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Organic Unity as the “True Unity” of the Intuitive Intellect

Sally Sedgwick

in Hegel's Critique of Kant

Hegel describes the ‘true unity’ of the intuitive intellect as ‘organic unity.’ Kant’s idea of organic unity, he says, offers us a model of the ‘identity of the universal and the particular.’ The ... More

Hegel describes the ‘true unity’ of the intuitive intellect as ‘organic unity.’ Kant’s idea of organic unity, he says, offers us a model of the ‘identity of the universal and the particular.’ The central aim of this chapter is to determine what Kant’s model of organic unity suggests to Hegel about the ‘true unity’ achieved by the intuitive intellect. It is argued that Hegel is particularly interested in the fact that, for Kant, the parts and whole of an organism stand in a relation of purposive reciprocal determination. Hegel takes this model of organic unity to suggest how human cognition is able to achieve the identity of concept and intuition. We are able to achieve identity, according to Hegel, because concepts and intuitions somehow stand to each other in a relation of reciprocal determination.Less

Organicism: The Idealist Tradition

David Fairer

in Organising Poetry: The Coleridge Circle, 1790-1798

This book argues that it is inappropriate and misleading to discuss the 1790s poetry of Coleridge and his circle in terms of the organicist theories that the poet expounded years later under the ... More

This book argues that it is inappropriate and misleading to discuss the 1790s poetry of Coleridge and his circle in terms of the organicist theories that the poet expounded years later under the influence of German idealist philosophy. This chapter traces the development of this ‘organicism’ through a critical tradition that culminated in the work of M. H. Abrams, who set a ’living’ organic form against an 18th-century empirical mechanic form (derived from Newton and Locke). The chapter argues that this influential binary has distorted literary history and (by privileging a supposed ‘organic form’ and ‘organic unity’) has led to persistent misreadings of the 1790s poetry of Coleridge, Wordsworth, and their friends. The book argues that their work at this time is more usefully seen in response to an 18th-century native ‘organic’ tradition, empirical in character, which is entirely incompatible with the values and principles of idealism.Less

Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action

Robert Audi

in Metaethics after Moore

This chapter sketches a theory of intrinsic value that aims to incorporate certain elements of Moore's theory, but which goes beyond it in important ways while also avoiding commitment to many of ... More

This chapter sketches a theory of intrinsic value that aims to incorporate certain elements of Moore's theory, but which goes beyond it in important ways while also avoiding commitment to many of Moore's controversial normative and metaethical views. Moore held that experiences, and non-experiential items such as art works, can be the bearers of intrinsic value. By contrast, the chapter defends experientialism — according to which the bearers of intrinsic value are concrete experiences — partly by arguing that it is experiences that seem to have the kind of Aristotelian ‘finality’ and thus ‘choiceworthiness’ that is appropriate for anything's having intrinsic value. In order to accommodate the Moorean idea that items such as art works are in some sense ‘good in themselves’ (and not merely instrumentally good), the notion of inherent value is introduced; a species of value that is possessed by something whenever an appropriate experience of it is intrinsically good. A painting, for example, can be inherently good because an appropriate aesthetic experience of that object is itself intrinsically good. The concepts of intrinsic and inherent value, along with a Moorean principle of organic unities (suitably broadened), provide the basis for a nuanced theory of value whose merits include the recognition and explanation of a wide range of intuitively plausible value judgments, as well as contributing to a general theory of practical reason.Less

Why Holists Should Love Organic Unities

Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge

in Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy

Many agree that, to be sound, judgements of value must take account of context. Yet there are distinct models for how this can be done. According to G. E. Moore, one can properly take account of ... More

Many agree that, to be sound, judgements of value must take account of context. Yet there are distinct models for how this can be done. According to G. E. Moore, one can properly take account of context only by admitting organic unities—wholes whose value is not the sum of the value of their parts. According to Jonathan Dancy, one can properly take account of context only by recognizing holism about value; the value of a part can vary depending upon its surrounding context. In the present paper, we ask whether the doctrine of organic unities and holism about value are best seen as rival or compatible and we conclude that the views are compatible. This paper argues that holism is compatible with the doctrine of organic unities, and that there may well be values that behave both holistically and as organic unities.Less

Value Theory

Thomas Hurka

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter surveys a variety of views about which states of affairs are intrinsically good, that is, in themselves or apart from their consequences. It considers the claims to intrinsic value of ... More

This chapter surveys a variety of views about which states of affairs are intrinsically good, that is, in themselves or apart from their consequences. It considers the claims to intrinsic value of such states of individuals as pleasure, the fulfillment of desire, knowledge, achievement, moral virtue, and personal relationships; the different ways such goods can be compared and aggregated both within and across individual lives; and the possibility, given a principle of “organic unities,” of goods located in wholes larger than individual lives, such as complex ecosystems.Less

Are there Organic Unities?

Jonathan Dancy

in Ethics Without Principles

Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable ... More

Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.Less

Evil Achievements and the Principle of Recursion

Gwen Bradford

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 3

This chapter investigates the value of achievements by examining the implications of a highly plausible axiological principle, the principle of Recursion, as developed by Thomas Hurka. According to ... More

This chapter investigates the value of achievements by examining the implications of a highly plausible axiological principle, the principle of Recursion, as developed by Thomas Hurka. According to Recursion, the pursuit of an intrinsic good is itself good, and the pursuit of a bad is bad. Evil achievements present a puzzle for Recursion. The value of achievements is at least in part grounded by the positive intrinsic value of the pursuit. This is true even of achievements with evil goals. Yet Recursion entails that the pursuit of an evil is itself evil. Three different construals of Recursion are considered, and their merits are evaluated in light of the value of achievements. Doing so reveals not only a good way to account for the value of achievements, but also the best way to understand the principle of Recursion as an axiological principle. Ultimately, it is concluded that Recursion is best construed as an instance of genuine organic unity.Less

God’s Affective Love

Jordan Wessling

in Love Divine

Much of the difference between advocates of divine impassibility and divine passibility centres upon the supposed value of suffering in compassion. Proponents of divine impassibility typically ... More

Much of the difference between advocates of divine impassibility and divine passibility centres upon the supposed value of suffering in compassion. Proponents of divine impassibility typically maintain that because suffering is not intrinsically valuable, compassionate suffering need not be predicated to God. Supporters of divine passibility are perhaps unanimous in the affirmation of an opposing conclusion. For them, suffering-compassion is a way in which God identifies with His creatures deeply, a manner of identification that is valuable in itself, notwithstanding the negativity of the suffering involved. In this chapter, a defence of this passibilist value claim is presented. Additionally, as a secondary aim, this chapter underscores one value-based reason for expanding the value account of God’s love defended in Chapter 2 to include a comprehensive set of divine emotions.Less

Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil

Noah Lemos

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 9

Many attempts to respond to the problem of evil appeal to the concept of an organic unity. The first part of Chapter 8 explains Roderick Chisholm’s views on organic unities, the concept of defeat, ... More

Many attempts to respond to the problem of evil appeal to the concept of an organic unity. The first part of Chapter 8 explains Roderick Chisholm’s views on organic unities, the concept of defeat, and how he thinks they bear on the problem of evil. The second part examines three prominent and recent objections to the principle of organic unities. Roughly, the objections are that (1) the principle of organic unities is incoherent, (2) it leads to “evaluative schizophrenia,” and (3) the examples that allegedly support it, do not, in fact, do so. It is argued that these objections give us no good reason to reject the principle of organic unities.Less

Organic Unities and the Problem of Evil: A Reply to Lemos

Michael J. Zimmerman

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 9

Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos’s contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos’s defense of G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities against three ... More

Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos’s contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos’s defense of G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs; the second concerns a kind of evaluative schizophrenia; and the third concerns the concept of evaluative inadequacy. Lemos’s response to the third objection is examined at length, and it is argued that this response may not succeed in defeating the objection, in which case the problem of evil may not be as easy to solve as some theodicists have suggested,Less

The Value of Achievement

Gwen Bradford

in Achievement

What makes achievements valuable? The essential features of achievements—difficulty and competent causation—are sources of value for all achievements. The best account to capture their value is a ... More

What makes achievements valuable? The essential features of achievements—difficulty and competent causation—are sources of value for all achievements. The best account to capture their value is a perfectionist theory of value, according to which the exercise of our characteristically human capacities has intrinsic value. But not just any perfectionist account can capture the value of achievements. We must acknowledge that the will is among the characteristic capacities. Exercising the will is a matter of exerting effort. Difficult activities essentially involve the will. All achievements are difficult, and so achievements are all valuable in virtue of their difficulty. Similarly, competent causation involves an exercise of the rational capacity, and this too is valuable according to perfectionism. But the value of achievement is greater than the value of the sum of its parts. Achievements are also organic unities.Less

Two Kinds of Organic Unity

Thomas Hurka

in Drawing Morals: Essays in Ethical Theory

This chapter discusses the principle of organic unities as held in G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica: “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.” ... More

This chapter discusses the principle of organic unities as held in G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica: “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.” Moore's favored approach is a holistic interpretation grounded on a “thesis of universality”—that a part of the whole will retain the same intrinsic value while it is and is not a part of the whole. An opposing view—the conditionality interpretation—negates the universality thesis by claiming that a component will change its value when entering the whole in relation to the other parts. Neither approach is superior to the other, as there will certainly be cases wherein one view will be more applicable compared to the other. Ultimately, what matters is that both interpretations agree on the intrinsic value of the whole.Less

Redecorating the International Economy: Keynes, Grant and the Queering of Bretton Woods

Bill Maurer

in Queer Bloomsbury

Maurer reappraises the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, arguing that Keynes’s monetary theory is often mistakenly conflated with the final outcome of the Bretton Woods agreement (different ... More

Maurer reappraises the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, arguing that Keynes’s monetary theory is often mistakenly conflated with the final outcome of the Bretton Woods agreement (different from Keynes’s original proposal to create an international ‘Clearing Union’ that would rely on multiple perspectives to determine the value of currency). Keynes’s affinity for the ‘organic unity’ of complex economic relations resonates with the aesthetic theories of Duncan Grant, his lover and friend. Both Grant and Keynes consider perception an agentive process. Grant manifests this through his post-impressionist interior design, which cannot be experienced from a single vantage point, but must be apprehended from different positions. Keynes articulates the importance of multiple vantage points in his work on probability, which rejects Bertrand Russell’s ‘atomic’, individualistic, logic in favour of dynamic, relational factors that become known through experience and interaction.Less

The Relative Value of Achievement

Gwen Bradford

in Achievement

What makes one achievement more valuable than another? This chapter explores how the value of achievements can vary by appealing to the perfectionist theory of value developed in the previous ... More

What makes one achievement more valuable than another? This chapter explores how the value of achievements can vary by appealing to the perfectionist theory of value developed in the previous chapter, as well as other value theoretic resources. Perhaps surprisingly, achievements that are more difficult are more valuable than achievements that are less difficult, other things being equal. Perhaps unsurprisingly, achievements can also vary in value if they have additional value in their process, or have additional value in their products. An achievement that results in a product of great positive value will have more value than one that doesn’t. The possibility of evil achievements and their value is also explored.Less

Conclusion. Elusive Unity: City Churches in a Romantic Age, after 1840

Kyle T. Bulthuis

in Four Steeples over the City Streets: Religion and Society in New York's Early Republic Congregations

This concluding chapter extends the narrative to the Civil War. In the 1840s and 1850s, a number of larger developments in American religious and intellectual history suggested that a new unity could ... More

This concluding chapter extends the narrative to the Civil War. In the 1840s and 1850s, a number of larger developments in American religious and intellectual history suggested that a new unity could be created in New York, whether it lay in evangelical revivalism, Broad Church Episcopalianism, or generalized Romanticism. But the reality of how church members lived highlighted major differences with the colonial era's promotion of organic unity, in particular the significance of place within the sphere of religious life. All four churches occupied space in Lower Manhattan, a site of increased commercialism and waning residence even at the turn of the nineteenth century. However, not all have remained in the same place, highlighting the challenges of urban worship even for the most resourceful and energetic congregations.Less

Perfection, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Cost

Micheal Slote

in The Impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle, Feminism, and the Complexities of Ethics

Moral dilemmas involve situations where one cannot avoid wrongdoing, and moral cost, as the notion was introduced by Bernard Williams, means that one has wronged someone even while acting in a way ... More

Moral dilemmas involve situations where one cannot avoid wrongdoing, and moral cost, as the notion was introduced by Bernard Williams, means that one has wronged someone even while acting in a way that was morally permissible overall. One might think that familiar examples of dilemma and cost would add to our stock of examples illustrating the impossibility of perfection, but in fact they do no such thing. If one is seeking support for the Berlin thesis, moral dilemma and cost don't as such deliver it. It also turns out that the idea that one needs to experience the bad in order to appreciate the good and the idea that morality doesn't necessarily override all other values don't in themselves push us toward the idea of inevitably imperfect happiness and/or virtue.Less

Religious Establishment Challenged, Destroyed, and Re-formed: The Revolutionary Era

Kyle T. Bulthuis

in Four Steeples over the City Streets: Religion and Society in New York's Early Republic Congregations

This chapter discusses the Revolutionary era's challenges to formal, legal establishment, and the persistence after the Revolution of a social vision of unity in both churches. Accusations of ... More

This chapter discusses the Revolutionary era's challenges to formal, legal establishment, and the persistence after the Revolution of a social vision of unity in both churches. Accusations of loyalism dogged both Anglicans and Methodists, and both groups' connections to blacks heightened such uncertainty, given British-black interaction in New York. During the American Revolution, the State of New York formally disestablished the Episcopal Church, and both churches faced signs of hostility. After the Revolution, however, many assumptions of organic society persisted. Episcopalian and Methodist leaders continued informal associations that promoted a vision of a united society under their leadership. Both groups included blacks within their communities, but kept them at a distance to conform more clearly to cultural assumptions that many white Americans shared.Less

Moore’s Account of Vindictive Punishment: A Test Case for Theories of Organic Unities

Jonathan Dancy

in Practical Thought: Essays on Reason, Intuition, and Action

This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not ... More

This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not have different non-instrumental value in different contexts, but the value they contribute to a whole of which they are a part may vary according to other parts of that whole. In this sense, they can contribute value that they have not got. This paper contrasts that conception with a different, variabilist conception which is more friendly to a general holism in the theory of value. It argues that intrinsicalism gives an incoherent account of what Moore calls vindictive punishment.Less