Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Traditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to ...
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Traditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to speak, a launching pad and breeding ground of biological organisms, some pathological and many benign, that are transmitted from one human individual to another. Understanding people as way-station selves embedded in a web of infectious disease requires rethinking some of the most basic concepts of bioethics: autonomy, the harm principle, and responsibility, among others. The autonomous agent cannot be seen as an isolated individual, but must be viewed as acting in biological relationships with others. The harm principle's basic idea that intervention is permissible only to prevent people from harming each other must be reshaped by the recognition that there is no easy way to separate actions that harm only the individual him/herself from actions that affect others. Responsibility must be rethought in light of the biological reality that people may infect others unknowingly, and may never know the sources of the infections they contract. Although people may be more or less aware of their susceptibility to infectious disease, there is always a sense in which each person stands in unknown relationships of potential contagion to others.Less
Traditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to speak, a launching pad and breeding ground of biological organisms, some pathological and many benign, that are transmitted from one human individual to another. Understanding people as way-station selves embedded in a web of infectious disease requires rethinking some of the most basic concepts of bioethics: autonomy, the harm principle, and responsibility, among others. The autonomous agent cannot be seen as an isolated individual, but must be viewed as acting in biological relationships with others. The harm principle's basic idea that intervention is permissible only to prevent people from harming each other must be reshaped by the recognition that there is no easy way to separate actions that harm only the individual him/herself from actions that affect others. Responsibility must be rethought in light of the biological reality that people may infect others unknowingly, and may never know the sources of the infections they contract. Although people may be more or less aware of their susceptibility to infectious disease, there is always a sense in which each person stands in unknown relationships of potential contagion to others.
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176421
- eISBN:
- 9780199872008
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or ...
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Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.Less
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.
David P. Hughes and Patrizia d'Ettorre
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199216840
- eISBN:
- 9780191712043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216840.003.0017
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
As evidenced by this contributed volume communication is multifarious. It exists among organisms but also between cells and in networks, and even possesses inorganic properties as a result of ...
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As evidenced by this contributed volume communication is multifarious. It exists among organisms but also between cells and in networks, and even possesses inorganic properties as a result of collective organization. The approaches that can be adopted to study communication are similarly varied — from the mechanistic to the functional, and from cell biology to linguistics. This book has formulated the synthesis that this volume has achieved in a personal sociobiological view that encompasses both a reductionist and a systems biology view. The expanding toolbox with which to dissect mechanisms requires a robust interdisciplinary logic and sound theory to achieve the functional balance needed to make further progress in the evolutionary study of communication.Less
As evidenced by this contributed volume communication is multifarious. It exists among organisms but also between cells and in networks, and even possesses inorganic properties as a result of collective organization. The approaches that can be adopted to study communication are similarly varied — from the mechanistic to the functional, and from cell biology to linguistics. This book has formulated the synthesis that this volume has achieved in a personal sociobiological view that encompasses both a reductionist and a systems biology view. The expanding toolbox with which to dissect mechanisms requires a robust interdisciplinary logic and sound theory to achieve the functional balance needed to make further progress in the evolutionary study of communication.
Paul Guyer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199273461
- eISBN:
- 9780191706196
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of ...
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The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.Less
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.
John Tyler Bonner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691157016
- eISBN:
- 9781400846429
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691157016.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
This book challenges a central tenet of evolutionary biology. The book makes the bold and provocative claim that some biological diversity may be explained by something other than natural selection. ...
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This book challenges a central tenet of evolutionary biology. The book makes the bold and provocative claim that some biological diversity may be explained by something other than natural selection. The book makes an argument for the underappreciated role that randomness—or chance—plays in evolution. Due to the tremendous and enduring influence of Darwin's natural selection, the importance of randomness has been to some extent overshadowed. The book shows how the effects of randomness differ for organisms of different sizes, and how the smaller an organism is, the more likely it is that morphological differences will be random and selection may not be involved to any degree. The book then traces the increase in size and complexity of organisms over geological time, and looks at the varying significance of randomness at different size levels, from microorganisms to large mammals. The book also discusses how sexual cycles vary depending on size and complexity, and how the trend away from randomness in higher forms has even been reversed in some social organisms.Less
This book challenges a central tenet of evolutionary biology. The book makes the bold and provocative claim that some biological diversity may be explained by something other than natural selection. The book makes an argument for the underappreciated role that randomness—or chance—plays in evolution. Due to the tremendous and enduring influence of Darwin's natural selection, the importance of randomness has been to some extent overshadowed. The book shows how the effects of randomness differ for organisms of different sizes, and how the smaller an organism is, the more likely it is that morphological differences will be random and selection may not be involved to any degree. The book then traces the increase in size and complexity of organisms over geological time, and looks at the varying significance of randomness at different size levels, from microorganisms to large mammals. The book also discusses how sexual cycles vary depending on size and complexity, and how the trend away from randomness in higher forms has even been reversed in some social organisms.
Thomas Pradeu
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199775286
- eISBN:
- 9780199932818
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199775286.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What counts as an individual in the living world? What does it mean for a living thing to remain the same through time while constantly changing? Immunology, one of the most dynamic fields of today’s ...
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What counts as an individual in the living world? What does it mean for a living thing to remain the same through time while constantly changing? Immunology, one of the most dynamic fields of today’s biology, considers these questions its province, and answers them through its crucial concepts of “self” and “nonself.” Though immunology has been dominated since the 1940s by the self-nonself theory, this book argues that this theory is inadequate, because immune responses to self constituents and immune tolerance of foreign entities are the rule, not the exception. An alternative theory, the continuity theory, is advanced instead. This theory offers a new way to answer the question of what triggers an immune response. It also echoes the recent realization that all organisms, and not higher vertebrates only, have an immune system. This book’s main thesis is that the self-nonself theory should be abandoned, but that immunology still proves to be decisive for delineating the boundaries of the organism. Articulating an evolutionary and an immunological perspective, it offers an original conception of the organism. Tolerance of the fetus by the mother and of countless bacteria on the body’s surfaces proves that every organism is heterogeneous, that is, made of entities of different origins. In other words, every organism appears as a chimera, a mixed living thing the cohesiveness of which is ensured by the constant action of its immune system. The Limits of the Self will be essential reading for anyone interested in the definition of biological individuality and the understanding of the immune system.Less
What counts as an individual in the living world? What does it mean for a living thing to remain the same through time while constantly changing? Immunology, one of the most dynamic fields of today’s biology, considers these questions its province, and answers them through its crucial concepts of “self” and “nonself.” Though immunology has been dominated since the 1940s by the self-nonself theory, this book argues that this theory is inadequate, because immune responses to self constituents and immune tolerance of foreign entities are the rule, not the exception. An alternative theory, the continuity theory, is advanced instead. This theory offers a new way to answer the question of what triggers an immune response. It also echoes the recent realization that all organisms, and not higher vertebrates only, have an immune system. This book’s main thesis is that the self-nonself theory should be abandoned, but that immunology still proves to be decisive for delineating the boundaries of the organism. Articulating an evolutionary and an immunological perspective, it offers an original conception of the organism. Tolerance of the fetus by the mother and of countless bacteria on the body’s surfaces proves that every organism is heterogeneous, that is, made of entities of different origins. In other words, every organism appears as a chimera, a mixed living thing the cohesiveness of which is ensured by the constant action of its immune system. The Limits of the Self will be essential reading for anyone interested in the definition of biological individuality and the understanding of the immune system.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245369
- eISBN:
- 9780191598036
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245363.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged ...
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There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.Less
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.
The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.
I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.
A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.
Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter reviews the principles proposed in Chapter 6. The first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class ...
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This chapter reviews the principles proposed in Chapter 6. The first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class have some moral status based upon their intrinsic properties. Organic life confers only a modest moral status; sentience confers a stronger moral status; and moral agency is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status. The fourth principle expands the community of moral equals to include sentient human beings who are not moral agents. Finally, the last three principles require the acceptance of special obligations to plants and animals of ecosystemically important species, and animal members of our social communities; and permit the acceptance of obligations to some non-living things that have ecosystemic importance, or that have special religious or spiritual value to some people.Less
This chapter reviews the principles proposed in Chapter 6. The first three principles refer to nested classes of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moral agents. Beings of each class have some moral status based upon their intrinsic properties. Organic life confers only a modest moral status; sentience confers a stronger moral status; and moral agency is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status. The fourth principle expands the community of moral equals to include sentient human beings who are not moral agents. Finally, the last three principles require the acceptance of special obligations to plants and animals of ecosystemically important species, and animal members of our social communities; and permit the acceptance of obligations to some non-living things that have ecosystemic importance, or that have special religious or spiritual value to some people.
Richard Sole and Santiago F. Elena
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691158846
- eISBN:
- 9780691185118
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158846.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Viruses are everywhere, infecting all sorts of living organisms, from the tiniest bacteria to the largest mammals. Many are harmful parasites, but viruses also play a major role as drivers of our ...
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Viruses are everywhere, infecting all sorts of living organisms, from the tiniest bacteria to the largest mammals. Many are harmful parasites, but viruses also play a major role as drivers of our evolution as a species and are essential regulators of the composition and complexity of ecosystems on a global scale. This book draws on complex systems theory to provide a fresh look at viral origins, populations, and evolution, and the coevolutionary dynamics of viruses and their hosts. New viruses continue to emerge that threaten people, crops, and farm animals. Viruses constantly evade our immune systems, and antiviral therapies and vaccination campaigns can be powerless against them. These unique characteristics of virus biology are a consequence of their tremendous evolutionary potential, which enables viruses to quickly adapt to any environmental challenge. This book presents a unified framework for understanding viruses as complex adaptive systems. It shows how the application of complex systems theory to viral dynamics has provided new insights into the development of AIDS in patients infected with HIV-1, the emergence of new antigenic variants of the influenza A virus, and other cutting-edge advances. The book also extends the analogy of viruses to the evolution of other replicators such as computer viruses, cancer, and languages.Less
Viruses are everywhere, infecting all sorts of living organisms, from the tiniest bacteria to the largest mammals. Many are harmful parasites, but viruses also play a major role as drivers of our evolution as a species and are essential regulators of the composition and complexity of ecosystems on a global scale. This book draws on complex systems theory to provide a fresh look at viral origins, populations, and evolution, and the coevolutionary dynamics of viruses and their hosts. New viruses continue to emerge that threaten people, crops, and farm animals. Viruses constantly evade our immune systems, and antiviral therapies and vaccination campaigns can be powerless against them. These unique characteristics of virus biology are a consequence of their tremendous evolutionary potential, which enables viruses to quickly adapt to any environmental challenge. This book presents a unified framework for understanding viruses as complex adaptive systems. It shows how the application of complex systems theory to viral dynamics has provided new insights into the development of AIDS in patients infected with HIV-1, the emergence of new antigenic variants of the influenza A virus, and other cutting-edge advances. The book also extends the analogy of viruses to the evolution of other replicators such as computer viruses, cancer, and languages.
Walter Glannon
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195307788
- eISBN:
- 9780199867431
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307788.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter defends a narrow neurological criterion of death, which says that the permanent cessation of higher brain, or cortical, function is sufficient for the death of a person. It distinguishes ...
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This chapter defends a narrow neurological criterion of death, which says that the permanent cessation of higher brain, or cortical, function is sufficient for the death of a person. It distinguishes between persons and human organisms, and argues that we are essentially persons rather than organisms. This distinction is elaborated by considering different conceptions of the soul, as well as different perspectives on when the soul leaves the body. It is argued that only persons, and not human organisms, can have interests. The capacity for consciousness is necessary to have interests, and this capacity is an essential property of persons but not of human organisms. Insofar as benefit and harm are defined in terms of the satisfaction or defeat of interests, only persons can benefit or be harmed. This argument is critical for exploring the ethical implications of brain death. It is particularly critical for analyzing ethical questions about the permissibility or impermissibility of such actions as withdrawing life-support and procuring organs for transplantation.Less
This chapter defends a narrow neurological criterion of death, which says that the permanent cessation of higher brain, or cortical, function is sufficient for the death of a person. It distinguishes between persons and human organisms, and argues that we are essentially persons rather than organisms. This distinction is elaborated by considering different conceptions of the soul, as well as different perspectives on when the soul leaves the body. It is argued that only persons, and not human organisms, can have interests. The capacity for consciousness is necessary to have interests, and this capacity is an essential property of persons but not of human organisms. Insofar as benefit and harm are defined in terms of the satisfaction or defeat of interests, only persons can benefit or be harmed. This argument is critical for exploring the ethical implications of brain death. It is particularly critical for analyzing ethical questions about the permissibility or impermissibility of such actions as withdrawing life-support and procuring organs for transplantation.
Paul U. Unschuld
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520257658
- eISBN:
- 9780520944701
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520257658.003.0017
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Medical Anthropology
The ruler of Qin conquered his opponents in the year 221 bc and was able to rule over a unified China and called himself the “First Emperor of Qin.” He was able to create an integrated whole out of ...
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The ruler of Qin conquered his opponents in the year 221 bc and was able to rule over a unified China and called himself the “First Emperor of Qin.” He was able to create an integrated whole out of states that for the most part had been culturally and economically independent. He ordered a common script, common track width (on roads), and common weights and measures, thereby laying the foundation for a lasting exchange of goods and people in his kingdom that was necessary to support the huge new cities in distant parts of the country. The new state organism offered China an experience of being an organism consisting of several units, where each unit contributed to the well-being of the whole. For some philosophers of the time, the effect of this new economic and social organism on their worldview was so profound that they could not avoid internalizing the model as a whole, extending it even to their understanding of the body. The body organism in the new medicine was nothing but the state organism transferred onto the body.Less
The ruler of Qin conquered his opponents in the year 221 bc and was able to rule over a unified China and called himself the “First Emperor of Qin.” He was able to create an integrated whole out of states that for the most part had been culturally and economically independent. He ordered a common script, common track width (on roads), and common weights and measures, thereby laying the foundation for a lasting exchange of goods and people in his kingdom that was necessary to support the huge new cities in distant parts of the country. The new state organism offered China an experience of being an organism consisting of several units, where each unit contributed to the well-being of the whole. For some philosophers of the time, the effect of this new economic and social organism on their worldview was so profound that they could not avoid internalizing the model as a whole, extending it even to their understanding of the body. The body organism in the new medicine was nothing but the state organism transferred onto the body.
Paulette Kurzer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199283958
- eISBN:
- 9780191603297
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199283958.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Why has the problem of tobacco energized NGOs and policy entrepreneurs in the USA but much less in the EU? Why has transgenic food provoked similar kinds of collective responses in the EU, but much ...
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Why has the problem of tobacco energized NGOs and policy entrepreneurs in the USA but much less in the EU? Why has transgenic food provoked similar kinds of collective responses in the EU, but much less in the USA? First, the USA and EU-15 possess different ‘cultural markers’ in that they express different values/collective preferences. Second, institutional arrangements vary and steer even similar preferences and values to produce different political results.Less
Why has the problem of tobacco energized NGOs and policy entrepreneurs in the USA but much less in the EU? Why has transgenic food provoked similar kinds of collective responses in the EU, but much less in the USA? First, the USA and EU-15 possess different ‘cultural markers’ in that they express different values/collective preferences. Second, institutional arrangements vary and steer even similar preferences and values to produce different political results.
Steven M. Bartell and Ying Feng
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195127270
- eISBN:
- 9780199869121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195127270.003.0007
- Subject:
- Biology, Ecology, Biochemistry / Molecular Biology
This chapter describes methods for assessing the movement of radionuclides along pathways of transport and bioaccumulation in rivers, reservoirs, lakes, estuaries, and coastal oceans. The materials ...
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This chapter describes methods for assessing the movement of radionuclides along pathways of transport and bioaccumulation in rivers, reservoirs, lakes, estuaries, and coastal oceans. The materials presented here focus primarily on the accumulation of radionuclides by aquatic organisms. The key pathways for transport and bioaccumulation are demonstrated using a model for 137Cs in the Chernobyl (former Soviet Union) cooling pond. Subsequent consumption of contaminated aquatic resources by humans is briefly described in relation to human health risk assessment.Less
This chapter describes methods for assessing the movement of radionuclides along pathways of transport and bioaccumulation in rivers, reservoirs, lakes, estuaries, and coastal oceans. The materials presented here focus primarily on the accumulation of radionuclides by aquatic organisms. The key pathways for transport and bioaccumulation are demonstrated using a model for 137Cs in the Chernobyl (former Soviet Union) cooling pond. Subsequent consumption of contaminated aquatic resources by humans is briefly described in relation to human health risk assessment.
David P Hughes
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199216840
- eISBN:
- 9780191712043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216840.003.0010
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Societies of social insects are paragons of communication. Multiple channels exist between different members and the transmitted information ranges from specifying the location of foraging areas to ...
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Societies of social insects are paragons of communication. Multiple channels exist between different members and the transmitted information ranges from specifying the location of foraging areas to who controls reproduction. Whole colonies can also communicate with other colonies or even vertebrates. But what if the individuals within a society are not, in a word, themselves? This chapter explores how adaptive manipulation of host behaviour by parasites, i.e., the extended phenotype of parasites obscures social communication, and it asks how it influences other members of the society. Since manipulated kin are at best cheaters and at worst potential infective agents can the society recognise them? Knowing how a highly complicated example of social communication is broken or subverted by parasites can provide considerable insight into the evolution of communication. The chapter discusses conflict and communication in this system in the context of the debate over the nature of the organism.Less
Societies of social insects are paragons of communication. Multiple channels exist between different members and the transmitted information ranges from specifying the location of foraging areas to who controls reproduction. Whole colonies can also communicate with other colonies or even vertebrates. But what if the individuals within a society are not, in a word, themselves? This chapter explores how adaptive manipulation of host behaviour by parasites, i.e., the extended phenotype of parasites obscures social communication, and it asks how it influences other members of the society. Since manipulated kin are at best cheaters and at worst potential infective agents can the society recognise them? Knowing how a highly complicated example of social communication is broken or subverted by parasites can provide considerable insight into the evolution of communication. The chapter discusses conflict and communication in this system in the context of the debate over the nature of the organism.
David Haig
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199216840
- eISBN:
- 9780191712043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216840.003.0012
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Behavioural ecology and cell biology both use the language of communication and signalling. In cell biology, signaller and receiver are cells of a single body or molecules encoded by a single genome ...
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Behavioural ecology and cell biology both use the language of communication and signalling. In cell biology, signaller and receiver are cells of a single body or molecules encoded by a single genome and are implicitly assumed to have identical evolutionary interests. The signaller does not have an incentive to deceive. In behavioural ecology, signaller and receiver are different genetic individuals, with possibly conflicting evolutionary interests. Signallers may have an incentive to deceive, so receivers must decide whether signals can be trusted. However, we now know conflicts within genomes are possible. This raises questions about how internal conflicts influence signalling between and within individual organisms. These questions are explored using the example of genomic imprinting.Less
Behavioural ecology and cell biology both use the language of communication and signalling. In cell biology, signaller and receiver are cells of a single body or molecules encoded by a single genome and are implicitly assumed to have identical evolutionary interests. The signaller does not have an incentive to deceive. In behavioural ecology, signaller and receiver are different genetic individuals, with possibly conflicting evolutionary interests. Signallers may have an incentive to deceive, so receivers must decide whether signals can be trusted. However, we now know conflicts within genomes are possible. This raises questions about how internal conflicts influence signalling between and within individual organisms. These questions are explored using the example of genomic imprinting.
Lora A. Morandin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195316957
- eISBN:
- 9780199871575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195316957.003.0012
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology, Plant Sciences and Forestry
Genetic modification (GM) of crops has been accompanied by concerns of environmental impact, including effects to beneficial organisms such as bees. Currently, most commercial GM crops are modified ...
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Genetic modification (GM) of crops has been accompanied by concerns of environmental impact, including effects to beneficial organisms such as bees. Currently, most commercial GM crops are modified for pest and/or herbicide resistance. Transgenes such as Bt may be expressed in pollen, resulting in exposure to bees. However, studies to date indicate that crops transformed with genes coding for Bt proteins will not harm bees. Herbicide resistant crops are not likely to pose direct toxicity effects to bees; yet, greater weed control in herbicide resistant crops may be responsible for a lower bee abundance in these crops than non-transformed crops. Reduced pesticide use associated with insect resistant GM crops, and reduced tillage that is possible with herbicide tolerant crops, could be beneficial to bee populations compared to conventional agriculture. Risk of GM crops to bees should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in relation to feasible alternatives.Less
Genetic modification (GM) of crops has been accompanied by concerns of environmental impact, including effects to beneficial organisms such as bees. Currently, most commercial GM crops are modified for pest and/or herbicide resistance. Transgenes such as Bt may be expressed in pollen, resulting in exposure to bees. However, studies to date indicate that crops transformed with genes coding for Bt proteins will not harm bees. Herbicide resistant crops are not likely to pose direct toxicity effects to bees; yet, greater weed control in herbicide resistant crops may be responsible for a lower bee abundance in these crops than non-transformed crops. Reduced pesticide use associated with insect resistant GM crops, and reduced tillage that is possible with herbicide tolerant crops, could be beneficial to bee populations compared to conventional agriculture. Risk of GM crops to bees should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in relation to feasible alternatives.
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176421
- eISBN:
- 9780199872008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines animalism, the view that we are biological organisms. It is based on the claim that human organisms think just as we do. This implies that if I am not an organism, I am one of ...
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This chapter examines animalism, the view that we are biological organisms. It is based on the claim that human organisms think just as we do. This implies that if I am not an organism, I am one of at least two thinkers of my thoughts, making it hard to see how I could know that I am the nonanimal thinker: the thinking-animal problem. Some proposed solutions are critically examined, notably Shoemaker's claim that human organisms cannot think and Noonan's account of how we might know that we are not the animals thinking our thoughts. Familiar objections to animalism are then reviewed, such as its implication that personal identity does not consist in psychological continuity. It is argued that these objections are weak and that more serious worries lie elsewhere.Less
This chapter examines animalism, the view that we are biological organisms. It is based on the claim that human organisms think just as we do. This implies that if I am not an organism, I am one of at least two thinkers of my thoughts, making it hard to see how I could know that I am the nonanimal thinker: the thinking-animal problem. Some proposed solutions are critically examined, notably Shoemaker's claim that human organisms cannot think and Noonan's account of how we might know that we are not the animals thinking our thoughts. Familiar objections to animalism are then reviewed, such as its implication that personal identity does not consist in psychological continuity. It is argued that these objections are weak and that more serious worries lie elsewhere.
Randy J. Nelson, David L. Denlinger, and David E. Somers (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195335903
- eISBN:
- 9780199775446
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335903.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology
Life evolves in a cyclic environment, and to be successful, organisms must adapt not only to their spatial habitat, but also to their temporal habitat. How do plants and animals determine the time of ...
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Life evolves in a cyclic environment, and to be successful, organisms must adapt not only to their spatial habitat, but also to their temporal habitat. How do plants and animals determine the time of year so they can anticipate seasonal changes in their habitats? In most cases, day length or photoperiod acts as the principal external cue for determining seasonal activity. For organisms not living at the bottom of the ocean or deep in a cave, day follows night, and the length of the day changes predictably throughout the year. These changes in photoperiod provide the most accurate signal for predicting upcoming seasonal conditions. Measuring day length allows plants and animals to anticipate and adapt to seasonal changes in their environments in order to optimally time key developmental events including seasonal growth and flowering of plants, annual bouts of reproduction, dormancy and migration in insects, and the collapse and re-growth of the reproductive system that drives breeding seasons in mammals and birds. Although research on photoperiodic time measurement originally integrated work on plants and animals, recent work has focused more narrowly and separately on plants, invertebrates, or vertebrates. As the fields have become more specialized there has been less interaction across the broader field of photoperiodism. As a result, researchers in each area often needlessly repeat both theoretical and experimental work. However, over the past decade, intense work on daily and seasonal rhythms in fruit flies, mustard plants, and hamsters and mice, has led to remarkable progress in understanding the phenomenology, as well as the molecular and genetic mechanisms, underlying circadian rhythms and clocks. This book was developed to further this type of cooperation among scientists from all related disciplines.Less
Life evolves in a cyclic environment, and to be successful, organisms must adapt not only to their spatial habitat, but also to their temporal habitat. How do plants and animals determine the time of year so they can anticipate seasonal changes in their habitats? In most cases, day length or photoperiod acts as the principal external cue for determining seasonal activity. For organisms not living at the bottom of the ocean or deep in a cave, day follows night, and the length of the day changes predictably throughout the year. These changes in photoperiod provide the most accurate signal for predicting upcoming seasonal conditions. Measuring day length allows plants and animals to anticipate and adapt to seasonal changes in their environments in order to optimally time key developmental events including seasonal growth and flowering of plants, annual bouts of reproduction, dormancy and migration in insects, and the collapse and re-growth of the reproductive system that drives breeding seasons in mammals and birds. Although research on photoperiodic time measurement originally integrated work on plants and animals, recent work has focused more narrowly and separately on plants, invertebrates, or vertebrates. As the fields have become more specialized there has been less interaction across the broader field of photoperiodism. As a result, researchers in each area often needlessly repeat both theoretical and experimental work. However, over the past decade, intense work on daily and seasonal rhythms in fruit flies, mustard plants, and hamsters and mice, has led to remarkable progress in understanding the phenomenology, as well as the molecular and genetic mechanisms, underlying circadian rhythms and clocks. This book was developed to further this type of cooperation among scientists from all related disciplines.
John Tyler Bonner
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691157016
- eISBN:
- 9781400846429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691157016.003.0004
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
This chapter explains why randomness is curtailed in larger forms. Large organisms are unlikely to have an overall neutral morphology like small ones, and the reason is to be found in their elaborate ...
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This chapter explains why randomness is curtailed in larger forms. Large organisms are unlikely to have an overall neutral morphology like small ones, and the reason is to be found in their elaborate development. The greater the size, the more developmental steps. The voyage from a single cell, a fertilized egg, to a large, mature organism with millions of cells is a process that cannot be chaotic, but must be controlled if it is to achieve a consistent ultimate shape from generation to generation. There can be no significant deviation from those set steps to get from one generation to the next.Less
This chapter explains why randomness is curtailed in larger forms. Large organisms are unlikely to have an overall neutral morphology like small ones, and the reason is to be found in their elaborate development. The greater the size, the more developmental steps. The voyage from a single cell, a fertilized egg, to a large, mature organism with millions of cells is a process that cannot be chaotic, but must be controlled if it is to achieve a consistent ultimate shape from generation to generation. There can be no significant deviation from those set steps to get from one generation to the next.
Richard M. Murray
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161532
- eISBN:
- 9781400850501
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161532.003.0007
- Subject:
- Biology, Biochemistry / Molecular Biology
This chapter describes some of the design tradeoffs arising from the interaction between synthetic circuits and the host organism. It first considers the effects of competition for shared cellular ...
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This chapter describes some of the design tradeoffs arising from the interaction between synthetic circuits and the host organism. It first considers the effects of competition for shared cellular resources on circuits' behavior. In particular, circuits (endogenous and exogenous) share a number of cellular resources. The insertion or induction of synthetic circuits in the cellular environment changes for these resources, with possibly undesired repercussions on the functioning of the circuits. Independent circuits may become coupled when they share common resources that are not in overabundance. This fact leads to constraints among the concentrations of proteins in synthetic circuits, which should be accounted for in the design phase. Next, the chapter looks at the effect of biological noise on the design of devices requiring high gains. Specifically, the chapter illustrates possible design tradeoffs between retroactivity attenuation and noise amplification that emerge due to the intrinsic noise of biomolecular reactions.Less
This chapter describes some of the design tradeoffs arising from the interaction between synthetic circuits and the host organism. It first considers the effects of competition for shared cellular resources on circuits' behavior. In particular, circuits (endogenous and exogenous) share a number of cellular resources. The insertion or induction of synthetic circuits in the cellular environment changes for these resources, with possibly undesired repercussions on the functioning of the circuits. Independent circuits may become coupled when they share common resources that are not in overabundance. This fact leads to constraints among the concentrations of proteins in synthetic circuits, which should be accounted for in the design phase. Next, the chapter looks at the effect of biological noise on the design of devices requiring high gains. Specifically, the chapter illustrates possible design tradeoffs between retroactivity attenuation and noise amplification that emerge due to the intrinsic noise of biomolecular reactions.
