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His contemporaries, subsequent historians and biographers, and Woodrow Wilson himself have all agreed that his religious convictions are crucial to understanding the Democrat’s political thought and actions. Wilson revered the Bible, wore out several of them during his life, quoted it frequently, and sought to use its principles to guide his work as president. He prayed every day on his knees and followed Presbyterian standards in his personal life. While concurring that Wilson’s faith is pivotal to understanding him, scholars disagree over whether it had a positive or negative impact on his performance as president and his policies. Wilson’s firmly rooted and fervently cherished Calvinist faith significantly influenced his thought and actions as president. Clearly America’s preeminent Presbyterian statesman, Wilson’s faith is evident in his philosophy of government, his view of America’s mission in the world, and many of his major domestic and foreign policies, especially his attempts to mediate among the combatants in World War I, his decision to involve the United States in the war, and his role in devising the Paris Peace treaties and the League of Nations.

Starts by pointing out that if the Berlin and Brussels Acts and the experience of the Congo Free State (as discussed in the last chapter) are understood as representing the internationalization of the idea of trusteeship, then the League of Nations mandates system might be understood as representing its institutionalization in international society. Examines the current of ideas from which the institutionalization of trusteeship arose out of the debates concerning the disposal of German colonies conquered during the First World War, and the subsequent compromise that resulted in the creation of the mandates system, which stands as a response to the problem of ordering relations of Europeans and non‐Europeans by reconciling the obligations of trusteeship and the search for national security in a single institutional arrangement. The victorious Allied powers divided Germany's colonial possessions amongst themselves, in no small part for reasons of national security, but in assuming administrative responsibility for these territories they also accepted the oversight of ‘international machinery’ to ensure that the work of civilization was being done. The seven sections of the chapter are: War and the Old Diplomacy; Trusteeship or Annexation?; From the New World—the effect of the Russian revolution and the entry into the First World War of the US on the French and British annexation policy and Woodrow Wilson's ideas for peace; The Mandates System—the birth of the League of Nations; Impasse at Versailles—the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Versailles Peace Treaty; Trusteeship or Deception—the obligations and defects of the League of Nations Covenant; and Novelty and Tradition—the compromise of the League of Nations system.

The peace treaties with the other defeated belligerents were slowly but steadily concluded over the succeeding months: with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. While for the ‘big three’ the German treaty was the centre of major interest, the pre-war map of eastern Europe was even more drastically altered in terms of states and boundaries. Austria-Hungary ceased to exist. New states emerged at the expense of the defeated Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and tsarist empires. The treaties changed the domestic composition as well as the geographic lines of the older Balkan countries. Poland was resurrected and Czechoslovakia created; Serbia was transformed into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Romania doubled in population and size. Greece should have made substantial territorial gains; Albania was left in its state of anarchy. The result in the Balkan peninsula was to heighten the sense of difference between the winners and losers from the war.

This chapter investigates the declining use of peace treaties to conclude interstate war. The main argument of the chapter is that states have reacted to the proliferation of the laws of war by evading the formalities of war, including the use of peace treaties to end wars. The chapter’s findings support this argument, as well as extensions including the hypothesis that states that violate the laws of war during conflict are especially unlikely to conclude peace treaties. The chapter ends with a discussion of the relationship between declarations of war and peace treaties in interstate war, and finds that the use of these two formalities is highly correlated.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, both as a confidante of the Prime Minister and as professional head of the army, Henry Wilson continued to play a central role in the policy-making process. He began to worry about future military commitments as the internal political turmoil which had steadily undermined the German war effort now threatened to engulf the whole state. There was also the need for the military to supply post-war garrisons across the British empire, as well as armies of occupation. Although Wilson foresaw the establishment of a long-service voluntary army on the pre-war model, he also pressed for the continuance of conscription. After the signing of the Versailles peace treaty, David Lloyd George turned from foreign to domestic affairs. The prospect he had offered in the 1918 election campaign of domestic reconstruction and reform was underpinned by a fundamental democratisation of the British political system.

This chapter asks: why has the use of peace treaties to conclude civil wars increased in recent years? The main argument of the chapter is that the international community – which often provides critical support to both states and rebels fighting civil wars – has developed a taste for peace treaties. Rebel groups are likely to be willing to sign peace treaties because having a seat at the table accords them some legitimacy. States, while less interested in concluding peace treaties in civil wars, do so under pressure from the international community. But peace treaties are not always an inherent good in that they are not always associated with peace.

However coloured by medieval (chiefly ecclesiastical) polemic, and by constitutionalists of a statist cast of mind misapplying the concepts of the modern nation, fortresses (castles in the original comprehensive usage) were not so much private force embodied in stone (or earthwork and timber, latterly brick) as, rather, the most conspicuous contemporary and still surviving manifestation of the socially diffusive medieval ruling class. This art, along with the ‘religious’ architecture to which it is so closely related as to be indistinguishable, was among the most noble achievements of medieval culture. Since fortifying, like the ‘arms-ban’, operated as a noble perquisite, the restraining hand of the ‘public interest’ must be pursued also in other directions than ‘military activities’. Political as well as social motives were involved. This chapter looks at castles, fortresses, and fortifications as means of peacekeeping and pacification in England and France during the medieval period.

To many authors, the Westphalia Peace Treaties, negotiated in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), were the first solemn statements of juridical equality between states, representing the genesis of modern international society, which established a system of states. At the same time, it was “the plain affirmation of the statement of absolute independence of the different state orders.” These documents serve as the “birth certificate” of the modern, sovereign nation-state, the base of the present democratic state, and the founding moment of the international political system. This chapter focuses on the consequences of the Westphalia Peace Treaties for constitutional law.

Van de Ven argues that the 1952 Peace Treaty between the Republic of China and Japan was less a peace treaty than one of a series of US-inspired treaties to contain communism in East Asia. It was important because it meant that the Nationalists would be regarded as one of the victorious allies; because it turned Japan away from concluding an agreement with the PRC and steered it toward Taiwan and other states in South and Southeast Asia; and, finally, because it would form a cornerstone of a political order in East Asia which remaind in place today. Van de Ven demonstrates that many issues that bedevil interstate relations in East Asia, such as the status of Taiwan, have their origins in the negotations leading up to this treaty.

This chapter focuses on the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979. The first part examines whether societal or statist strategies and motivations inspired the treaty between these longstanding enemies. The second part examines why the agreement has endured but has not become a stable peace. It concludes that the treaty was motivated by a statist logic, principally the need of both parties to secure US military and economic assistance—as well as to respond to American coaxing and pressure—and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's urgent need to alleviate domestic economic and political pressures that threatened to topple him from power. Unlike in the Western European case, however, the treaty was never socialized with the help of democratization, international institutions, the generation of extensive bilateral economic interaction, or the elimination of the state-to-nation imbalance. Consequently, while the treaty has endured for statist reasons, it remains fundamentally unstable.

Peace agreements address the issue of cultural heritage in three ways: restitution and restoration of cultural heritage as reparations between existing states, post-conflict; cultural rights guarantees and restitution and protection of cultural heritage within existing states; and cultural rights guarantees and restitution and protection of cultural heritage in new states, being the latest iteration. This chapter explores the implications of this three-tiered typology for the implementation of cultural heritage law — with particular reference to restitution — using the relevant peace treaties arising from the Paris Peace Conferences of 1919 as case studies. These treaties not only typify the ‘old wine in new bottles’ adage but laid down foundational principles for contemporary international cultural heritage law, and their implementation schema may provide potential solutions for the resolution of disputes today.

This chapter examines the Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty of 1994. The parties engaged in peacemaking because of statist pressures: both Israel and Jordan faced greater regional threats than their traditional rival; Jordan encountered immense pressure to restore its relationship with Washington after it adopted a policy of neutrality during the 1991 Gulf War, and King Hussein needed US economic assistance in order to help him cope with threats to his hold on power. The postagreement phase in this case is similar to that in the Egyptian–Israeli case in Chapter 3. Although there was somewhat more bilateral economic exchange between Israel and Jordan than between Egypt and Israel, it was negligible. In this case, too, no serious efforts have been made to entrench the peace treaty through economic, institutional, or grievance-reducing strategies. As a result, this treaty, too, has yielded a peace settlement that is far from stable but endures because the two states continue to have top-down reasons to adhere to it.

The rule enshrined in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention is not a mere statement of principle: international practice confirms that it reflects a customary rule which, however, does not play a significant role as regards coerced peace treaties. Cases such as those concerning the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between Congo and Uganda or the Military and Technical Agreement between Serbia and KFOR show that victims of coercion tend to waive their claim as to the validity of peace treaties, since they have a strong interest in their implementation. The possibility of such a waiver is discussed in the light of Article 45 of the Vienna Convention and of the peremptory nature of the prohibition of the use of force.

This chapter models the instability of peace agreements, motivated by the empirical regularity with which peace agreements tend to break down following civil war. When war provides opportunities for profit to one side, or when other difficulties such as historical grievances exist, peace may become incentive incompatible. The party that has something to gain from surprise warfare may agree to peace, but will later renege on it. It is shown that the levels of conflict chosen by this group are an increasing function of both grievance and greed, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. Peace is achievable via externally devised mechanisms that enhance commitment to peace. Aid and direct military peacekeeping intervention (sanctions) can reduce or eliminate conflict. These sanctions, however, need to be credible. Finally, the independent provision and finance of international sanctions are considered. When these arrangements yield little benefit to financial sponsors, or are very costly to them, the bite of the sanctions can become ineffective.

This chapter situates the story of relief to both national and foreign refugees in Italy in the immediate postwar years within the entangled internationalisms and Italian struggles to reassert and reframe sovereignty in the aftermath of defeat. Although the concept of intergovernmentalism only originated in the 1960s in the context of nascent European integration, in practice it proved a key aspect of interwar and early postwar politics. Indeed, the retrenchment after 1945 of the nation-state in the international state system gained its most obvious expression in the creation of a series of intergovernmental institutions, including the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies (such as UNRRA, the IRO, and finally the UNHCR). In the realm of refugees, these agencies quite literally mediated between the realms of the state and the international; the UNHCR's statute gave expression to this interstitial role with its requirement that aid provided by states to the displaced be distributed through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In addition, decolonization—which took as its goal national independence and sovereignty—reaffirmed the centrality of the statist principle undergirding the United Nations. The chapter then considers UNRRA's Dodecanese Mission and the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy.

This chapter discusses the following events: the first confidential meeting between Ioffe and Dąbski; Polish territorial terms; the understanding of 5 October; General Żeligowski's capture of the region of Wilno; the final Polish offensive; and the drafting and the terms of the preliminary peace treaty and the armistice.

This chapter provides case overviews of all the remaining instances of regional rivalries that terminated in peace treaties during the twentieth century. Specifically, it examines the settlements between Ecuador and Peru (1998); Italy and Yugoslavia (1954); Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (1952); Russia and Turkey (1921); Ethiopia and Somalia (1988); and China and Japan (1978). By and large, these settlements follow the same pattern. In all cases, statist factors were the most significant motivators of peace, whether it was the emergence of greater threats, great power pressures, regime survival/state-building imperatives, or a combination of these. In only one case (China–Japan) were bottom-up pressures—namely, pressure from business communities that expected gains as a result of peace—at all consequential in the transition, but they played only a supporting role, insufficient to motivate a treaty without significant top-down imperatives pointing in the same direction. The postagreement experiences of these six dyads also conformed to the same pattern. Only three of these agreements were cemented with bottom-up strategies to bring the rival societies on board: the Ecuador–Peru settlement, the Italy–Yugoslavia agreement, and the twenty-first century successors to the Bulgaria–Yugoslavia settlement (Bulgaria and Macedonia), which benefitted (in the latter two cases only after the breakup of Yugoslavia) from the development of joint democracy, bilateral economic exchange, and cooperative regional institutions (or at least the early stages thereof). The remaining agreements, which did not employ societal strategies to any significant extent, either continue to endure in the absence of stability—that is, in the face of mutual recriminations and/or crises—for statist reasons (e.g. the Sino-Japanese treaty) or collapsed when the statist incentives for peace eroded (e.g. the Russo-Turkish settlement).

This chapter examines the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). United States policymakers increasingly recognized the importance of Japan in the Cold War. Indeed, the Truman administration concluded that the recovery of Japan was strategically and economically essential for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Imperative to achieving such ambitions was ending formal occupation by Allied forces and providing a Japanese peace treaty that would allow for its full economic and industrial recovery. However, U.S. plans encountered considerable opposition. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand resented a new commercial challenger in the region and feared a Japanese military revival. As all were signatories to the Japanese instruments of surrender, their support was essential to secure the two-thirds majority required to end formal occupation. The United States' desire for a Japanese peace treaty provided Australia and New Zealand with the opportunity to push for their longtime goal of a security treaty with the United States. Following negotiations, the ANZUS Treaty emerged in February of 1951. The United States, however, excluded the United Kingdom from this newly formed security pact. Washington also brushed aside London's efforts at drafting its own Japanese peace treaty, instead pushing forward a more lenient agreement that largely reflected U.S. wishes.