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This chapter attempts to consider and respond to a series of challenges against the argument from perceptual variation. Three classes of objections are illustrated. The first concerns suggestions to treat one's inability to single out a distinguished variant as a mere epistemic shortcoming with no ontological import. The second revolves on accepting irrealism about color. The third focuses on some that suggest non-relationalist ways of accepting ecumenicism with respect to multiple perceptual variants. The aim of this chapter is to respond to the objections of these three classes, thus strengthening the case for relationalism. Further, by discussing these objections, the goal is to throw into greater relief the connections between relationalism and other views that have shown up in the literature.

An argument for color relationalism based on the phenomenon of perceptual variation, which the author considers as the core argument for relationalism is presented in this chapter. Several different forms of this argument are demonstrated and in every instance, the author argues the evidence favors a relational, rather than an anti-relational, conception of color. The chapter begins with an illustrative instance and a general form with multiple instances of the argument. Then, the author extends the argument form to a number of independent factors: inter-species differences, interpersonal differences, and intrapersonal differences. This chapter concludes with an assertion that one should accept a relational understanding of colors. Also, several puzzles about color in the philosophical literature that turn on perceptual variation phenomena and in which relationalism provides an elegant and unified resolution is presented in the latter part of this chapter.

This chapter defends Mind-Independence against a prominent line of objection: the Argument from Perceptual Variation. Coloured objects appear differently to different perceivers and in different perceptual conditions. These facts put pressure on the claim that colours are mind-independent properties: given the dramatic variations in colour experience across conditions and perceivers, which perceivers in which conditions veridically perceive the real colours of objects? This chapter also defends Mind-Independence against different versions of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, appealing to differences in the illumination under which an object is perceived, inter-personal differences (particularly in the perception of the ‘unique hues’), and inter-species variations in colour perception.

This chapter proposes a picture of reference fixing for color adjectives and adjectives for other sensible qualities, according to which the relevant reference-fixing conventions allow those adjectives to be used with different intended standards in different contexts. It is argued that this explains the fact (used by secondary-quality theorists and eliminativists in “perceptual variation arguments”) that different equally normal people classify the same object by means of prima facie incompatible color adjectives, and that the explanation is perfectly compatible with the properties referred to by uses of these adjectives being primary qualities or objective properties. It is also argued that the picture satisfies a number of desiderata not satisfied by other objectivist theories in the literature.

There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need to give up perceptual atomism. It ends with a brief sketch of an alternative called perceptual structuralism.

This chapter introduces the reader to the philosophical debate around color and gives an overview of the central themes and conclusions of the book. It proposes that there are two distinct ways of setting up the problem of color ontology. The first is through cases of perceptual variation (as illustrated by Betrand Russell) and the second is through the clash of the “manifest” and “scientific images” (as illustrated by Arthur Eddington and Wilfrid Sellars). Comparisons are drawn between the debate over color and other topics in philosophy concerning the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between neurophysiology and psychology, and more generally, the place of mind in nature.