Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead ...
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A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.Less
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
Alan Wertheimer
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199743513
- eISBN:
- 9780199827145
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199743513.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Clinical research requires that some people be used and possibly harmed for the benefit of others. What justifies such use of people? This book provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of several ...
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Clinical research requires that some people be used and possibly harmed for the benefit of others. What justifies such use of people? This book provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of several crucial issues in the ethics of clinical research. Much writing on the ethics of research with human subjects assumes that participation in research is a distinctive activity that requires distinctive moral principles. In most contexts, we allow people to choose the activities in which they engage. By contrast, people are permitted to participate in research only after IRBs determine that it is appropriate for them to do so. Although we assume that consent to participate in research must be preceded by an elaborate disclosure of information, we make no such assumption in many other areas of life. Although it is thought to be morally problematic to provide financial inducements to prospective subjects, we make no such assumptions when we hire people as loggers, fishermen, and fire fighters. Although we readily accept the “off-shoring” of manufacturing, many regard the off-shoring of medical research with great skepticism. This book seeks to widen the lens through which we consider such issues. When we do so, we will find that many standard principles of research ethics are difficult to defend.Less
Clinical research requires that some people be used and possibly harmed for the benefit of others. What justifies such use of people? This book provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of several crucial issues in the ethics of clinical research. Much writing on the ethics of research with human subjects assumes that participation in research is a distinctive activity that requires distinctive moral principles. In most contexts, we allow people to choose the activities in which they engage. By contrast, people are permitted to participate in research only after IRBs determine that it is appropriate for them to do so. Although we assume that consent to participate in research must be preceded by an elaborate disclosure of information, we make no such assumption in many other areas of life. Although it is thought to be morally problematic to provide financial inducements to prospective subjects, we make no such assumptions when we hire people as loggers, fishermen, and fire fighters. Although we readily accept the “off-shoring” of manufacturing, many regard the off-shoring of medical research with great skepticism. This book seeks to widen the lens through which we consider such issues. When we do so, we will find that many standard principles of research ethics are difficult to defend.
Peter de Marneffe
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195383249
- eISBN:
- 9780199870554
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383249.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a “victimless crime,” and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people ...
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Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a “victimless crime,” and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people who do it. Civil libertarians respond that most women freely choose to do this work, and that it is paternalistic for the government to limit a person's liberty for her own good. This book argues that although most prostitution is voluntary, paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are nonetheless morally justifiable. If prostitution is commonly harmful in the way that feminist critics maintain, this argument for prostitution laws is not objectionably moralistic and some prostitution laws violate no one's rights. Paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are therefore consistent with the fundamental principles of contemporary liberalism.Less
Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a “victimless crime,” and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people who do it. Civil libertarians respond that most women freely choose to do this work, and that it is paternalistic for the government to limit a person's liberty for her own good. This book argues that although most prostitution is voluntary, paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are nonetheless morally justifiable. If prostitution is commonly harmful in the way that feminist critics maintain, this argument for prostitution laws is not objectionably moralistic and some prostitution laws violate no one's rights. Paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are therefore consistent with the fundamental principles of contemporary liberalism.
Julian Le Grand and Bill New
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691164373
- eISBN:
- 9781400866298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691164373.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Public Policy
This chapter considers some of the confusions in the literature over the different terminologies used to describe various kinds of government paternalism, including legal paternalism, soft and hard ...
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This chapter considers some of the confusions in the literature over the different terminologies used to describe various kinds of government paternalism, including legal paternalism, soft and hard paternalism, and means- and ends-related paternalism. More specifically, it discusses paternalistic interventions whose intention is to replace the individual's judgment because the government does not approve of the individual's ends—the aims or outcomes that he/she seeks to achieve. It also examines paternalistic interventions that arise because the government perceives problems with the judgment that the individual has made concerning the means that are appropriate for achieving those ends. The chapter concludes by describing the relationship between ends-related paternalism and perfectionism, Ronald Dworkin's understanding of “volitional” and “critical” forms of paternalism as they relate to the means-ends distinction, and moral paternalism and legal moralism.Less
This chapter considers some of the confusions in the literature over the different terminologies used to describe various kinds of government paternalism, including legal paternalism, soft and hard paternalism, and means- and ends-related paternalism. More specifically, it discusses paternalistic interventions whose intention is to replace the individual's judgment because the government does not approve of the individual's ends—the aims or outcomes that he/she seeks to achieve. It also examines paternalistic interventions that arise because the government perceives problems with the judgment that the individual has made concerning the means that are appropriate for achieving those ends. The chapter concludes by describing the relationship between ends-related paternalism and perfectionism, Ronald Dworkin's understanding of “volitional” and “critical” forms of paternalism as they relate to the means-ends distinction, and moral paternalism and legal moralism.
William Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195173475
- eISBN:
- 9780199835331
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195173473.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, ...
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In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.Less
In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.
Lacy K. Ford, Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195118094
- eISBN:
- 9780199870936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195118094.003.0019
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
This chapter discusses the upper and lower South's respective answers to the slavery question, which lay in different ways of reconfiguring the institution. In the upper South, that reconfiguration ...
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This chapter discusses the upper and lower South's respective answers to the slavery question, which lay in different ways of reconfiguring the institution. In the upper South, that reconfiguration was a demographic one. The idea of a demographic reconfiguration of slavery emphasized the gradual whitening of the region and depended heavily on continued lower South demand for slaves and an active internal slave trade. The lower South's reconfiguration was ideological in nature, and it revolved around the embrace of race as the chief justification for slavery, the acceptance of white egalitarianism as the ethos of the region's political culture, and the triumph of paternalism as the lower South's prevailing ideology of slaveholding.Less
This chapter discusses the upper and lower South's respective answers to the slavery question, which lay in different ways of reconfiguring the institution. In the upper South, that reconfiguration was a demographic one. The idea of a demographic reconfiguration of slavery emphasized the gradual whitening of the region and depended heavily on continued lower South demand for slaves and an active internal slave trade. The lower South's reconfiguration was ideological in nature, and it revolved around the embrace of race as the chief justification for slavery, the acceptance of white egalitarianism as the ethos of the region's political culture, and the triumph of paternalism as the lower South's prevailing ideology of slaveholding.
Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Cases illustrating variables relevant to decisions involving teenage pregnancy and motherhood, confidentiality, female genital surgery, and eating disorders are presented. For each topic, empirical ...
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Cases illustrating variables relevant to decisions involving teenage pregnancy and motherhood, confidentiality, female genital surgery, and eating disorders are presented. For each topic, empirical and theoretical factors relevant to the cases are discussed from an egalitarian perspective that addresses the nondominance of minors as well as their capacity for moral agency. A conception of parentalism as an antidote to paternalism and maternalism is proposed.Less
Cases illustrating variables relevant to decisions involving teenage pregnancy and motherhood, confidentiality, female genital surgery, and eating disorders are presented. For each topic, empirical and theoretical factors relevant to the cases are discussed from an egalitarian perspective that addresses the nondominance of minors as well as their capacity for moral agency. A conception of parentalism as an antidote to paternalism and maternalism is proposed.
William Bain
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199260263
- eISBN:
- 9780191600975
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260265.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The international administration of troubled states—whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor—has seen a return to the principle of trusteeship: i.e. situations in which some form of international ...
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The international administration of troubled states—whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor—has seen a return to the principle of trusteeship: i.e. situations in which some form of international supervision is required in a particular territory in order both to maintain order and to foster the norms and practices of fair self‐government. This book rescues the normative discourse of trusteeship from the obscurity into which it has fallen since decolonization. It traces the development of trusteeship from its emergence out of debates concerning the misrule of the East India Company (Ch. 2), to its internationalization in imperial Africa (Ch. 3), to its institutionalization in the League of Nations mandates system (Ch. 4) and in the UN trusteeship system, and to the destruction of its legitimacy by the ideas of self‐determination and human equality (Ch. 5). The book brings this rich historical experience to bear on the dilemmas posed by the resurrection of trusteeship after the end of the cold war (Ch. 6) and, in the context of contemporary world problems, explores the obligations that attach to preponderant power and the limits that should be observed in exercising that power for the sake of global good. In Ch. 7, the book concludes by arguing that trusteeship remains fundamentally at odds with the ideas of human dignity and equality.Less
The international administration of troubled states—whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor—has seen a return to the principle of trusteeship: i.e. situations in which some form of international supervision is required in a particular territory in order both to maintain order and to foster the norms and practices of fair self‐government. This book rescues the normative discourse of trusteeship from the obscurity into which it has fallen since decolonization. It traces the development of trusteeship from its emergence out of debates concerning the misrule of the East India Company (Ch. 2), to its internationalization in imperial Africa (Ch. 3), to its institutionalization in the League of Nations mandates system (Ch. 4) and in the UN trusteeship system, and to the destruction of its legitimacy by the ideas of self‐determination and human equality (Ch. 5). The book brings this rich historical experience to bear on the dilemmas posed by the resurrection of trusteeship after the end of the cold war (Ch. 6) and, in the context of contemporary world problems, explores the obligations that attach to preponderant power and the limits that should be observed in exercising that power for the sake of global good. In Ch. 7, the book concludes by arguing that trusteeship remains fundamentally at odds with the ideas of human dignity and equality.
Joel Feinberg
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195046649
- eISBN:
- 9780199868728
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195046641.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? ...
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Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? Feinberg identifies four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles, each of which is the subject of a volume of his book. In the first volume, Feinberg looks at the principle of harm to others – or the harm principle – which John Stuart Mill identified as the only liberty‐limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) the offense principle: it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) legal paternalism: it is necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism: it is necessary to prevent immoral conduct whether or not it harms anyone. As a thinker who favors liberalism, Feinberg rejects legal paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the harm principle and the offense principle exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Feinberg's examination of the harm principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other concepts like interests, wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. After addressing difficult examples such as moral harm, vicious harm, prenatal harm, and posthumous harm, Feinberg considers both the moral status of a failure to prevent harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms.Less
Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? Feinberg identifies four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles, each of which is the subject of a volume of his book. In the first volume, Feinberg looks at the principle of harm to others – or the harm principle – which John Stuart Mill identified as the only liberty‐limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) the offense principle: it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) legal paternalism: it is necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism: it is necessary to prevent immoral conduct whether or not it harms anyone. As a thinker who favors liberalism, Feinberg rejects legal paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the harm principle and the offense principle exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Feinberg's examination of the harm principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other concepts like interests, wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. After addressing difficult examples such as moral harm, vicious harm, prenatal harm, and posthumous harm, Feinberg considers both the moral status of a failure to prevent harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms.
Alexander Kaufman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294670.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Many scholars view Kant's explicit rejection of the principle of ’welfare’, as a basis for legislation, as decisive in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political ...
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Many scholars view Kant's explicit rejection of the principle of ’welfare’, as a basis for legislation, as decisive in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought. This reading, in fact, misconstrues both the subject matter and analytical level of Kant's claims. First, the traditional interpretation conflates the notion of welfare to which Kant objects with the general notion of social welfare. Second, the traditional interpretation misconstrues the level of generality of Kant's argument: Kant argues against a principle of welfare as the ground of a system of legislation, not as the ground of individual legislative acts.Less
Many scholars view Kant's explicit rejection of the principle of ’welfare’, as a basis for legislation, as decisive in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought. This reading, in fact, misconstrues both the subject matter and analytical level of Kant's claims. First, the traditional interpretation conflates the notion of welfare to which Kant objects with the general notion of social welfare. Second, the traditional interpretation misconstrues the level of generality of Kant's argument: Kant argues against a principle of welfare as the ground of a system of legislation, not as the ground of individual legislative acts.
Cécile Laborde
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199550210
- eISBN:
- 9780191720857
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550210.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Political Theory
Chapter 6 presents a range of radical feminist objections to the hijab ban. It first interprets the paternalistic ban on hijab as a form of state oppression, which claims to coerce individuals into ...
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Chapter 6 presents a range of radical feminist objections to the hijab ban. It first interprets the paternalistic ban on hijab as a form of state oppression, which claims to coerce individuals into being free, in the name of a highly contestable conception of individual autonomy as secular liberation from religion. It then sets out an alternative sociology of contemporary religion to the modernist paradigm implicitly endorsed by laïcistes, showing that the contemporary religious revival is not necessarily a traditionalist and anti-individualistic backlash but is, rather, compatible with ‘post-modern’ agential individualism. Bringing these conceptual and sociological arguments to bear on the moral and normative case, the Chapter then argues that toleration of the hijab in schools expresses respect for Muslim female agency.Less
Chapter 6 presents a range of radical feminist objections to the hijab ban. It first interprets the paternalistic ban on hijab as a form of state oppression, which claims to coerce individuals into being free, in the name of a highly contestable conception of individual autonomy as secular liberation from religion. It then sets out an alternative sociology of contemporary religion to the modernist paradigm implicitly endorsed by laïcistes, showing that the contemporary religious revival is not necessarily a traditionalist and anti-individualistic backlash but is, rather, compatible with ‘post-modern’ agential individualism. Bringing these conceptual and sociological arguments to bear on the moral and normative case, the Chapter then argues that toleration of the hijab in schools expresses respect for Muslim female agency.
Gilles Saint-Paul
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691128177
- eISBN:
- 9781400838899
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691128177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
The general assumption that social policy should be utilitarian—that society should be organized to yield the greatest level of welfare—leads inexorably to increased government interventions. ...
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The general assumption that social policy should be utilitarian—that society should be organized to yield the greatest level of welfare—leads inexorably to increased government interventions. Historically, however, the science of economics has advocated limits to these interventions for utilitarian reasons and because of the assumption that people know what is best for themselves. But more recently, behavioral economics has focused on biases and inconsistencies in individual behavior. Based on these developments, governments now prescribe the foods we eat, the apartments we rent, and the composition of our financial portfolios. This book takes on this rise of paternalism and its dangers for individual freedoms, and examines how developments in economics and the social sciences are leading to greater government intrusion in our private lives. The book posits that the utilitarian foundations of individual freedom promoted by traditional economics are fundamentally flawed. When combined with developments in social science that view the individual as incapable of making rational and responsible choices, utilitarianism seems to logically call for greater governmental intervention in our lives. Arguing that this cannot be defended on purely instrumental grounds, the book calls for individual liberty to be restored as a central value in our society. Exploring how behavioral economics is contributing to the excessive rise of paternalistic interventions, this book presents a controversial challenge to the prevailing currents in economic and political discourse.Less
The general assumption that social policy should be utilitarian—that society should be organized to yield the greatest level of welfare—leads inexorably to increased government interventions. Historically, however, the science of economics has advocated limits to these interventions for utilitarian reasons and because of the assumption that people know what is best for themselves. But more recently, behavioral economics has focused on biases and inconsistencies in individual behavior. Based on these developments, governments now prescribe the foods we eat, the apartments we rent, and the composition of our financial portfolios. This book takes on this rise of paternalism and its dangers for individual freedoms, and examines how developments in economics and the social sciences are leading to greater government intrusion in our private lives. The book posits that the utilitarian foundations of individual freedom promoted by traditional economics are fundamentally flawed. When combined with developments in social science that view the individual as incapable of making rational and responsible choices, utilitarianism seems to logically call for greater governmental intervention in our lives. Arguing that this cannot be defended on purely instrumental grounds, the book calls for individual liberty to be restored as a central value in our society. Exploring how behavioral economics is contributing to the excessive rise of paternalistic interventions, this book presents a controversial challenge to the prevailing currents in economic and political discourse.
Meira Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250448
- eISBN:
- 9780191599750
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250448.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Discusses the relationship between the exercise and development of autonomy and analyses their implications for liberalism and liberal education. Section 2.1 proves that since the liberal state ...
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Discusses the relationship between the exercise and development of autonomy and analyses their implications for liberalism and liberal education. Section 2.1 proves that since the liberal state values adults’ exercise of autonomy, it must also value children's development of autonomy. Section 2.2 argues that state paternalism towards children, in particular, state efforts to help children develop the capacity for autonomy even against their parents’ wishes, is consistent with liberal principles. Section 2.3 argues that parents have privileges rather than rights to control their children's upbringing, but that these privileges nonetheless offer ample scope for parents to exert independent paternalistic control. Finally, Section 2.4 argues that the liberal ideal of autonomy not merely permits but requires the intrusion of the state into the child's life, specifically in the form of compulsory, ‘detached’, autonomy‐driven schools.Less
Discusses the relationship between the exercise and development of autonomy and analyses their implications for liberalism and liberal education. Section 2.1 proves that since the liberal state values adults’ exercise of autonomy, it must also value children's development of autonomy. Section 2.2 argues that state paternalism towards children, in particular, state efforts to help children develop the capacity for autonomy even against their parents’ wishes, is consistent with liberal principles. Section 2.3 argues that parents have privileges rather than rights to control their children's upbringing, but that these privileges nonetheless offer ample scope for parents to exert independent paternalistic control. Finally, Section 2.4 argues that the liberal ideal of autonomy not merely permits but requires the intrusion of the state into the child's life, specifically in the form of compulsory, ‘detached’, autonomy‐driven schools.
William Bain
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199260263
- eISBN:
- 9780191600975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260265.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
On 1 Nov 1994, the UN Trusteeship Council voted to suspend operations after Palau, the last remaining trust territory, attained independence. The sovereign state has emerged out of decolonization as ...
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On 1 Nov 1994, the UN Trusteeship Council voted to suspend operations after Palau, the last remaining trust territory, attained independence. The sovereign state has emerged out of decolonization as the supreme form of political organization in post‐colonial international society—an international society in which dominions, colonies, principalities, free cities, and, of course, mandates and trust territories have all but vanished. However, the ostensible failure of this post‐colonial project—the fact that the promise of peace and prosperity held out by independent statehood is too often betrayed by appalling violence and absolute poverty—has reinvigorated interest in trusteeship as a way of responding to problems of international disorder and injustice. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, it examines the principal dilemma of decolonization that has resulted in a renewed interest in trusteeship; second, it considers this renewed interest in trusteeship in the context of international involvement in administering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and, until recently, East Timor; third, it reflects upon the normative implications that a resurrected practice of trusteeship carries for a society of states that is premised on the juridical equality of all its members. The five sections of the chapter are: The False Promise of post‐Colonial Independence; Innovation and Convention—the case for trusteeship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor; The New International Legitimacy—the resurrection of trusteeship; A Universal Society of States?; and Answering the Call of Humanity.Less
On 1 Nov 1994, the UN Trusteeship Council voted to suspend operations after Palau, the last remaining trust territory, attained independence. The sovereign state has emerged out of decolonization as the supreme form of political organization in post‐colonial international society—an international society in which dominions, colonies, principalities, free cities, and, of course, mandates and trust territories have all but vanished. However, the ostensible failure of this post‐colonial project—the fact that the promise of peace and prosperity held out by independent statehood is too often betrayed by appalling violence and absolute poverty—has reinvigorated interest in trusteeship as a way of responding to problems of international disorder and injustice. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, it examines the principal dilemma of decolonization that has resulted in a renewed interest in trusteeship; second, it considers this renewed interest in trusteeship in the context of international involvement in administering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and, until recently, East Timor; third, it reflects upon the normative implications that a resurrected practice of trusteeship carries for a society of states that is premised on the juridical equality of all its members. The five sections of the chapter are: The False Promise of post‐Colonial Independence; Innovation and Convention—the case for trusteeship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor; The New International Legitimacy—the resurrection of trusteeship; A Universal Society of States?; and Answering the Call of Humanity.
William Bain
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199260263
- eISBN:
- 9780191600975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260265.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Offers some thoughts about the idea of trusteeship and its place in the history of international society. The first section, Unity, Progress, and Perfection of Humankind, puts forward the claim that ...
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Offers some thoughts about the idea of trusteeship and its place in the history of international society. The first section, Unity, Progress, and Perfection of Humankind, puts forward the claim that trusteeship is a historic idea that is distinctive of a particular time and place, and, specifically, that it is intelligible in relation to other ideas that are especially characteristic of the Enlightenment. Thus, trusteeship discloses moral excellence, and indeed obtains powerful justification, when it contributes to the unity, progress, and perfection of the human family. The second section, A Society of States and a Family of Peoples, argues that these ideas call forth an understanding of international life that conceives international society and human society as forming a perfect identity, and which is underwritten by the duty that we should act so as to secure the good of our fellows. The third section, The Limit of Obligation, considers the limits of this duty, and concludes that in seeking the good of our fellows we must stop short of treating people paternally. This conclusion casts a pall of doubt on the legitimacy of trusteeship in contemporary international society, even when it is aimed at protecting fundamental human rights, because it proposes to treat an equal unequally—indeed, trusteeship is morally objectionable because it offends the irreducible sanctity of human personality by repudiating the essence of what it means to be human, a thinking and choosing agent.Less
Offers some thoughts about the idea of trusteeship and its place in the history of international society. The first section, Unity, Progress, and Perfection of Humankind, puts forward the claim that trusteeship is a historic idea that is distinctive of a particular time and place, and, specifically, that it is intelligible in relation to other ideas that are especially characteristic of the Enlightenment. Thus, trusteeship discloses moral excellence, and indeed obtains powerful justification, when it contributes to the unity, progress, and perfection of the human family. The second section, A Society of States and a Family of Peoples, argues that these ideas call forth an understanding of international life that conceives international society and human society as forming a perfect identity, and which is underwritten by the duty that we should act so as to secure the good of our fellows. The third section, The Limit of Obligation, considers the limits of this duty, and concludes that in seeking the good of our fellows we must stop short of treating people paternally. This conclusion casts a pall of doubt on the legitimacy of trusteeship in contemporary international society, even when it is aimed at protecting fundamental human rights, because it proposes to treat an equal unequally—indeed, trusteeship is morally objectionable because it offends the irreducible sanctity of human personality by repudiating the essence of what it means to be human, a thinking and choosing agent.
Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256174
- eISBN:
- 9780191599354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256179.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them ...
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This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy.Less
This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy.
Desmond King
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296294
- eISBN:
- 9780191599668
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296290.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
King concludes by summarizing his major themes and arguing that the policies examined in his book are significant due to their influence on the definition of citizenship, its development in liberal ...
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King concludes by summarizing his major themes and arguing that the policies examined in his book are significant due to their influence on the definition of citizenship, its development in liberal democratic polities, and the duties that such citizenship is said to entail. He explores how the social policies examined in his work have contributed to the implicit boundaries of the public and private as well as the historical balance of rights and obligations. King offers four typologies that aim to capture the ways in which citizenship has historically balanced rights and responsibilities: as a loss of certain rights altogether, citizenship duties, coercive obligations such as workfare and, finally, paternalism.Less
King concludes by summarizing his major themes and arguing that the policies examined in his book are significant due to their influence on the definition of citizenship, its development in liberal democratic polities, and the duties that such citizenship is said to entail. He explores how the social policies examined in his work have contributed to the implicit boundaries of the public and private as well as the historical balance of rights and obligations. King offers four typologies that aim to capture the ways in which citizenship has historically balanced rights and responsibilities: as a loss of certain rights altogether, citizenship duties, coercive obligations such as workfare and, finally, paternalism.
EYAL ZAMIR and BARAK MEDINA
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195372168
- eISBN:
- 9780199776078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372168.003.10
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter analyzes legal paternalism in its various manifestations. It first argues that contrary to prevailing notions, normative economics does not entail principled anti-paternalism. In fact, ...
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This chapter analyzes legal paternalism in its various manifestations. It first argues that contrary to prevailing notions, normative economics does not entail principled anti-paternalism. In fact, the consequentialist nature of standard welfare economics — namely the absence of constraints on promoting good outcomes — opens the door to limiting people's freedom with a view to promoting their own good. Economists ordinarily object to paternalism, but rather than pointing to the intrinsic value of freedom, they base their anti-paternalistic stance on various secondary considerations, thus missing the real dilemmas inherent in paternalism. Adding deontological constraints to the analysis better captures the pertinent issues, and provides more accurate yardsticks with which to evaluate paternalistic legal norms and explain existing ones. The chapter constructs formal models to evaluate the desirability of paternalistic legal norms from both economic and moderate deontological perspectives.Less
This chapter analyzes legal paternalism in its various manifestations. It first argues that contrary to prevailing notions, normative economics does not entail principled anti-paternalism. In fact, the consequentialist nature of standard welfare economics — namely the absence of constraints on promoting good outcomes — opens the door to limiting people's freedom with a view to promoting their own good. Economists ordinarily object to paternalism, but rather than pointing to the intrinsic value of freedom, they base their anti-paternalistic stance on various secondary considerations, thus missing the real dilemmas inherent in paternalism. Adding deontological constraints to the analysis better captures the pertinent issues, and provides more accurate yardsticks with which to evaluate paternalistic legal norms and explain existing ones. The chapter constructs formal models to evaluate the desirability of paternalistic legal norms from both economic and moderate deontological perspectives.
Julian Le Grand and Bill New
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691164373
- eISBN:
- 9781400866298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691164373.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Public Policy
This chapter examines arguments over government paternalism derived from considerations of individual well-being. It begins with a discussion of the classical economic model of rationality and the ...
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This chapter examines arguments over government paternalism derived from considerations of individual well-being. It begins with a discussion of the classical economic model of rationality and the emergence of an alternative model during the twentieth century. It then reviews an increasing volume of evidence from behavioral economics and psychology of the so-called “reasoning failure”: the fact that individuals, in trying to achieve the end of improving their well-being, tend to make mistakes and do so in a systematic way. Four possible sources for such failure are discussed: limited technical ability, limited imagination, limited willpower, and limited objectivity. The chapter concludes by rejecting ends-related paternalism but accepting the well-being case for means-related paternalism.Less
This chapter examines arguments over government paternalism derived from considerations of individual well-being. It begins with a discussion of the classical economic model of rationality and the emergence of an alternative model during the twentieth century. It then reviews an increasing volume of evidence from behavioral economics and psychology of the so-called “reasoning failure”: the fact that individuals, in trying to achieve the end of improving their well-being, tend to make mistakes and do so in a systematic way. Four possible sources for such failure are discussed: limited technical ability, limited imagination, limited willpower, and limited objectivity. The chapter concludes by rejecting ends-related paternalism but accepting the well-being case for means-related paternalism.
Julian Le Grand and Bill New
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691164373
- eISBN:
- 9781400866298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691164373.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Public Policy
This chapter examines the argument that government paternalism harms or inappropriately restricts individual autonomy. More specifically, it considers the criticism that the paternalist government is ...
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This chapter examines the argument that government paternalism harms or inappropriately restricts individual autonomy. More specifically, it considers the criticism that the paternalist government is actually a “nanny state”: the state is seen to treat its citizens as a nanny treats her charges, instead of as autonomous adults. After elaborating on the notion of autonomy, the chapter explores the relationship between paternalism, autonomy, and motivation. It then assesses the claim, associated with soft paternalism, that the individuals affected in fact have little autonomy to be violated. This position is based on the so-called autonomy failure—that is, the justification for paternalism depends in large part on a prior diminution of the individual's capacity for autonomous decision making, so that autonomy is therefore not offended by the intervention. The chapter describes the various circumstances in which this autonomy failure takes place and concludes by analyzing hard paternalism.Less
This chapter examines the argument that government paternalism harms or inappropriately restricts individual autonomy. More specifically, it considers the criticism that the paternalist government is actually a “nanny state”: the state is seen to treat its citizens as a nanny treats her charges, instead of as autonomous adults. After elaborating on the notion of autonomy, the chapter explores the relationship between paternalism, autonomy, and motivation. It then assesses the claim, associated with soft paternalism, that the individuals affected in fact have little autonomy to be violated. This position is based on the so-called autonomy failure—that is, the justification for paternalism depends in large part on a prior diminution of the individual's capacity for autonomous decision making, so that autonomy is therefore not offended by the intervention. The chapter describes the various circumstances in which this autonomy failure takes place and concludes by analyzing hard paternalism.
