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This chapter focuses on change, rather than static differences/similarities among countries. The study shows that large differences between US-UK and Europe persist, together with some convergence trends in the late 1990s (on both sides) as far as ownership concentration is concerned. The chapter observes that convergence on this aspect co-exists with divergence (or persisting differences) on other aspects; that convergence among the two areas has been toward each other and not from one to the other (in particular not only of Europe towards the US), and that these dynamics are in any case likely to have been specific to the stock market bubble period and should not be extrapolated.

An evaluation is made of various ways in which corporate governance can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. Corporate governance is not a concept that can be directly observed. Consequently, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. Given the pros and cons of different measures of corporate governance, it is decided to undertake the empirical analysis with three plausible proxies – equity share, value traded, and international equity issuance – rather than to base conclusions on a single measure. Other potential measures of corporate governance – such as ownership concentration, corporate governance ratings, and measures of corporate governance regulation – are not utilized for various conceptual and practical reasons.

This chapter questions the power of law in solving CG problems and maintains that there are societal and political forces that are likely to shape governance structures irrespective of any regulation. In particular, the most common configuration of those forces around the world tends to reinforce concentrated ownership no matter what laws are adopted to protect minority shareholders. The chapter presents a new regression analysis of a wide database on political indicators and ownership concentration in sixteen major countries, which supports the conjecture that political variables, in particular the degree of employment protection and trade union strength, are strong inverse correlates of ownership separation and the diffusion of public companies.

This chapter presents a statistical inquiry to test the political hypothesis that strong social democracies widen the natural gap between managers and distant stockholders, and impede firms from developing tools that would close that gap. By arraying nations on a left-to-right political scale, and then arranging them on a highly-concentrated to highly diffuse ownership scale, the scales correlate powerfully. The political explanation accounts for the variation in ownership concentration in the world's richest nations.

When product market rents are higher, two key constraints on managers — product and capital market competition — weaken. When these constraints on managers weaken, managerial agency costs in the fully public firm and the demand for alternative means to reduce these costs rise. When product market rents are higher, all else being equal, ownership concentration also becomes higher. Meanwhile, as product increases, managerial agency costs inside the firm decrease.

This chapter examines media ownership and concentration in Switzerland. Following an overview of the Swiss media landscape, including major debates in Switzerland concerning changes in regulation, the remainder of the chapter focuses on print media (newspapers, book publishing, magazine publishing), audiovisual media (radio, television, film), telecommunications media (wireline and wireless telecom), and Internet media (Internet Service Providers, search engines, online news market). Concentration is relatively moderate in Switzerland. While concentration indices appear to be quite high for some industries, the Swiss market is small compared to other European markets. There is a good amount of cross-border inflow of media from adjoining countries, which adds to the media diversity in a country divided by three major language groups. Unusual for present Europe, the telecom incumbent, Swisscom, is state-owned, with other participation by TDC, Liberty Global, and Orange. In cable TV, Liberty Media is dominant; in audiovisual media, the public SRG/SSR, plus German and French broadcasters; and in print media, Ringier, Tamedia, and Axel Springer.

The liberalization of trade turned on a wave of cross-border M&A after the turn of the century that dramatically increased the concentration of ownership in the global beer market, where the four largest breweries now serve close to 60 percent of the market. The chapter looks at the motivation behind these changes in corporate ownership and the pay-off to the breweries and their owners. The breweries spend a large amount of money promoting some of their lager beer as premium beer, and as consumers perceive it as high-quality beer, they are willing to pay a high price premium for the branded beer. We estimate the price premium for branded beer and relate it to the rapid change in the ownership structure in the beer market.