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Much of the literature on parties centres on decline and failure, but recently the decline hypothesis has come under attack on both empirical and theoretical grounds, and this has exposed major shortcomings in dominant views (models) of party development, which mostly have offered an externalist view of party development and cast political parties as passive takers of their environment. This view of parties is markedly at odds with the considerable leeway attributed to other political actors and organizations, and whatever the solution to this impasse maybe, it clearly requires looking at party development not only from ‘without’, but also from ‘within’, in ways that capture the two‐ways link between intra‐party politics and resources and inter‐party competition; this perspective brings back not only intra‐party politics as a crucial political arena but also parties as central political actors. Explores this possibility by applying the emerging ‘new’ organizational approach to the trajectory of the French Socialist Party (SFIO, the Section Française de l’lnternationale Ouvrière, until 1971, PS afterwards), which, in the 1970s, staged a spectacular renaissance, and within a decade brought it from near extinction to power—although since then, policy and moral failures have dissipated much of this popular enthusiasm. However, the left's victory at the 1997 elections, the popularity of the current Socialist‐led government, and the weak challenge posed by new politics formations, suggest that much of the capital the PS accumulated in the previous decade remains in place. Provides an internalist account of the PSs jagged trajectory in four parts: the first summarizes externalist approaches to party development; the second analyses the trajectory of the PS over the last three decades in terms of the match and mismatch between party organization and the environment; the third looks at regional variations within this national pattern; and the fourth discusses the resilience of factionalism and draws the implications of this case for the study of political parties.

This chapter seeks to understand how Islamist movements have evolved over time, and, in the process, provide important background on the political and religious contexts of the movements in question. In particular, it shows that Islamist movements coevolve. Focusing on the histories of Morocco's two main Islamist movements—the Justice and Spirituality Organization, or Al Adl wal Ihsan (Al Adl) and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD)—it suggests that their evolutions can only be fully appreciated if they are relayed in unison. These movements mirror one another depending on the competitive context, sometimes reflecting, sometimes refracting, sometimes borrowing, sometimes adapting or even reorganizing in order to keep up with the other.

Why do we see the emergence of strong, cross-ethnic opposition parties in some democratizing regimes, while opposition parties in other countries remain organizationally underdeveloped and often fragment on ethnic lines? Chapter 2 provides a more detailed account of the book’s two major arguments. It begins by defining party strength, focusing especially on the organizational qualities of strong, durable parties. It then turns to the theoretical framework fleshed out in the remainder of the book. The first argument is that authoritarian strategies of rule left in place institutional structures that either facilitated or impeded cross-ethnic collective action. Where authoritarian states relied on alliances with organized labor, they created mobilizing structures that could later be used by opposition parties. Secondly, the book argues that polarizing and confrontational strategies build stronger parties. These kinds of appeals and tactics, however, also raise the likelihood of violence and authoritarian backlash. The book, therefore, underlines one of the ambiguities inherent in democratization: democracy requires strong parties, but party-building is more effective where it intensifies conflict.

This chapter presents the author's reflections on the methods and challenges involved in studying both legal and illegal Islamist movements up close. The author details his attempts to make contact and interview members of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), a political party modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. The author describes an approach he calls “shuttle ethnography,” which combines extended ethnographic fieldwork and the analysis of texts and relevant survey data when available (and appropriate). Like a shuttle diplomat, the author bounced between actors, challenging each group's pontifications with insights and objections culled from their competitors. He found that there was no better way to tease out their beliefs and positions than to invoke this contrarian view; and this allowed me to better understand the nuances and distinctions between and within groups.

This chapter demonstrates how ideologies shaped Turkish foreign policies after the Cold War. The chapter makes two main points. First, partisan ideological differences were central to Turkish policymakers’ choices of international allies and enemies. Shared liberal ideological principles were fundamental to many Turkish leaders’ interest in allying with Israel and joining the European Union, just as large ideological differences separating many Turkish policymakers from Islamist Iran resulted in numerous crises. Conversely, Turkish Islamists viewed Iran as an ally and Israel, the EU, and the United States as enemies, and extreme nationalists joined with Islamists in opposing Turkey joining the EU. Second, ideologies created powerful incentives for ideological exportation. Numerous Turkish politicians believed that spreading Turkey’s secular, democratic regime type would significantly increase Turkey’s security. The policies of Kemalists and the Justice and Development Party, as well as the evolution of Turkish-American relations, receive particular attention in the chapter.

This chapter focuses on Morocco, highlighting how citizens across the North African monarchy rationalize authoritarianism through the prism of strategic utility to U.S. (and EU) ties. Morocco includes one of the most progressive Islamic movements in the region, and citizens, while applauding the movement's moderation, remain wary of its foreign intentions. Enhancing ties with the United States and maintaining ties to Europe were often cited as key reasons why the status quo was preferable to increasing levels of democracy. It became apparent that although the Islamic Party for Justice and Development is considered moderate in terms of its internal Islamic agenda, many in the kingdom worried about the party's stance toward the United States.

The Turkish headscarf debate since the 1980s and current political problems in the Turkish internal setting is the focus of this chapter. The power struggle between seculars and religious political parties; the role of the military and judiciary; the relevance of legal, political, and economic reforms; the emerging new Turkish political and economic elite during the two terms of the governing party Justice and Development starting from 2002 are the major issues in this chapter. At the end, the chapter deals with the victimization of the religious women during the last three decades in Turkey by exclusion of females who wear headscarf from education and public spaces.

This chapter examines the internal debates over party politics that took place within each of the six Islamic movements in question. It examines how ideological priorities and organizational needs influence Islamic movements and their decision-making.

This chapter looks at the effects of participation and non-participation both on Islamic movements and parties, and on the regime before and after the Arab Spring. By looking at how the same behaviour resulted in different outcomes, this chapter examines how Islamic movements reconstitute new political centres in their respective countries.

When they rose to prominence in the régimes censitaires of the nineteenth century, most political parties were based primarily in parliament and had little external organization. With the advent of mass suffrage, these elite parties were challenged by a new type of organization, the mass party ostensibly rooted in particular segments of society and with extensive extraparliamentary membership organizations that were, in theory, the authoritative voice of the party. By the second half of the twentieth century, both mass parties and the remaining elite parties were evolving into catch-all parties, with the party in public office more assertive of its independence and with parties increasingly working as brokers among competing interests rather than as the agents of particular interest. None of these any longer describes the nature of contemporary party politics, however.

This chapter examines why no coup has been staged by the Turkish military since November 2002. It first discusses the reasons behind the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) ascendancy in Turkish politics and evaluates its performance between 2002 and 2010. In particular, it considers how an Islamist-leaning party such as AKP achieved cultural hegemony in Turkey by focusing on the role played by Fethullah Gülen, founder of the Service Community (Hizmet Cemaat). It also analyzes how AKP altered Turkey's foreign policy that signaled a shift from Kemalist isolationism to what became known as “neo-Ottomanism.” Finally, it explains why the military expanded the Turkish security sector in 1980, along with the troubles faced by AKP that culminated in its loss of control on parliament in the 2015 national elections and the rise of the People's Democratic Party (HDP) led by Selahattin Demirtas. The chapter argues that the AKP not only curbed the military's political influence, but also resolved to punish officers for their past sins, and that the future of Turkish democracy remains uncertain.

How Moroccan Islamists have come to a vision of international affairs compliant with the Monarchy’s view of the Moroccan interest? This chapter sheds light on the evolution of the Party for Justice and Development’s discourse in the domain of international relations and foreign policy. Becoming state-builders at the head of a State that they could not reform the way they initially wanted has made Moroccan Islamism more moderate although initial ideals are still present.

This chapter analyzes the changing role of the military in Turkish politics from guardian to accepting civilian supremacy. Street violence and ineffective coalitions brought another military intervention in 1980. To remove the need for future interventions, the commanders tried to transform the political system, with restricted space for electoral politics, a depoliticized society, and constitutional arrangements granting the military direct instruments to influence the political process such as the MGK (National Security Council). In 1997–1998, the military forced the coalition led by the Welfare Party (RP) to first adopt new secularist educational measures, and later to resign. The rise of AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 2001, its solid electoral victories since, and the political and economic stability the country has enjoyed have enabled the government to challenge successfully the military’s political role, and take to court top officers for having planned anti-government conspiracies.

This chapter discusses the development of Turkey’s secular state and the re-emergence of Islam in Turkish politics. For years, Turkey provided the only modern secular (though not completely democratic) state in the Muslim world, believed to be immune from any serious impact of Political Islam. Many saw Turkey as the model for Muslim-majority nation-states, adopting in 1928 the secular path necessary for modernization and development. However, the 1996 election of Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party (WP), as Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister, signaled a seismic political shift: the threat of a retreat from its secular past. Despite the influence and intervention of the military and suppression of the WP and its successor parties, 2002 witnessed the stunning election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), whose leaders were former members of the WP.

The aim of this contribution is to think about the modalities of change that have affected Islamism in Morocco over the last decades. Conceptualizing this change against the backdrop of larger academic debates on the relation between Islam and politics; I interrogate the notion of post-Islamism as a possible conceptual tool to broaden our understanding of political movements referring to Islam in the Moroccan context. Instead of positing any a priori assumption of what Islamist parties are or are not, what they can or cannot become, I focus on what these movements have done in the past and do today, i.e. how these movements evolved and changed over time. This chapter analyzes the ideological changes as well as the strategic options of the Islamist movements, the limits of mobilization and participation that the context is offering as well as the regional and global environment in which the movements operate.

This chapter begins with an analysis of the shifts in global and local conjunctures that facilitated the Islamist AKP's (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) rise to power, followed by an overview of its neoliberal and pro-EU policies during its first term. It then explores how the anti-Western and anti-globalization currents became substantial elements of media, politics, and culture in the twenty-first century. Local and international developments—such as the EU accession process, the relative easing of restrictions on Kurdish cultural rights, the US invasion of Iraq, the emergence of a revisionist discourse on the Armenian genocide, and the entry of foreign media companies into the Turkish market—began to engender fears and anxieties among the nationalists about the decline of the Turkish state. Through the lens of these developments, the chapter discusses the tensions between globalizing and statist dynamics as well as the AKP's consolidation of the authoritarian neoliberal order.