Andrew Vincent
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199271252
- eISBN:
- 9780191601101
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271259.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines the advent of logical positivism, the development of conceptual analysis, ordinary language philosophy, the so‐called death of political theory, the impact of linguistic philosophy and the ...
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Examines the advent of logical positivism, the development of conceptual analysis, ordinary language philosophy, the so‐called death of political theory, the impact of linguistic philosophy and the influence of Wittgenstein's thought on political theory, and particularly the idea of ‘essential contestability’.Less
Examines the advent of logical positivism, the development of conceptual analysis, ordinary language philosophy, the so‐called death of political theory, the impact of linguistic philosophy and the influence of Wittgenstein's thought on political theory, and particularly the idea of ‘essential contestability’.
J. L. Austin
J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1979
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192830210
- eISBN:
- 9780191597039
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019283021X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the ...
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This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the 13 papers. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on ‘performative utterances’. The doctrine of ‘speech acts’, i.e. a statement may be the pragmatic use of language, is discussed in Chs 6 and 10. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems the language encounters in discussing actions and consider the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The ‘correspondence theory’, i.e. a statement is truth when it corresponds to a fact, is presented in Chs 5 and 6. Finally, Chs 1 and 3 study how a word may have different but related senses considering Aristotle’s view. Chapters 11 and 13 illustrate the meaning of ‘pretending’ and a Plato’s text respectively.Less
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the 13 papers. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on ‘performative utterances’. The doctrine of ‘speech acts’, i.e. a statement may be the pragmatic use of language, is discussed in Chs 6 and 10. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems the language encounters in discussing actions and consider the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The ‘correspondence theory’, i.e. a statement is truth when it corresponds to a fact, is presented in Chs 5 and 6. Finally, Chs 1 and 3 study how a word may have different but related senses considering Aristotle’s view. Chapters 11 and 13 illustrate the meaning of ‘pretending’ and a Plato’s text respectively.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238508
- eISBN:
- 9780191679643
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238508.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Aesthetics
The author of the book presents a full-length philosophical study of the work of Stanley Cavell, best known for his highly influential contributions to the fields of film studies, Shakespearian ...
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The author of the book presents a full-length philosophical study of the work of Stanley Cavell, best known for his highly influential contributions to the fields of film studies, Shakespearian literary criticism, and the confluence of psychoanalysis and literary theory. It is not properly appreciated that Cavell's project originated in his interpretation of Austin's and Wittgenstein's philosophical interest in the criteria governing ordinary language, and is given unity by an abiding concern with the nature and the varying cultural manifestations of the sceptical impulse in modernity. This book elucidates the essentially philosophical roots and trajectory of Cavell's work, traces its links with Romanticism and its recent turn towards a species of moral pefectionism associated with Thoreau and Emerson, and concludes with an assessment of its relations to liberal-democratic political theory, Christian religious thought, and feminist literary studies.Less
The author of the book presents a full-length philosophical study of the work of Stanley Cavell, best known for his highly influential contributions to the fields of film studies, Shakespearian literary criticism, and the confluence of psychoanalysis and literary theory. It is not properly appreciated that Cavell's project originated in his interpretation of Austin's and Wittgenstein's philosophical interest in the criteria governing ordinary language, and is given unity by an abiding concern with the nature and the varying cultural manifestations of the sceptical impulse in modernity. This book elucidates the essentially philosophical roots and trajectory of Cavell's work, traces its links with Romanticism and its recent turn towards a species of moral pefectionism associated with Thoreau and Emerson, and concludes with an assessment of its relations to liberal-democratic political theory, Christian religious thought, and feminist literary studies.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187137
- eISBN:
- 9780199850570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187137.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A regimentation of a designated section of ordinary language replaces that designated section with a piece of engineered artificial language, not in the sense of giving speakers a different language ...
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A regimentation of a designated section of ordinary language replaces that designated section with a piece of engineered artificial language, not in the sense of giving speakers a different language to use, or speak in, but more narrowly, of giving normative constraints on inferences, and other logical matters, that speakers should acknowledge on the basis of statements they've committed themselves too. The purpose of this chapter is to present systematically sentential vehicles with computationally transparent and tractable inferential properties, and to supply a mathematically tractable semantic theory for such items. It's easy to confuse regimentation with an empirical study of natural languages. Under such a misapprehension, one presumes that if a regimented idiom operates the way an idiom in a natural language does, then the syntax and semantics of the regimented idiom may be attributed to the natural-language idiom.Less
A regimentation of a designated section of ordinary language replaces that designated section with a piece of engineered artificial language, not in the sense of giving speakers a different language to use, or speak in, but more narrowly, of giving normative constraints on inferences, and other logical matters, that speakers should acknowledge on the basis of statements they've committed themselves too. The purpose of this chapter is to present systematically sentential vehicles with computationally transparent and tractable inferential properties, and to supply a mathematically tractable semantic theory for such items. It's easy to confuse regimentation with an empirical study of natural languages. Under such a misapprehension, one presumes that if a regimented idiom operates the way an idiom in a natural language does, then the syntax and semantics of the regimented idiom may be attributed to the natural-language idiom.
Jay David Atlas
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195133004
- eISBN:
- 9780199850181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133004.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Dogma refers to the notion of how language is divided into two categories: one that is figurative or literary and that is widely used metaphorically, and the other concerns standard or ordinary ...
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Dogma refers to the notion of how language is divided into two categories: one that is figurative or literary and that is widely used metaphorically, and the other concerns standard or ordinary language which is taken to refer to things literally. Dogma plays no small part in the study of literary style in the twentieth century and in studies of the philosophy of language. The fact that this notion is believed to have not been established with a reliable basis entails two effects — a revision of Fregean semantics that veers away from the idea that meaning determines reference and that literal meaning is definite, and the dissolution of the distinction between the linguistic life and linguistic art. This chapter focuses on the distinctions between the different functions of language and how these were systematically imposed during the period between the 1920s and the 1930s.Less
Dogma refers to the notion of how language is divided into two categories: one that is figurative or literary and that is widely used metaphorically, and the other concerns standard or ordinary language which is taken to refer to things literally. Dogma plays no small part in the study of literary style in the twentieth century and in studies of the philosophy of language. The fact that this notion is believed to have not been established with a reliable basis entails two effects — a revision of Fregean semantics that veers away from the idea that meaning determines reference and that literal meaning is definite, and the dissolution of the distinction between the linguistic life and linguistic art. This chapter focuses on the distinctions between the different functions of language and how these were systematically imposed during the period between the 1920s and the 1930s.
Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sørli (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ...
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This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete “doyen of ordinary language philosophy”, the contributors show how Austin’s work can be brought to bear on issues that are on the top of today’s philosophical agenda, such as scepticism and contextualism, the epistemology of testimony, the generality of the conceptual, the viability of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, and issues in philosophical methodology. The connections made between Austin’s philosophy and current debates provide new interpretations of his views and aim to demonstrate that his work deserves a more central place in mainstream philosophical discussion than it currently has. The collection also contains a substantial introduction that situates Austin’s thought in its original intellectual milieu and provides an overview of the many different ways in which his ideas have influenced later developments, in philosophy and elsewhere. Contributors are Avner Baz, Simon Glendinning, Martin Gustafsson, Mark Kaplan, Adam Leite, Benjamin McMyler, Jean-Philippe Narboux, and Charles Travis.Less
This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete “doyen of ordinary language philosophy”, the contributors show how Austin’s work can be brought to bear on issues that are on the top of today’s philosophical agenda, such as scepticism and contextualism, the epistemology of testimony, the generality of the conceptual, the viability of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, and issues in philosophical methodology. The connections made between Austin’s philosophy and current debates provide new interpretations of his views and aim to demonstrate that his work deserves a more central place in mainstream philosophical discussion than it currently has. The collection also contains a substantial introduction that situates Austin’s thought in its original intellectual milieu and provides an overview of the many different ways in which his ideas have influenced later developments, in philosophy and elsewhere. Contributors are Avner Baz, Simon Glendinning, Martin Gustafsson, Mark Kaplan, Adam Leite, Benjamin McMyler, Jean-Philippe Narboux, and Charles Travis.
Rupert Read
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195381559
- eISBN:
- 9780199869244
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381559.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter addresses homologies between Wittgenstein's account of philosophical practice in both the Tractatus and the Investigations with accounts of practice in Zen. The chapter argues that both ...
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This chapter addresses homologies between Wittgenstein's account of philosophical practice in both the Tractatus and the Investigations with accounts of practice in Zen. The chapter argues that both Wittgenstein and such Zen thinkers as Shunryu Suzuki regard philosophy as, at one level, indicating that ordinary practice, ordinary language, and ordinary life are “in order” as they are—requiring neither critique nor validation by philosophy—while, at another, they regard philosophical insight as necessary to living ordinary life in an enlightened way. The distinction between ordinary life and enlightened life is, on both accounts, profound but ineffable.Less
This chapter addresses homologies between Wittgenstein's account of philosophical practice in both the Tractatus and the Investigations with accounts of practice in Zen. The chapter argues that both Wittgenstein and such Zen thinkers as Shunryu Suzuki regard philosophy as, at one level, indicating that ordinary practice, ordinary language, and ordinary life are “in order” as they are—requiring neither critique nor validation by philosophy—while, at another, they regard philosophical insight as necessary to living ordinary life in an enlightened way. The distinction between ordinary life and enlightened life is, on both accounts, profound but ineffable.
Sandra Laugier
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226470542
- eISBN:
- 9780226037554
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226037554.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a ...
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Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a unified, coherent, and inevitable advancement. This book questions this assumption, rethinking the very grounds that drove analytic philosophy to develop and uncovering its inherent tensions and confusions. Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it provides—and in doing so contributes to the philosophy of language and twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy as a whole.Less
Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the United States, Australia, and Britain over the past one hundred years, and it is often seen as a unified, coherent, and inevitable advancement. This book questions this assumption, rethinking the very grounds that drove analytic philosophy to develop and uncovering its inherent tensions and confusions. Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it provides—and in doing so contributes to the philosophy of language and twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy as a whole.
Martin Gustafsson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates ...
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This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates Austin’s philosophy in its original intellectual milieu, focusing in particular on the significance of his immediate predecessors, G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard. It then looks at the various ways in which Austin’s ideas have been appropriated by speech act theorists (via Grice and Searle), by performativity theorists (via Derrida and Butler), in discussions of pornography and free speech (via Hornsby and Langton), and by others such as Quentin Skinner, H. L. A. Hart, Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and Mark Kaplan. Finally it provides an overview of the remaining chapters of the book.Less
This introduction describes the background and legacy of Austin’s thought, going beyond the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete ‘doyen of ordinary language philosophy’. It situates Austin’s philosophy in its original intellectual milieu, focusing in particular on the significance of his immediate predecessors, G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard. It then looks at the various ways in which Austin’s ideas have been appropriated by speech act theorists (via Grice and Searle), by performativity theorists (via Derrida and Butler), in discussions of pornography and free speech (via Hornsby and Langton), and by others such as Quentin Skinner, H. L. A. Hart, Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and Mark Kaplan. Finally it provides an overview of the remaining chapters of the book.
Mark Kaplan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199219759
- eISBN:
- 9780191730818
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Suppose you want to question my claim to know that the bird in my garden is a goldfinch. Austin held that you cannot legitimately demand that I do more than ‘enough to show that (within reason, and ...
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Suppose you want to question my claim to know that the bird in my garden is a goldfinch. Austin held that you cannot legitimately demand that I do more than ‘enough to show that (within reason, and for the present intents and purposes) it “can’t” be anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing, description of it’, where it is understood that ‘[e]nough is enough […]. It does not mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch’. But why not? This chapter argues that (i) the standard answers are not available to Austin, (ii) Austin’s writings and methods (including his characteristic way of arguing for philosophical conclusions via appeal to what we would say when) make available a different and novel diagnosis of what goes wrong with scepticism based on arguments from ignorance, and (iii) these methods—comprising Austin’s ‘ordinary language philosophy‘—have been misunderstood, and their power underestimated.Less
Suppose you want to question my claim to know that the bird in my garden is a goldfinch. Austin held that you cannot legitimately demand that I do more than ‘enough to show that (within reason, and for the present intents and purposes) it “can’t” be anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing, description of it’, where it is understood that ‘[e]nough is enough […]. It does not mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch’. But why not? This chapter argues that (i) the standard answers are not available to Austin, (ii) Austin’s writings and methods (including his characteristic way of arguing for philosophical conclusions via appeal to what we would say when) make available a different and novel diagnosis of what goes wrong with scepticism based on arguments from ignorance, and (iii) these methods—comprising Austin’s ‘ordinary language philosophy‘—have been misunderstood, and their power underestimated.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159882
- eISBN:
- 9780199834990
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159888.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter refutes the two possible arguments for Quine’s criterion for what a discourse is committed to: (1) the triviality thesis, that “there is” as used in ordinary language indicates ...
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This chapter refutes the two possible arguments for Quine’s criterion for what a discourse is committed to: (1) the triviality thesis, that “there is” as used in ordinary language indicates ontological commitment, and this idiom is straightforwardly regimented by the objectual existential quantifier, (2) that the semantics of objectual quantification presupposes ontological commitment. Seven strategies for supporting the triviality thesis are reviewed, including paraphrase in ordinary language and the pretense program.Less
This chapter refutes the two possible arguments for Quine’s criterion for what a discourse is committed to: (1) the triviality thesis, that “there is” as used in ordinary language indicates ontological commitment, and this idiom is straightforwardly regimented by the objectual existential quantifier, (2) that the semantics of objectual quantification presupposes ontological commitment. Seven strategies for supporting the triviality thesis are reviewed, including paraphrase in ordinary language and the pretense program.
Keith DeRose
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199564460
- eISBN:
- 9780191721410
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents the main argument for contextualism: the argument from the ordinary, non-philosophical usage of ‘knows’. Both the features of ordinary usage that support contextualism and the ...
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This chapter presents the main argument for contextualism: the argument from the ordinary, non-philosophical usage of ‘knows’. Both the features of ordinary usage that support contextualism and the reasons why these features provide such strong support are scrutinized. Hence, there is considerable focus on the methodology of ordinary language philosophy, and especially on the question of just when it is important for a theory of the meaning of a term to make ordinary claims involving that term come out true. The chapter's Appendix looks briefly at contextualist accounts of terms other than ’knows that’, and discusses whether similarly powerful grounds exist for these other contextualisms.Less
This chapter presents the main argument for contextualism: the argument from the ordinary, non-philosophical usage of ‘knows’. Both the features of ordinary usage that support contextualism and the reasons why these features provide such strong support are scrutinized. Hence, there is considerable focus on the methodology of ordinary language philosophy, and especially on the question of just when it is important for a theory of the meaning of a term to make ordinary claims involving that term come out true. The chapter's Appendix looks briefly at contextualist accounts of terms other than ’knows that’, and discusses whether similarly powerful grounds exist for these other contextualisms.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247708
- eISBN:
- 9780191598203
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247702.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but ...
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This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but eloquent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole; Part II critically examines the earlier system, delineating and evaluating the central ideas (logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and solipsism) with intellectual rigour and clarity. Pears succeeds in both offering an original realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, one that has found many followers, and in demarcating a structural framework that makes the internal organization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole more accessible.Less
This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but eloquent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole; Part II critically examines the earlier system, delineating and evaluating the central ideas (logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and solipsism) with intellectual rigour and clarity. Pears succeeds in both offering an original realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, one that has found many followers, and in demarcating a structural framework that makes the internal organization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole more accessible.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
The chapter explores the general nature of mental states such as belief, desire, and intentions, and their relation to brain states It does this through an extended analysis of the Freudian theory of ...
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The chapter explores the general nature of mental states such as belief, desire, and intentions, and their relation to brain states It does this through an extended analysis of the Freudian theory of the unconscious. Rightly conceived, the Freudian unconscious is seen as functionally characterized, sub-personal states of the brain that underlie the mental states of whole persons. The folk psychology on which the criminal law’s culpability discriminations are built, is thus seen to be secure against the insights of a progressive, scientific psychology, be it Freudian, behaviourist, cognitive, neuroscientific, or other.Less
The chapter explores the general nature of mental states such as belief, desire, and intentions, and their relation to brain states It does this through an extended analysis of the Freudian theory of the unconscious. Rightly conceived, the Freudian unconscious is seen as functionally characterized, sub-personal states of the brain that underlie the mental states of whole persons. The folk psychology on which the criminal law’s culpability discriminations are built, is thus seen to be secure against the insights of a progressive, scientific psychology, be it Freudian, behaviourist, cognitive, neuroscientific, or other.
Chana Kronfeld
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780804782951
- eISBN:
- 9780804797214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804782951.003.0002
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Jewish Studies
Simplicity and accessibility are for Amichai serious ethical principles, guidelines for a poetic effect that are part of the fabric of everyday life, not just the mark of “a playful poet” writing ...
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Simplicity and accessibility are for Amichai serious ethical principles, guidelines for a poetic effect that are part of the fabric of everyday life, not just the mark of “a playful poet” writing “easy” verse who has “no worldview,” as some scholars have argued, mistaking his egalitarian imperative for a lack of philosophical gravitas. Poetic philosophy is revealed in the process to be a feature of stylistics as of thematics. Chapter Two outlines the major principles that underlie Amichai's poetic philosophy, focusing on the state of “in-between-ness” as the privileged yet endangered site of the poetic subjects-cum-ordinary human beings. This sets the stage for an array of systematic correlations between liminality as the governing feature of Amichai's poetic worldview and many of his signature rhetorical practices discussed throughout the book, such as juxtaposition, intertextuality and metaphor, which map two domains together without ignoring their distinctness.Less
Simplicity and accessibility are for Amichai serious ethical principles, guidelines for a poetic effect that are part of the fabric of everyday life, not just the mark of “a playful poet” writing “easy” verse who has “no worldview,” as some scholars have argued, mistaking his egalitarian imperative for a lack of philosophical gravitas. Poetic philosophy is revealed in the process to be a feature of stylistics as of thematics. Chapter Two outlines the major principles that underlie Amichai's poetic philosophy, focusing on the state of “in-between-ness” as the privileged yet endangered site of the poetic subjects-cum-ordinary human beings. This sets the stage for an array of systematic correlations between liminality as the governing feature of Amichai's poetic worldview and many of his signature rhetorical practices discussed throughout the book, such as juxtaposition, intertextuality and metaphor, which map two domains together without ignoring their distinctness.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187137
- eISBN:
- 9780199850570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187137.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter deals with the formalization of anaphorically unrestricted pronouns. The result is a family of logical systems very close in their metalogical properties to those of the first-order ...
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This chapter deals with the formalization of anaphorically unrestricted pronouns. The result is a family of logical systems very close in their metalogical properties to those of the first-order predicate calculus. Two approaches are offered to anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers. The first imitates standard approaches to truth. The ability of the transcendent truth predicate of ordinary language to blindly endorse foreign sentences can be captured by AU-quantification. The second approach, AU-quantification, provides a slight generalization of the first which may be useful in certain circumstances. Just as Tarskian satisfaction drafts variables as temporary names of objects, so too, the AU approach allows a variable in a sentential context to act sentence like.Less
This chapter deals with the formalization of anaphorically unrestricted pronouns. The result is a family of logical systems very close in their metalogical properties to those of the first-order predicate calculus. Two approaches are offered to anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers. The first imitates standard approaches to truth. The ability of the transcendent truth predicate of ordinary language to blindly endorse foreign sentences can be captured by AU-quantification. The second approach, AU-quantification, provides a slight generalization of the first which may be useful in certain circumstances. Just as Tarskian satisfaction drafts variables as temporary names of objects, so too, the AU approach allows a variable in a sentential context to act sentence like.
Stanley Rosen
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300091977
- eISBN:
- 9780300129526
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300091977.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter raises the question: What is ordinary about ordinary language? In raising this question, the chapter looks at some of the philosophical writings of John Austin. This chapter does not, ...
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This chapter raises the question: What is ordinary about ordinary language? In raising this question, the chapter looks at some of the philosophical writings of John Austin. This chapter does not, however, present a detailed study of Austin's philosophy, but uses passages from his texts as authoritative illustrations of the following problem. Despite the very frequent reference in Austin and many other thinkers to “ordinary language” or what is “ordinarily” said, there is virtually no effort to state in a detailed or even general way what is meant by the expression “ordinary language” and how it can be distinguished from the extraordinary variety. On the contrary, ordinary language is presumed to be directly intelligible and accessible not only to the plain man but to the philosopher as well.Less
This chapter raises the question: What is ordinary about ordinary language? In raising this question, the chapter looks at some of the philosophical writings of John Austin. This chapter does not, however, present a detailed study of Austin's philosophy, but uses passages from his texts as authoritative illustrations of the following problem. Despite the very frequent reference in Austin and many other thinkers to “ordinary language” or what is “ordinarily” said, there is virtually no effort to state in a detailed or even general way what is meant by the expression “ordinary language” and how it can be distinguished from the extraordinary variety. On the contrary, ordinary language is presumed to be directly intelligible and accessible not only to the plain man but to the philosopher as well.
Toril Moi
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226464305
- eISBN:
- 9780226464589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226464589.003.0008
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Theorists from Gellner and Marcuse to Butler and Žižek accuse ordinary language philosophy of being inherently conservative or even reactionary, largely because they take this philosophy to endorse ...
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Theorists from Gellner and Marcuse to Butler and Žižek accuse ordinary language philosophy of being inherently conservative or even reactionary, largely because they take this philosophy to endorse common sense. But Gellner’s critique of Wittgenstein is based on severe misreadings. Marcuse’s influential attack on “linguistic analysis” is also based on misunderstandings. For Marcuse, critique (critical philosophy) is incompatible with the ordinary; truly critical thinking requires a special philosophical vocabulary, unavailable to the ordinary “chap in the street.” This chapter challenges these beliefs and demonstrates that partisans of critique misread Wittgenstein. Drawing on Austin, it explains what “ordinary language” is. It criticizes the various arguments that cast common sense as inherently reactionary, and refuses to disdain the critical powers of ordinary people. Through a discussion of the so-called “Bad Writing Contest,” it shows that both champions and critics of obscure theory writing fail to grasp the real issues at stake. No specific writing style, whether darkly obscure or crystal clear, is inherently critical (or inherently uncritical). In its commitment to the ordinary and the everyday, ordinary language philosophy inspires us to find our “real need,” to change our ordinary practices, not just philosophyLess
Theorists from Gellner and Marcuse to Butler and Žižek accuse ordinary language philosophy of being inherently conservative or even reactionary, largely because they take this philosophy to endorse common sense. But Gellner’s critique of Wittgenstein is based on severe misreadings. Marcuse’s influential attack on “linguistic analysis” is also based on misunderstandings. For Marcuse, critique (critical philosophy) is incompatible with the ordinary; truly critical thinking requires a special philosophical vocabulary, unavailable to the ordinary “chap in the street.” This chapter challenges these beliefs and demonstrates that partisans of critique misread Wittgenstein. Drawing on Austin, it explains what “ordinary language” is. It criticizes the various arguments that cast common sense as inherently reactionary, and refuses to disdain the critical powers of ordinary people. Through a discussion of the so-called “Bad Writing Contest,” it shows that both champions and critics of obscure theory writing fail to grasp the real issues at stake. No specific writing style, whether darkly obscure or crystal clear, is inherently critical (or inherently uncritical). In its commitment to the ordinary and the everyday, ordinary language philosophy inspires us to find our “real need,” to change our ordinary practices, not just philosophy
Stanley Rosen
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300091977
- eISBN:
- 9780300129526
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300091977.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter endeavors to clarify the relation between common sense and ordinary language, with special attention to the use of these terms in the approaches to philosophy that are characteristic of ...
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This chapter endeavors to clarify the relation between common sense and ordinary language, with special attention to the use of these terms in the approaches to philosophy that are characteristic of G. E. Moore, John Austin, and Paul Grice. The topics of ordinary language and common sense are closely related in one way and quite different in another. A language, by definition, is a set of procedures for constructing intelligible units of communication. Common sense, on the other hand, is a faculty of judgment. The terms “ordinary” and “common,” however, suggest a deeper connection. It is a simple step to the inference that ordinary language is that which is spoken normally or usually within some specified linguistic community, as defined by some particular natural language or languages. An analogous step allows one to infer that common sense belongs to the majority of a designated population, and perhaps to all of its members.Less
This chapter endeavors to clarify the relation between common sense and ordinary language, with special attention to the use of these terms in the approaches to philosophy that are characteristic of G. E. Moore, John Austin, and Paul Grice. The topics of ordinary language and common sense are closely related in one way and quite different in another. A language, by definition, is a set of procedures for constructing intelligible units of communication. Common sense, on the other hand, is a faculty of judgment. The terms “ordinary” and “common,” however, suggest a deeper connection. It is a simple step to the inference that ordinary language is that which is spoken normally or usually within some specified linguistic community, as defined by some particular natural language or languages. An analogous step allows one to infer that common sense belongs to the majority of a designated population, and perhaps to all of its members.
Roy A. Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195129137
- eISBN:
- 9780199786138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019512913X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents and motivates the issues surrounding thought experiments by assembling the case against their use. It begins by exploring the more specific charge that thought experiment is ...
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This chapter presents and motivates the issues surrounding thought experiments by assembling the case against their use. It begins by exploring the more specific charge that thought experiment is just introspection, then concentrates on the charge that it is merely an atavistic appeal to ordinary language. Even if thought experiment is distinct from either of these methods, it strongly resembles them. Hence, details of both introspection and the appeal to ordinary language will be discussed in the hope of illuminating thought experiment at least by analogy. Finally, a more general problem about the informativeness of thought experiment is developed.Less
This chapter presents and motivates the issues surrounding thought experiments by assembling the case against their use. It begins by exploring the more specific charge that thought experiment is just introspection, then concentrates on the charge that it is merely an atavistic appeal to ordinary language. Even if thought experiment is distinct from either of these methods, it strongly resembles them. Hence, details of both introspection and the appeal to ordinary language will be discussed in the hope of illuminating thought experiment at least by analogy. Finally, a more general problem about the informativeness of thought experiment is developed.
