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Chapter 8 contests that the alleged de jure autonomy of government bodies profoundly influence their de facto autonomy. The empirical test is a study of the factual autonomy of EU‐level agencies. This chapter presents organizational data from thirty‐five EU‐level agencies and survey and interview data from civil servants of seven EU‐level agencies. The data suggests that agency autonomy combines organizational and actor‐level characteristics. Firstly, organizational‐level autonomy consists of the accumulated organizational capacities of EU‐level agencies. Secondly, actor‐level autonomy contains a departmental decision‐making dynamic among the agency personnel. Essentially, Chapter 8 suggests that the de jure autonomy of EU‐level agencies is of minor relevance when assessing their de facto autonomy. Consequently, the bureaucratic autonomy of the emergent European Executive Order is less contingent on legal formulas than by everyday decision‐making processes among agency personnel.

In this chapter cohesion theory is introduced to explain why national militaries differ in two important ways: (1) the ability of most units to fight hard on the battlefield and, (2) the capacity of the armed forces as a whole to avoid disintegration when facing the possibility of losing a war. The first section defines military cohesion, the study's dependent variable. The second section outlines the collective action problem associated with motivating groups to sustain cooperation even though individual members risk high costs to achieve a common goal. Fighting in a war represents an extreme example of collective action. This chapter explains that group cohesion depends on the ability of a group's leaders to promote and enforce norms of unconditional loyalty. This core idea applies to groups of any size and function, but will be applied to a country's armed forces in subsequent chapters

The previous chapter talked about two essential elements of leadership that were significantly dependent on the theoretical approach. The first was the extent of the elimination of uncertainty from the appraisal system through considering objective approaches while the second involved the extent to which the theoretical perspective on organizational autonomy modifies the role given to leadership. While the uncertainty problem is conventionally viewed to be the concern of individual leaders, this chapter attempts to look into how the uncertainty problem may be taken on in terms of the utility of scientific knowledge. Since science may enable us to veer away from the Aristotelian binary of error and truth, this chapter explores the specific case of mad cow disease. Particularly, science may be utilized in dealing with ignorance and in establishing the foundation for managers to arrive at rational decisions.

Chapter three examines Germany in World War II and World War I. The cohesion of German armed forces varied greatly between the two World Wars. The tenacity of the messianic German Army in World War II offers compelling evidence in support of cohesion theory; a high degree of organization autonomy bolstered military cohesion. This chapter then compares the performance of the German Army from 1917 to 1918 with the Wehrmacht of World War II, arguing that the combination of a high degree of organizational autonomy but low degree of regime control produced a professional military in Wilhelmine Germany. Chapter keywords: cohesion theory, military cohesion, World War II, Germany, Wehrmacht, messianic military, World War I, professional military, Wilhelmine Germany

This chapter examines the intergroup tensions among the Children's Defense Fund (CDF), Black Community Crusade for Children (BCCC), and Black Student Leadership Network (BSLN), as well as the intraorganizational tensions that existed inside of the BSLN which led to its collapse in 1996. There was increasing skepticism among BSLN members, particularly among its leadership, about the commitment of the BCCC and CDF in supporting the youth formation's agenda and programs. Their skepticism increased after the CDF announced plans to launch the Stand for Children campaign in 1996 that targeted welfare reform legislation being deliberated by Congress at the time. Although the campaign had good intentions, it may have highlighted the challenges of institutional leveraging. The Stand For Children campaign neutralized the BSLN's program, which, in turn, encouraged its leaders to push for greater organizational autonomy. After the BCCC resisted the BSLN's attempts at exercising greater control over its agenda, the youth organization disbanded in August 1996.