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The European Union is frequently accused of having a ‘democratic deficit’. Many commentators argue that this could be remedied by increasing the powers of the European Parliament relative to those of the Council and the Commission. The fact that the European Parliament is the only EU institution whose members are directly elected leads to the assumption that it is also the most legitimate. This book argues that this position is based on the flawed assumption that the nature of European citizenry is similar to those of the member states. In other words, the position assumes that the union has a demos, or a people, who are prepared to accept majority outcomes even when finding themselves in the minority. The book argues that this is not the case and that the most severe dimension of the democracy problem is not procedural, but socio-psychological. The fact that the EU does not have a people means that establishing an EU-wide democracy based on analogies to domestic political systems is likely to lead to a further loss of democratic legitimacy. The EU can rely on output legitimacy in policy areas which do not require pan-European solidarity and identity, and in which policy-making at EU-level increases efficiency and thereby benefits all citizens. However, policy areas which require high levels of solidarity or a common identity should either remain fully within the nation states, or be subject to intergovernmental rather than supranational decision-making at EU-level.

The past fifteen years have seen declining public support for European integration, and widespread suggestions that a legitimacy crisis faces the European Union (EU). Many in the EU have believed that this problem could be effectively tackled by vesting greater powers in the European Parliament (EP), the Union's only directly-elected institution. The central argument of this book is that, while considerable efforts have been made to increase the status of the EP, it is in crucial respects a failure as a representative body. This failure is grounded in the manner in which the parliament is elected. The electoral systems used for EP elections in many EU countries are, the book argues, actively obstructive of Europe's voters being represented in the way that they are most likely to respond positively towards. While the behaviour of EP members is shaped strongly by the electoral systems under which they are elected (which vary across the twenty-five member states of the EU), the electoral systems currently in place push most of them to behave in ways contrary to what citizens desire. Drawing on public opinion data, surveys of MEPs and considerable qualitative interview evidence, this book that the failure of parliamentary representation in the EU has a strong foundation in electoral institutions.

Contemporary political science assumes that ‘institutions matter’. But the governing institutions of the European Union are widely presumed to matter more than most. A commonplace assumption about the EU is that those working within European institutions are subject to a pervasive tendency to become socialised into progressively more pro-integration attitudes and behaviours. This assumption has been integral to many accounts of European integration, and is also central to how scholars study individual EU institutions. However, the theoretical and empirical adequacy of this assumption has never been properly investigated. This study examines this question in the context of an increasingly important EU institution, the European Parliament. The book integrates new theoretical arguments with a substantial amount of original empirical research. It develops a coherent understanding, based on simple rationalist principles, of when and why institutional socialisation is effective. This theoretical argument explains the main empirical findings of the book. Drawing on several sources of evidence on MEPs’ attitudes and behaviour, and deploying advanced empirical techniques, the empirical analysis shows the commonplace assumption about EU institutions to be false. European Parliamentarians do not become more pro-integration as they are socialised into the institution. The findings of the study generate some highly important conclusions. They indicate that institutional socialisation of political elites should be given a much more limited and conditional role in understanding European integration than it is accorded in many accounts. They suggest that MEPs remain largely national politicians in their attitudes, loyalties and much of their activities, and that traditional classifications of the European Parliament as a ‘supra-national’ institution are misleading. Finally, the study offers broader lessons about the circumstances in which institutions effectively socialise those working within them.

Democracy was inspired by the lofty ideals of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These ideals led many countries to challenge the absolutist monarchies of the past. In Europe, democratic ideals and values grew in response to the oppressive rule of absolutist monarchs. In India, the idea of democracy came with colonial rule but conferred subjecthood without citizenship on the Indian people. Colonial rule kindled the aspiration of Indians to become a nation of free and equal citizens and led to the formation of a political party, the Indian National Congress. This book explores the political institutions of democracy in India, focusing on those that began to emerge from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. It looks at Parliament and the state legislatures, the Supreme Court and high courts, and political parties, highlighting the maladies that beset these basic institutions of democracy today. After discussing the institutions of democracy, the book looks at the role of government and opposition in a democracy, civil society and the state, constitutional morality, how institutions work and why they fail, the representation of India as a society of castes and communities as well as a nation of citizens, pluralism and liberalism in India, the distinction between law and custom, and the relationship between sociology and ideology.

This book poses the question: how and why do institutions change? Institutions, understood as rules of behaviour constraining and facilitating social interaction, are subject to different forms and processes of change. A change may be designed intentionally on a large scale and then be followed by a period of only incremental adjustments to new conditions. But institutions may also emerge as informal rules, persist for a long time and only be formalized later. The causes, processes, and outcomes of institutional change raise a number of conceptual, theoretical, and empirical questions. While we know a lot about the creation of institutions, relatively little research has been conducted about their transformation once they have been put into place. Attention has focused on politically salient events of change, such as the Intergovernmental Conferences of Treaty reform. In focusing on such grand events, it is easy overlook inconspicuous changes in European institutional rules that are occurring on a daily basis. Thus, the European Parliament has gradually acquired a right of investing individual Commissioners. This has never been an issue in the negotiations of formal treaty revisions. Or, the decision-making rule(s) under which the European Parliament participates in the legislative process have drastically changed over the last decades starting from a modest consultation ending up with codecision. The book discusses various theories accounting for long-term institutional change, and explores them on the basis of five important institutional rules in the European Union. It proposes typical sequences of long-term institutional change and their theorization which hold for other contexts as well, if the number of actors and their goals are clearly defined, and interaction takes place under the ‘shadow of the future’.

Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.

Overarching this book and its companion volume Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union (ed. Schmitt and Thomassen) is the theme of exploring political representation in Europe in a truly comparative context. A distinguished array of academic experts analyse the ‘views from within’ concerning European integration and the role of parliaments in this process. Ranging from chapters on role orientations among parliamentarians to the future of European integration, the overall focus in this volume is uniquely on the attitudes, backgrounds, and reported actions of parliamentarians both in national parliaments and in the European Parliament.