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Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism

Mark Kaplan

in Williamson on Knowledge

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199287512
eISBN:
9780191713620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

The Requirement of Total Evidence enjoins you to proportion your beliefs to the support they receive from your total evidence. How exactly are we to understand what it is asking you to do? In ... More


How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?

Julia Staffel

in Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
February 2020
ISBN:
9780198833710
eISBN:
9780191872136
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833710.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 9 examines how the proposed theory of epistemic rationality can accommodate outright beliefs, and what role such outright beliefs play in our epistemic conduct. It is argued that people need ... More


Open-Mindedness

Jeremy Fantl

in The Limitations of the Open Mind

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198807957
eISBN:
9780191845741
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198807957.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Political Philosophy

This chapter argues for a “Platonic” conception of open-mindedness. Open-mindedness is not simply a matter of being willing to change your mind in response to a counterargument. You have to be ... More


Epistemic modals and probability operators

Sarah Moss

in Probabilistic Knowledge

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198792154
eISBN:
9780191861260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends a semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators. This semantics is probabilistic—that is, sentences containing these expressions have sets of probability spaces as ... More


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