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 Reputations with Long-Lived Players

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0016
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This argument extends the reputation results of the previous chapter to games in which both players are long-lived. The argument here is complicated by the intertemporal incentives that now appear in ... More


 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency ... More


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