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This chapter argues that there can be coincident entities, numerically different things, having different persistence conditions, that are composed of exactly the same micro-entities. This means that the higher-order properties of such entities do not supervene on, and are not realized by, the ‘thin’ physical properties that are shared by the coincident entities. They are realized by ‘thick’ physical properties, ones individuated by the persistence conditions of the things that have them. The nature of the causal profiles of properties is argued to be incompatible with the four-dimensionalist, perdurance account of the nature of persisting entities. It is argued that these causal profiles provide a basis for saying what it is for a set of microentities to make up a single object.

The account of the ontological categories begun earlier in the book is completed and it is explained why and how such categories, which have an a priori status, must be distinguished from the empirically discoverable natural kinds into which objects—and, more particularly, naturally occurring individual substances—are divisible. By focusing on the problem of substantial change and associated questions concerning the persistence‐conditions of different kinds of object, the indispensable role that a system of ontological categories has in enabling us to understand the fundamental structure of reality is illustrated, thereby providing further and indeed conclusive evidence of the indispensability and autonomy of metaphysics as an intellectual discipline.

Chapter 7 considers two sources of doubt about the coherence of the robust first-person perspective. The first concerns the role of first-person perspectives as persistence conditions: you, essentially a person, continue to exist as long as your first-person perspective is exemplified. This seems circular. The rebuttal is to show that the irreducibility of personhood precludes there being informative sufficient conditions for personal identity over time. A second source of doubt concerns the suggestion that the robust first-person perspective turns out to be a substantial object. If it is putatively a substantial object, then it seems to go the way of Johnston’s “self”: it is a merely intentional object, a notional object, a virtual object—not a real object—that cannot exist except in our own minds. The rebuttal is to show that the first-person perspective is not an object at all, but a property.

This chapter offers a close analysis of Locke’s approach to questions of individuation and identity over time. It examines how Locke distinguishes individuation from identity and proposes that Locke’s approach to identity is best understood as kind-dependent. This means that the persistence conditions vary depending on the kind of being under consideration. For Locke it is important to first examine the kind under consideration, before persistence conditions for members of this kind can be specified. More precisely, if the nominal essences of kind F and kind G vary, then it is likely that the persistence conditions for members of kind F will vary from the persistence conditions for members of kind G. This chapter provides the framework for the subsequent discussion of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity.

This chapter compares some empty ideas about material persistence to substantial counterparts positing the existence of self-directed propensities. It is noted that philosophers fail to make distinctions between, say, copper, a piece of copper, a lump of copper, a hunk of copper, copper statues, copper scultures and more. All of this is seen to be trivial, but the ubiquity of such simple mistakes remains astonishing.

This chapter discusses the suggestion that a psychological approach must be mistaken, because, in fact, the correct account of personal identity is given by the biological approach, according to which we are human beings whose identity over time requires no kind of psychological continuity or connectedness whatsoever. A number of authors support this suggestion, including Paul Snowdon (1991), Peter van Inwagen (1990), and Eric Olson (1997, 2002). This also presumes that humans, i.e. members of the species Homo sapiens, are animals of a certain kind. It does not rule out the possibility of persons that are not human beings or animals, but it insists that we are all human animals, possessing the persistence conditions of human animals. This biological approach is often rejected with the notion that it conflicts with human intuition, as can be seen in the transplant case.

The rivalry between Animalist and Psychological views of human persons interweaves with some much-discussed technical disputes in metaphysics, many involving the “constitution” relations which Psychological views typically invoke. They include debates over four-dimensionalism, modality, the ontological grounding of sortal kinds and persistence-conditions, and the nature of constitution itself. By exploring the resources available using a minimalist notion of constitution, this chapter attempts to sidestep or defer some of those disputes. The overall goal is to defend the plausibility of Psychological views as naturalistic competitors to Animalism, by showing how they can dovetail naturally with a suitable conception of the generic ontology of material entities. The chapter ends by sketching some elements of that ontology, trying to illuminate and improve some crucial views and concepts relevant to it, and finishing with some brief thoughts about how to handle some of the thornier technical issues.

This chapter discusses some general questions about animal existence and persistence, arguing that animals, even advanced ones, do not require psychological properties to remain in existence. An animal also cannot be separated from its body should that body remain alive and intact. These claims imply that if we are animals the same applies to us. It is also argued that life is not a necessary condition for animal existence. This rejection of the Termination Thesis does not, though, seem to have significant implications for the debate about animalism. It is at least plausible to say that an animal cannot itself cease to be an animal, and, moreover, has to remain the type of animal it is, although the support for these claims is not conclusive. Finally, it is argued that animal persistence is not explicable in terms simply of bulk, but is in some sense functional.

Traditionally, visual artworks persist over time through the preservation of their material elements: if the surface of a painting is irrevocably obscured, the work is destroyed. While this remains true for many artworks, in other cases artists have sanctioned custom rules that permit or require certain forms of material change. Zoe Leonard requires that her objects be allowed to decay; Sarah Sze requires that some objects in her sculptural works be periodically replaced. In still other cases, such as James Turrell’s Skyspaces, changes in environmental conditions may destroy the work even if the object fabricated by the artist remains intact. Institutions have developed detailed procedures for gathering information about how artworks should be conserved, since this information is essential to the work’s identity and the meanings it expresses.