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This chapter summarizes the key points raised by the book, with particular emphasis on questions of organizational control, party-building, and party strength in Congress. It begins with a discussion of the role that the party caucus has played in hastening a consistent House organization by the majority party. It then considers the organizational cartel's relationship with the procedural cartel and the applicability of the organizational cartel mechanism in other legislatures, including the U.S. Senate, American state legislatures, and parliaments around the world. The chapter also examines Martin van Buren's legacy, focusing on his role in developing the organizational capacity of the Democratic Party and his efforts in building the American party system, before concluding with some final thoughts on political parties and congressional organization.

This chapter examines leadership selection after the Reed Rules and the persistence of the organizational cartel in the House of Representatives during the period 1891–2011. It begins by discussing factional divisions and further threats to the caucus organization before considering the progressive Republicans' 1910 revolt against Speaker Joseph G. Cannon as well as the Democrats' return to power and control of the House from the 62nd through 65th Congresses (1911–1919). It then analyzes the rift between progressive and conservative elements in the Republican Party that challenged the party monopoly over the House's makeup. Despite these problematic events and other issues, along with severe regional divisions within the majority Democratic Party, the chapter shows that the binding party caucus and organizational cartel survived and flourished through the present day.

This chapter examines the emergence of the organizational cartel based on caucus decision making during the period 1861–1891. It considers how the caucus-induced, organizational arrangement solved the lingering instability that had often plagued speakership decisions during the antebellum era. It also shows how the binding party caucus on organizational matters institutionalized and evolved into an equilibrium institution, with both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party embracing the practice of keeping the organization of the House of Representatives “in the family” rather than risking potential complications on the floor. In short, the majority party had finally become an organizational cartel. The chapter explains how the organizational cartel allowed the majority party to control the election of the Speaker and other House officers, as well as the more general makeup of the chamber.

This book investigates the history of organizational politics in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to the present. It argues that the history of how speakership elections developed was driven by a desire to establish an organizational cartel in the House. It examines the centrality of the party caucus for the organization of the House, and more specifically how the majority party came to own the chief House officers, especially the Speaker. It also discusses two themes about Congress and its role in the American political system: the construction of mass political parties in the early nineteenth century and the role that political parties play in guiding the agenda of Congress today. This chapter provides an overview of the data and methods used by the book as well as the chapters that follow.