Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on the justification of perceptual beliefs. It begins by considering various theories of justification. It argues that the most attractive view of perceptual justification is ...
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This chapter focuses on the justification of perceptual beliefs. It begins by considering various theories of justification. It argues that the most attractive view of perceptual justification is that perceptual beliefs are justified in virtue of their relation to propositional-content-bearing experiences. A problem for this attractive view is discussed.Less
This chapter focuses on the justification of perceptual beliefs. It begins by considering various theories of justification. It argues that the most attractive view of perceptual justification is that perceptual beliefs are justified in virtue of their relation to propositional-content-bearing experiences. A problem for this attractive view is discussed.
David James Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198833314
- eISBN:
- 9780191871658
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to ...
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According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To avoid this result, the anti-Cartesian must either license an unacceptable epistemic chauvinism, or else claim that merely reflecting on one’s experiences defeats perceptual justification. This leaves us with a puzzle: Although Cartesianism faces problems, avoiding them brings a new set of problems.Less
According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To avoid this result, the anti-Cartesian must either license an unacceptable epistemic chauvinism, or else claim that merely reflecting on one’s experiences defeats perceptual justification. This leaves us with a puzzle: Although Cartesianism faces problems, avoiding them brings a new set of problems.
Susanna Siegel
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199289769
- eISBN:
- 9780191711046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and ...
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What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? This chapter argues that kind properties can be represented in experience. The contents of visual experience are not limited to colour, shape, illumination, and motion.Less
What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? This chapter argues that kind properties can be represented in experience. The contents of visual experience are not limited to colour, shape, illumination, and motion.
Michael Rescorla
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The ...
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This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The chapter develops the analysis by comparing how dogmatism and infinitism handle the notorious regress of justifications. It distinguishes four different regress problems. In each case, it argues that that the relevant regress provides no support for infinitism over dogmatism.Less
This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The chapter develops the analysis by comparing how dogmatism and infinitism handle the notorious regress of justifications. It distinguishes four different regress problems. In each case, it argues that that the relevant regress provides no support for infinitism over dogmatism.
Susanna Siegel
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198797081
- eISBN:
- 9780191844348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The examples used to motivate the Rationality of Perception pose the problem of hijacked experience. Part of the problem is that there is some pressure, on the face of it, to deny that these ...
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The examples used to motivate the Rationality of Perception pose the problem of hijacked experience. Part of the problem is that there is some pressure, on the face of it, to deny that these experiences have just as much power to provide justification as they could, if they were not influenced by the subject’s fears, suspicions, or prejudice. Chapter 4 defines the notion of epistemic power, and argues that experiences would indeed lose epistemic power in the cases that motivate the Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, this loss of epistemic power is called “epistemic downgrade.” It is the second conceptual ingredient needed to defend the Rationality of Perception.Less
The examples used to motivate the Rationality of Perception pose the problem of hijacked experience. Part of the problem is that there is some pressure, on the face of it, to deny that these experiences have just as much power to provide justification as they could, if they were not influenced by the subject’s fears, suspicions, or prejudice. Chapter 4 defines the notion of epistemic power, and argues that experiences would indeed lose epistemic power in the cases that motivate the Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, this loss of epistemic power is called “epistemic downgrade.” It is the second conceptual ingredient needed to defend the Rationality of Perception.
Bence Nanay
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190648916
- eISBN:
- 9780190648947
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190648916.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this chapter ...
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There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this chapter is to argue that a different set of findings in perceptual psychology poses an even more serious challenge to the very idea of perceptual justification. These findings are about the importance of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality (such as amodal completion and multimodal completion). These findings show that everyday perception is in fact a mixture of sensory-stimulation-driven perceptual processing and perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality and that we have strong reasons to doubt the epistemic pedigree of the latter process. The implication of this is not that we should become skeptics or deny the possibility of perceptual justification. It is, rather, that the only way in which we can understand when and whether a perceptual state justifies beliefs is by paying close attention to empirical facts about the reliability of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. In this sense (a very narrow sense) epistemology needs to be naturalized.Less
There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this chapter is to argue that a different set of findings in perceptual psychology poses an even more serious challenge to the very idea of perceptual justification. These findings are about the importance of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality (such as amodal completion and multimodal completion). These findings show that everyday perception is in fact a mixture of sensory-stimulation-driven perceptual processing and perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality and that we have strong reasons to doubt the epistemic pedigree of the latter process. The implication of this is not that we should become skeptics or deny the possibility of perceptual justification. It is, rather, that the only way in which we can understand when and whether a perceptual state justifies beliefs is by paying close attention to empirical facts about the reliability of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. In this sense (a very narrow sense) epistemology needs to be naturalized.
Elijah Chudnoff
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198863021
- eISBN:
- 9780191913440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Can the way that an experience is caused make a difference to what that experience justifies believing? Presentational Conservatism implies that the answer to this question is no. It thereby incurs ...
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Can the way that an experience is caused make a difference to what that experience justifies believing? Presentational Conservatism implies that the answer to this question is no. It thereby incurs two explanatory burdens. One is to explain the apparent epistemic downgrade in cases such as Susanna Siegel’s example of Jack looking angry to Jill because of her unjustified fear. Another explanatory burden is to explain the superior epistemic position of expert perceivers such as bird watchers and radiologists whose trained eyes allow them to see more than those with untrained eyes. This chapter argues that Presentational Conservatism has adequate resources to discharge both explanatory burdens.Less
Can the way that an experience is caused make a difference to what that experience justifies believing? Presentational Conservatism implies that the answer to this question is no. It thereby incurs two explanatory burdens. One is to explain the apparent epistemic downgrade in cases such as Susanna Siegel’s example of Jack looking angry to Jill because of her unjustified fear. Another explanatory burden is to explain the superior epistemic position of expert perceivers such as bird watchers and radiologists whose trained eyes allow them to see more than those with untrained eyes. This chapter argues that Presentational Conservatism has adequate resources to discharge both explanatory burdens.
Peter J. Markie
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199899494
- eISBN:
- 9780199367719
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
Is there a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism? Michael Huemer has developed an unqualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism, ...
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Is there a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism? Michael Huemer has developed an unqualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism, but unqualified Dogmatism is false. Michael Bergmann has developed a qualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Foundationalism but inconsistent with Mentalism. I organize my search for a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Foundationalism and Mentalism as follows. After a brief examination of Dogmatism in both its unqualified and qualified forms, I show that two major arguments for unqualified Dogmatism are unsuccessful and that the view is open to compelling counterexamples. With qualified Dogmatism as the remaining option, I explore how best to develop it in the context of Mentalism and Foundationalism, focusing on one approach, the Knowledge How Proposal, in particular.Less
Is there a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism? Michael Huemer has developed an unqualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism, but unqualified Dogmatism is false. Michael Bergmann has developed a qualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Foundationalism but inconsistent with Mentalism. I organize my search for a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Foundationalism and Mentalism as follows. After a brief examination of Dogmatism in both its unqualified and qualified forms, I show that two major arguments for unqualified Dogmatism are unsuccessful and that the view is open to compelling counterexamples. With qualified Dogmatism as the remaining option, I explore how best to develop it in the context of Mentalism and Foundationalism, focusing on one approach, the Knowledge How Proposal, in particular.
Elijah Chudnoff
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198863021
- eISBN:
- 9780191913440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198863021.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Presentational Conservatism is the view that if, and only if, you have an experience that has presentational phenomenology with respect to p, then do you thereby have some prima facie justification ...
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Presentational Conservatism is the view that if, and only if, you have an experience that has presentational phenomenology with respect to p, then do you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. This chapter defends Presentational Conservatism and explores its epistemic implications. Once located in relation to other dogmatist and phenomenal conservative approaches to justification, the view is clarified through discussion of presentational phenomenology and motivated on the basis of reflection on cases and general epistemological considerations. If Presentational Conservatism is true, then various epistemological agendas that have been pursued in the wake of the literature on high-level perceptual content need to be reassessed. Implications for recently popular perceptual accounts of our knowledge of other minds are explored in some detail.Less
Presentational Conservatism is the view that if, and only if, you have an experience that has presentational phenomenology with respect to p, then do you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. This chapter defends Presentational Conservatism and explores its epistemic implications. Once located in relation to other dogmatist and phenomenal conservative approaches to justification, the view is clarified through discussion of presentational phenomenology and motivated on the basis of reflection on cases and general epistemological considerations. If Presentational Conservatism is true, then various epistemological agendas that have been pursued in the wake of the literature on high-level perceptual content need to be reassessed. Implications for recently popular perceptual accounts of our knowledge of other minds are explored in some detail.
Casey O'Callaghan
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198833703
- eISBN:
- 9780191872129
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198833703.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that typical human subjects possess distinctive multisensory perceptual capacities. Empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support the claim that perceivers are ...
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This chapter argues that typical human subjects possess distinctive multisensory perceptual capacities. Empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support the claim that perceivers are differentially sensitive to novel intermodal features, such as identity, simultaneity, motion, causality, and flavor, that could not be perceived using one sense at a time nor using several senses working merely in parallel. In light of their role in grounding cognition and guiding action, such capacities belong to perception, rather than extraperceptual cognition, for the purposes of empirical and rational psychological explanation. Therefore, multisensory perceptual capacities can serve in psychological explanations that deal with subjects and their capacities, in contrast with just subpersonal processes and mechanisms. Multisensory perception targets new features in the world. The joint use of multiple senses thus extends human perceptual capacities.Less
This chapter argues that typical human subjects possess distinctive multisensory perceptual capacities. Empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support the claim that perceivers are differentially sensitive to novel intermodal features, such as identity, simultaneity, motion, causality, and flavor, that could not be perceived using one sense at a time nor using several senses working merely in parallel. In light of their role in grounding cognition and guiding action, such capacities belong to perception, rather than extraperceptual cognition, for the purposes of empirical and rational psychological explanation. Therefore, multisensory perceptual capacities can serve in psychological explanations that deal with subjects and their capacities, in contrast with just subpersonal processes and mechanisms. Multisensory perception targets new features in the world. The joint use of multiple senses thus extends human perceptual capacities.
Susanna Siegel and Nicholas Silins
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199658343
- eISBN:
- 9780191760983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is about the role in epistemology of consciousness outside attention. In Section 1 the chapter argues that we are indeed sometimes conscious of entities to which we do not attend, as ...
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This chapter is about the role in epistemology of consciousness outside attention. In Section 1 the chapter argues that we are indeed sometimes conscious of entities to which we do not attend, as when you remember you saw something you did not notice at the time. In Section 2 the chapter makes a case for the view that consciousness outside attention gives us reasons for belief. In Section 3 the chapter responds to the case against its view. In the conclusion, the chapter surveys the upshots of the issue for traditional debates about ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ in epistemology.Less
This chapter is about the role in epistemology of consciousness outside attention. In Section 1 the chapter argues that we are indeed sometimes conscious of entities to which we do not attend, as when you remember you saw something you did not notice at the time. In Section 2 the chapter makes a case for the view that consciousness outside attention gives us reasons for belief. In Section 3 the chapter responds to the case against its view. In the conclusion, the chapter surveys the upshots of the issue for traditional debates about ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ in epistemology.
Lana Kühle
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190648916
- eISBN:
- 9780190648947
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190648916.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory ...
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This chapter considers how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities—audition, gustation, olfaction, and so on. The chapter takes the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body—interoception—the potential epistemological difficulties remain: How can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience? As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste, and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as this chapter argues, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, the chapter proposes that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand.Less
This chapter considers how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities—audition, gustation, olfaction, and so on. The chapter takes the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body—interoception—the potential epistemological difficulties remain: How can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience? As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste, and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as this chapter argues, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, the chapter proposes that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand.
Susanna Siegel
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198797081
- eISBN:
- 9780191844348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Jill suspects that Jack is angry at her. But she doesn’t know that her suspicion will affect the way Jack looks when she sees him. If Jill’s suspicion that Jack is angry makes him appear angry, does ...
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Jill suspects that Jack is angry at her. But she doesn’t know that her suspicion will affect the way Jack looks when she sees him. If Jill’s suspicion that Jack is angry makes him appear angry, does her perceptual experience give her reason to strengthen her suspicion that he is angry?—Yes, because according to her visual experience, Jack looks angry to her. But No, because her suspicion is illicitly strengthening itself, via Jill’s experience. Both answers can seem plausible, and that is the problem of hijacked experience. Chapter 1 defines perceptual hijacking in general, explains the differences between hijacked experiences and other sorts of perceptual hijacking, and highlights the special epistemological problem posed by hijacked experiences.Less
Jill suspects that Jack is angry at her. But she doesn’t know that her suspicion will affect the way Jack looks when she sees him. If Jill’s suspicion that Jack is angry makes him appear angry, does her perceptual experience give her reason to strengthen her suspicion that he is angry?—Yes, because according to her visual experience, Jack looks angry to her. But No, because her suspicion is illicitly strengthening itself, via Jill’s experience. Both answers can seem plausible, and that is the problem of hijacked experience. Chapter 1 defines perceptual hijacking in general, explains the differences between hijacked experiences and other sorts of perceptual hijacking, and highlights the special epistemological problem posed by hijacked experiences.
Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198833314
- eISBN:
- 9780191871658
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed ...
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Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 6 include the nature of perceptual justification, intentionality, modal knowledge, credences, epistemic supererogation, epistemic and rational norms, expressivism, skepticism, and pragmatic encroachment. The various writers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.Less
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 6 include the nature of perceptual justification, intentionality, modal knowledge, credences, epistemic supererogation, epistemic and rational norms, expressivism, skepticism, and pragmatic encroachment. The various writers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.
Anders Nes
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198803461
- eISBN:
- 9780191841644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
I distinguish two reactions to Russell’s theory of acquaintance, specifically to its claim that perceptual awareness is simpler than and independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of ...
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I distinguish two reactions to Russell’s theory of acquaintance, specifically to its claim that perceptual awareness is simpler than and independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. The conceptualist response, championed inter alia by John McDowell, argues perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are in play in perception. The relationist response, championed inter alia by John Campbell, endorses Russell’s view that perceptual awareness is non-propositional and even non-representational, yet holds it is a relation to physical objects not sense-data. I here point up an underappreciated convergence between McDowell’s recast, non-propositionalist conceptualism and Campbell’s attention-centric relationism; I show how the former can be defended drawing inter alia on some central claims in the latter.Less
I distinguish two reactions to Russell’s theory of acquaintance, specifically to its claim that perceptual awareness is simpler than and independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. The conceptualist response, championed inter alia by John McDowell, argues perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are in play in perception. The relationist response, championed inter alia by John Campbell, endorses Russell’s view that perceptual awareness is non-propositional and even non-representational, yet holds it is a relation to physical objects not sense-data. I here point up an underappreciated convergence between McDowell’s recast, non-propositionalist conceptualism and Campbell’s attention-centric relationism; I show how the former can be defended drawing inter alia on some central claims in the latter.
John Zeimbekis
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198738916
- eISBN:
- 9780191802102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet their phenomenology has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for ...
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Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet their phenomenology has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of vision to ground perceptual justification, and the cognitive/perceptual phenomenology distinction. This chapter explores those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture surface as flat after it has caused visual experiences with volumetric contents, and the ability to use a surface initially perceived as flat to visualize 3D scenes. In both cases, the visual processes which extract viewer-centered volumetric shapes (equivalent to Marr’s 2½D sketch) can be penetrated by cognitively driven acts of visualizing. It then make a proposal about why this form of cognitive penetration does not weaken vision’s ability to provide perceptual justification for beliefs.Less
Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet their phenomenology has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of vision to ground perceptual justification, and the cognitive/perceptual phenomenology distinction. This chapter explores those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture surface as flat after it has caused visual experiences with volumetric contents, and the ability to use a surface initially perceived as flat to visualize 3D scenes. In both cases, the visual processes which extract viewer-centered volumetric shapes (equivalent to Marr’s 2½D sketch) can be penetrated by cognitively driven acts of visualizing. It then make a proposal about why this form of cognitive penetration does not weaken vision’s ability to provide perceptual justification for beliefs.
Mark Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- July 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198868224
- eISBN:
- 9780191904745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198868224.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 12 summarizes and brings together the key lessons of the book. It contrasts the accounts developed in Parts II, III, and IV of the structure perceptual justification, the role of evidence, ...
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Chapter 12 summarizes and brings together the key lessons of the book. It contrasts the accounts developed in Parts II, III, and IV of the structure perceptual justification, the role of evidence, and the nature of knowledge with some of their prominent competitors. The chief morals of Part IV are combined with the chief morals of each of Parts II and III, and it is shown that the resulting combinations have strengths that go beyond the strengths of each package considered separately. And finally, morals are drawn for the ultimate prospects of the idea that reasons come first.Less
Chapter 12 summarizes and brings together the key lessons of the book. It contrasts the accounts developed in Parts II, III, and IV of the structure perceptual justification, the role of evidence, and the nature of knowledge with some of their prominent competitors. The chief morals of Part IV are combined with the chief morals of each of Parts II and III, and it is shown that the resulting combinations have strengths that go beyond the strengths of each package considered separately. And finally, morals are drawn for the ultimate prospects of the idea that reasons come first.