Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, ...
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The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.Less
The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, ...
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For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.Less
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter defines the main terms and the project of the book, and specifically situates the problem of the relation of self‐interest and morality in the larger philosophical context.
This chapter defines the main terms and the project of the book, and specifically situates the problem of the relation of self‐interest and morality in the larger philosophical context.
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following ...
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This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following themes in moral philosophy are considered: the nature of the ‘subject’, agency, free will, and self-knowledge. The first three chapters of the book focus on memory, anxiety, and time. The next three chapters are explicitly about the subject, and about first-person, propositional thought. The final chapters articulate the idea that one cannot hive off the subjective aspects of a person from those that are objective.Less
This book revolves around the theme that psychological space demands physical space; that the inner world is embedded in, and fabricated from, interactions between world and mind. The following themes in moral philosophy are considered: the nature of the ‘subject’, agency, free will, and self-knowledge. The first three chapters of the book focus on memory, anxiety, and time. The next three chapters are explicitly about the subject, and about first-person, propositional thought. The final chapters articulate the idea that one cannot hive off the subjective aspects of a person from those that are objective.
Lucy O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261482
- eISBN:
- 9780191718632
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of ...
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This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?Less
This book argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. It considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions?
Lloyd P. Gerson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288670
- eISBN:
- 9780191717789
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288670.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
For Plato, persons are not identical with individuals falling under the putative natural kind ‘human being’. Alternatively, it can also be said that for Plato, souls are not identical with individual ...
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For Plato, persons are not identical with individuals falling under the putative natural kind ‘human being’. Alternatively, it can also be said that for Plato, souls are not identical with individual composites of soul and body. But an embodied person (or an embodied soul) is not exactly the same thing as a disembodied person (or soul), so it is a mistake to suppose that the human being is just the simple sum of person or soul and body. A person with a body is not a person plus a body. An embodied person is different from a disembodied person, as images of the intelligible differ from their paradigms. It would be more accurate to characterize Plato's dualism as based upon the distinction between disembodied person and embodied person than upon the distinction between soul and body. Therefore, Plato's position avoids or at least changes the meaning of the question ‘How is the soul related to the body?’ The embodied person or soul is neither a res cogitans related to a res extensa nor even a ‘captain’ related to a bodily ‘ship’, to use Aristotle's metaphor. The embodied person has a body and is the subject of bodily states.Less
For Plato, persons are not identical with individuals falling under the putative natural kind ‘human being’. Alternatively, it can also be said that for Plato, souls are not identical with individual composites of soul and body. But an embodied person (or an embodied soul) is not exactly the same thing as a disembodied person (or soul), so it is a mistake to suppose that the human being is just the simple sum of person or soul and body. A person with a body is not a person plus a body. An embodied person is different from a disembodied person, as images of the intelligible differ from their paradigms. It would be more accurate to characterize Plato's dualism as based upon the distinction between disembodied person and embodied person than upon the distinction between soul and body. Therefore, Plato's position avoids or at least changes the meaning of the question ‘How is the soul related to the body?’ The embodied person or soul is neither a res cogitans related to a res extensa nor even a ‘captain’ related to a bodily ‘ship’, to use Aristotle's metaphor. The embodied person has a body and is the subject of bodily states.
William S. Sax
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139150
- eISBN:
- 9780199871650
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139151.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Hinduism
Explores the way personhood is constructed in public ritual performance. The performances are pandav lilas, ritual dramatizations of India's great epic, Mahabharata. They take place in the former ...
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Explores the way personhood is constructed in public ritual performance. The performances are pandav lilas, ritual dramatizations of India's great epic, Mahabharata. They take place in the former Hindu kingdom of Garhwal, located in the central Himalayas of North India. The book begins by summarizing the theoretical literature on personhood (or ”selfhood”) and performance and providing a brief summary of the epic. Next, it describes one particular performance in detail and then goes on to discuss questions of caste, gender, and locality – all in the context of an overarching discussion of the performative construction of the self. The last few chapters describe a fascinating valley in the Western part of Garhwal, where the villains of the Mahabharata are worshiped as local, divine kings. The major conclusion reached by the book is that public ritual performances are one of the chief arenas where ”persons” are constructed – in Garhwal as well as in other cultures.Less
Explores the way personhood is constructed in public ritual performance. The performances are pandav lilas, ritual dramatizations of India's great epic, Mahabharata. They take place in the former Hindu kingdom of Garhwal, located in the central Himalayas of North India. The book begins by summarizing the theoretical literature on personhood (or ”selfhood”) and performance and providing a brief summary of the epic. Next, it describes one particular performance in detail and then goes on to discuss questions of caste, gender, and locality – all in the context of an overarching discussion of the performative construction of the self. The last few chapters describe a fascinating valley in the Western part of Garhwal, where the villains of the Mahabharata are worshiped as local, divine kings. The major conclusion reached by the book is that public ritual performances are one of the chief arenas where ”persons” are constructed – in Garhwal as well as in other cultures.
Garry Hagberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234226
- eISBN:
- 9780191715440
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, ...
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The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.Less
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, ...
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This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.Less
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.
Lucian Turcescu
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195174250
- eISBN:
- 9780199835478
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195174259.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The concept of personhood is central to a wide range of contemporary issues, ranging from reproductive rights to the death penalty and euthanasia. We may think that the concept of person is a modern ...
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The concept of personhood is central to a wide range of contemporary issues, ranging from reproductive rights to the death penalty and euthanasia. We may think that the concept of person is a modern development. In fact, however, this idea does not originate with our discovery of human rights, consciousness, and individuality. This study shows that the fourth-century theologian Gregory of Nyssa developed a very sophisticated concept of the person in the context of his attempts to clarify the paradox of the Trinity—a single God comprising three distinct persons. The book offers the first in-depth analysis of Gregory’s writings about the divine persons. It shows that Gregory understood personhood as characterized by uniqueness, relationality, and freedom. He reasoned that the three persons of the Trinity have distinctive properties that make them individuals, that is, capable of being enumerated and circumscribed. But this idea of individuation, inherited from the neo-Platonists, falls short of expressing a clear notion of personal uniqueness. By itself it would suggest that a person is merely a collection of properties. Gregory’s great contribution was to perceive the importance of relationality to personhood. The three divine persons know and love each other, are in communion with each other, and freely act together in their common will. This understanding adds up to a concept of personal uniqueness much like our modern one. The book not only contributes to our knowledge of the history of Trinitarian theology but can be helpful to theologians who are dealing with issues in contemporary ethics.Less
The concept of personhood is central to a wide range of contemporary issues, ranging from reproductive rights to the death penalty and euthanasia. We may think that the concept of person is a modern development. In fact, however, this idea does not originate with our discovery of human rights, consciousness, and individuality. This study shows that the fourth-century theologian Gregory of Nyssa developed a very sophisticated concept of the person in the context of his attempts to clarify the paradox of the Trinity—a single God comprising three distinct persons. The book offers the first in-depth analysis of Gregory’s writings about the divine persons. It shows that Gregory understood personhood as characterized by uniqueness, relationality, and freedom. He reasoned that the three persons of the Trinity have distinctive properties that make them individuals, that is, capable of being enumerated and circumscribed. But this idea of individuation, inherited from the neo-Platonists, falls short of expressing a clear notion of personal uniqueness. By itself it would suggest that a person is merely a collection of properties. Gregory’s great contribution was to perceive the importance of relationality to personhood. The three divine persons know and love each other, are in communion with each other, and freely act together in their common will. This understanding adds up to a concept of personal uniqueness much like our modern one. The book not only contributes to our knowledge of the history of Trinitarian theology but can be helpful to theologians who are dealing with issues in contemporary ethics.
Jerome Murphy-O'Connor
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266531
- eISBN:
- 9780191601583
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
The purpose of this book is to reveal the personality of Paul of Tarsus. Too long considered merely as a fountain of theological ideas, the Apostle of the Gentiles is brought to life by a strong ...
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The purpose of this book is to reveal the personality of Paul of Tarsus. Too long considered merely as a fountain of theological ideas, the Apostle of the Gentiles is brought to life by a strong narrative line, which reconstructs the events of his life in chronological order and in sufficient detail to give it consistency and colour. Historical imagination is tightly controlled by skilful exploitation of the evidence provided by ancient texts and monuments. His letters are seen to grow from the concrete circumstances of changing situations. His theology is born out of history.Less
The purpose of this book is to reveal the personality of Paul of Tarsus. Too long considered merely as a fountain of theological ideas, the Apostle of the Gentiles is brought to life by a strong narrative line, which reconstructs the events of his life in chronological order and in sufficient detail to give it consistency and colour. Historical imagination is tightly controlled by skilful exploitation of the evidence provided by ancient texts and monuments. His letters are seen to grow from the concrete circumstances of changing situations. His theology is born out of history.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the ...
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To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.Less
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A brief conclusion, pulling together the arguments of the previous six chapters, is given. It is suggested that the ultimate epistemic consequence of being a person may be an inevitable confrontation ...
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A brief conclusion, pulling together the arguments of the previous six chapters, is given. It is suggested that the ultimate epistemic consequence of being a person may be an inevitable confrontation with philosophical issues.Less
A brief conclusion, pulling together the arguments of the previous six chapters, is given. It is suggested that the ultimate epistemic consequence of being a person may be an inevitable confrontation with philosophical issues.
Sharon B. Berlin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195110371
- eISBN:
- 9780199865680
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110371.001.0001
- Subject:
- Social Work, Health and Mental Health
This is a book about how people change their minds and how mental health practitioners can help this process along. It addresses a gap in the literature on cognitive therapy that results from an ...
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This is a book about how people change their minds and how mental health practitioners can help this process along. It addresses a gap in the literature on cognitive therapy that results from an almost exclusive focus on the constructed aspects of personal meaning, and a lack of attention to the ways in which information that we pick up from life circumstances also influences what we know, feel, and do. Conceptions that ignore the role that current life conditions and interpersonal events play in creating or revising meanings limit the utility of cognitive therapy approaches for clients whose lives are marked by ongoing deprivation, threat, and vulnerability. In laying out a broader perspective, a Cognitive-Integrative perspective, the book expands the internal focus of traditional cognitive therapies to take more account of the role of information generated by environmental events and conditions in impeding or promoting change. It contends that mind draws on organized memories of previous experiences as well as currently available information to generate cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. The theoretical grounding for this perspective is drawn from a range of cognitive, neurological, social, psychological, and social work theories. Theoretical explanations are laid out. They are balanced with practice guidelines and grounded in an offering of clinical examples.Less
This is a book about how people change their minds and how mental health practitioners can help this process along. It addresses a gap in the literature on cognitive therapy that results from an almost exclusive focus on the constructed aspects of personal meaning, and a lack of attention to the ways in which information that we pick up from life circumstances also influences what we know, feel, and do. Conceptions that ignore the role that current life conditions and interpersonal events play in creating or revising meanings limit the utility of cognitive therapy approaches for clients whose lives are marked by ongoing deprivation, threat, and vulnerability. In laying out a broader perspective, a Cognitive-Integrative perspective, the book expands the internal focus of traditional cognitive therapies to take more account of the role of information generated by environmental events and conditions in impeding or promoting change. It contends that mind draws on organized memories of previous experiences as well as currently available information to generate cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. The theoretical grounding for this perspective is drawn from a range of cognitive, neurological, social, psychological, and social work theories. Theoretical explanations are laid out. They are balanced with practice guidelines and grounded in an offering of clinical examples.
Paul Guyer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199273461
- eISBN:
- 9780191706196
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of ...
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The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.Less
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.
Patrick R. Laughlin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691147918
- eISBN:
- 9781400836673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691147918.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter examines group ability composition and social combination processes on world knowledge tasks. On difficult world knowledge tasks, high-ability persons performed better in cooperative ...
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This chapter examines group ability composition and social combination processes on world knowledge tasks. On difficult world knowledge tasks, high-ability persons performed better in cooperative groups with other high-ability members than they did alone, and this difference increased with group size. In contrast, low-ability persons did not perform better in cooperative groups with other low-ability members than they did alone, and there was little improvement as group size increased. Low-ability members contributed very little unique information to one another and virtually none to high-ability members. Medium-ability members displayed an intermediate pattern that was more like low-ability than high-ability members. Consequently, the performance of groups of mixed high-ability, medium-ability, and low-ability members was basically proportional to the number of high-ability members: the greater the proportion of high-ability members, the better the group performance.Less
This chapter examines group ability composition and social combination processes on world knowledge tasks. On difficult world knowledge tasks, high-ability persons performed better in cooperative groups with other high-ability members than they did alone, and this difference increased with group size. In contrast, low-ability persons did not perform better in cooperative groups with other low-ability members than they did alone, and there was little improvement as group size increased. Low-ability members contributed very little unique information to one another and virtually none to high-ability members. Medium-ability members displayed an intermediate pattern that was more like low-ability than high-ability members. Consequently, the performance of groups of mixed high-ability, medium-ability, and low-ability members was basically proportional to the number of high-ability members: the greater the proportion of high-ability members, the better the group performance.
Silvia Scarpa
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199541904
- eISBN:
- 9780191715464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541904.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This introductory chapter synthesises the structure of the book that is subdivided into five chapters. The first chapter examines trafficking in persons in the light of the recent definition of the ...
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This introductory chapter synthesises the structure of the book that is subdivided into five chapters. The first chapter examines trafficking in persons in the light of the recent definition of the phenomenon given by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and identifies the most common forms of exploitation related to it. The second reviews the most important international instruments against slavery and the slave trade, the white slave traffic and trafficking in persons. The third discusses States' obligations under international human rights, criminal and labour law. The last two chapters deal with the contribution made to this field by the most important regional organizations in Europe, namely the Council of Europe and the European Union. Finally, it concludes by explaining that notwithstanding the many efforts already made to fight against trafficking in persons, improvements to the international protection standards for trafficking victims need to be made.Less
This introductory chapter synthesises the structure of the book that is subdivided into five chapters. The first chapter examines trafficking in persons in the light of the recent definition of the phenomenon given by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and identifies the most common forms of exploitation related to it. The second reviews the most important international instruments against slavery and the slave trade, the white slave traffic and trafficking in persons. The third discusses States' obligations under international human rights, criminal and labour law. The last two chapters deal with the contribution made to this field by the most important regional organizations in Europe, namely the Council of Europe and the European Union. Finally, it concludes by explaining that notwithstanding the many efforts already made to fight against trafficking in persons, improvements to the international protection standards for trafficking victims need to be made.
Kathleen V. Wilkes
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240808
- eISBN:
- 9780191680281
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing ...
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This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.Less
This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.
Thomas McCall and Michael Rea (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199216215
- eISBN:
- 9780191695995
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216215.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
Classical Christian orthodoxy insists that God is Triune: there is only one God, but there are three divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — who are somehow of one substance with one another. ...
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Classical Christian orthodoxy insists that God is Triune: there is only one God, but there are three divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — who are somehow of one substance with one another. But what does this doctrine mean? How can we coherently believe that there is only one God if we also believe that there are three divine Persons? This problem, sometimes called the ‘threeness-oneness problem’ or the ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, is the focus of this interdisciplinary volume. It includes a selection of recent philosophical work on this topic, accompanied by a variety of essays by philosophers and theologians to further the discussion. The book is divided into four parts, the first three dealing in turn with the three most prominent models for understanding the relations between the Persons of the Trinity: Social Trinitarianism, Latin Trinitarianism, and Relative Trinitarianism. Each section includes essays by both proponents and critics of the relevant model. The volume concludes with a section containing essays by theologians reflecting on the current state of the debate.Less
Classical Christian orthodoxy insists that God is Triune: there is only one God, but there are three divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — who are somehow of one substance with one another. But what does this doctrine mean? How can we coherently believe that there is only one God if we also believe that there are three divine Persons? This problem, sometimes called the ‘threeness-oneness problem’ or the ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, is the focus of this interdisciplinary volume. It includes a selection of recent philosophical work on this topic, accompanied by a variety of essays by philosophers and theologians to further the discussion. The book is divided into four parts, the first three dealing in turn with the three most prominent models for understanding the relations between the Persons of the Trinity: Social Trinitarianism, Latin Trinitarianism, and Relative Trinitarianism. Each section includes essays by both proponents and critics of the relevant model. The volume concludes with a section containing essays by theologians reflecting on the current state of the debate.
