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Provides an introduction to the concept of semi‐presidentialism and establishes a framework for the study of the politics of semi‐presidential regimes. The first part sketches the evolution of the concept of semi‐presidentialism, considers some of the main criticisms of the concept, proposes a slight reformulation of the standard definition of the term, and identifies a list of semi‐presidential regimes. The second part of the chapter outlines a framework for the comparative study of semi‐presidential regimes, which provides for particular attention to be paid to the constitutional powers of political actors, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the regime, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relationship between the president and that majority. In this way, this chapter then provides the basis both for the in‐depth country studies of semi‐presidentialism that follow and for the conclusion, which examines the comparative experience of semi‐presidentialism and addresses the issue of whether countries should adopt a semi‐presidential form of government in preference to either presidential or parliamentary forms of government.

In Slovenia the power of the state is divided along classical lines into a legislature, an executive and a judiciary: legislative power is exercised by the parliament, comprising a National Assembly, which is the general representative house, and a National Council, which is a body representing various interests and has very limited powers; executive power is divided between the president and the government; judicial power is exercised by the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, which rules on the conformity of legal enactments with the constitution and the law and decides constitutional complaints and certain other matters. It is generally accepted that Slovenia has a parliamentary system in which the focus of political decision–making lies with the parliament and the government. As in most other Central and East European countries in transition, in Slovenia the formal powers of parliament remain very strong, but, unlike the pure parliamentarism that certain countries opted for, the Slovene arrangements belong more to a group that could be characterized as parliamentarism with a directly (popularly) elected (or semi‐presidential) president. The role of the president is relatively small, and is to act as the head of state, whose function or powers are mainly of a representative, initiative, and protocol nature. After an introduction discussing whether Slovenia has a parliamentary or semi‐presidential system, this chapter focuses on the actual nature and features of the position and role of the president in the context of the constitutional and political system of the Republic of Slovenia, in six further sections: National Independence and Establishment of the First President of the Republic, Parliament and Government; Historical Factors and the Events Surrounding the Formation of the Regime; The Constitutional Powers of the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament; The Nature of the Parliamentary Majority and the Relationship Between the President and the Majority; and Conclusion.

Ukraine can be said to have a semi‐presidential system insofar as it has direct presidential elections combined with a prime minister and a government answerable to both president and parliament. Since winning independence in 1991, Ukraine has also gained a reputation for political gridlock: both of the presidents elected since independence disappointed the initial hopes of their supporters, building up an impressive array of powers on paper, but proving unable to match this in practice. Conflict between presidents, prime ministers, and the chairmen of parliament has been an endemic feature of Ukrainian politics, as have the frustrations of a weak and fractious post‐communist party system. This chapter seeks to explain why semi‐presidentialism has nevertheless provided an attractive form of political compromise in Ukraine's ethnically, linguistically, and regionally divided society, despite the problems of political stasis that it has both reflected and helped to promote. The aim is to explain why circumstances have made it difficult for Ukraine to choose any other regime type, despite the residual enthusiasm of the Ukrainian Left for a Soviet (i.e. parliamentary) republic. The chapter first examines how semi‐presidentialism was established in Ukraine and then looks at Duverger's other key criteria of semi‐presidentialism: the constitutional powers of the key political actors, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relations between the president and that majority.

The office of Icelandic president was created in 1944 to take over the functions of the Danish monarch, which were largely ceremonial at that time, and is non‐party political. Although the president is directly elected, political power in Iceland lies with the parliament and a government that is responsible to it. This chapter explores the actual and potential powers of the Icelandic presidency in the light of Duverger's concept of semi‐presidential government, arguing that traditional interpretations of the Icelandic constitution have overlooked the distinctiveness of semi‐presidential government, and noting that the powerlessness of the presidency is less a fact of law than of politics. An attempt is also made to account for why the presidency has developed in the manner of a powerless figurehead rather than as an effective political leader. The three sections of the chapter are: The Presidency and Political Leadership in Iceland—formation of the regime, constitutional powers, parliamentary majorities; The Presidency and the Political Forces—presidentialism in Iceland, the choice of a president; and Conclusion.

General Charles de Gaulle, founder of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, was a bitter opponent of the unchecked power of political parties, for which he blamed the failure of earlier Republics, but his vision of the future was as naïve as his diagnosis of the past was tendentious, for the problem of the Third and Fourth Republics was rather the weakness of parties. The main surprise of the Fifth Republic was the emergence, from 1962, of the secure parliamentary majorities that France had hitherto lacked; in addition, since 1965, when de Gaulle himself found that he needed party support to campaign for re‐election, the presidency itself has been a key stake in party competition. These two developments transformed the role of parties, and the party system of the Fifth Republic may now be described as one of bipolar multipartism. This contains two distinct and opposed sets of dynamics (pressures): bipolarity, (which is encouraged in important ways by France's political institutions), and forces in the party system pointing towards fragmentation and multipartism; these pressures exist in every party system, but the French case is unusual because they are so evenly balanced. The introduction discusses this situation; the next three sections cover the same topics as those in the other country case studies in the book, and examine party legitimacy, party organizational strength (finance and staffing, and activism, and parties in civil society), and party functionality (in political recruitment, governance, interest articulation and aggregation, political participation, and political communication and education).

The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was adopted by referendum in September 1958, and this chapter explores the relationship between the president and the prime minister in that Fifth Republic. The first section of the chapter, Patterns of Political Leadership, provides an overview of presidential–prime ministerial relations. The second section, French Semi‐Presidentialism in Context, discusses the constitutional situation, the founding context of the 1962 reform, and the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority. The concluding section, The Contemporary Nature of French Semi‐Presidentialism, considers the wider context of presidential–prime ministerial relations, and discusses the changing parameters of executive leadership generally. In these ways, the contemporary nature of the Fifth Republic's semi‐presidential system is established.

Romania emerged from one of the darkest periods in its history in December 1989, when Ceauşsescu's regime was overthrown, leaving Romania with a traumatized population and a devastated economy, and the gradual establishment of a democratic system of government during the last seven years has been painful and not without setbacks. The new institutional system established in Romania is semi‐presidential in the sense of the definition used in this book: it has a directly elected fixed‐term president alongside a prime minister who is responsible to parliament. The semi‐presidential system of government was established gradually, initially on the basis of the Electoral Law of 14 Mar 1990 and the rules of procedure of parliament adopted after the May 1990 elections. The institutional provisions of the Electoral Law and the rules of procedure of parliament subsequently formed the basis of the semi‐presidential system of government established under the new constitution, which was approved in a referendum in December 1991. It is important to note that there is no historical precedent for the establishment of a semi‐presidential system of government in Romania, and the inheritance of the whole period between independence (in 1878) and the fall of the Ceauşescu regime generally provides an unsuitable basis for the development of a democratic system of government. The chapter is divided into three main parts, organised according to the three factors identified by Duverger as determining for the leadership style in semi‐presidential systems: the events surrounding the formation of the system; the constitutional powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament; and the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the president and the majority.

This chapter argues that Winston Churchill' coalition government represented the culmination of a process, begun before the war, in which the Labour Party and growing number of Conservatives and Liberals converged on a common response to the prospect and eventual reality of war. Unlike the previous government which clung to a more limited view of Britain's effort, its opponents espoused the need for total war against Germany. In stark contrast to the French case, this conception of total was became the basis of a stable, cross-party parliamentary majority.

This chapter discusses an alternate strategy that policy-makers tend to use when they do not enjoy sufficiently strong political power, and when they address reforms in broad-reaching sectors that affect a large fraction of the population. In the absence of a large parliamentary majority or in the presence of strong opposition in the economic or social arena, policy-makers widen the political base for their reform by resorting to social dialogue and to a more consensual style. The need to gather wider social and political support induces policy-makers to increase the share of winners from the reform, while raising expenses for the losers.