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Much of the literature on parties centres on decline and failure, but recently the decline hypothesis has come under attack on both empirical and theoretical grounds, and this has exposed major shortcomings in dominant views (models) of party development, which mostly have offered an externalist view of party development and cast political parties as passive takers of their environment. This view of parties is markedly at odds with the considerable leeway attributed to other political actors and organizations, and whatever the solution to this impasse maybe, it clearly requires looking at party development not only from ‘without’, but also from ‘within’, in ways that capture the two‐ways link between intra‐party politics and resources and inter‐party competition; this perspective brings back not only intra‐party politics as a crucial political arena but also parties as central political actors. Explores this possibility by applying the emerging ‘new’ organizational approach to the trajectory of the French Socialist Party (SFIO, the Section Française de l’lnternationale Ouvrière, until 1971, PS afterwards), which, in the 1970s, staged a spectacular renaissance, and within a decade brought it from near extinction to power—although since then, policy and moral failures have dissipated much of this popular enthusiasm. However, the left's victory at the 1997 elections, the popularity of the current Socialist‐led government, and the weak challenge posed by new politics formations, suggest that much of the capital the PS accumulated in the previous decade remains in place. Provides an internalist account of the PSs jagged trajectory in four parts: the first summarizes externalist approaches to party development; the second analyses the trajectory of the PS over the last three decades in terms of the match and mismatch between party organization and the environment; the third looks at regional variations within this national pattern; and the fourth discusses the resilience of factionalism and draws the implications of this case for the study of political parties.

This chapter seeks to understand how Islamist movements have evolved over time, and, in the process, provide important background on the political and religious contexts of the movements in question. In particular, it shows that Islamist movements coevolve. Focusing on the histories of Morocco's two main Islamist movements—the Justice and Spirituality Organization, or Al Adl wal Ihsan (Al Adl) and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD)—it suggests that their evolutions can only be fully appreciated if they are relayed in unison. These movements mirror one another depending on the competitive context, sometimes reflecting, sometimes refracting, sometimes borrowing, sometimes adapting or even reorganizing in order to keep up with the other.

Why do we see the emergence of strong, cross-ethnic opposition parties in some democratizing regimes, while opposition parties in other countries remain organizationally underdeveloped and often fragment on ethnic lines? Chapter 2 provides a more detailed account of the book’s two major arguments. It begins by defining party strength, focusing especially on the organizational qualities of strong, durable parties. It then turns to the theoretical framework fleshed out in the remainder of the book. The first argument is that authoritarian strategies of rule left in place institutional structures that either facilitated or impeded cross-ethnic collective action. Where authoritarian states relied on alliances with organized labor, they created mobilizing structures that could later be used by opposition parties. Secondly, the book argues that polarizing and confrontational strategies build stronger parties. These kinds of appeals and tactics, however, also raise the likelihood of violence and authoritarian backlash. The book, therefore, underlines one of the ambiguities inherent in democratization: democracy requires strong parties, but party-building is more effective where it intensifies conflict.

This chapter presents the author's reflections on the methods and challenges involved in studying both legal and illegal Islamist movements up close. The author details his attempts to make contact and interview members of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), a political party modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. The author describes an approach he calls “shuttle ethnography,” which combines extended ethnographic fieldwork and the analysis of texts and relevant survey data when available (and appropriate). Like a shuttle diplomat, the author bounced between actors, challenging each group's pontifications with insights and objections culled from their competitors. He found that there was no better way to tease out their beliefs and positions than to invoke this contrarian view; and this allowed me to better understand the nuances and distinctions between and within groups.

This chapter demonstrates how ideologies shaped Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War. The chapter makes two main points. First, partisan ideological differences were central to Turkish policymakers’ choices of international allies and enemies. Shared liberal ideological principles were fundamental to many Turkish leaders’ interest in allying with Israel and joining the European Union, just as large ideological differences separating many Turkish policymakers from Islamist Iran resulted in numerous crises. Conversely, Turkish Islamists viewed Iran as an ally and Israel, the EU, and the United States as enemies, and extreme nationalists joined with Islamists in opposing Turkey joining the EU. Second, ideologies created powerful incentives for ideological exportation. Numerous Turkish politicians believed that spreading Turkey’s secular, democratic regime type would significantly increase Turkey’s security. The policies of Kemalists and the Justice and Development Party, as well as the evolution of Turkish-American relations, receive particular attention in the chapter.

This chapter focuses on Morocco, highlighting how citizens across the North African monarchy rationalize authoritarianism through the prism of strategic utility to U.S. (and EU) ties. Morocco includes one of the most progressive Islamic movements in the region, and citizens, while applauding the movement's moderation, remain wary of its foreign intentions. Enhancing ties with the United States and maintaining ties to Europe were often cited as key reasons why the status quo was preferable to increasing levels of democracy. It became apparent that although the Islamic Party for Justice and Development is considered moderate in terms of its internal Islamic agenda, many in the kingdom worried about the party's stance toward the United States.

This chapter examines Kurds’ participation in the electoral process and the impact of Kurdish actors – and voters – in Turkey’s political framework. The chapter views the Kurds’ enthusiastic participation in elections as an instance of Renan’s ‘daily plebiscite’, and argues that this is an affirmation of their citizenship of Turkey. The Peoples’ Democracy Party’s (HDP) strong performance in the June 2015 election created a wave of optimism amongst Kurds about Turkey’s political future. The chapter argues the Kurds’ assertion of a political identity represent an acceptance of their place in Turkey, not a repudiation of the Turkish political system. The chapter confirms Doǧu Ergil’s findings from 1995, namely that Kurds desire a place within Turkey, and examines the extent to which this is possible in the AKP’s Turkey, focusing on a succession of elections from 2015 until 2019.

The Turkish headscarf debate since the 1980s and current political problems in the Turkish internal setting is the focus of this chapter. The power struggle between seculars and religious political parties; the role of the military and judiciary; the relevance of legal, political, and economic reforms; the emerging new Turkish political and economic elite during the two terms of the governing party Justice and Development starting from 2002 are the major issues in this chapter. At the end, the chapter deals with the victimization of the religious women during the last three decades in Turkey by exclusion of females who wear headscarf from education and public spaces.

This chapter examines the internal debates over party politics that took place within each of the six Islamic movements in question. It examines how ideological priorities and organizational needs influence Islamic movements and their decision-making.

This chapter looks at the effects of participation and non-participation both on Islamic movements and parties, and on the regime before and after the Arab Spring. By looking at how the same behaviour resulted in different outcomes, this chapter examines how Islamic movements reconstitute new political centres in their respective countries.

This chapter highlights Turkey’s nation-building project and how it involved the ‘invention’ of Turkishness as an ethnic category and nationalism as a forge for unity. It thus examines how processes of Turkish and Kurdish identity formation occurred simultaneously and in opposition to each other. It thus highlights how Turkey’s narrow nationalist vision, centred on building a cogent national identity, created the conditions that fomented the ‘Kurdish Question’, i.e., Kurds’ (partially) unresolved demands for political and cultural rights, and resulted in ongoing official suspicion of the ‘Other’. The chapter then discusses how these circumstances changed under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which initially fostered a more inclusive polity, but since the Gezi protests of 2013 has reimposed restrictions and assumed a hegemonic position in politics. The political landscape of contemporary Turkey described here serves as background and context for the chapters that follow.

This chapter examines, the role that religion plays in Kurdish life, and how Kurds have for some time been reassessing their relationship to Islam. Most Kurds and Turks follow of Sunni Islam, but as this chapter contends, following the ascendance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with ‘Islamist’ roots, and the rise of ISIS, Kurds have sought to articulate a distinctive religious stance. This entails a narrative that highlights Kurds’ diversity in religious affiliation and a political vision that is ecumenical in distinction to the AKP’s ostentatious yet narrow religiosity. The chapter further contends that allegations of Turkey’s support of ISIS harden Kurdish opposition to the AKP government and impel Kurds to formulate a more open-minded religious stance.

The concluding chapter brings together threads discussed earlier to argue that while Kurds seek to highlight an identity that is distinct from that of the Turkish majority this does not amount to a rejection of the Republic of Turkey. The book’s findings indicate that Kurdish identity in Turkey can be seen at its core as a political identity. During the rule of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kurds initially saw political opportunity spaces broaden as the government implemented a series of reforms, but as the AKP has become entrenched in power its engagement with Kurds became more autocratic, another attempt at top-down control. The pendulum has swung back towards a system where nationalism is a key political tool, where government figures often accuse the Kurdish opposition of ‘terrorism’. The chapter argues that being able to maintain distinct political positions has been of most importance to Kurds – they want to be able to assert and maintain their identity within an inclusive, democratic Turkey – but as the AKP grows more authoritarian and societal divides widen such aspirations appear unreachable.

This chapter studies the rupture of the Turkish–Israeli alliance at the end of the 2000s. Turkey and Israel in the middle of the 1990s formed a close security relationship that involved extensive security cooperation in a number of areas, including joint military exercises and training, the sharing of intelligence, arms transfers, and the coordinated deterrence of common enemies, especially Syria and Iran. The nature of Turkey's ideological relationship with Israel changed beginning in November of 2002 with the election of the recently created Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish). The AKP's defining identity was a unique hybrid that was dedicated to both political liberalization and the advancement of Islamic ideology and interests. Although this synthesis created an important area of ideological overlap with Israel based on a mutual commitment to democracy, AKP elites more frequently described Israel as an ideological rival because of its oppression of Muslims. AKP leaders on multiple occasions accused Israel of being a “terrorist” state akin to Nazi Germany, the leaders of which should be tried for war crimes. These views transformed the Turkish–Israeli relationship into a frenemy one.