678
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190087647.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter provides a detailed critique of personal autonomy. It distinguishes several hazards affecting agents who are personally autonomous, moving beyond received understandings and critiques. ...
More
This chapter provides a detailed critique of personal autonomy. It distinguishes several hazards affecting agents who are personally autonomous, moving beyond received understandings and critiques. The chapter explains how personal autonomy offers normatively inadequate boundaries with respect to deliberation, volition, capabilities, and the generation of options, respectively. Included in this chapter is discussion of extreme actions, and of evil, to serve to establish the central points of argumentation. The critique presented here is robust even granting that theories of personal autonomy do not countenance immoral action, much less egregious law-breaking or terrible rights violations, on the part of personally autonomous agents.Less
This chapter provides a detailed critique of personal autonomy. It distinguishes several hazards affecting agents who are personally autonomous, moving beyond received understandings and critiques. The chapter explains how personal autonomy offers normatively inadequate boundaries with respect to deliberation, volition, capabilities, and the generation of options, respectively. Included in this chapter is discussion of extreme actions, and of evil, to serve to establish the central points of argumentation. The critique presented here is robust even granting that theories of personal autonomy do not countenance immoral action, much less egregious law-breaking or terrible rights violations, on the part of personally autonomous agents.
Paul Benson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199969104
- eISBN:
- 9780190225711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969104.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A number of prominent theories of personal autonomy have been influenced substantially by feminist normative commitments. While the sharing of such commitments may have been hoped to yield more ready ...
More
A number of prominent theories of personal autonomy have been influenced substantially by feminist normative commitments. While the sharing of such commitments may have been hoped to yield more ready agreement on the relational and normative dimensions of autonomy, that hope has not been fulfilled. This chapter examines critically ways four recent conceptions of autonomy—those developed, respectively, by Marina Oshana, Natalie Stoljar, Marilyn Friedman, and John Christman—appeal to particular feminist commitments and the manner in which those appeals shape each theory’s understanding of autonomy’s relational character. Contending that Oshana’s and Stoljar’s approaches restrict the scope of autonomy excessively and that Friedman’s and Christman’s theories are overly inclusive, the chapter argues for a constitutively relational account of autonomy that integrates considerations of autonomous agents’ voices with considerations of their agential authority. The resulting view of autonomy clarifies the role of personal autonomy within feminist social theory.Less
A number of prominent theories of personal autonomy have been influenced substantially by feminist normative commitments. While the sharing of such commitments may have been hoped to yield more ready agreement on the relational and normative dimensions of autonomy, that hope has not been fulfilled. This chapter examines critically ways four recent conceptions of autonomy—those developed, respectively, by Marina Oshana, Natalie Stoljar, Marilyn Friedman, and John Christman—appeal to particular feminist commitments and the manner in which those appeals shape each theory’s understanding of autonomy’s relational character. Contending that Oshana’s and Stoljar’s approaches restrict the scope of autonomy excessively and that Friedman’s and Christman’s theories are overly inclusive, the chapter argues for a constitutively relational account of autonomy that integrates considerations of autonomous agents’ voices with considerations of their agential authority. The resulting view of autonomy clarifies the role of personal autonomy within feminist social theory.
Marilyn Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138504
- eISBN:
- 9780199785902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138503.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter examines autonomy in regard to domestic violence. It discusses how intimate partner abuse diminishes autonomy. It is argued that professional care-givers should usually provide ...
More
This chapter examines autonomy in regard to domestic violence. It discusses how intimate partner abuse diminishes autonomy. It is argued that professional care-givers should usually provide uncritical support for abused women who choose to remain in abusive relationships rather than trying rationally to persuade them to change their minds. Legal policy must treat individual cases with consideration for the material and symbolic impact of that treatment on a whole population.Less
This chapter examines autonomy in regard to domestic violence. It discusses how intimate partner abuse diminishes autonomy. It is argued that professional care-givers should usually provide uncritical support for abused women who choose to remain in abusive relationships rather than trying rationally to persuade them to change their minds. Legal policy must treat individual cases with consideration for the material and symbolic impact of that treatment on a whole population.
Kai Möller
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199664603
- eISBN:
- 9780191745751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664603.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This chapter discusses two competing conceptions of personal autonomy: the excluded reasons conception and the protected interests conception. The excluded reasons conception — related to Ronald ...
More
This chapter discusses two competing conceptions of personal autonomy: the excluded reasons conception and the protected interests conception. The excluded reasons conception — related to Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights — holds that in order to respect a person's autonomy, the state must not rely on certain (excluded) reasons in its treatment of him, in particular moralistic or paternalistic reasons. The chapter argues that this conception of autonomy, while coherent, cannot explain the broad scope of rights accepted today. The second and preferable conception — the protected interests conception — focuses directly on the actions and personal resources which are important for the purpose of leading an autonomous life. It is then possible to assess the weight of a specific autonomy interest with reference to its importance from the perspective of the self-conception of the agent. This approach is related but preferable to similar concepts used by courts and philosophers, such as the idea of developing one's personality, James Griffin's idea of living one's conception of a worthwhile life, or the idea of self-realisation.Less
This chapter discusses two competing conceptions of personal autonomy: the excluded reasons conception and the protected interests conception. The excluded reasons conception — related to Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights — holds that in order to respect a person's autonomy, the state must not rely on certain (excluded) reasons in its treatment of him, in particular moralistic or paternalistic reasons. The chapter argues that this conception of autonomy, while coherent, cannot explain the broad scope of rights accepted today. The second and preferable conception — the protected interests conception — focuses directly on the actions and personal resources which are important for the purpose of leading an autonomous life. It is then possible to assess the weight of a specific autonomy interest with reference to its importance from the perspective of the self-conception of the agent. This approach is related but preferable to similar concepts used by courts and philosophers, such as the idea of developing one's personality, James Griffin's idea of living one's conception of a worthwhile life, or the idea of self-realisation.
Kai Möller
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199664603
- eISBN:
- 9780191745751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664603.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
The Conclusion summarises the theory proposed in the book by giving an account of the main concepts relied on: personal autonomy; equality; democracy; political autonomy; constitutional rights; ...
More
The Conclusion summarises the theory proposed in the book by giving an account of the main concepts relied on: personal autonomy; equality; democracy; political autonomy; constitutional rights; balancing; proportionality; the margin of appreciation. It argues that the main entitlement that rights confer upon a person under the global model is to be treated with a certain attitude, namely an attitude which takes the right-holder's personal autonomy seriously. It shows that all features of the global model flow from this basic proposition. It concludes with some thoughts on the role of judges in shaping the global model and invites further discussion on the merits of judicial review under the global model.Less
The Conclusion summarises the theory proposed in the book by giving an account of the main concepts relied on: personal autonomy; equality; democracy; political autonomy; constitutional rights; balancing; proportionality; the margin of appreciation. It argues that the main entitlement that rights confer upon a person under the global model is to be treated with a certain attitude, namely an attitude which takes the right-holder's personal autonomy seriously. It shows that all features of the global model flow from this basic proposition. It concludes with some thoughts on the role of judges in shaping the global model and invites further discussion on the merits of judicial review under the global model.
Edith Esch
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622099234
- eISBN:
- 9789882207165
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622099234.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter shows how the notion of autonomy has spread into language pedagogy in the past 10 years and how this mainstreaming has been accompanied by conceptual distortions and discursive ...
More
This chapter shows how the notion of autonomy has spread into language pedagogy in the past 10 years and how this mainstreaming has been accompanied by conceptual distortions and discursive dissonances. Such dissonances can be located in the contradictions between the discourses of individual personal autonomy and of critical socially situated autonomy. It argues that people are at a crossroads and that if they take the notion of social learning seriously, opting for the road of individual personal autonomy is not sufficient. They need to take a whole-community approach to autonomy and reassert the critical dimension originally associated with autonomy and foreign language learning.Less
This chapter shows how the notion of autonomy has spread into language pedagogy in the past 10 years and how this mainstreaming has been accompanied by conceptual distortions and discursive dissonances. Such dissonances can be located in the contradictions between the discourses of individual personal autonomy and of critical socially situated autonomy. It argues that people are at a crossroads and that if they take the notion of social learning seriously, opting for the road of individual personal autonomy is not sufficient. They need to take a whole-community approach to autonomy and reassert the critical dimension originally associated with autonomy and foreign language learning.
