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This concluding chapter addresses the main issues raised in the Introduction and presents the general findings that emerge from the country studies. It has three main aims. First, it puts forward three arguments on the basis of the national investigations of policy co-ordination at the European level, and comparisons of permanent representations: the first argument is that that all the member states have responded to the co-ordination need that arises from EU policy-making and most aspire to a careful crafting of policy, but that the nature of their response varies according to the prevailing national attitude to European integration, features of the national political and administrative opportunity structures, policy style, and available resources; the second argument is that, although there are some similarities between national arrangements with respect to some aspects of organization and core functions, there are also several very substantial differences—neither the ‘convergence hypothesis’ nor the ‘continuing divergence hypothesis’ outlined in the Introduction is confirmed by the case studies, but there is evidence that many of the factors identified by each are at work; the third argument is related to effectiveness—each set of national arrangements has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, but one common factor affecting performance is the efficiency of domestic co-ordination procedures. The second aim of the Conclusion is to consider the wider implications of the findings both for the functioning of the European Union as a system and for theorizing about the EU; with respect to the former, national arrangements in Brussels do little to overcome the problem of segmentation that characterizes the EU, but concerning the latter, the case studies suggest that the intergovernmentalist image is at odds with how national policy preferences are actually formed and the nature of the role played by the permanent representations; the alternative image approach outlined above, and described in the Introduction, offers a better guide on both counts. The third and final aim of the chapter is to compare national co-ordination practices at the domestic level with those found at the European level; the contention put forward is that the domestic co-ordination of EU policy is more effective than processes at the European level.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Spain. It concentrates on the processes that take place in Madrid, and using a threefold categorization, examines the mechanisms used by central government in its dealings with the other main actors involved in the process. The first set of relationships are horizontal, and relate to non-governmental actors, including the Parliament, political parties, and interest groups; the second set are vertical, or more precisely intergovernmental, and concern relations between the centre and the periphery under the surveillance of the Constitutional Court; the third set are internal, and relate to intragovernmental co-ordination within the central administration and the core executive. These three sets of relationships are examined in the three main sections of the chapter. It is argued that Spain’s politico-constitutional uniqueness has been retained, and even reinforced within the EU, and that the Spanish case appears to challenge the assumption that Europeanization is hollowing out the state, since the Spanish state, here identified with its central government, has been strengthened since accession.

This final country study describes how limited material resources impose severe constraints on the coverage of action and the type of activities that can be pursued by Ireland at the European level. At the same time, however, it shows that policy co-ordination can be effectively achieved when relations within an administrative élite are close and there is a political consensus in favour of Europe. Ireland’s permanent representation was established at Brussels in 1967 as an EU mission, and was part of a long-term strategy to ensure that Ireland would be successful in its application for membership of the European Union. This was finally achieved in 1973. The chapter describes the size and development of the Irish permanent representation from 1967 onwards, its current working methods, its role, and its effectiveness and capacity to implement ambitions.

This introduction starts by pointing out that entry into the European Union (EU) appears to pose even greater demands for co-ordination on its member states than that already required for the domestic public sector. With entry into the EU, the domain of government and action and responsibility has been extended, the complexity of decision-making has been increased and the policy stakes in many policy areas have been raised. In addition to co-ordinating their internal policy-making activities, governments must also be prepared to defend more coherent programmes at the EU level and ensure that their proposals in Brussels and their actions in their national capital are compatible. The different sections of the introduction discuss EU membership and the sources of co-ordination need, the challenge of EU policy co-ordination, and convergence and distinctiveness (divergence).

The purpose of this Introduction to the book is to provide a point of reference and context for the eleven country studies that follow. It begins with a brief discussion of national co-ordination and why it matters to governments at the European level, and then outlines the tasks and difficulties that face national co-ordinators in Brussels, looking at the EU as a political system, and at its complex institutional structure (the Council of the Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission). The following section looks at the tasks that national co-ordinators are called to perform in routine policy-making, and identifies four phases: policy initiation, policy formulation, deliberation and decision; and implementation and enforcement. A brief section on ‘heroic’ decision-making by national governments follows, and then the matter of the emergence of an overall pattern in national co-ordination—of convergence or divergence—is considered. The next section looks at the effectiveness of national arrangements in Brussels, and the concluding one introduces the eleven country case studies.

France has traditionally aspired to play a leading role in shaping the development of European integration, and implicit in this approach has been a vision of integration as a process within which the member states predominate. Debates within the EU are carried out, as far as the traditional French conception has it, on the basis of competing and conflicting national interests, and the effectiveness with which individual member states can shape outputs at the EU level is intrinsically related to their success in presenting coherent positions within such debates; this emphasis on coherence has led to the creation in Paris of a centralized and institutionalized system of interministerial co-ordination. Although often overlooked, 1 the French administration in Brussels also plays a key role in ensuring the coherence of national positions and in defending French interests within the EU; this is most true of the French permanent representation, whose staff represent France in most meetings of the Council of Ministers, and which is responsible for keeping Paris appraised of developments in Brussels. Paris has increasingly, however, also come to recognize the need to exert influence over the supranational institutions of the EU, and over the Commission in particular, so the French have developed strategies both for ensuring the presence of French officials within these institutions and for maintaining close contact with them. This chapter is divided into three sections: the first examines the composition, organization, internal workings, and role of the French permanent representation to the European Union; the second investigates French strategies designed to ensure both a sufficient and an effective French presence within the supranational institutions—notably the Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament; and the final section critically evaluates the performance of the French administration in Brussels, considering first its capacity to carry out its allotted tasks, and second its effectiveness, particularly in terms of its ability to further France’s EU policy objectives.

New social risks are at the forefront of the EU's social policy agenda. In part, this is because a new social risk approach fits with open market policies, which stress constraints on state interventions and the importance of adapting social provision to meet economic goals; in part because old social risk areas are so heavily occupied by existing national government policies that it is difficult to find support for innovations. During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of attempts to develop international policy harmonization were pursued. These failed due to the difficulty of achieving cross‐national consensus. There are a number of relevant directives, chiefly in the areas of equality of opportunity for men and women and other labour market issues. The most important current developments, however, are in the area of ‘soft law’ through the Open Method of Co‐ordination and the National Action Plans in relation to employment, social exclusion, pensions, health and social care. The European Employment Strategy, with its stress on ‘flexicurity’, is the most advanced of these. It is at present unclear to what extent this process will achieve substantial changes in comparison with the importance of the economic pressures from the Single European Market.

A variety of practical obstacles prevented the Vilna Ga’on’s disciples from settling in Jerusalem as soon as they arrived in the Land of Israel in 1808-1812. Instead, they settled in the Galilean city of Safed, where they sought to hasten the redemption through mystical and spiritual practices, and through the purchase of land to be able to fulfill the commandments contingent on the Land of Israel. In 1813, the community was decimated by an epidemic, which some of the survivors, led by Rabbi Menahem Mendel of Shklov, interpreted as punishment for not having immediately endured the rigors of settling in Jerusalem; they accordingly established a colony there. That step was opposed by another group of survivors, led by Rabbi Israel of Shklov. He regarded settlement of Jerusalem as premature, adhering to a doctrine that the redemption would begin with the Sanhedrin’s restoration in the Galilee, where it had last functioned before being disbanded. Restoration of the Sanhedrin required the renewal of classical ordination, which had lapsed in late antiquity or early medieval times and could be renewed only by an ordained sage. To that end, intensive efforts were launched to locate the lost Ten Tribes of Israel, among whom ordination had presumably not lapsed. Among those efforts was the ultimately ill-fated venture of Barukh ben Samuel of Pinsk, dispatched by Israel of Shklov in 1830.

Guy Peters and Jon Pierre address multi‐level governance both as an analytical concept and as a system adopted by decision‐makers for its capacity to address the complex governance demands of the modern epoch. In relation to the latter, they consider whether the problem‐solving capacity of multi‐level governance and the achievement of effective policy outcomes take precedence over democratic input and accountability. This leads to the argument that multi‐level governance could be a ‘Faustian bargain’ in which, ‘core values of democratic government are traded for accommodation, consensus and the purported efficiency in governance’, or put another way, where ‘informal patterns of political coordination could in fact be a strategy for political interests to escape or by‐pass regulations put in place explicitly to prevent that from happening’.

Charles Wesley's reputation has been affected by his sometimes difficult personality and the controversial views that he championed, which has resulted in comparative neglect of his life and ministry. A strong case can, however, be presented for Charles having made a more positive contribution to the long‐term success and character of Methodism than is commonly acknowledged. His championship of a considerable body of pro‐Anglican opinion within the movement helped to stave off separation until the movement was in a position to flourish independently of the Church of England and also contributed to the unique character of the Methodist Church. Detailed study of Charles Wesley's life and ministry underlines the case for a new examination of aspects of Methodist history, complementary to but separate from the traditional focus on John Wesley.

The year 1784 represents a landmark in Methodist history as John Wesley established the Conference as his successor and ordained preachers for the United States. These events, which established de facto Methodist institutional independence from the Church of England, were foreshadowed by developments during the 1770s and early 1780s as separatists and Church‐Methodists agitated in support of conflicting visions of the Methodist future. These conflicts and the events of 1784 illustrate several important but understated themes of early Methodist history, such as the political nature of the Wesley brothers, the strong support for the Church of England within the ranks of laity and preachers, and how 19^th century Methodist scholarship sanitized and distorted the movement's early history.

Although this chapter touches on the long-term development of the Austrian permanent representation at Brussels (which dates back to the mid-1950s, when Austria had a mission for handling relations with the European Coal and Steel Community), it concentrates on the time since Austria has been a member of the European Union (1995). The first two sections deal with the organization and personnel of the permanent representation. The following section locates the permanent representation in the policy co-ordination process. A discussion follows of the limits to co-ordination that are inherent in the set-up of the Austrian institutions, and there is also a brief discussion of activities and strategies. The conclusion attempts to situate the empirical findings in the context of models of government.

The chapter is divided into two main parts, with the first part of the discussion providing the contextual backdrop to the detailed study of the Swedish permanent representation that follows. The argument presented in the first part is twofold: first, it is argued that effective co-ordination of EU policy at both the national and EU levels is regarded as extremely important by the Swedish government for at least two related reasons—the high political salience of EU matters in Sweden, and the Social Democratic government’s determination to be an influential actor in the EU policy arena; second, it is argued that, although Swedish administrative adjustment to EU membership has been relatively unproblematic in the short term, the process of adaptation is not yet complete—the initial belief that EU matters could simply be incorporated into the Swedish system of ministerial consultation has proved problematic, and the volume and pace of EU policy-making has placed considerable strains upon the limited resources of the Swedish ministries, and might yet prove to be incompatible with Swedish policy style. In an attempt to address these problems, the government introduced in 1998 new co-ordinating structures designed to streamline central EU policy co-ordination and strengthen political leadership on EU policy. The second part of the chapter examines how the Swedish permanent representation fits into this wider picture; it discusses the organization, personnel, internal functioning and working methods, and role of the Brussels-based administration, and evaluates its effectiveness and capacity to implement ambitions, bearing in mind the co-ordination needs and policy ambitions of the Swedish administration. The picture that emerges from this study is one of a technically specialized, functionally segmented, and non-hierarchical bureaucracy, which, after five years, is nevertheless still evolving as an administration, and whose effectiveness in delivering national policy ambitions is as much a reflection of its capacity to influence the national administration as of its diplomatic role in Brussels.

This chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Austria starts by discussing the challenge of co-ordination, and outlining the policy changes and reforms in the lead-up to membership of the EU. The strategy employed has resulted in high ambitions concerning EU co-ordination, and this co-ordination ambition is supported by a policy-making culture that values co-ordination and integration, and is based on the country’s long tradition of wide consultation, grand coalition government, parliamentary consensus seeking, and corporatism. The remainder of the chapter looks at the various actors involved individually, briefly pointing out in which way membership of the EU constitutes a challenge, mapping out the respective actor’s formal role in the co-ordination process, and evaluating the actor’s impact on Austria’s position- taking in the EU. The five sets of actors examined are: the central players ( the cabinet and the central administration); Parliament; the President; the Länder; and interest groups (corporatism). The conclusion aims at an overall evaluation of the EU co-ordination process from a political power perspective.

This chapter on the national co-ordination of European Union (EU) policy in Denmark starts by pointing out that the Danish position within the EU is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Denmark has acquired the image of a ‘Eurosceptic’ having obtained several opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty; on the other hand, its day-to-day performance in the EU is widely regarded as positive, since its rate and speed of implementation of EU legislative acts is one of the highest. This performance is partly due to Denmark’s EU co-ordination system, combined with its internal emphasis upon consensus. The Danish EU co-ordination system is centralized but also displays some decentralized features; in addition, compared with the normal domestic procedures for co-ordination, EU co-ordination in the country is very formalized, although it is also achieved informally through consensus. The four main sections of the chapter discuss: the centralization issue; the structure and procedures for EU policy co-ordination; sectorization (a decision-making process in which the decisive influence is located in an alliance between a sectoral ministry and important interest groups in an area); and the role of parliament and the European Committee.

This concluding chapter has three main aims: to identify the main findings that emerge from the ten country case studies presented in the book; to present an argument about the factors that shape the strategies and structures of national co-ordination; and to draw attention to a number of wider issues on the basis of what the findings suggest. The first finding is that European integration exerts a powerful need for co-ordination on the part of governments and that European Union (EU) policy-making has become an important locus of domestic co-ordination for governments; however, membership of the Union confronts the member states with very specific challenges, and meeting its complex demands is extremely problematic. Second, national responses to the demands of EU membership have led to a redefinition of the functions traditionally performed by some actors and a recasting or recalibration of interinstitutional relationships. Third, there are important similarities between the way in which the member states co-ordinate their European policies, although diversity persists and institutional convergence is limited in scope and extent. The main part of the conclusion presents a cross-national view of the co-ordination of EU policy, looking at similarities and differences and explaining them; the last part presents concluding remarks on the effectiveness of national co-ordination systems, co-ordination as a process, the systemic implications (impact) of the findings, and theoretical issues.