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From Liberty to Equality

James P. Sterba

in From Rationality to Equality

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199580767
eISBN:
9780191745836
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580767.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

In this chapter, Morality as Compromise is completed by showing when the its requirements are enforceable. This is done by starting with the assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian ... More


‘Ought’ and ‘Can’

R. M. Hare

in Freedom and Reason

Published in print:
1965
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198810926
eISBN:
9780191597589
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019881092X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Discusses the thesis that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. A sense in which ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is developed in kinship to remarks by Strawson on the existential presuppositions of definite descriptions. The ... More


A Rationale for the Rational Abilities View: Praise, Blame, and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle

Dana Kay Nelkin

in Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter offers a novel rationale for the rational abilities view that appeals to a moral principle often taken to be axiomatic, and referred to as the “Ought-Implies-Can Principle”. The basic ... More


Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Dana Kay Nelkin

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This book presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately ... More


Justifying Statism: A Methodological Critique

Laura Valentini

in Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199593859
eISBN:
9780191731457
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0005
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

This chapter identifies and discusses the methodological flaws that make statism excessively subservient to the status quo. It focuses on three methodological commitments on the basis of which ... More


Belief in a Just World

Bruce N. Waller

in The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780262028165
eISBN:
9780262327404
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262028165.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The deep nonconscious belief in a just world – extensively studied by psychologists – is basically the belief that good things happen to good people and bad things to bad people. When an innocent ... More


Promising Too Much

Julia Driver

in Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780195377958
eISBN:
9780199893836
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter begins with the idea that we can learn a good deal about promising by examining the conditions and norms that govern promise-breaking. Sometimes promises are broken as a deliberate plan, ... More


Persistent Disagreement

Catherine Z. Elgin

in Disagreement

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199226078
eISBN:
9780191594236
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter responds to arguments for the conclusion that participants in persistent peer disagreement ought to suspend judgment about the disputed proposition by noting that ‘ought implies can’ and ... More


‘Rationally Ought’ Implies ‘Can’

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is defended: it follows from the classical semantics for ‘ought’, and the objections to it can be answered. If the ‘ought’ is a non-trivial agential ‘ought’, ... More


Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?

Robert Stern

in Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780198722298
eISBN:
9780191789113
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722298.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has ... More


Remaining Questions

Steven Sverdlik

in Motive and Rightness

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199594948
eISBN:
9780191725401
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594948.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Seven questions were posed at the end of Chapter 1. Four of them have been answered. Extrinsic consequentialism has emerged as the most plausible approach to the deontic relevance of motives. It is ... More


Moral Dilemmas and Impossible Moral Requirements

Lisa Tessman

in Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199396146
eISBN:
9780199396160
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396146.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 1 introduces the concepts of impossible moral requirements and unavoidable moral failure by reviewing and rethinking the philosophical debates about whether or not any moral conflicts are ... More


Enhancing Responsibility

Nicole A Vincent

in Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199925605
eISBN:
9780199332939
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199925605.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

We normally think that responsibility tracks mental capacity — i.e. that people’s responsibility diminishes when their mental capacities are compromised, and that it is restored as those capacities ... More


Is, Ought, and the Brain

Guy Kahane

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

It would be nice to know more about what happens in our brains when we judge what we morally ought to do. But for normative ethics, this kind of scientific research is of interest only if it could ... More


Should Tort Law Demand the Impossible?

Adam Slavny

in Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
July 2020
ISBN:
9780190865269
eISBN:
9780190865290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190865269.003.0017
Subject:
Law, Criminal Law and Criminology

This chapter critically examines the moral justification of two settled features of tort law—the objective standard of care and strict liability—insofar as they appear to violate the putative moral ... More


Moral Appraisal and Defects of Character

K. E. Boxer

in Rethinking Responsibility

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199695324
eISBN:
9780191752216
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695324.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 2 discusses desert of moral blame on a traditional understanding of such blame. On this understanding, to morally blame an agent for her action is to judge that her action reflects a defect ... More


Why Does Ought Imply Can?

Robert Stern

in Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780198722298
eISBN:
9780191789113
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722298.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter examines different ways in which the principle that ‘ought implies can’ might be rendered plausible. This chapter sets the principle in the context of the kind of theories of obligation ... More


In Defense of ‘Ought Implies Can’

Derek Leben

in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198815259
eISBN:
9780191853012
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Two recent papers have presented experimental evidence against the hypothesis that there is a semantic connection between OUGHT and CAN, rather than a pragmatic and defeasible one. However, there are ... More


Is Rationality Normative?

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Value of Rationality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198802693
eISBN:
9780191841972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In its original meaning, the word ‘rational’ referred to the faculty of reason—the capacity for reasoning. It is undeniable that the word later came also to express a normative concept—the concept of ... More


What We Know and What We Owe

Vanessa Carbonell

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 3

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199685905
eISBN:
9780191765803
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This chapter argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations ... More


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