Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282593
- eISBN:
- 9780191603587
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282595.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by ...
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This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It identifies two problems created by Fitch’s proof: a perceived anti-realism and the paradox created by the proof. It is argued that although the two problems are related, a defence against the threat to anti-realism is no solution to the paradox. The neo-Russellian theory of quantification is considered the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.Less
This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It identifies two problems created by Fitch’s proof: a perceived anti-realism and the paradox created by the proof. It is argued that although the two problems are related, a defence against the threat to anti-realism is no solution to the paradox. The neo-Russellian theory of quantification is considered the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.
Jeff Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291328
- eISBN:
- 9780191710698
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
What if there is no strong evidence that God exists? Is belief in God when faced with a lack of evidence illegitimate and improper? Evidentialism answers yes. According to Evidentialism, it is ...
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What if there is no strong evidence that God exists? Is belief in God when faced with a lack of evidence illegitimate and improper? Evidentialism answers yes. According to Evidentialism, it is impermissible to believe any proposition lacking adequate evidence. And, if any thesis enjoys the status of a dogma among philosophers, it is Evidentialism. Presenting a direct challenge to Evidentialism are pragmatic arguments for theism, which are designed to support belief in the absence of adequate evidence. Pascal's Wager is the most prominent theistic pragmatic argument, and issues in epistemology, the ethics of belief, and decision theory, as well as philosophical theology, all intersect at the Wager. This book explores various theistic pragmatic arguments and the objections employed against them. It presents a new version of the Wager, the so-called ‘Jamesian Wager’, and argues that this survives the objections hurled against theistic pragmatic arguments and provides strong support for theistic belief. Objections found in Voltaire, Hume, and Nietzsche against the Wager are scrutinized, as are objections issued by Richard Swinburne, Richard Gale, and other contemporary philosophers. The ethics of belief, the many-gods objection, the problem of infinite utilities, and the propriety of a hope-based acceptance are also examined.Less
What if there is no strong evidence that God exists? Is belief in God when faced with a lack of evidence illegitimate and improper? Evidentialism answers yes. According to Evidentialism, it is impermissible to believe any proposition lacking adequate evidence. And, if any thesis enjoys the status of a dogma among philosophers, it is Evidentialism. Presenting a direct challenge to Evidentialism are pragmatic arguments for theism, which are designed to support belief in the absence of adequate evidence. Pascal's Wager is the most prominent theistic pragmatic argument, and issues in epistemology, the ethics of belief, and decision theory, as well as philosophical theology, all intersect at the Wager. This book explores various theistic pragmatic arguments and the objections employed against them. It presents a new version of the Wager, the so-called ‘Jamesian Wager’, and argues that this survives the objections hurled against theistic pragmatic arguments and provides strong support for theistic belief. Objections found in Voltaire, Hume, and Nietzsche against the Wager are scrutinized, as are objections issued by Richard Swinburne, Richard Gale, and other contemporary philosophers. The ethics of belief, the many-gods objection, the problem of infinite utilities, and the propriety of a hope-based acceptance are also examined.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at ...
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The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.Less
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.
Nick Huggett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379518
- eISBN:
- 9780199776559
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379518.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This pair of chapters discuss Zeno's paradoxes and some of their modern descendants: the ‘dichotomy’, the ‘arrow’, and the ‘supertasks’ of Thompson's lamp and Bernadete. These paradoxes arise from ...
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This pair of chapters discuss Zeno's paradoxes and some of their modern descendants: the ‘dichotomy’, the ‘arrow’, and the ‘supertasks’ of Thompson's lamp and Bernadete. These paradoxes arise from the inifinite divisibility of time and space. For instance, the dichotomy considers dividing a journey into two stages, and then the second stage into half, and the second half of that into half, and so on to infinity: every stage takes a finite time, so shouldn't the whole journey take infinitely long, never to be completed? The problems are challenges to the mathematical description of the world: for instance, the number of metres comprising a journey. The paradoxes reveal confusions in the mathematical nature of infinity, and its application by physics to the world. The chapter explains how a proper understanding of infinity resolves the paradoxes, and demonstrates how these philosophical questions were crucial to the development of mathematical physics.Less
This pair of chapters discuss Zeno's paradoxes and some of their modern descendants: the ‘dichotomy’, the ‘arrow’, and the ‘supertasks’ of Thompson's lamp and Bernadete. These paradoxes arise from the inifinite divisibility of time and space. For instance, the dichotomy considers dividing a journey into two stages, and then the second stage into half, and the second half of that into half, and so on to infinity: every stage takes a finite time, so shouldn't the whole journey take infinitely long, never to be completed? The problems are challenges to the mathematical description of the world: for instance, the number of metres comprising a journey. The paradoxes reveal confusions in the mathematical nature of infinity, and its application by physics to the world. The chapter explains how a proper understanding of infinity resolves the paradoxes, and demonstrates how these philosophical questions were crucial to the development of mathematical physics.
Gregory Graybill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199589487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594588
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? ...
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If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.Less
If one is saved by faith alone in Jesus Christ, then what is the origin of that faith? Is it a preordained gift of God to elect individuals, or is some measure of human free choice involved? Initially, Philipp Melanchthon concurred with Martin Luther—that the human will is completely bound by sin, and that the choice of faith can flow only from God's unilateral grace. But if this is so, what about those whom God has not chosen? Is he not casting people into hell who never even had a chance? What are the pastoral implications for believers thinking about the nature of God and their own relationship to him? As a result of practical concerns such as these, aided by an intellectual aversion to paradox, Melanchthon came to believe that the human will does play a key role in the origins of a saving faith in Jesus Christ. This was not the Roman Catholic free will of Erasmus, however. It was a limited free will tied to justification by faith alone. It was an evangelical free will.
Jc Beall
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199268733
- eISBN:
- 9780191708527
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268733.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which ‘is true’ is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when ...
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Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which ‘is true’ is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of ‘true’ are limited. This book presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.Less
Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which ‘is true’ is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of ‘true’ are limited. This book presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
Maria Plaza
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199281114
- eISBN:
- 9780191712739
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281114.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
Our image of Roman satire has developed from that of a static, moralizing genre to a deliberately complex form, but our approach to the humour intrinsic to satire has not developed accordingly. This ...
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Our image of Roman satire has developed from that of a static, moralizing genre to a deliberately complex form, but our approach to the humour intrinsic to satire has not developed accordingly. This book offers a comprehensive new analysis of humour in the writings of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, with an excursus to Lucilius. The main thesis is that far from being an external means of sweetening the moral lesson, humour lies at the heart of Roman satire and shapes its paradoxical essence. The book argues that while the satirist needs humour for the aesthetic merit of his work, his ideological message inevitably suffers from the ambivalence that humour carries. By analyzing object-oriented humour, humour directed at the speaker (including self-irony), and humour directed at neither object nor subject, the book shows how the Roman satirists work round this double mission of morals and merriment. As a result, they present the reader with a much more sprawling and ‘open’ literary product than they promise in their programmatic self-presentations. The argument is rounded off by a contemplation of the end of Roman satire, and its descendants — not only modern satire but also the novel, in which satire’s humorous orchestration of epic questions was later taken up and richly elaborated.Less
Our image of Roman satire has developed from that of a static, moralizing genre to a deliberately complex form, but our approach to the humour intrinsic to satire has not developed accordingly. This book offers a comprehensive new analysis of humour in the writings of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, with an excursus to Lucilius. The main thesis is that far from being an external means of sweetening the moral lesson, humour lies at the heart of Roman satire and shapes its paradoxical essence. The book argues that while the satirist needs humour for the aesthetic merit of his work, his ideological message inevitably suffers from the ambivalence that humour carries. By analyzing object-oriented humour, humour directed at the speaker (including self-irony), and humour directed at neither object nor subject, the book shows how the Roman satirists work round this double mission of morals and merriment. As a result, they present the reader with a much more sprawling and ‘open’ literary product than they promise in their programmatic self-presentations. The argument is rounded off by a contemplation of the end of Roman satire, and its descendants — not only modern satire but also the novel, in which satire’s humorous orchestration of epic questions was later taken up and richly elaborated.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book ...
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Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.Less
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.
Jo Shaw and Antje Wiener
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297574
- eISBN:
- 9780191598982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297572.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter examines the features of European integration, which suggest that the EU is both ‘near-state’ and antiethical to stateness. It highlights the paradox of the European policy, consisting ...
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This chapter examines the features of European integration, which suggest that the EU is both ‘near-state’ and antiethical to stateness. It highlights the paradox of the European policy, consisting of a parallel development of two dimensions: one institutional and the other theoretical. The debate over constitutionalism and constitutional change as an approach to the paradox of stateness is discussed. An empirical example of a process in which social norms become materialized into legal norms is presented.Less
This chapter examines the features of European integration, which suggest that the EU is both ‘near-state’ and antiethical to stateness. It highlights the paradox of the European policy, consisting of a parallel development of two dimensions: one institutional and the other theoretical. The debate over constitutionalism and constitutional change as an approach to the paradox of stateness is discussed. An empirical example of a process in which social norms become materialized into legal norms is presented.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230747
- eISBN:
- 9780191710933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter is a short introduction to the ways of dealing with the Liar paradox within classical logic. It distinguishes classical gap theories, classical glut theories, and weakly classical ...
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This chapter is a short introduction to the ways of dealing with the Liar paradox within classical logic. It distinguishes classical gap theories, classical glut theories, and weakly classical theories (a heading that includes both supervaluation theories and revision theories, in their ‘internal’ versions). It introduces some natural ‘Incoherence Principles’, jointly unsatisfiable in classical logic. The gap, glut, and weakly classical theories can be understood as different choices as to which incoherence principle to reject.Less
This chapter is a short introduction to the ways of dealing with the Liar paradox within classical logic. It distinguishes classical gap theories, classical glut theories, and weakly classical theories (a heading that includes both supervaluation theories and revision theories, in their ‘internal’ versions). It introduces some natural ‘Incoherence Principles’, jointly unsatisfiable in classical logic. The gap, glut, and weakly classical theories can be understood as different choices as to which incoherence principle to reject.
Mike W. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845217
- eISBN:
- 9780199933068
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845217.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Happiness in Good Lives explores happiness as an important dimension of fully desirable lives. Happiness is defined as loving one’s life, valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment ...
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Happiness in Good Lives explores happiness as an important dimension of fully desirable lives. Happiness is defined as loving one’s life, valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment and a robust sense of meaning. As such, it interacts with all other dimensions of good lives, in particular with moral decency and goodness, authenticity, mental health, self-fulfillment, and meaningfulness. The book integrates philosophical issues with topics of broad human interest, and it includes chapters on how happiness connects with the virtues, love, philanthropy, suffering, simplicity, balancing work and leisure, and politics. Happiness is a moral value, as well as a self-interested value, which we have a responsibility as well as a right to pursue. Myriad specific virtues contribute to pursuing happiness, and in turn happiness contributes to or manifests an array of virtues such as love, self-respect, gratitude, and hope. Although happiness is by no means the entirety of good lives, it helps define some additional aspects of good lives, including authenticity, self-fulfillment, meaningfulness, and mental health. It also enters into understanding what it means to live a balanced life, and also a simple life centered on what matters most. The moral status of happiness is a central concern in the history of ethics. Recent “positive psychology” has breathed new life into traditional philosophical issues, and the book draws extensively on psychological studies. It also uses myriad examples from memoirs, novels, and films. One chapter is devoted to assessing the claim of Mary Shelley’s monster in Frankenstein: “Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.”Less
Happiness in Good Lives explores happiness as an important dimension of fully desirable lives. Happiness is defined as loving one’s life, valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment and a robust sense of meaning. As such, it interacts with all other dimensions of good lives, in particular with moral decency and goodness, authenticity, mental health, self-fulfillment, and meaningfulness. The book integrates philosophical issues with topics of broad human interest, and it includes chapters on how happiness connects with the virtues, love, philanthropy, suffering, simplicity, balancing work and leisure, and politics. Happiness is a moral value, as well as a self-interested value, which we have a responsibility as well as a right to pursue. Myriad specific virtues contribute to pursuing happiness, and in turn happiness contributes to or manifests an array of virtues such as love, self-respect, gratitude, and hope. Although happiness is by no means the entirety of good lives, it helps define some additional aspects of good lives, including authenticity, self-fulfillment, meaningfulness, and mental health. It also enters into understanding what it means to live a balanced life, and also a simple life centered on what matters most. The moral status of happiness is a central concern in the history of ethics. Recent “positive psychology” has breathed new life into traditional philosophical issues, and the book draws extensively on psychological studies. It also uses myriad examples from memoirs, novels, and films. One chapter is devoted to assessing the claim of Mary Shelley’s monster in Frankenstein: “Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.”
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199247493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594830
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. ...
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There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.Less
There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.
Michael Dummett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199285495
- eISBN:
- 9780191713972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter defends p→¬¬Kp as the best expression of semantic antirealism.
This chapter defends p→¬¬Kp as the best expression of semantic antirealism.
Bonnie Mann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187458
- eISBN:
- 9780199786565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187458.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
The turn of the century was marked by a preoccupation with relationships of Otherness, both internal and external to Europe. In establishing his difference from these Others, the Euro-masculine ...
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The turn of the century was marked by a preoccupation with relationships of Otherness, both internal and external to Europe. In establishing his difference from these Others, the Euro-masculine subject also established himself. The very possibility of erecting a convincing edifice of freedom, autonomy, and sovereignty rested on what he did with these Others. Kant wrote his Observations and, more than two decades later, his “Analytic of the Sublime” in the midst of these debates. He attempted to sort through the confusions that characterized the Euro-masculine relation to Others, both as a philosopher and as one of the founders of the new field of anthropology. This chapter discusses these confusions based on two general sets of paradoxes: the paradox of space and the paradox of time. The first paradox considers these sorts of questions: where are the Others of the Euro-masculine subject in relation to him — inside or outside? What kind of space or place does this subject inhabit? Is a woman a part of a man? If so then how is it that a man is not partly a woman? How is this subject's spatial self-constitution built around a man's spatial relations to nature and women? The second paradox considers questions of time and sequence: what kind of time does this subject inhabit? What kind of time inhabits him? Where are others in this subject's time? Are racialized others that I encounter encountered in my time? How is temporal self-constitution built around temporal relations to racialized others?Less
The turn of the century was marked by a preoccupation with relationships of Otherness, both internal and external to Europe. In establishing his difference from these Others, the Euro-masculine subject also established himself. The very possibility of erecting a convincing edifice of freedom, autonomy, and sovereignty rested on what he did with these Others. Kant wrote his Observations and, more than two decades later, his “Analytic of the Sublime” in the midst of these debates. He attempted to sort through the confusions that characterized the Euro-masculine relation to Others, both as a philosopher and as one of the founders of the new field of anthropology. This chapter discusses these confusions based on two general sets of paradoxes: the paradox of space and the paradox of time. The first paradox considers these sorts of questions: where are the Others of the Euro-masculine subject in relation to him — inside or outside? What kind of space or place does this subject inhabit? Is a woman a part of a man? If so then how is it that a man is not partly a woman? How is this subject's spatial self-constitution built around a man's spatial relations to nature and women? The second paradox considers questions of time and sequence: what kind of time does this subject inhabit? What kind of time inhabits him? Where are others in this subject's time? Are racialized others that I encounter encountered in my time? How is temporal self-constitution built around temporal relations to racialized others?
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay surveys the range of philosophical problems that can be encompassed under the rubric, emotion in response to art. It details five such problems, according most of its attention to the ...
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This essay surveys the range of philosophical problems that can be encompassed under the rubric, emotion in response to art. It details five such problems, according most of its attention to the nature of the emotional responses had to art, and the puzzle of emotional responses to fictional entities known to be fictional (what is often labeled ‘the paradox of fiction’). Attention is also given to the puzzle of how people derive satisfaction from art expressive or evocative of negative emotion (what is often labeled ‘the paradox of tragedy’), and to the question of how abstract works of art (such as pieces of instrumental music) manage to express or evoke emotions at all.Less
This essay surveys the range of philosophical problems that can be encompassed under the rubric, emotion in response to art. It details five such problems, according most of its attention to the nature of the emotional responses had to art, and the puzzle of emotional responses to fictional entities known to be fictional (what is often labeled ‘the paradox of fiction’). Attention is also given to the puzzle of how people derive satisfaction from art expressive or evocative of negative emotion (what is often labeled ‘the paradox of tragedy’), and to the question of how abstract works of art (such as pieces of instrumental music) manage to express or evoke emotions at all.
Robert Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195177541
- eISBN:
- 9780199850143
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195177541.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Human beings are both supremely rational and deeply superstitious, capable of believing just about anything and of questioning just about everything. Indeed, just as our reason demands that we know ...
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Human beings are both supremely rational and deeply superstitious, capable of believing just about anything and of questioning just about everything. Indeed, just as our reason demands that we know the truth, our skepticism leads to doubts we can ever really do so. This book guides us through a contradiction that lies at the very heart of philosophical inquiry. The book argues that our rational faculties insist on a purely rational account of the universe; yet at the same time, the inherent limitations of these faculties ensure that we will never fully satisfy that demand. As a result of being driven to this point of paradox, we either comfort ourselves with what Kant called “metaphysical illusions” or adopt a stance of radical skepticism. No middle ground seems possible and, as the book shows, skepticism, even though a healthy dose of it is essential for living a rational life, “has an inherent tendency to become unlimited in its scope, with the result that the edifice of rationality is destroyed.” In much Postmodernist thought, for example, skepticism takes the extreme form of absolute relativism, denying the basis for any value distinctions and treating all truth-claims as equally groundless. How reason avoids disgracing itself, walking a fine line between dogmatic belief and self-defeating doubt, is the question the book seeks to answer.Less
Human beings are both supremely rational and deeply superstitious, capable of believing just about anything and of questioning just about everything. Indeed, just as our reason demands that we know the truth, our skepticism leads to doubts we can ever really do so. This book guides us through a contradiction that lies at the very heart of philosophical inquiry. The book argues that our rational faculties insist on a purely rational account of the universe; yet at the same time, the inherent limitations of these faculties ensure that we will never fully satisfy that demand. As a result of being driven to this point of paradox, we either comfort ourselves with what Kant called “metaphysical illusions” or adopt a stance of radical skepticism. No middle ground seems possible and, as the book shows, skepticism, even though a healthy dose of it is essential for living a rational life, “has an inherent tendency to become unlimited in its scope, with the result that the edifice of rationality is destroyed.” In much Postmodernist thought, for example, skepticism takes the extreme form of absolute relativism, denying the basis for any value distinctions and treating all truth-claims as equally groundless. How reason avoids disgracing itself, walking a fine line between dogmatic belief and self-defeating doubt, is the question the book seeks to answer.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their ...
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Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.Less
Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.
W. D. Hart
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199285495
- eISBN:
- 9780191713972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter takes Fitch's proof to be evidence for realism. It argues that the prospects are not good for a solution coming from the theory of types.
This chapter takes Fitch's proof to be evidence for realism. It argues that the prospects are not good for a solution coming from the theory of types.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195123357
- eISBN:
- 9780199872114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195123352.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is ...
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Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.Less
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199269730
- eISBN:
- 9780191699443
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269730.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book presents a philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. The book offers an ...
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This book presents a philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. The book offers an account of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, and the various axiom candidates. It discusses in detail the project of set-theoretic reduction, which aims to interpret the rest of mathematics in terms of set theory. The key question here is how to deal with the paradoxes that bedevil set theory. The book offers a simple version of the most widely accepted response to the paradoxes, which classifies sets by means of a hierarchy of levels. The book interweaves a presentation of the technical material with a philosophical critique. The book does not merely expound the theory dogmatically but at every stage discusses in detail the reasons that can be offered for believing it to be true.Less
This book presents a philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. The book offers an account of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, and the various axiom candidates. It discusses in detail the project of set-theoretic reduction, which aims to interpret the rest of mathematics in terms of set theory. The key question here is how to deal with the paradoxes that bedevil set theory. The book offers a simple version of the most widely accepted response to the paradoxes, which classifies sets by means of a hierarchy of levels. The book interweaves a presentation of the technical material with a philosophical critique. The book does not merely expound the theory dogmatically but at every stage discusses in detail the reasons that can be offered for believing it to be true.
