George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This argument extends the reputation results of the previous chapter to games in which both players are long-lived. The argument here is complicated by the intertemporal incentives that now appear in ...
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This argument extends the reputation results of the previous chapter to games in which both players are long-lived. The argument here is complicated by the intertemporal incentives that now appear in the choices of the (long-lived) uninformed player. While the results are accordingly somewhat weaker, they again take the form of lower bounds on the payoff of a sufficiently patient long-lived player whose type is subject to some uncertainty. Relatively strong payoff bounds are obtained for games with conflicting interests, games of imperfect monitoring, and games with sophisticated commitment types.Less
This argument extends the reputation results of the previous chapter to games in which both players are long-lived. The argument here is complicated by the intertemporal incentives that now appear in the choices of the (long-lived) uninformed player. While the results are accordingly somewhat weaker, they again take the form of lower bounds on the payoff of a sufficiently patient long-lived player whose type is subject to some uncertainty. Relatively strong payoff bounds are obtained for games with conflicting interests, games of imperfect monitoring, and games with sophisticated commitment types.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency ...
More
This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency for games with binding moral hazard. Extensive illustrations are provided, primarily with the prisoners’ dilemma.Less
This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency for games with binding moral hazard. Extensive illustrations are provided, primarily with the prisoners’ dilemma.
