Benjamin Reilly
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286874
- eISBN:
- 9780191713156
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286874.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter examines the theory and practice of the various approaches to the sharing and dividing of governing power in the Asia-Pacific. It first looks at the broad issues of executive structure ...
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This chapter examines the theory and practice of the various approaches to the sharing and dividing of governing power in the Asia-Pacific. It first looks at the broad issues of executive structure and the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems across the region, at the divergent approaches taken by Asian and Pacific states to both formal and informal practices of executive inclusion, and at the empirical relationship between these variables and broader goals of political stability. An ‘index of power-sharing’ is constructed to compare the horizontal sharing of powers over time. The experience of vertical power-sharing via measures such as federalism, devolution, and autonomy is then considered. Overall, the evidence suggests that while informal executive power-sharing practices have been relatively successful, formal requirements for inclusive cabinets have been dogged by problems.Less
This chapter examines the theory and practice of the various approaches to the sharing and dividing of governing power in the Asia-Pacific. It first looks at the broad issues of executive structure and the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems across the region, at the divergent approaches taken by Asian and Pacific states to both formal and informal practices of executive inclusion, and at the empirical relationship between these variables and broader goals of political stability. An ‘index of power-sharing’ is constructed to compare the horizontal sharing of powers over time. The experience of vertical power-sharing via measures such as federalism, devolution, and autonomy is then considered. Overall, the evidence suggests that while informal executive power-sharing practices have been relatively successful, formal requirements for inclusive cabinets have been dogged by problems.
Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296454
- eISBN:
- 9780191600036
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296452.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
This is a comparative introduction to elections and electoral systems in Africa. The first section is a historical overview, which points out that although elections have been an integral part of ...
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This is a comparative introduction to elections and electoral systems in Africa. The first section is a historical overview, which points out that although elections have been an integral part of African politics since political independence, they take place with a wide range of frequencies and under very difficult political conditions. The second section discusses the types of electoral systems found: parliamentary and presidential (or semipresidential). The last section discusses the problem of compiling electoral statistics.Less
This is a comparative introduction to elections and electoral systems in Africa. The first section is a historical overview, which points out that although elections have been an integral part of African politics since political independence, they take place with a wide range of frequencies and under very difficult political conditions. The second section discusses the types of electoral systems found: parliamentary and presidential (or semipresidential). The last section discusses the problem of compiling electoral statistics.
Benjamin Reilly
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286874
- eISBN:
- 9780191713156
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286874.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This book shows how political reformers across the Asia-Pacific region have responded to the reality of their internal diversity by deliberate, innovative, and often highly ambitious forms of ...
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This book shows how political reformers across the Asia-Pacific region have responded to the reality of their internal diversity by deliberate, innovative, and often highly ambitious forms of political engineering. Harking back to the success of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ and their unorthodox but successful interventions in the economic arena, many democratizing Northeast Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific Island states are now seeking to manage political change by far-reaching reforms to their electoral, parliamentary, and party systems. This book is part of the Oxford Studies in Democratization, a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia.Less
This book shows how political reformers across the Asia-Pacific region have responded to the reality of their internal diversity by deliberate, innovative, and often highly ambitious forms of political engineering. Harking back to the success of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ and their unorthodox but successful interventions in the economic arena, many democratizing Northeast Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific Island states are now seeking to manage political change by far-reaching reforms to their electoral, parliamentary, and party systems. This book is part of the Oxford Studies in Democratization, a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia.
Miro Cerar
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293866
- eISBN:
- 9780191599156
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293860.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
In Slovenia the power of the state is divided along classical lines into a legislature, an executive and a judiciary: legislative power is exercised by the parliament, comprising a National Assembly, ...
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In Slovenia the power of the state is divided along classical lines into a legislature, an executive and a judiciary: legislative power is exercised by the parliament, comprising a National Assembly, which is the general representative house, and a National Council, which is a body representing various interests and has very limited powers; executive power is divided between the president and the government; judicial power is exercised by the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, which rules on the conformity of legal enactments with the constitution and the law and decides constitutional complaints and certain other matters. It is generally accepted that Slovenia has a parliamentary system in which the focus of political decision–making lies with the parliament and the government. As in most other Central and East European countries in transition, in Slovenia the formal powers of parliament remain very strong, but, unlike the pure parliamentarism that certain countries opted for, the Slovene arrangements belong more to a group that could be characterized as parliamentarism with a directly (popularly) elected (or semi‐presidential) president. The role of the president is relatively small, and is to act as the head of state, whose function or powers are mainly of a representative, initiative, and protocol nature. After an introduction discussing whether Slovenia has a parliamentary or semi‐presidential system, this chapter focuses on the actual nature and features of the position and role of the president in the context of the constitutional and political system of the Republic of Slovenia, in six further sections: National Independence and Establishment of the First President of the Republic, Parliament and Government; Historical Factors and the Events Surrounding the Formation of the Regime; The Constitutional Powers of the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament; The Nature of the Parliamentary Majority and the Relationship Between the President and the Majority; and Conclusion.Less
In Slovenia the power of the state is divided along classical lines into a legislature, an executive and a judiciary: legislative power is exercised by the parliament, comprising a National Assembly, which is the general representative house, and a National Council, which is a body representing various interests and has very limited powers; executive power is divided between the president and the government; judicial power is exercised by the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, which rules on the conformity of legal enactments with the constitution and the law and decides constitutional complaints and certain other matters. It is generally accepted that Slovenia has a parliamentary system in which the focus of political decision–making lies with the parliament and the government. As in most other Central and East European countries in transition, in Slovenia the formal powers of parliament remain very strong, but, unlike the pure parliamentarism that certain countries opted for, the Slovene arrangements belong more to a group that could be characterized as parliamentarism with a directly (popularly) elected (or semi‐presidential) president. The role of the president is relatively small, and is to act as the head of state, whose function or powers are mainly of a representative, initiative, and protocol nature. After an introduction discussing whether Slovenia has a parliamentary or semi‐presidential system, this chapter focuses on the actual nature and features of the position and role of the president in the context of the constitutional and political system of the Republic of Slovenia, in six further sections: National Independence and Establishment of the First President of the Republic, Parliament and Government; Historical Factors and the Events Surrounding the Formation of the Regime; The Constitutional Powers of the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament; The Nature of the Parliamentary Majority and the Relationship Between the President and the Majority; and Conclusion.
Andrew Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295105
- eISBN:
- 9780191600128
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295103.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This is the second of four chapters that discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research on democratization in southern Africa that is described in the book, as well as providing qualitative ...
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This is the second of four chapters that discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research on democratization in southern Africa that is described in the book, as well as providing qualitative discussions of democracy in the five country case studies used: Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It first defines the intervening variable of ‘inclusion’, which is described as key to the explanation of how conflicts are best managed within divided societies, and discusses its relationship to the macro-institutional explanatory (independent) variables used in the study. It then defines and describes how to measure each of the explanatory variables used: electoral system type; democratic type (coalitions and grand coalitions – consensual– versus concentrations of executive power; fusion – majoritarian – or separation of executive and legislative powers; unicameralism or bicameralism; type of party system; issues dimensions of partisan conflict; unitary versus federal government; constitutions, minority vetoes, and judicial review); and executive type (presidential or parliamentary). The data obtained for each country are discussed, compared, and summarised in tables.Less
This is the second of four chapters that discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research on democratization in southern Africa that is described in the book, as well as providing qualitative discussions of democracy in the five country case studies used: Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It first defines the intervening variable of ‘inclusion’, which is described as key to the explanation of how conflicts are best managed within divided societies, and discusses its relationship to the macro-institutional explanatory (independent) variables used in the study. It then defines and describes how to measure each of the explanatory variables used: electoral system type; democratic type (coalitions and grand coalitions – consensual– versus concentrations of executive power; fusion – majoritarian – or separation of executive and legislative powers; unicameralism or bicameralism; type of party system; issues dimensions of partisan conflict; unitary versus federal government; constitutions, minority vetoes, and judicial review); and executive type (presidential or parliamentary). The data obtained for each country are discussed, compared, and summarised in tables.
Pippa Norris
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295686
- eISBN:
- 9780191600043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295685.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Substantial cross‐national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries ...
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Substantial cross‐national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries exist. It identifies at least three separate schools of thought seeking to explain this phenomenon: the role of cultural values, government performance, and political institutions. Comparisons are made among a broad range of political systems, drawing on the 1981–4, 1990–1 and 1995–7 World Values Surveys, the Latinobarometer and the Eurobarometer, and various support hypotheses are advanced (support for the party in government; dependence on level of democratization; differences between presidential and parliamentary systems (executive structure); variation with party system; differences between federal and unitary state structures; and variation with electoral system) and tested. The findings indicate that institutional confidence is most likely to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterized by plurality electoral systems, two‐party or moderate multi‐party systems, and unitary states, and that these relationships are confirmed even after controlling for differences in levels of economic development and post‐material values; social background and education are also related to institutional confidence, while the influence of socioeconomic status and gender are very modest. The results replicate one of the main theoretical principles of Anderson and Guillory (1997)—that winners express more confidence in the system than losers, and they also show that majoritarian institutions tend to produce greater institutional confidence than consociational arrangements.Less
Substantial cross‐national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries exist. It identifies at least three separate schools of thought seeking to explain this phenomenon: the role of cultural values, government performance, and political institutions. Comparisons are made among a broad range of political systems, drawing on the 1981–4, 1990–1 and 1995–7 World Values Surveys, the Latinobarometer and the Eurobarometer, and various support hypotheses are advanced (support for the party in government; dependence on level of democratization; differences between presidential and parliamentary systems (executive structure); variation with party system; differences between federal and unitary state structures; and variation with electoral system) and tested. The findings indicate that institutional confidence is most likely to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterized by plurality electoral systems, two‐party or moderate multi‐party systems, and unitary states, and that these relationships are confirmed even after controlling for differences in levels of economic development and post‐material values; social background and education are also related to institutional confidence, while the influence of socioeconomic status and gender are very modest. The results replicate one of the main theoretical principles of Anderson and Guillory (1997)—that winners express more confidence in the system than losers, and they also show that majoritarian institutions tend to produce greater institutional confidence than consociational arrangements.
Istvan Szikinger
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244089
- eISBN:
- 9780191600364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244081.003.0015
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Describes the process of institutional engineering and the consequences of the absence of a new constitution in Hungary. As a result of the amendments passed by the outgoing communist parliament ...
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Describes the process of institutional engineering and the consequences of the absence of a new constitution in Hungary. As a result of the amendments passed by the outgoing communist parliament following the decisions made at the Roundtable Talks, Hungary has a formally old but substantively new constitution. This evolutionary approach has been warped by the formation of a parliamentary super‐majority that can easily amend the Constitution further in order to suit its political goals. The chapter points out the shortcomings of the Hungarian Constitution, such as the lack of protection from majority tyranny and no real progress in the field of human rights protection. The chapter also emphasizes problems in the political environment in Hungary and how it affects the chances for success in adopting a formally new Constitution. Political parties in Hungary are unable to integrate, or even to convey and express the legitimate interests of non‐partisan organizations, movements, and groups.Less
Describes the process of institutional engineering and the consequences of the absence of a new constitution in Hungary. As a result of the amendments passed by the outgoing communist parliament following the decisions made at the Roundtable Talks, Hungary has a formally old but substantively new constitution. This evolutionary approach has been warped by the formation of a parliamentary super‐majority that can easily amend the Constitution further in order to suit its political goals. The chapter points out the shortcomings of the Hungarian Constitution, such as the lack of protection from majority tyranny and no real progress in the field of human rights protection. The chapter also emphasizes problems in the political environment in Hungary and how it affects the chances for success in adopting a formally new Constitution. Political parties in Hungary are unable to integrate, or even to convey and express the legitimate interests of non‐partisan organizations, movements, and groups.
Russell J. Dalton, Ian McAllister, and Martin P. Wattenberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253098
- eISBN:
- 9780191599026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253099.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Assembles cross‐national data to demonstrate the behavioural consequences of partisan dealignment. Without the reinforcement of habitual party ties, more voters are waiting longer to decide for whom ...
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Assembles cross‐national data to demonstrate the behavioural consequences of partisan dealignment. Without the reinforcement of habitual party ties, more voters are waiting longer to decide for whom they will vote, and in the countries where ticket splitting is possible, more are dividing their party choices. Candidate‐centred politics appears to be on the rise, although this is much more pronounced in presidential than parliamentary systems, and signifying the different style of dealignment politics, participation in campaigns and volunteer work for political parties is decreasing. In short, partisan dealignment is transforming the relationship between some voters and political parties—a relationship that was once seen as an essential element in the process of representative government.Less
Assembles cross‐national data to demonstrate the behavioural consequences of partisan dealignment. Without the reinforcement of habitual party ties, more voters are waiting longer to decide for whom they will vote, and in the countries where ticket splitting is possible, more are dividing their party choices. Candidate‐centred politics appears to be on the rise, although this is much more pronounced in presidential than parliamentary systems, and signifying the different style of dealignment politics, participation in campaigns and volunteer work for political parties is decreasing. In short, partisan dealignment is transforming the relationship between some voters and political parties—a relationship that was once seen as an essential element in the process of representative government.
Andrew Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295105
- eISBN:
- 9780191600128
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295103.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This book is one of the series Oxford Studies in Democratization, and examines electoral systems and democratization in southern Africa. The design of electoral systems and executive types is ...
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This book is one of the series Oxford Studies in Democratization, and examines electoral systems and democratization in southern Africa. The design of electoral systems and executive types is increasingly being recognized as the key lever of constitutional engineering to be applied in the interests of political accommodation and stability in ethnically divided societies. In this comparative study of democratic design in southern Africa, Andrew Reynolds finds that the decisions about how to constitute representative parliaments have wide-ranging effects on the type of parties and the party system that develops, the nature of executive–legislative relations, and the inclusiveness of both majority and minority interests in the process of governance. While electoral system design is the primary focus of the book, the related constitutional issues of whether to choose a presidential or parliamentary system, and whether to entrench consensual, consociational, or majoritarian government are also discussed. In analysing the experiences of Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the author presents conclusions that help shed light on the success or failure of democratic design in other fledgling democracies, in both Africa and beyond.Less
This book is one of the series Oxford Studies in Democratization, and examines electoral systems and democratization in southern Africa. The design of electoral systems and executive types is increasingly being recognized as the key lever of constitutional engineering to be applied in the interests of political accommodation and stability in ethnically divided societies. In this comparative study of democratic design in southern Africa, Andrew Reynolds finds that the decisions about how to constitute representative parliaments have wide-ranging effects on the type of parties and the party system that develops, the nature of executive–legislative relations, and the inclusiveness of both majority and minority interests in the process of governance. While electoral system design is the primary focus of the book, the related constitutional issues of whether to choose a presidential or parliamentary system, and whether to entrench consensual, consociational, or majoritarian government are also discussed. In analysing the experiences of Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the author presents conclusions that help shed light on the success or failure of democratic design in other fledgling democracies, in both Africa and beyond.
Wolfgang C. Müller
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293866
- eISBN:
- 9780191599156
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293860.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Since the constitutional reform of 1929, Austria comes under the rubric of semi‐presidentialism as defined in this volume: alongside the chancellor (prime minister), who is fully responsible to ...
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Since the constitutional reform of 1929, Austria comes under the rubric of semi‐presidentialism as defined in this volume: alongside the chancellor (prime minister), who is fully responsible to parliament, there is a directly elected president, who appoints the government and can dismiss it, although in practical terms the president has very little accountability. Nevertheless, Austria is generally considered as a parliamentary system by leading comparativists, and indeed it is parliamentary elections rather than presidential elections that decide the distribution of power. This chapter concentrates on the post‐war period, although the interwar years are also important for understanding the gap between the large constitutional powers and limited role that presidents have actually played. It draws on the literature on the Austrian presidency, original archival work, and interviews with political actors. The different sections of the chapter are: The Historical Legacy of Introducing Semi‐Presidentialism; Constitutional Powers and Their Practical Relevance; The Presidency and Party Politics; and Conclusion.Less
Since the constitutional reform of 1929, Austria comes under the rubric of semi‐presidentialism as defined in this volume: alongside the chancellor (prime minister), who is fully responsible to parliament, there is a directly elected president, who appoints the government and can dismiss it, although in practical terms the president has very little accountability. Nevertheless, Austria is generally considered as a parliamentary system by leading comparativists, and indeed it is parliamentary elections rather than presidential elections that decide the distribution of power. This chapter concentrates on the post‐war period, although the interwar years are also important for understanding the gap between the large constitutional powers and limited role that presidents have actually played. It draws on the literature on the Austrian presidency, original archival work, and interviews with political actors. The different sections of the chapter are: The Historical Legacy of Introducing Semi‐Presidentialism; Constitutional Powers and Their Practical Relevance; The Presidency and Party Politics; and Conclusion.
Margit Tavits
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199553327
- eISBN:
- 9780191721007
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553327.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This book is about presidents in parliamentary systems. One commonly recurring political debate within parliamentary systems is over whether or not the public should directly elect the head of state. ...
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This book is about presidents in parliamentary systems. One commonly recurring political debate within parliamentary systems is over whether or not the public should directly elect the head of state. Despite the importance of this topic in practical politics, political scientists have offered little empirical evidence yet made bold assumptions about the consequences of popular elections for heads of state. A common argument is that direct elections enhance presidents' legitimacy thereby increasing their activism and encouraging authoritarian tendencies. Another popular assumption is that direct presidential elections are more heavily contested and partisan, polarizing, and dividing political elites and the electorate. Proponents of direct elections argue that such elections will help decrease voter alienation and apathy. This book challenges the conventional wisdom. Using both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence from democratic systems across the world, this book demonstrates that compared to indirect selection methods, direct elections do not yield more active and contentious presidents, do not polarize political elites or society, and do not remedy political apathy. Rather, presidential activism in both “semi-presidential” and “pure parliamentary” systems is shaped by political opportunity framework—the institutional strength and partisan composition of both parliament and government. Further, because holding the presidency provides parties with an electoral asset, direct and indirect presidential elections can be equally contentious and polarizing. Last, but not least, rather than decreasing apathy, direct election is associated with increased voter fatigue and decreased turnout in parliamentary elections by about seven percentage points.Less
This book is about presidents in parliamentary systems. One commonly recurring political debate within parliamentary systems is over whether or not the public should directly elect the head of state. Despite the importance of this topic in practical politics, political scientists have offered little empirical evidence yet made bold assumptions about the consequences of popular elections for heads of state. A common argument is that direct elections enhance presidents' legitimacy thereby increasing their activism and encouraging authoritarian tendencies. Another popular assumption is that direct presidential elections are more heavily contested and partisan, polarizing, and dividing political elites and the electorate. Proponents of direct elections argue that such elections will help decrease voter alienation and apathy. This book challenges the conventional wisdom. Using both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence from democratic systems across the world, this book demonstrates that compared to indirect selection methods, direct elections do not yield more active and contentious presidents, do not polarize political elites or society, and do not remedy political apathy. Rather, presidential activism in both “semi-presidential” and “pure parliamentary” systems is shaped by political opportunity framework—the institutional strength and partisan composition of both parliament and government. Further, because holding the presidency provides parties with an electoral asset, direct and indirect presidential elections can be equally contentious and polarizing. Last, but not least, rather than decreasing apathy, direct election is associated with increased voter fatigue and decreased turnout in parliamentary elections by about seven percentage points.
Paul Webb and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199289653
- eISBN:
- 9780191710964
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289653.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter presents a summary of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that parties are no longer central to mobilizing political participation in either established or new ...
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This chapter presents a summary of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that parties are no longer central to mobilizing political participation in either established or new democracies. Parties are at their most feeble in those recently transitional democracies characterized by personalistic, candidate-centred forms of presidential politics. These countries are associated with weakly institutionalized party organizations, low levels of legislative cohesion, and undue executive encroachment on the media. Elsewhere in the recently transitional democracies, parties are showing signs of stability and institutionalization — especially, but not exclusively, in the parliamentary systems. In every case, parties make important contributions to the governance, recruitment, articulation, and aggregation functions, albeit not without challenges and constraints. To this extent, at least, it may be concluded that as in the established democracies, parties in some of the newer democracies can help facilitate a meaningful degree of popular choice and control.Less
This chapter presents a summary of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that parties are no longer central to mobilizing political participation in either established or new democracies. Parties are at their most feeble in those recently transitional democracies characterized by personalistic, candidate-centred forms of presidential politics. These countries are associated with weakly institutionalized party organizations, low levels of legislative cohesion, and undue executive encroachment on the media. Elsewhere in the recently transitional democracies, parties are showing signs of stability and institutionalization — especially, but not exclusively, in the parliamentary systems. In every case, parties make important contributions to the governance, recruitment, articulation, and aggregation functions, albeit not without challenges and constraints. To this extent, at least, it may be concluded that as in the established democracies, parties in some of the newer democracies can help facilitate a meaningful degree of popular choice and control.
Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151169
- eISBN:
- 9780199833917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515116X.003.0017
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
In mid‐July, the revision committee turned its attention to the draft's language on the structure of government in Japan's new parliamentary system: the make‐up and powers of the Diet, the “highest ...
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In mid‐July, the revision committee turned its attention to the draft's language on the structure of government in Japan's new parliamentary system: the make‐up and powers of the Diet, the “highest organ of state power” (including the House of Representatives and House of Councillors), the executive (cabinet) and the judiciary; and explicit restrictions on the exercise of governmental power by the emperor. Ch. 15 traces the brilliant performance of Kanamori as interpreter and expositor of constitutional language.Less
In mid‐July, the revision committee turned its attention to the draft's language on the structure of government in Japan's new parliamentary system: the make‐up and powers of the Diet, the “highest organ of state power” (including the House of Representatives and House of Councillors), the executive (cabinet) and the judiciary; and explicit restrictions on the exercise of governmental power by the emperor. Ch. 15 traces the brilliant performance of Kanamori as interpreter and expositor of constitutional language.
Brian Woodall
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780813145013
- eISBN:
- 9780813145327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813145013.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter surveys the analytical topography and introduces the conceptual framework that informs this study. Concepts from institutionalization theory and historical institutionalism are fused to ...
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This chapter surveys the analytical topography and introduces the conceptual framework that informs this study. Concepts from institutionalization theory and historical institutionalism are fused to create a unique lens through which to assess the process whereby Japan’s cabinet system evolved and the factors that molded its distinctive form and functions. It is posited that Japan’s cabinet system was transformed at seven critical junctures. In prewar times, significant changes followed the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the advent of party-led cabinets, and their violent demise with the “May 15th Incident.” In postwar times, American occupation planners orchestrated a dramatic reconfiguration, while significant changes followed the emergence of the “1955 system” that ushered in the Liberal Democratic Party’s protracted rule, the “shocks” of the early 1970s, the advent of coalition cabinets in 1993, and the emergence of “Twisted Diets” following the 2007 upper house elections. Consequently, Japan’s present system is the product of a developmental process that has resulted in the inability to establish a properly functioning system of cabinet government. A central lesson gleaned from this analysis is that growing democracy is not easy, and, in this regard, the Japanese case offers crucial lessons for understanding the challenges and disappointments that confront today’s developing countries.Less
This chapter surveys the analytical topography and introduces the conceptual framework that informs this study. Concepts from institutionalization theory and historical institutionalism are fused to create a unique lens through which to assess the process whereby Japan’s cabinet system evolved and the factors that molded its distinctive form and functions. It is posited that Japan’s cabinet system was transformed at seven critical junctures. In prewar times, significant changes followed the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the advent of party-led cabinets, and their violent demise with the “May 15th Incident.” In postwar times, American occupation planners orchestrated a dramatic reconfiguration, while significant changes followed the emergence of the “1955 system” that ushered in the Liberal Democratic Party’s protracted rule, the “shocks” of the early 1970s, the advent of coalition cabinets in 1993, and the emergence of “Twisted Diets” following the 2007 upper house elections. Consequently, Japan’s present system is the product of a developmental process that has resulted in the inability to establish a properly functioning system of cabinet government. A central lesson gleaned from this analysis is that growing democracy is not easy, and, in this regard, the Japanese case offers crucial lessons for understanding the challenges and disappointments that confront today’s developing countries.
John Prest
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201755
- eISBN:
- 9780191675003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201755.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This introductory chapter focuses on the forms of legislation in central and local government. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the relations between central and local government were worked out in ...
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This introductory chapter focuses on the forms of legislation in central and local government. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the relations between central and local government were worked out in parliament. In the British parliamentary system of the 18th and early 19th century initiatives could pass in both directions, from the centre to the localities and from the localities to the centre. There were two distinct forms of legislation, which before the end of the 18th century were divided into public general Acts and private Acts. Public general Acts applied to the whole of one or more of the three kingdoms, England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Private Acts were divided in the statute-book into two categories of ‘Local and Personal Acts’ and ‘Private Acts’ and were passed upon petition by a local body, the promoters of a joint-stock company, or even by an individual person.Less
This introductory chapter focuses on the forms of legislation in central and local government. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the relations between central and local government were worked out in parliament. In the British parliamentary system of the 18th and early 19th century initiatives could pass in both directions, from the centre to the localities and from the localities to the centre. There were two distinct forms of legislation, which before the end of the 18th century were divided into public general Acts and private Acts. Public general Acts applied to the whole of one or more of the three kingdoms, England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Private Acts were divided in the statute-book into two categories of ‘Local and Personal Acts’ and ‘Private Acts’ and were passed upon petition by a local body, the promoters of a joint-stock company, or even by an individual person.
Brian Woodall
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780813145013
- eISBN:
- 9780813145327
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813145013.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
The March 2011 disasters exposed the ineffectiveness of Japan’s political leaders, evoking three broad questions. First, why did the Kan cabinet fail to provide effective leadership in response to ...
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The March 2011 disasters exposed the ineffectiveness of Japan’s political leaders, evoking three broad questions. First, why did the Kan cabinet fail to provide effective leadership in response to the disasters and why was a succession of governments unable to guide Japan out of the seemingly interminable economic malaise of the “lost decades”? The fact that Japan’s leaders possess similar powers to those of counterparts in other democratic polities suggests that a dysfunctional cabinet system is the culprit. So why is it that Japan has parliamentary democracy in form but not in practice? This is puzzling given that postwar Japan has been governed under institutional arrangements modeled after Britain’s “Westminster system,” and yet cabinet government has not set root. And, third, what gives Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system its characteristic form and function? This draws attention to the shaping effect and distributional consequences of institutions, as well as the role of critical junctures in creating strategic openings for change. And so, to understand Japan’s cabinet system, it is essential to trace its evolution. This leads backward in time from the recent challenges of “Twisted Diets” and coalition governments to institutional solutions rendered by reformers in the 1990s, the legacies of protracted single-party rule, actions taken by American occupation planners, prewar technocrats, and party leaders, and, ultimately, to a cabal that emerged in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. The development of the cabinet system can be seen as a proxy for Japan’s experiment with democratic governance in the longue durée.Less
The March 2011 disasters exposed the ineffectiveness of Japan’s political leaders, evoking three broad questions. First, why did the Kan cabinet fail to provide effective leadership in response to the disasters and why was a succession of governments unable to guide Japan out of the seemingly interminable economic malaise of the “lost decades”? The fact that Japan’s leaders possess similar powers to those of counterparts in other democratic polities suggests that a dysfunctional cabinet system is the culprit. So why is it that Japan has parliamentary democracy in form but not in practice? This is puzzling given that postwar Japan has been governed under institutional arrangements modeled after Britain’s “Westminster system,” and yet cabinet government has not set root. And, third, what gives Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system its characteristic form and function? This draws attention to the shaping effect and distributional consequences of institutions, as well as the role of critical junctures in creating strategic openings for change. And so, to understand Japan’s cabinet system, it is essential to trace its evolution. This leads backward in time from the recent challenges of “Twisted Diets” and coalition governments to institutional solutions rendered by reformers in the 1990s, the legacies of protracted single-party rule, actions taken by American occupation planners, prewar technocrats, and party leaders, and, ultimately, to a cabal that emerged in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. The development of the cabinet system can be seen as a proxy for Japan’s experiment with democratic governance in the longue durée.
Brian Woodall
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780813145013
- eISBN:
- 9780813145327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813145013.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter summarizes the book’s central findings. The Kan cabinet and the governments that ruled during the “lost decades” were products of evolutionary change that resulted in a dysfunctional ...
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This chapter summarizes the book’s central findings. The Kan cabinet and the governments that ruled during the “lost decades” were products of evolutionary change that resulted in a dysfunctional cabinet system. This explains the flawed response to the March 2011 disasters and the prolonged inability to right the economic ship. Japan’s inability to achieve parliamentary democracy in practice is reflected in its failure to institutionalize cabinet government. Indeed, the American military dictatorship, an activist bureaucracy, “policy tribes,” and “Twisted Diets” assured that the postwar cabinets did not perform their expected role. The distinctive organizational structures, roles, and relationships that constitute Japan’s cabinet system were forged in a matrix composed of laws, ordinances, structures, norms, and unwritten codes. Moreover, the postwar cabinet system inherited institutions, structures, personnel, and norms from an authoritarian prewar order. In sum, while postwar Japan has established a stable system of democratic governance, it has yet to produce the effective executive leadership that is needed to respond to the challenges of an advanced industrialized democracy. The evolution of Japan’s parliamentary system teaches that growing democracy is not easy and that would-be reformers must consider the institutional and historical context in which they seek to implant institutions.Less
This chapter summarizes the book’s central findings. The Kan cabinet and the governments that ruled during the “lost decades” were products of evolutionary change that resulted in a dysfunctional cabinet system. This explains the flawed response to the March 2011 disasters and the prolonged inability to right the economic ship. Japan’s inability to achieve parliamentary democracy in practice is reflected in its failure to institutionalize cabinet government. Indeed, the American military dictatorship, an activist bureaucracy, “policy tribes,” and “Twisted Diets” assured that the postwar cabinets did not perform their expected role. The distinctive organizational structures, roles, and relationships that constitute Japan’s cabinet system were forged in a matrix composed of laws, ordinances, structures, norms, and unwritten codes. Moreover, the postwar cabinet system inherited institutions, structures, personnel, and norms from an authoritarian prewar order. In sum, while postwar Japan has established a stable system of democratic governance, it has yet to produce the effective executive leadership that is needed to respond to the challenges of an advanced industrialized democracy. The evolution of Japan’s parliamentary system teaches that growing democracy is not easy and that would-be reformers must consider the institutional and historical context in which they seek to implant institutions.
Alastair Bellany and Thomas Cogswell
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780300214963
- eISBN:
- 9780300217827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300214963.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History
This chapter considers the defence of the Duke of Buckingham. To find a ‘true cleering’, Buckingham had to make an ‘honorable satisfactory answer’ to the charges against him. The first twelve, while ...
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This chapter considers the defence of the Duke of Buckingham. To find a ‘true cleering’, Buckingham had to make an ‘honorable satisfactory answer’ to the charges against him. The first twelve, while serious, were relatively easy to handle, but the thirteenth — his involvement in James' death — was decidedly more awkward. The duke undoubtedly held Eglisham's accusations beneath contempt, but while the Commons had avoided any direct mention of the scandalous tract, some had hinted that Buckingham might have poisoned James. Any response to the thirteenth charge would draw further attention to James' death and, inevitably, to The Forerunner. Yet because the regime desperately needed money, Buckingham had to answer the charges if the Crown were to have any hope of coaxing the parliamentary financial system back to life.Less
This chapter considers the defence of the Duke of Buckingham. To find a ‘true cleering’, Buckingham had to make an ‘honorable satisfactory answer’ to the charges against him. The first twelve, while serious, were relatively easy to handle, but the thirteenth — his involvement in James' death — was decidedly more awkward. The duke undoubtedly held Eglisham's accusations beneath contempt, but while the Commons had avoided any direct mention of the scandalous tract, some had hinted that Buckingham might have poisoned James. Any response to the thirteenth charge would draw further attention to James' death and, inevitably, to The Forerunner. Yet because the regime desperately needed money, Buckingham had to answer the charges if the Crown were to have any hope of coaxing the parliamentary financial system back to life.
Víctor Ferreres Comella
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300148671
- eISBN:
- 9780300148688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300148671.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines the forms of the constitutional conversation. The chapter argues here that various features of the European model help enhance the public visibility of constitutional courts, as ...
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This chapter examines the forms of the constitutional conversation. The chapter argues here that various features of the European model help enhance the public visibility of constitutional courts, as well as their impact on political debates. In a parliamentary system, the legislative body is deemed to be the most representative political institution since its members are directly elected by the people, whereas the officials who occupy the other branches of government are not, as a general rule. Most Western European countries follow this pattern, though in some countries there is also a popularly elected president. France is an exception, however, because the most important figure in the country's executive branch is the prime minister supported by the parliament, not the president.Less
This chapter examines the forms of the constitutional conversation. The chapter argues here that various features of the European model help enhance the public visibility of constitutional courts, as well as their impact on political debates. In a parliamentary system, the legislative body is deemed to be the most representative political institution since its members are directly elected by the people, whereas the officials who occupy the other branches of government are not, as a general rule. Most Western European countries follow this pattern, though in some countries there is also a popularly elected president. France is an exception, however, because the most important figure in the country's executive branch is the prime minister supported by the parliament, not the president.
Sascha Huber
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199660124
- eISBN:
- 9780191755934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660124.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Using an experimental approach, this chapter tackles the endogeneity problem of leader effects and disentangles the relationship between political and apolitical factors in the formation of judgments ...
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Using an experimental approach, this chapter tackles the endogeneity problem of leader effects and disentangles the relationship between political and apolitical factors in the formation of judgments on political leaders: to what extent are evaluations of leaders the product of political considerations and to what extent are they solely based on their character traits? A second objective of the chapter is to analyse the institutional effects of parliamentary and presidential elections on the influence of character assessments on vote choices. The results of three experiments conducted in France, Germany, and Sweden suggest that perceptions of character traits are heavily influenced by the political assessments of candidates. Supposedly apolitical evaluations of political leaders will then often have a political foundation. In addition, the experiments revealed an institutional effect indicating a stronger influence of leader traits in presidential elections than in parliamentary elections.Less
Using an experimental approach, this chapter tackles the endogeneity problem of leader effects and disentangles the relationship between political and apolitical factors in the formation of judgments on political leaders: to what extent are evaluations of leaders the product of political considerations and to what extent are they solely based on their character traits? A second objective of the chapter is to analyse the institutional effects of parliamentary and presidential elections on the influence of character assessments on vote choices. The results of three experiments conducted in France, Germany, and Sweden suggest that perceptions of character traits are heavily influenced by the political assessments of candidates. Supposedly apolitical evaluations of political leaders will then often have a political foundation. In addition, the experiments revealed an institutional effect indicating a stronger influence of leader traits in presidential elections than in parliamentary elections.