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Most peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) were founded between 1980 and 1990, in response to heightened conflict in their regions; charismatic leaders – usually highly educated and politically astute – and local networks played instrumental roles. Most P/CROs relied on international funding. South African P/CROs received funding from foreign governments, international multilateral agencies, and religious institutions, Israeli/Palestinian P/CROs from private foreign donors and foundations, and Northern Irish P/CROs mainly from the UK and the European Union. All P/CROs used a variety of tactics, but emphasized a package of tactics that fit their members’ beliefs, interests, and skills; there was only slight variation in tactics across regions, but political context did play a small role in determining “tastes in tactics.” Almost all P/CROs, whatever their initial aspirations, became somewhat formalized as they aged. P/CROs in Northern Ireland tended to frame the conflict in terms of personal attitudes; in South Africa and Israel/Palestine, P/CRO frames emphasized systemic factors.

Assessing the efficacy of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine was difficult because the regions shared no common definition of peace, the political situation in each was constantly evolving, and it was generally difficult to determine causality in complex social processes. Researchers in each region were asked to interview knowledgeable individuals about whether P/CROs had political or cultural influence on their conflicts. Across all regions, there was a consensus that P/CROs had little direct political impact, although Israeli P/CROs played a role in the Oslo process, and South African P/CROs in the Dakar meetings. Political contexts in Israel and South Africa also allowed P/CROs in these countries more access to political parties, and therefore somewhat more influence on the political system. Culturally, P/CROS in all regions were effective in promoting nonmainstream analyses of their conflicts, in introducing new tactics of social action, and in attracting media attention and so a measure of public acceptance. Although they may not have hastened peace, P/CROs probably slowed the course of violence.

This study investigated peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) in three protracted conflicts in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine. P/CROs are citizen‐initiated voluntary organizations that promote peace, reconciliation, and coexistence between parties to their conflicts, and the mutual recognition of the rights of each side. Comparative research on P/CROs faces theoretical and methodological challenges. They can be analyzed as elements of civil society, as social movement organizations, and as organizations focused on the resolution of conflict. P/CROs activities include service delivery, advocacy, dialog promotion, and consciousness raising. The study examined P/CRO characteristics such as membership, ideology, structure, financial and human resources, relations with other organizations, risks encountered, and impact on the conflict. Study methodology was evolutionary and iterative, and involved a three‐phase selection procedure, research by local teams, and oversight by an international advisory board.

The “democratic deficit” and significant British and European financial support for civil society have led to the growth of a large voluntary sector in Northern Ireland, including a diverse collection of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs). P/CROs in Northern Ireland were founded to deal with the symptoms of the conflict, not its real or perceived causes, and member characteristics were largely determined by which symptoms P/CROs focused on; however, most members were broadly left leaning. Some P/CROs targeted specific communities, some sought to influence a broader audience, and others did both. While smaller, less formal P/CROS needed little income, larger groups required more funding, and sometimes had to professionalize in order to secure it, although relationships with funders tended to be relaxed. While P/CROs clearly had no direct impact on the peace process, they did introduce an “inclusivist” philosophy into the political arena, encouraged political debate, and provided an extra tier of progressive leadership.

Participation in civil society was one of the few options for the pursuit of peaceful progressive change in apartheid South Africa, and a range of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) explored this option. These P/CROs were staffed mainly by middle class, white, university educated, English‐speaking males, exhibited significant levels of formalization and centralization, depended heavily on international funding, and were often harassed by the apartheid state. P/CROs were active in antimilitarization activities, mediation, promoting contact between white and black communities, encouraging dialog between elites, and research. Extensive links developed amongst P/CROs, between P/CROs and other kinds of antiapartheid nongovernmental organizations, and between some P/CROs and the mass‐based resistance movements; collectively, these organizations formed a “multiorganizational field.” P/CROs, in concert with the rest of the multiorganizational field, helped project an “emergent reality” – a nonracial and democratic South Africa; established channels of communication between the apartheid state and the resistance movement; and ripened the climate for political change.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) began to develop in Palestine after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, but only a few of these can be considered peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs). P/CRO growth was hindered by the culture of antagonism with Israel, the neopatriarchal structure of Palestinian society and the autocracy of the Palestinian Authority, and the Israeli occupation's stifling effect on civil society, and many Palestinians have preferred armed resistance. P/CROs were usually internally democratic; ideology played an important role in success or failure, most relied on international funding, and all either regarded themselves as complementing the Palestinian Authority or monitoring it. P/CRO activities included human rights advocacy, the representation of Palestinian interests to the international community, and domestic consciousness raising. However, the P/CRO contribution to peace building has been insignificant, and the true Palestinian “peace camp” is the Palestinian Authority.

This study of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine faced several methodological challenges: it had to define P/CROs, draw on both social movement and third‐sector theory, develop research tools to obtain data about P/CROs valid for regional and international analyses, and simultaneously understand P/CROs as a class with common attributes and appreciate differences amongst them. P/CROs are a new organizational classification, different from “peace movement organizations,” an existing classification. The study analyzed P/CROs from three perspectives: social movement theory, third‐sector theory, and the institutional theory of organizations. Four main findings emerged: (1) foreign funding was central to all P/CROs; (2) charismatic leadership was crucial; (3) almost all P/CROs became more professional and formal over time; and (4) while P/CROs played no direct role in the resolution of their respective conflicts, they made important indirect contributions. In particular, P/CROs helped to “sell” future settlements and agreements to their populations. Issues for further research include the preconditions for the emergence of P/CROs, and the assimilation of social movement and third‐sector research.

Increasingly, scholars are recognizing that civil society is important to the prevention of conflict and peace keeping. Peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) are a form of civil society or nongovernmental organizations dedicated to promoting peace and ending violence. This chapter introduces an international comparative study of P/CROs in three protracted conflicts in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine, and justifies the choice of these conflicts. It describes the range of P/CROs studied, difficulties encountered during the study, and study issues, which include: the organizational characteristics of the P/CROs; the methods P/CROs employed; comparisons of P/CROs in the four countries; and the contributions P/CROs made to peace in their regions.

In the late 1960s, and especially after the 1973 war, peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) concerned to resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict, peacefully began to emerge in Israel, and in the 1980s, P/CROs became an integral, although mainly unpopular part of Israeli political life. P/CROs’ activities included consciousness raising and protest, dialog promotion, some professional service provision, and the articulation of propeace arguments. Discord amongst P/CROs over the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the conservative turn taken by the Israeli government and society after Rabin's assassination, left Israeli P/CROs weak and ineffectual by the mid 1990s. Furthermore, they had always been hamstrung by the public's perception of the P/CRO political agenda as naïve and idealistic, by their extraparliamentary status in a country that prioritized parliamentary politics, and by their homogeneous membership – older, middle class, highly educated, urban, secular Ashkenazi Jews, many of them born in the USA. While the Israeli government ultimately took advantage of the propeace attitude fostered by the P/CROs and adopted much of the program advocated by P/CROs, it consistently denied them any credit for or role in the peace process.

This chapter details the conceptual and theoretical approaches of conflict resolution and develops a framework to understanding non-violent attempts to resolve ethno-nationalist conflicts. The chapter focuses on two interrelated arguments. Firstly, that conflict resolution efforts of states, sub-state groups and third parties provide a framework for ending ethno-nationalist violence. Secondly, that conflict resolution as a process develops an understanding of non-violent resolution efforts during the pre-negotiation and negotiation stages. The chapter divides conflict resolution approaches into three levels; the elite, middle-range and grassroots level approaches. As the book addresses peacemaking efforts between states, opposition groups and third parties, the relevance of the elite level approaches as well as other groups and the initiatives of other actors towards peace are clarified by conceptualising three major parts that play a role in peacemaking efforts: backchannel communications, P/CROs and official negotiations.