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Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds)

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of ... More


Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity

Simon Robertson (ed.)

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199572939
eISBN:
9780191722165
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book comprises nine chapters on the philosophy of normativity. On one broad construal level, the normative sphere concerns norms, requirements, oughts, reasons, reasoning, rationality, ... More


From a Deflationary Point of View

Paul Horwich

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199251261
eISBN:
9780191602252
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251266.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book features ten essays written by Paul Horwich in the 1980s and 1990s. They illustrate his deflationary perspective on the nature of truth, realism vs antirealism, the creation of meaning, ... More


The Distinction Between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’

Henry Sidgwick

in Essays on Ethics and Method

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198250234
eISBN:
9780191598432
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250231.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Taking ‘what ought to be’ to include both what is commonly judged to be ‘good’ and what is commonly judged to be ‘right’, that is to say, ‘the duty’ of a person, Sidgwick observes that there is a ... More


The Time of an Obligation

H. A. Prichard

in Moral Writings

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199250196
eISBN:
9780191598265
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199250197.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In discussing the fact that it takes time to perform an action, distinguishes statements such as ‘I shall do x’ from statements such as ‘I shall be under an obligation to do x’ and ‘I was doing x’ ... More


‘Ought’

H. A. Prichard

in Moral Writings

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199250196
eISBN:
9780191598265
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199250197.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Prichard's topic here is the nature of ‘ought’. If we were to take ‘I ought to will x’ to be equivalent to ‘my willing x ought to exist’, then it is true that ‘If I were to will a certain change x, ... More


Justifying Statism: A Methodological Critique

Laura Valentini

in Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199593859
eISBN:
9780191731457
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0005
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

This chapter identifies and discusses the methodological flaws that make statism excessively subservient to the status quo. It focuses on three methodological commitments on the basis of which ... More


Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility

Dana Kay Nelkin

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608560
eISBN:
9780191729638
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This book presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately ... More


What Do Reasons Do?

Jonathan Dancy

in Metaethics after Moore

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199269914
eISBN:
9780191710032
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter focuses on the issue of how we are to understand ‘contributory reasons’, particularly as they are related to oughts. It begins by rehearsing six proposals for understanding contributory ... More


Hume's Place in History

Russell Hardin

in David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199232567
eISBN:
9780191715976
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232567.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter surveys several theoretical stances that Hume takes. It discusses Hume's naturalism, and addresses the role of the is—ought argument in his moral theory. That argument is that theorists ... More


Williams on Ought

John Broome

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter interprets and assesses Williams's ‘“Ought” and moral obligation’, together with a later unpublished lecture of his on ‘ought’. It describes a notion of ownership for oughts. For ... More


Persistent Disagreement

Catherine Z. Elgin

in Disagreement

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199226078
eISBN:
9780191594236
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter responds to arguments for the conclusion that participants in persistent peer disagreement ought to suspend judgment about the disputed proposition by noting that ‘ought implies can’ and ... More


The Motive Power of Evaluative Concepts

Paul Horwich

in Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199268900
eISBN:
9780191708459
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

The focus here is on the emotivist/expressivist contention that normative concepts are constituted non-cognitively, by their motivational role. This chapter defends that contention against the ... More


The General Norms of Positive Morality and Positive Law are always Hypothetical

Hans Kelsen

in General Theory of Norms

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198252177
eISBN:
9780191681363
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0005
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

For every conditional norm, there is a statement about the occurrence of the act of which the conditional norm is the meaning, such as ‘God commanded that if someone makes a promise he is to keep it’ ... More


Practical Judgements

A. W. Price

in Contextuality in Practical Reason

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199534791
eISBN:
9780191715877
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534791.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Practical judgements (such as ‘I must/ought to ψ’) are commonly to be understood relatively to a set of ends, quasi-ends (e.g., side-constraints), and circumstances. One can ask: necessary/fitting ... More


Reasoning with Conditionals

A. W. Price

in Contextuality in Practical Reason

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199534791
eISBN:
9780191715877
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534791.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Hypothetical imperatives are problematic: does ‘If you want to get drunk every evening, you ought to work in a bar’ entail, given ‘You want to get drunk every evening’, ‘You ought to work in a bar’? ... More


Reasons

Maria Alvarez

in Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199550005
eISBN:
9780191720239
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The first chapter prepares the ground, and the conceptual tools, for an exploration of reasons in contexts of human agency, by exploring reasons broadly. It examines the normative and explanatory ... More


Reasons and oughts

John F. Horty

in Reasons as Defaults

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744077
eISBN:
9780199932566
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The goal of this chapter is to explain how the various reasons at work in a situation can support conclusions about what an agent ought to do—in the language of Ross, how prima facie duties, or prima ... More


Moral conflicts

John F. Horty

in Reasons as Defaults

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744077
eISBN:
9780199932566
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter appraises the possibility of all things considered moral conflicts. The chapter considers three kinds of objections to the possibility, based on considerations from deontic logic, on ... More


Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation

Richard Feldman

in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195128925
eISBN:
9780199833764
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195128923.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would ... More


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