Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285549
- eISBN:
- 9780191713965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the ‘direct’ aspect of direct perceptual realism, and in particular, Kant's theory of non-conceptual perceptual content. A cognition is direct in the Kantian sense if and only ...
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This chapter explores the ‘direct’ aspect of direct perceptual realism, and in particular, Kant's theory of non-conceptual perceptual content. A cognition is direct in the Kantian sense if and only if it refers ‘immediately’ (unmittelbar) to an object, and in turn, a cognition refers immediately to an object if and only if it is non-epistemic (belief-independent), non-conceptual (concept-independent), and otherwise unmediated (in the sense that it does not, or at least need not, refer by means of any other sort of representational faculty, representational content, psychological intermediary, or physical intermediary). Since all beliefs intrinsically contain concepts, then non-conceptuality is both necessary and sufficient for a cognition's being non-epistemic. It is argued that non-conceptuality is also both necessary and sufficient for a perception's being otherwise unmediated. Thus, non-conceptuality is both necessary and sufficient for the directness of perception.Less
This chapter explores the ‘direct’ aspect of direct perceptual realism, and in particular, Kant's theory of non-conceptual perceptual content. A cognition is direct in the Kantian sense if and only if it refers ‘immediately’ (unmittelbar) to an object, and in turn, a cognition refers immediately to an object if and only if it is non-epistemic (belief-independent), non-conceptual (concept-independent), and otherwise unmediated (in the sense that it does not, or at least need not, refer by means of any other sort of representational faculty, representational content, psychological intermediary, or physical intermediary). Since all beliefs intrinsically contain concepts, then non-conceptuality is both necessary and sufficient for a cognition's being non-epistemic. It is argued that non-conceptuality is also both necessary and sufficient for a perception's being otherwise unmediated. Thus, non-conceptuality is both necessary and sufficient for the directness of perception.
John Dilworth
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199585960
- eISBN:
- 9780191723490
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585960.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
A picture provides both configurational content concerning its design features, and pictorial or recognitional content about its external subject. This chapter argues that a picture's design both ...
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A picture provides both configurational content concerning its design features, and pictorial or recognitional content about its external subject. This chapter argues that a picture's design both encodes artistically relevant design content, and in turn that design content encodes the subject content of the picture — producing overall a double content structure. An adequate theory for this structure should be able to explain the ambiguities involved in abstracting two levels of visual content from a single visible surface, as well as explaining the systematic relations between the two kinds of content. The chapter provides an orientational theory — based on a recently developed spatial logic of orientational concepts — for this purpose, and shows how depictive and perceptual content in general can be usefully explained in these orientational terms. This account of picturing also integrates well with a previously developed, more generic double content theory of art, and it is also plausible in cognitive science terms.Less
A picture provides both configurational content concerning its design features, and pictorial or recognitional content about its external subject. This chapter argues that a picture's design both encodes artistically relevant design content, and in turn that design content encodes the subject content of the picture — producing overall a double content structure. An adequate theory for this structure should be able to explain the ambiguities involved in abstracting two levels of visual content from a single visible surface, as well as explaining the systematic relations between the two kinds of content. The chapter provides an orientational theory — based on a recently developed spatial logic of orientational concepts — for this purpose, and shows how depictive and perceptual content in general can be usefully explained in these orientational terms. This account of picturing also integrates well with a previously developed, more generic double content theory of art, and it is also plausible in cognitive science terms.
Bill Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250455
- eISBN:
- 9780191597114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250456.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for ...
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Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.Less
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs about particular objects in the world at all. So there are epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experience lies in its essential contribution to the subject's understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. I explain in detail how this is so; defend my position against a wide range of objections; compare and contrast it with a number of influential alternative views in the area; and bring out its connection with Russell's Principle of Acquaintance, and its consequences for the compatibility of content externalism with an adequate account of self‐knowledge.
Bence Nanay
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195386196
- eISBN:
- 9780199866748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This introductory essay aims to explain why and in what way perception became a very central field of philosophical research by asking what questions contemporary philosophers of perception are ...
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This introductory essay aims to explain why and in what way perception became a very central field of philosophical research by asking what questions contemporary philosophers of perception are concerned with and how they are different from the ‘old’ philosophical questions about perception. The answer is threefold. First, the questions contemporary philosophers of perception are concerned with are that they have intricate links to other subfields of philosophy: epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, aesthetics, even value theory. To put it somewhat provocatively, philosophy of perception no longer seems to be merely a subfield of philosophy of mind. Second, rather than taking for granted that questions about perception are questions about representation, many contemporary philosophers of perception either question the concept of perceptual representation or try to clarify what this concept means. Finally, an important feature of the new way of arguing about philosophical questions concerning perception is that paying close attention to empirical findings about perception seems to be the norm, rather than the exception.Less
This introductory essay aims to explain why and in what way perception became a very central field of philosophical research by asking what questions contemporary philosophers of perception are concerned with and how they are different from the ‘old’ philosophical questions about perception. The answer is threefold. First, the questions contemporary philosophers of perception are concerned with are that they have intricate links to other subfields of philosophy: epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, aesthetics, even value theory. To put it somewhat provocatively, philosophy of perception no longer seems to be merely a subfield of philosophy of mind. Second, rather than taking for granted that questions about perception are questions about representation, many contemporary philosophers of perception either question the concept of perceptual representation or try to clarify what this concept means. Finally, an important feature of the new way of arguing about philosophical questions concerning perception is that paying close attention to empirical findings about perception seems to be the norm, rather than the exception.
Susanna Schellenberg
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198827702
- eISBN:
- 9780191866784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198827702.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that ...
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Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content. The chapter shows that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with representationalism. Most objections to the thesis that perceptual experience has representational content apply only to austere representationalist accounts, that is, accounts on which perceptual relations to the environment play no explanatory role. By arguing that perceptual relations and perceptual content are mutually dependent the chapter shows how Fregean particularism can avoid the pitfalls of both austere representationalism and austere relationalism. With relationalists, Fregean particularism argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.Less
Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content. The chapter shows that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with representationalism. Most objections to the thesis that perceptual experience has representational content apply only to austere representationalist accounts, that is, accounts on which perceptual relations to the environment play no explanatory role. By arguing that perceptual relations and perceptual content are mutually dependent the chapter shows how Fregean particularism can avoid the pitfalls of both austere representationalism and austere relationalism. With relationalists, Fregean particularism argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.
Susanna Siegel
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199289769
- eISBN:
- 9780191711046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and ...
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What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? This chapter argues that kind properties can be represented in experience. The contents of visual experience are not limited to colour, shape, illumination, and motion.Less
What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? This chapter argues that kind properties can be represented in experience. The contents of visual experience are not limited to colour, shape, illumination, and motion.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199756018
- eISBN:
- 9780199395255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the connection between the volume’s remaining fourteen contributions. One of the main observations made along the way is that debates about whether perceptual experience has ...
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This chapter explores the connection between the volume’s remaining fourteen contributions. One of the main observations made along the way is that debates about whether perceptual experience has content cannot be resolved independently of addressing the question of what the constituents of content would be, if perceptual experience did have content. It is also argued that the view that perception has content in a minimal sense, together with uncontroversial assumptions, entails that perception has content in a strong sense.Less
This chapter explores the connection between the volume’s remaining fourteen contributions. One of the main observations made along the way is that debates about whether perceptual experience has content cannot be resolved independently of addressing the question of what the constituents of content would be, if perceptual experience did have content. It is also argued that the view that perception has content in a minimal sense, together with uncontroversial assumptions, entails that perception has content in a strong sense.
Susanna Schellenberg
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019200
- eISBN:
- 9780262315050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds ...
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There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s environment. The chapter starts by motivating content externalism. It then argues that hallucinations are best understood in terms of a deficiency of veridical perceptual experiences. The chapter discusses the consequences of this thesis by developing a view of hallucinations that is committed to externalism about content.Less
There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s environment. The chapter starts by motivating content externalism. It then argues that hallucinations are best understood in terms of a deficiency of veridical perceptual experiences. The chapter discusses the consequences of this thesis by developing a view of hallucinations that is committed to externalism about content.
Susanna Schellenberg
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198827702
- eISBN:
- 9780191866784
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198827702.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 4 develops Fregean particularism, thereby providing the details of my account of singular content. Fregean particularism advances a new understanding of singular modes of presentation: ...
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Chapter 4 develops Fregean particularism, thereby providing the details of my account of singular content. Fregean particularism advances a new understanding of singular modes of presentation: perceptual content is constituted by the perceptual capacities employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out. These modes of presentation can be individuated at the level of content types and token contents. Perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions with the same phenomenal character are constituted by employing the same perceptual capacities; they thereby share a content type. But the token content of perception, hallucination, and illusion differs at least in part. If one perceives a particular, one employs perceptual capacities that successfully single out that particular. Thereby, the token content is constituted by the particular singled out and thus is singular content. If one fails to single out a particular (perhaps because one is suffering an illusion or hallucination), the token content is gappy.Less
Chapter 4 develops Fregean particularism, thereby providing the details of my account of singular content. Fregean particularism advances a new understanding of singular modes of presentation: perceptual content is constituted by the perceptual capacities employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out. These modes of presentation can be individuated at the level of content types and token contents. Perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions with the same phenomenal character are constituted by employing the same perceptual capacities; they thereby share a content type. But the token content of perception, hallucination, and illusion differs at least in part. If one perceives a particular, one employs perceptual capacities that successfully single out that particular. Thereby, the token content is constituted by the particular singled out and thus is singular content. If one fails to single out a particular (perhaps because one is suffering an illusion or hallucination), the token content is gappy.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251582
- eISBN:
- 9780191598012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251584.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this previously unpublished follow‐up to ‘Another Look at Colour’, McGinn evaluates a possible objection to the account developed there. In McGinn's view, ‘colours are simple monadic primitive ...
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In this previously unpublished follow‐up to ‘Another Look at Colour’, McGinn evaluates a possible objection to the account developed there. In McGinn's view, ‘colours are simple monadic primitive properties whose instantiation supervenes on complex relational dispositions to appear to perceivers in such‐and‐such ways’. According to the objection (which McGinn labels ‘the neutrality thesis’), the phenomenology of colour experience is wholly uninformative with respect to the ontological nature of colour (i.e. the kind of property colours must be); thus, for instance, the question of whether colours are identical to, or rather supervene on, dispositions need not arise. McGinn argues against the neutrality thesis, ultimately defending a kind of externalism about perceptual content, according to which ‘visual experience is a relation between a conscious subject and a cluster of properties, which may or may not be instantiated’. McGinn concludes by criticizing McDowell's neo‐Kantian view of perceptual appearance.Less
In this previously unpublished follow‐up to ‘Another Look at Colour’, McGinn evaluates a possible objection to the account developed there. In McGinn's view, ‘colours are simple monadic primitive properties whose instantiation supervenes on complex relational dispositions to appear to perceivers in such‐and‐such ways’. According to the objection (which McGinn labels ‘the neutrality thesis’), the phenomenology of colour experience is wholly uninformative with respect to the ontological nature of colour (i.e. the kind of property colours must be); thus, for instance, the question of whether colours are identical to, or rather supervene on, dispositions need not arise. McGinn argues against the neutrality thesis, ultimately defending a kind of externalism about perceptual content, according to which ‘visual experience is a relation between a conscious subject and a cluster of properties, which may or may not be instantiated’. McGinn concludes by criticizing McDowell's neo‐Kantian view of perceptual appearance.
Mohan Matthen
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199268504
- eISBN:
- 9780191602283
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268509.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as active devices for data extraction B rather than, in the traditional way, as passive ...
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Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as active devices for data extraction B rather than, in the traditional way, as passive recorders of ambient energy patterns.Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines that assign real-world objects to classes. A sense feature is the property of belonging to such a class. A sensory experience, or sensation, is a label that the system uses in order to allow the organism access to the classifications that it has performed. This Sensory Classification Thesis (SCT), discussed in Chs 1–3, inverts the normally assumed relationship between sensory classes and sensations. Philosophers standardly hold that red is to be defined in terms of the sensation of red; here, sensations derive from sensory classes and are thus unsuitable for defining them. SCT is a simplification: some sensory systems order real-world objects in relations of similarity, and do not just put them into discrete classes (Chs 4–5). SCT makes sense of sensory specialization across species—different kinds of organisms employ different classification schemes to serve their idiosyncratic data-extraction needs (Chs 6–8). This leads to an output-driven account of sensory content. Sense features are defined in terms of their aptness for epistemic (not just sensorimotor) actions, and the content of sensations in terms of the features with which they are associated by an internal convention (Chs 9–11). This leads to a form of realism: sensory classifications are correct if the states of affairs in which they consistently occur are indeed right for the actions with which they are paired.Finally, the nature of object perception is explored: Chs 12–13 speculate about the psychological origins of sensory reference and of the feeling in perception that external objects are present (by contrast, for instance, with objects depicted in paintings and photographs).Less
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as active devices for data extraction B rather than, in the traditional way, as passive recorders of ambient energy patterns.
Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines that assign real-world objects to classes. A sense feature is the property of belonging to such a class. A sensory experience, or sensation, is a label that the system uses in order to allow the organism access to the classifications that it has performed. This Sensory Classification Thesis (SCT), discussed in Chs 1–3, inverts the normally assumed relationship between sensory classes and sensations. Philosophers standardly hold that red is to be defined in terms of the sensation of red; here, sensations derive from sensory classes and are thus unsuitable for defining them. SCT is a simplification: some sensory systems order real-world objects in relations of similarity, and do not just put them into discrete classes (Chs 4–5).
SCT makes sense of sensory specialization across species—different kinds of organisms employ different classification schemes to serve their idiosyncratic data-extraction needs (Chs 6–8). This leads to an output-driven account of sensory content. Sense features are defined in terms of their aptness for epistemic (not just sensorimotor) actions, and the content of sensations in terms of the features with which they are associated by an internal convention (Chs 9–11). This leads to a form of realism: sensory classifications are correct if the states of affairs in which they consistently occur are indeed right for the actions with which they are paired.
Finally, the nature of object perception is explored: Chs 12–13 speculate about the psychological origins of sensory reference and of the feeling in perception that external objects are present (by contrast, for instance, with objects depicted in paintings and photographs).
Gerhard Preyer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199697519
- eISBN:
- 9780191742316
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697519.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
In recent decades the analysis of the connection of truth, meaning, and the mental has been a major philosophical question, and Donald Davidson has brought together these subjects in a unified theory ...
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In recent decades the analysis of the connection of truth, meaning, and the mental has been a major philosophical question, and Donald Davidson has brought together these subjects in a unified theory of thought, meaning, action, and evaluation. This volume features specially written essays from the most important philosophers working on the subject, and the collection reappraises Davidson’s philosophy with an engaging and illuminating discussion of various problems in the philosophy of truth, meaning, and the mental. In particular, Lepore and Ludwig’s interpretation of Davidson’s philosophy presents a new look and systematization of his philosophy of language, meaning, and thought. Davidson has been a considerable presence in the philosophical landscape since the 1970s, but from the contemporary point of view we have yet to come to a decision about his final place in the annals of philosophy.Less
In recent decades the analysis of the connection of truth, meaning, and the mental has been a major philosophical question, and Donald Davidson has brought together these subjects in a unified theory of thought, meaning, action, and evaluation. This volume features specially written essays from the most important philosophers working on the subject, and the collection reappraises Davidson’s philosophy with an engaging and illuminating discussion of various problems in the philosophy of truth, meaning, and the mental. In particular, Lepore and Ludwig’s interpretation of Davidson’s philosophy presents a new look and systematization of his philosophy of language, meaning, and thought. Davidson has been a considerable presence in the philosophical landscape since the 1970s, but from the contemporary point of view we have yet to come to a decision about his final place in the annals of philosophy.
Bence Nanay
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199695379
- eISBN:
- 9780191760747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695379.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
If pragmatic representations are perceptual states, then a number of important debates in the philosophy of perception need to be re-evaluated. This chapter argues that the perceptually attributed ...
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If pragmatic representations are perceptual states, then a number of important debates in the philosophy of perception need to be re-evaluated. This chapter argues that the perceptually attributed properties (that is, the properties we perceive objects as having) include “action-properties”—properties relevant for the performance of one’s action. Further, the focus on pragmatic representations also provides new insights for the debate about “sensory individuals”—the objects we perceive. It is also argued that we do need to talk about perceptual representations in order to describe some features of perception, and that pragmatic representations are not to be considered as the representation of the dorsal visual subsystem.Less
If pragmatic representations are perceptual states, then a number of important debates in the philosophy of perception need to be re-evaluated. This chapter argues that the perceptually attributed properties (that is, the properties we perceive objects as having) include “action-properties”—properties relevant for the performance of one’s action. Further, the focus on pragmatic representations also provides new insights for the debate about “sensory individuals”—the objects we perceive. It is also argued that we do need to talk about perceptual representations in order to describe some features of perception, and that pragmatic representations are not to be considered as the representation of the dorsal visual subsystem.
Anna Marmodoro
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199326006
- eISBN:
- 9780199349876
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we ...
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How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? Are the five senses sufficient for the perception of objects? Aristotle was the first to investigate these questions to a depth that makes his account fruitful even for contemporary philosophy, but also challenging. He addressed them by means of the metaphysical modeling of the unity of the perceptual faculty and the unity of perceptual content. This book offers a reconstruction of the six metaphysical models offered by Aristotle to address these and related questions, focusing on their metaphysical underpinning in his theory of causal powers. By doing so, the book brings out what is especially valuable and even surprising about the topic: Aristotle’s metaphysics of perception is fundamentally different from his metaphysics of substance. Yet, for precisely this reason, his models of perceptual content are unexplored territory. This book is groundbreaking in charting this new territory: it offers an understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics of the content of perceptual experience and of the composition of the perceptual faculty, and aims at bringing out the breakthroughs Aristotle achieved.Less
How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? Are the five senses sufficient for the perception of objects? Aristotle was the first to investigate these questions to a depth that makes his account fruitful even for contemporary philosophy, but also challenging. He addressed them by means of the metaphysical modeling of the unity of the perceptual faculty and the unity of perceptual content. This book offers a reconstruction of the six metaphysical models offered by Aristotle to address these and related questions, focusing on their metaphysical underpinning in his theory of causal powers. By doing so, the book brings out what is especially valuable and even surprising about the topic: Aristotle’s metaphysics of perception is fundamentally different from his metaphysics of substance. Yet, for precisely this reason, his models of perceptual content are unexplored territory. This book is groundbreaking in charting this new territory: it offers an understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics of the content of perceptual experience and of the composition of the perceptual faculty, and aims at bringing out the breakthroughs Aristotle achieved.
Fiona Macpherson
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198738916
- eISBN:
- 9780191802102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires ...
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This chapter seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires affect one’s perceptual experience in a particular way. This chapter examines two different models of cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. It argues that one model of cognitive penetration—‘classic’ cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of the accounts of nonconceptual content that It identifys. The chapter then considers the other model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration ‘lite’. It provides reasons to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. Moreover, it argues that the account of nonconceptual content that it is not compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be abandoned. Thus, it claims that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content.Less
This chapter seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires affect one’s perceptual experience in a particular way. This chapter examines two different models of cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. It argues that one model of cognitive penetration—‘classic’ cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of the accounts of nonconceptual content that It identifys. The chapter then considers the other model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration ‘lite’. It provides reasons to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. Moreover, it argues that the account of nonconceptual content that it is not compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be abandoned. Thus, it claims that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content.
Paul Noordhof
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198786054
- eISBN:
- 9780191827747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
One dimension of the controversy over whether evaluative properties are presented in perceptual content has general roots in the debate over whether perceptual content, in general, is rich or ...
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One dimension of the controversy over whether evaluative properties are presented in perceptual content has general roots in the debate over whether perceptual content, in general, is rich or austere. This chapter argues that we need to recognize a level of rich non-sensory perceptual content, drawing on experiences of chicken sexing and speech perception, to capture what our experience is like and our epistemic entitlements. In both cases (and many others), we are not conscious of the precise perceptual cues that are the basis for discriminations and, thus, the characterization of the phenomenal content of such experiences must go beyond sensory properties. Nevertheless, this point is arguably insufficient to establish the perception of evaluative properties. Their representation requires the subject to respond in certain ways. The chapter discusses how this should go for the case of pain and then, in outline, for moral properties.Less
One dimension of the controversy over whether evaluative properties are presented in perceptual content has general roots in the debate over whether perceptual content, in general, is rich or austere. This chapter argues that we need to recognize a level of rich non-sensory perceptual content, drawing on experiences of chicken sexing and speech perception, to capture what our experience is like and our epistemic entitlements. In both cases (and many others), we are not conscious of the precise perceptual cues that are the basis for discriminations and, thus, the characterization of the phenomenal content of such experiences must go beyond sensory properties. Nevertheless, this point is arguably insufficient to establish the perception of evaluative properties. Their representation requires the subject to respond in certain ways. The chapter discusses how this should go for the case of pain and then, in outline, for moral properties.
Dustin Stokes
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198786054
- eISBN:
- 9780191827747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics maintain that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there are many reasons to be sceptical ...
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Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics maintain that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there are many reasons to be sceptical of this. This chapter defends the thesis—that aesthetic properties are sometimes represented in perceptual experience—against one of those sceptical opponents who maintains that perception represents only low-level properties, and since all theorists agree that aesthetic properties are not low-level properties, perception does not represent aesthetic properties. This chapter offers a novel argument—the argument from seeing-as—against that sceptic which moves from consideration of ambiguous figures to consideration of visual art, concluding that aesthetic properties are sometimes perceived and delivers a general lesson for philosophy of perception. Contrary to extant theories of rich perceptual content, aesthetic properties are better candidates for high-level perceptual contents than standardly theorized rich contents like natural kinds.Less
Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics maintain that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there are many reasons to be sceptical of this. This chapter defends the thesis—that aesthetic properties are sometimes represented in perceptual experience—against one of those sceptical opponents who maintains that perception represents only low-level properties, and since all theorists agree that aesthetic properties are not low-level properties, perception does not represent aesthetic properties. This chapter offers a novel argument—the argument from seeing-as—against that sceptic which moves from consideration of ambiguous figures to consideration of visual art, concluding that aesthetic properties are sometimes perceived and delivers a general lesson for philosophy of perception. Contrary to extant theories of rich perceptual content, aesthetic properties are better candidates for high-level perceptual contents than standardly theorized rich contents like natural kinds.
Anna Marmodoro
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199326006
- eISBN:
- 9780199349876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
For Aristotle our only means for perceiving the world are the five senses, each individuated by the type of perceptible qualities it is sensitive to: colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc. Do we ...
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For Aristotle our only means for perceiving the world are the five senses, each individuated by the type of perceptible qualities it is sensitive to: colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc. Do we perceive only one perceptible quality at a time? Are perceptual qualities given individually, separately in perception, even if contemporaneously? If this were the case, we would not perceive objects, or discriminate and compare their qualities. But we do perceive objects and discriminate and compare their qualities. How is it that we can become aware of perceptual content that does not consist of isolated perceptible qualities at a time? How do we achieve complex perceptual content?Less
For Aristotle our only means for perceiving the world are the five senses, each individuated by the type of perceptible qualities it is sensitive to: colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc. Do we perceive only one perceptible quality at a time? Are perceptual qualities given individually, separately in perception, even if contemporaneously? If this were the case, we would not perceive objects, or discriminate and compare their qualities. But we do perceive objects and discriminate and compare their qualities. How is it that we can become aware of perceptual content that does not consist of isolated perceptible qualities at a time? How do we achieve complex perceptual content?
Anna Marmodoro
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199326006
- eISBN:
- 9780199349876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199326006.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Aristotle argues that there are a number of perceptual operations that are essential for a full perceptual grasp of the world and its ‘furniture’, which cannot be performed by any one of the special ...
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Aristotle argues that there are a number of perceptual operations that are essential for a full perceptual grasp of the world and its ‘furniture’, which cannot be performed by any one of the special senses. All such operations require the possibility of complex perceptual content. Each sense is defined by its sensitivity to a type of perceptible qualities (sight to colors, etc.). To account for the complexity of perceptual content, Aristotle argues for a common sense. The common sense is a perceptual power that makes possible awareness of multimodal content. The complexity of the content derives either from the world, or from the operations of the common sense itself on the content, enabling perceptual discrimination, cross modal-binding, etc.Less
Aristotle argues that there are a number of perceptual operations that are essential for a full perceptual grasp of the world and its ‘furniture’, which cannot be performed by any one of the special senses. All such operations require the possibility of complex perceptual content. Each sense is defined by its sensitivity to a type of perceptible qualities (sight to colors, etc.). To account for the complexity of perceptual content, Aristotle argues for a common sense. The common sense is a perceptual power that makes possible awareness of multimodal content. The complexity of the content derives either from the world, or from the operations of the common sense itself on the content, enabling perceptual discrimination, cross modal-binding, etc.
Mohan Matthen
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199756018
- eISBN:
- 9780199395255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer ...
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The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer notion is presented, sensory images include located objects and features predicated of them. Two problems concerning image content are explored. The first is that, even on an enriched conception, image content has certain expressive limitations. In particular, it cannot express absolute location and time (as opposed to spatiotemporal relations) or logical complexity. Yet, perceptual experience does seem to express certain absolute locations—namely, here and now. How can it do so? Second, image content cannot exhaust the significance of perceptual states. This is proved by noting that perception, memory, and anticipation can have the same image content. Yet they have different significance. These problems lead to some general theses regarding perceptual content.Less
The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer notion is presented, sensory images include located objects and features predicated of them. Two problems concerning image content are explored. The first is that, even on an enriched conception, image content has certain expressive limitations. In particular, it cannot express absolute location and time (as opposed to spatiotemporal relations) or logical complexity. Yet, perceptual experience does seem to express certain absolute locations—namely, here and now. How can it do so? Second, image content cannot exhaust the significance of perceptual states. This is proved by noting that perception, memory, and anticipation can have the same image content. Yet they have different significance. These problems lead to some general theses regarding perceptual content.
