Susan Mendus
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297819
- eISBN:
- 9780191599880
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297815.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The dispute between impartialists and partialists dominates much modern moral and political philosophy. This book is an attempt to investigate what is at stake between impartialists and their ...
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The dispute between impartialists and partialists dominates much modern moral and political philosophy. This book is an attempt to investigate what is at stake between impartialists and their opponents, and to suggest a possible reconciliation. It begins by noting that, in political philosophy, impartiality is normally taken to reflect a belief in the equality of all human beings. However, in a world characterized by plural and competing conceptions of the good, not everyone accepts that all human beings are equal. Belief in equality is part of a comprehensive, and contested, conception of the good. Therefore, if liberal impartiality is to gain support, it must provide an alternative foundation: one which can demonstrate the priority of justice, but which does not depend upon acceptance of a particular conception of the good. I suggest that this foundation is to be found in a form of impartialism that gives centrality to the partial concerns we have for particular others. The fact that we care for particular others can provide a justification for impartialism and can also explain its motivational force.Less
The dispute between impartialists and partialists dominates much modern moral and political philosophy. This book is an attempt to investigate what is at stake between impartialists and their opponents, and to suggest a possible reconciliation. It begins by noting that, in political philosophy, impartiality is normally taken to reflect a belief in the equality of all human beings. However, in a world characterized by plural and competing conceptions of the good, not everyone accepts that all human beings are equal. Belief in equality is part of a comprehensive, and contested, conception of the good. Therefore, if liberal impartiality is to gain support, it must provide an alternative foundation: one which can demonstrate the priority of justice, but which does not depend upon acceptance of a particular conception of the good. I suggest that this foundation is to be found in a form of impartialism that gives centrality to the partial concerns we have for particular others. The fact that we care for particular others can provide a justification for impartialism and can also explain its motivational force.
Daniel Engster
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199214358
- eISBN:
- 9780191706684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214358.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Caring is usually defined either too narrowly or too broadly to support a moral and political theory. This chapter outlines a definition of caring that is better suited for guiding the development of ...
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Caring is usually defined either too narrowly or too broadly to support a moral and political theory. This chapter outlines a definition of caring that is better suited for guiding the development of a moral and political theory. Caring is defined as a practice encompassing everything we do directly to help individuals satisfy their basic biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate pain and suffering. The chapter further outlines a theory of obligation for caring, arguing that we all have obligations to care for others in need because we all have made claims upon others to care for us when in need. The last part of the chapter discusses the rightful distribution of our caring obligations, arguing that we might justifiably show partiality in caring for ourselves and our loved ones but ultimately have obligations to care for all individuals in need when we are capable of doing so.Less
Caring is usually defined either too narrowly or too broadly to support a moral and political theory. This chapter outlines a definition of caring that is better suited for guiding the development of a moral and political theory. Caring is defined as a practice encompassing everything we do directly to help individuals satisfy their basic biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate pain and suffering. The chapter further outlines a theory of obligation for caring, arguing that we all have obligations to care for others in need because we all have made claims upon others to care for us when in need. The last part of the chapter discusses the rightful distribution of our caring obligations, arguing that we might justifiably show partiality in caring for ourselves and our loved ones but ultimately have obligations to care for all individuals in need when we are capable of doing so.
Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199579952
- eISBN:
- 9780191595233
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic ...
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What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.Less
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.
Roger Crisp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752349
- eISBN:
- 9780191597251
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752342.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical ...
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Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good, vices, emotions, politics, feminism and moral education, and community.Less
Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good, vices, emotions, politics, feminism and moral education, and community.
David O. Brink
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266401
- eISBN:
- 9780191600906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266409.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Green's liberal political commitments. It is argued that Green's brand of liberalism mixes egalitarian social and economic reforms with a commitment to democratic institutions ...
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This chapter focuses on Green's liberal political commitments. It is argued that Green's brand of liberalism mixes egalitarian social and economic reforms with a commitment to democratic institutions and a system of personal and civic liberties and opportunities. Egalitarian reforms establishing a decent minimum standard of living and a system of state-sponsored education provide each citizen with resources with which to pursue his own self-realization; democratic procedures allow for individual participation in collective decision-making; and individual liberties create space for individual self-determination. This kind of liberal regime would effect a division of moral and political labour that might accommodate the potentially conflicting demands of partiality and impartiality.Less
This chapter focuses on Green's liberal political commitments. It is argued that Green's brand of liberalism mixes egalitarian social and economic reforms with a commitment to democratic institutions and a system of personal and civic liberties and opportunities. Egalitarian reforms establishing a decent minimum standard of living and a system of state-sponsored education provide each citizen with resources with which to pursue his own self-realization; democratic procedures allow for individual participation in collective decision-making; and individual liberties create space for individual self-determination. This kind of liberal regime would effect a division of moral and political labour that might accommodate the potentially conflicting demands of partiality and impartiality.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297291
- eISBN:
- 9780191598777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297297.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The partiality problem refers to the need to (1) allow persons to pursue their own partial interests including the interests of those to whom they are partial, (2) while somehow taking into account ...
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The partiality problem refers to the need to (1) allow persons to pursue their own partial interests including the interests of those to whom they are partial, (2) while somehow taking into account the partial interests of others whose interests are more remote to them. The partiality problem represents an independent reason to adopt the solution to the knowledge problem provided by the fusion of justice and the rule of law. The liberal conception of justice based on a decentralized regime of several property rights addresses the general problem of partiality by compartmentalizing the effects of partial decision making, requiring that persons seeking to use the resources under the jurisdiction of others take their interests into account, and permits a checks and balances system of tit‐for‐tat to operate among right‐holders. The liberal conception of the rule of law based on publicly accessible and generally applicable legal precepts addresses the acute problem of partiality that arises in the administration of justice by triggering a warning when these formal tenets are violated that a partial exercise of judgement may have occurred.Less
The partiality problem refers to the need to (1) allow persons to pursue their own partial interests including the interests of those to whom they are partial, (2) while somehow taking into account the partial interests of others whose interests are more remote to them. The partiality problem represents an independent reason to adopt the solution to the knowledge problem provided by the fusion of justice and the rule of law. The liberal conception of justice based on a decentralized regime of several property rights addresses the general problem of partiality by compartmentalizing the effects of partial decision making, requiring that persons seeking to use the resources under the jurisdiction of others take their interests into account, and permits a checks and balances system of tit‐for‐tat to operate among right‐holders. The liberal conception of the rule of law based on publicly accessible and generally applicable legal precepts addresses the acute problem of partiality that arises in the administration of justice by triggering a warning when these formal tenets are violated that a partial exercise of judgement may have occurred.
Eamonn Callan
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292586
- eISBN:
- 9780191598913
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292589.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The institutionalization of political education requires thought about the kind of schooling that will realize its ends with due regard for whatever moral constraints limit what the state may do for ...
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The institutionalization of political education requires thought about the kind of schooling that will realize its ends with due regard for whatever moral constraints limit what the state may do for the sake of those ends. It is argued that the liberal state can permissibly show systematic partiality for ‘common schools’ that children from diverse social groups attend on terms of mutual respect over ‘separate schools’ that cater to students on the basis of selective ethnic or religious criteria or the like. On the other hand, there may be a cogent case for state sponsorship of separate schools during the early years of schooling if these accept the ends of liberal political education.Less
The institutionalization of political education requires thought about the kind of schooling that will realize its ends with due regard for whatever moral constraints limit what the state may do for the sake of those ends. It is argued that the liberal state can permissibly show systematic partiality for ‘common schools’ that children from diverse social groups attend on terms of mutual respect over ‘separate schools’ that cater to students on the basis of selective ethnic or religious criteria or the like. On the other hand, there may be a cogent case for state sponsorship of separate schools during the early years of schooling if these accept the ends of liberal political education.
Susan Mendus
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297819
- eISBN:
- 9780191599880
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297815.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In moral philosophy, the requirement of impartiality gives rise to the normative question, which is a question about why we should give priority to, and be motivated by, impartial concerns which ...
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In moral philosophy, the requirement of impartiality gives rise to the normative question, which is a question about why we should give priority to, and be motivated by, impartial concerns which conflict with the concerns we have for particular people or causes. In this chapter, discussion concentrates on those who already see the force of the requirements of impartial morality, but are sometimes tempted to ignore its demands. I suggest that, for such people, impartialism can command motivational priority only if it is seen as springing from our partial concerns and care for others. When impartialism is so grounded, it may also be commended to those who do not antecedently recognize its force.Less
In moral philosophy, the requirement of impartiality gives rise to the normative question, which is a question about why we should give priority to, and be motivated by, impartial concerns which conflict with the concerns we have for particular people or causes. In this chapter, discussion concentrates on those who already see the force of the requirements of impartial morality, but are sometimes tempted to ignore its demands. I suggest that, for such people, impartialism can command motivational priority only if it is seen as springing from our partial concerns and care for others. When impartialism is so grounded, it may also be commended to those who do not antecedently recognize its force.
Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Inequalities that arise because of the influence of arbitrary factors of social or natural contingency, as opposed to choices, are unjust. But whilst liberals wish to preserve and protect the ...
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Inequalities that arise because of the influence of arbitrary factors of social or natural contingency, as opposed to choices, are unjust. But whilst liberals wish to preserve and protect the affective family, parental partiality to their own children can result in an inequality that is unjust on account of it being attributable to arbitrary factors. Children's access to resources and opportunities should not be significantly determined by parental entitlement to resources. Justice requires not the abandonment of the family, but it does impose constraints on the ways in which parents can permissibly express their partiality for their children.Less
Inequalities that arise because of the influence of arbitrary factors of social or natural contingency, as opposed to choices, are unjust. But whilst liberals wish to preserve and protect the affective family, parental partiality to their own children can result in an inequality that is unjust on account of it being attributable to arbitrary factors. Children's access to resources and opportunities should not be significantly determined by parental entitlement to resources. Justice requires not the abandonment of the family, but it does impose constraints on the ways in which parents can permissibly express their partiality for their children.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297468
- eISBN:
- 9780191599958
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297467.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter is concerned with moral arguments about membership in a national community, focusing on David Miller's On Nationality and Tom Hurka's article ‘The Justification of National Partiality’. ...
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This chapter is concerned with moral arguments about membership in a national community, focusing on David Miller's On Nationality and Tom Hurka's article ‘The Justification of National Partiality’. It examines the bonds of attachment that co‐nationals feel towards those who share the same national identity, and the moral importance that should be placed on that.Less
This chapter is concerned with moral arguments about membership in a national community, focusing on David Miller's On Nationality and Tom Hurka's article ‘The Justification of National Partiality’. It examines the bonds of attachment that co‐nationals feel towards those who share the same national identity, and the moral importance that should be placed on that.
Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent ...
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Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? Assuming standard logical principles, Sorites' arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? This book presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original chapters on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.Less
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? Assuming standard logical principles, Sorites' arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? This book presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original chapters on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.
Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264706
- eISBN:
- 9780191734557
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264706.003.0010
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies
This chapter presents an overview of Milton's biographers from the earliest lives of the poet to the year 2000. The life of Milton has been a subject of quite a lot of accounts compared to other ...
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This chapter presents an overview of Milton's biographers from the earliest lives of the poet to the year 2000. The life of Milton has been a subject of quite a lot of accounts compared to other early modern English writers, due in part to the availability of early biographies by people who knew him; in part because of the towering status he enjoyed in the English canon despite attempts to unseat him; and in part because of his story, of poetic genius surrounding surviving political engagement, of resolution and moral courage overcoming great physical impairment. Biographers from Cyriak Skinner to Barbara Lewalski are discussed in the chapter, including the ebbs and flows of Milton biography and the ideological partiality among the biographers.Less
This chapter presents an overview of Milton's biographers from the earliest lives of the poet to the year 2000. The life of Milton has been a subject of quite a lot of accounts compared to other early modern English writers, due in part to the availability of early biographies by people who knew him; in part because of the towering status he enjoyed in the English canon despite attempts to unseat him; and in part because of his story, of poetic genius surrounding surviving political engagement, of resolution and moral courage overcoming great physical impairment. Biographers from Cyriak Skinner to Barbara Lewalski are discussed in the chapter, including the ebbs and flows of Milton biography and the ideological partiality among the biographers.
Simon Keller
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154732
- eISBN:
- 9781400846382
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154732.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships—if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, ...
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We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships—if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, why? This book presents a theory of the reasons supporting special treatment within special relationships and explores the vexing problem of how we might reconcile the moral value of these relationships with competing claims of impartial morality. The book explains that in order to understand why we give special treatment to our family and friends, we need to understand how people come to matter in their own rights. The book first presents two main accounts of partiality: the projects view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the place that people take within our lives and our commitments, and the relationships view, on which relationships themselves contain fundamental value or reason-giving force. The book then argues that neither view is satisfactory because neither captures the experience of acting well within special relationships. Instead, the book defends the individuals view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the value of the individuals with whom our relationships are shared. It defends this view by saying that we must accept that two people, whether friend or stranger, can have the same value, even as their value makes different demands upon people with whom they share different relationships. The book explores the implications of this claim within a wider understanding of morality and our relationships with groups, institutions, and countries.Less
We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships—if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, why? This book presents a theory of the reasons supporting special treatment within special relationships and explores the vexing problem of how we might reconcile the moral value of these relationships with competing claims of impartial morality. The book explains that in order to understand why we give special treatment to our family and friends, we need to understand how people come to matter in their own rights. The book first presents two main accounts of partiality: the projects view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the place that people take within our lives and our commitments, and the relationships view, on which relationships themselves contain fundamental value or reason-giving force. The book then argues that neither view is satisfactory because neither captures the experience of acting well within special relationships. Instead, the book defends the individuals view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the value of the individuals with whom our relationships are shared. It defends this view by saying that we must accept that two people, whether friend or stranger, can have the same value, even as their value makes different demands upon people with whom they share different relationships. The book explores the implications of this claim within a wider understanding of morality and our relationships with groups, institutions, and countries.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199579952
- eISBN:
- 9780191595233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter argues that any coherent morality will make room for partiality, not merely in the sense that it will permit or require partial behaviour in some circumstances, but also in the sense ...
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This chapter argues that any coherent morality will make room for partiality, not merely in the sense that it will permit or require partial behaviour in some circumstances, but also in the sense that it will treat ‘reasons of partiality’ as bearing directly on the rightness and wrongness of actions. Reasons of partiality include project-dependent, relationship-dependent, and membership-dependent reasons. Although the content of morality is not exhausted by such reasons, Thomas Scanlon and others have suggested that moral reasons in general have their source in interpersonal relationships of a certain kind. This chapter examines these suggestions and identifies a number of difficulties that must be addressed if such a ‘relational’ view of morality is to be defended.Less
This chapter argues that any coherent morality will make room for partiality, not merely in the sense that it will permit or require partial behaviour in some circumstances, but also in the sense that it will treat ‘reasons of partiality’ as bearing directly on the rightness and wrongness of actions. Reasons of partiality include project-dependent, relationship-dependent, and membership-dependent reasons. Although the content of morality is not exhausted by such reasons, Thomas Scanlon and others have suggested that moral reasons in general have their source in interpersonal relationships of a certain kind. This chapter examines these suggestions and identifies a number of difficulties that must be addressed if such a ‘relational’ view of morality is to be defended.
Susan Wolf
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
At the end of ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, Bernard Williams discusses the case of a man who, faced with a situation in which he can save only one of two people in equal peril, chooses to save ...
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At the end of ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, Bernard Williams discusses the case of a man who, faced with a situation in which he can save only one of two people in equal peril, chooses to save his wife. Williams famously observes that a moral justification defending the man against the charge that he ought to have been impartial provides the rescuer with ‘one thought too many’. Most of Williams’ commentators agree, interpreting his remarks as a reminder that a morally good person need not, and perhaps should not, be thinking about what is morally justifiable all the time. This chapter draws and defends a more radical interpretation of Williams' remarks. One attractive ideal of love would prohibit the lover not only from thinking about morality all the time, but also from being unconditionally committed to acting according to morality all the time. This does not imply that a person is positively permitted or justified in disregarding moral requirements. It rather supports Williams's thought that ‘some situations lie beyond justification’.Less
At the end of ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, Bernard Williams discusses the case of a man who, faced with a situation in which he can save only one of two people in equal peril, chooses to save his wife. Williams famously observes that a moral justification defending the man against the charge that he ought to have been impartial provides the rescuer with ‘one thought too many’. Most of Williams’ commentators agree, interpreting his remarks as a reminder that a morally good person need not, and perhaps should not, be thinking about what is morally justifiable all the time. This chapter draws and defends a more radical interpretation of Williams' remarks. One attractive ideal of love would prohibit the lover not only from thinking about morality all the time, but also from being unconditionally committed to acting according to morality all the time. This does not imply that a person is positively permitted or justified in disregarding moral requirements. It rather supports Williams's thought that ‘some situations lie beyond justification’.
Ward E. Jones
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195320398
- eISBN:
- 9780199869534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320398.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
One of the more common experiences of the film viewer is that of finding something on the screen funny or humorous. Some of this amusement will be at what I will call transgressive actions, that is, ...
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One of the more common experiences of the film viewer is that of finding something on the screen funny or humorous. Some of this amusement will be at what I will call transgressive actions, that is, at the kind of events that would, in many other, easily imaginable instances, appropriately bring about very different kinds of responses. This phenomenon is prima facie perplexing, since our default response to wrongdoing does not (nor should it) include amusement. The present paper explores one kind of transgressive comedy – that which invites viewers to laugh with a perpetrator of wrongdoing. My positive claim, developed in Sections 4-6, will be that our favoritism towards certain persons or characters plays a role in some examples of humor at wrongdoings; in particular, I will suggest that it plays a central role in our amusement at the events in the 1940 Howard Hawks film His Girl Friday.Less
One of the more common experiences of the film viewer is that of finding something on the screen funny or humorous. Some of this amusement will be at what I will call transgressive actions, that is, at the kind of events that would, in many other, easily imaginable instances, appropriately bring about very different kinds of responses. This phenomenon is prima facie perplexing, since our default response to wrongdoing does not (nor should it) include amusement. The present paper explores one kind of transgressive comedy – that which invites viewers to laugh with a perpetrator of wrongdoing. My positive claim, developed in Sections 4-6, will be that our favoritism towards certain persons or characters plays a role in some examples of humor at wrongdoings; in particular, I will suggest that it plays a central role in our amusement at the events in the 1940 Howard Hawks film His Girl Friday.
Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199539659
- eISBN:
- 9780191594908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539659.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter addresses the issue of whether deliberative contractualism has what it takes to satisfy the moral accuracy criterion. First, it considers whether deliberative contractualism is ...
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This chapter addresses the issue of whether deliberative contractualism has what it takes to satisfy the moral accuracy criterion. First, it considers whether deliberative contractualism is adequately faithful to core aspects of morality's intensional character, in particular to morality's normativity and objectivity. Second, it considers whether deliberative contractualism is adequately faithful to core aspects of morality's extensional character, in particular judgements concerning partiality and impartiality. It concludes that we have grounds for optimism on both fronts.Less
This chapter addresses the issue of whether deliberative contractualism has what it takes to satisfy the moral accuracy criterion. First, it considers whether deliberative contractualism is adequately faithful to core aspects of morality's intensional character, in particular to morality's normativity and objectivity. Second, it considers whether deliberative contractualism is adequately faithful to core aspects of morality's extensional character, in particular judgements concerning partiality and impartiality. It concludes that we have grounds for optimism on both fronts.
Rodney Barker
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198274957
- eISBN:
- 9780191684104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198274957.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter focuses on the legitimacy of the partisan state. For conservatives or at least for the Tories, the state ought to be partisan in the vigorous cultivation of traditional values, and has ...
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This chapter focuses on the legitimacy of the partisan state. For conservatives or at least for the Tories, the state ought to be partisan in the vigorous cultivation of traditional values, and has no business pandering to the mere wishes of its subjects whose rights are always overridden by the ‘obligation to be ruled’. The state's very partiality is its legitimation, and it is judged by its commitment to particular principles and values which are likely to be held by some of them.Less
This chapter focuses on the legitimacy of the partisan state. For conservatives or at least for the Tories, the state ought to be partisan in the vigorous cultivation of traditional values, and has no business pandering to the mere wishes of its subjects whose rights are always overridden by the ‘obligation to be ruled’. The state's very partiality is its legitimation, and it is judged by its commitment to particular principles and values which are likely to be held by some of them.
Fiona Leverick
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199283460
- eISBN:
- 9780191712654
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283460.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter argues that the most convincing theory to explain the permissibility of killing in self-defence is one based on the right to life with an accompanying theory of forfeiture. In coming to ...
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This chapter argues that the most convincing theory to explain the permissibility of killing in self-defence is one based on the right to life with an accompanying theory of forfeiture. In coming to this conclusion, various competing explanations, such as those based on consequentialist analysis, the theory of double effect and personal partiality, are rejected. It is recognised that the use of the term forfeiture in connection with the right to life is controversial, but it is used in preference to others such as Uniacke who avoid the issue by framing it as one of the specification of the right to life in terms such that it is not possessed by someone who becomes an immediate direct threat to the life of another.Less
This chapter argues that the most convincing theory to explain the permissibility of killing in self-defence is one based on the right to life with an accompanying theory of forfeiture. In coming to this conclusion, various competing explanations, such as those based on consequentialist analysis, the theory of double effect and personal partiality, are rejected. It is recognised that the use of the term forfeiture in connection with the right to life is controversial, but it is used in preference to others such as Uniacke who avoid the issue by framing it as one of the specification of the right to life in terms such that it is not possessed by someone who becomes an immediate direct threat to the life of another.
GRAHAM ODDIE
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273416
- eISBN:
- 9780191602658
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273413.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines what happens when certain pathologies of desire are systematically refined. The results suggest that there is a desire-independent value residue, one to which the pure idealist ...
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This chapter examines what happens when certain pathologies of desire are systematically refined. The results suggest that there is a desire-independent value residue, one to which the pure idealist cannot appeal, but one which it seems necessary to invoke if desire-refinement is to converge on the good. That there is a value residue at the level of higher-order desires is pretty well undeniable. At the end of the chapter, the question is raised as to whether there is a value residue at the first-order level as well.Less
This chapter examines what happens when certain pathologies of desire are systematically refined. The results suggest that there is a desire-independent value residue, one to which the pure idealist cannot appeal, but one which it seems necessary to invoke if desire-refinement is to converge on the good. That there is a value residue at the level of higher-order desires is pretty well undeniable. At the end of the chapter, the question is raised as to whether there is a value residue at the first-order level as well.
