Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s ...
More
The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s conception, and linking questions about time addressed in metaphysics with questions addressed in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, the book explores the temporal dimension of the material world in relation to the temporal dimension of our ordinary discourse about the world. The discussion is centred around the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists about whether the temporal profile of ordinary objects mirrors their spatial profile. Are ordinary objects extended in time in the same way in which they are extended in space? Do they have temporal as well as spatial parts? Four-dimensionalists say ‘yes’, three-dimensionalists say ‘no’. The book develops an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world, and argues that this picture is preferable to its four-dimensionalists rivals if ordinary thought and talk are taken seriously. Among the issues discussed are the metaphysics of persistence, change, composition, location, coincidence, and relativity; the ontology of past, present, and future; and the semantics of predication, tense, temporal modifiers, and sortal terms.Less
The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s conception, and linking questions about time addressed in metaphysics with questions addressed in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, the book explores the temporal dimension of the material world in relation to the temporal dimension of our ordinary discourse about the world. The discussion is centred around the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists about whether the temporal profile of ordinary objects mirrors their spatial profile. Are ordinary objects extended in time in the same way in which they are extended in space? Do they have temporal as well as spatial parts? Four-dimensionalists say ‘yes’, three-dimensionalists say ‘no’. The book develops an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world, and argues that this picture is preferable to its four-dimensionalists rivals if ordinary thought and talk are taken seriously. Among the issues discussed are the metaphysics of persistence, change, composition, location, coincidence, and relativity; the ontology of past, present, and future; and the semantics of predication, tense, temporal modifiers, and sortal terms.
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176421
- eISBN:
- 9780199872008
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or ...
More
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.Less
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.
Robert Kraut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199228126
- eISBN:
- 9780191711053
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228126.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
The artworld is a complicated place. It contains acts of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, preservation, misunderstanding, and condemnation. The goal of this book is to turn a critical ...
More
The artworld is a complicated place. It contains acts of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, preservation, misunderstanding, and condemnation. The goal of this book is to turn a critical reflective eye upon various aspects of the artworld, and to articulate some of the problems, principles, and norms implicit in the actual practices of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, and commodification. Aesthetic theory is treated as a descriptive, rather than normative, enterprise: one that relates to artworld realities as a semantic theory relates to the fragments of natural language it seeks to describe. Sustained efforts are made to illuminate emotional expression, correct interpretation, and objectivity in the context of artworld practice; the relevance of jazz to aesthetic theory; the goals of ontology (artworld and otherwise); the relation(s) between art and language; and the relation(s) between artistic/critical practice and aesthetic theory.Less
The artworld is a complicated place. It contains acts of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, preservation, misunderstanding, and condemnation. The goal of this book is to turn a critical reflective eye upon various aspects of the artworld, and to articulate some of the problems, principles, and norms implicit in the actual practices of artistic creation, interpretation, evaluation, and commodification. Aesthetic theory is treated as a descriptive, rather than normative, enterprise: one that relates to artworld realities as a semantic theory relates to the fragments of natural language it seeks to describe. Sustained efforts are made to illuminate emotional expression, correct interpretation, and objectivity in the context of artworld practice; the relevance of jazz to aesthetic theory; the goals of ontology (artworld and otherwise); the relation(s) between art and language; and the relation(s) between artistic/critical practice and aesthetic theory.
John Heil
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596201
- eISBN:
- 9780191741876
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596201.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book offers answers to the following questions. What does reality encompass? Is reality exclusively physical? Or does reality include non‐physical — mental, and perhaps ‘abstract’ — aspects? ...
More
This book offers answers to the following questions. What does reality encompass? Is reality exclusively physical? Or does reality include non‐physical — mental, and perhaps ‘abstract’ — aspects? What is it to be physical or mental — or to be an abstract entity? What are the elements of being, reality’s building blocks? How is the manifest image we inherit from our culture and refine in the special sciences related to the scientific image as we have it in fundamental physics? Can physics be understood as providing a ‘theory of everything’, or do the various sciences make up a hierarchy corresponding to autonomous levels of reality? Is our conscious human perspective on the universe in the universe or at its limits? What, if anything, makes ordinary truths, truths of the special sciences, and truths of mathematics true? And what is it for an assertion or judgment to be ‘made true’? Answers to these questions are framed in terms of a comprehensive ontology of substances and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, their successors, and their more recent exemplars. Substances are simple, lacking parts that are themselves substances. Properties are modes (tropes), particular ways particular substances are, not universals. Arrangements of propertied substances serve as truthmakers for all the truths that have truthmakers. The deep story about the nature of these truthmakers is addressed by fundamental physics.Less
This book offers answers to the following questions. What does reality encompass? Is reality exclusively physical? Or does reality include non‐physical — mental, and perhaps ‘abstract’ — aspects? What is it to be physical or mental — or to be an abstract entity? What are the elements of being, reality’s building blocks? How is the manifest image we inherit from our culture and refine in the special sciences related to the scientific image as we have it in fundamental physics? Can physics be understood as providing a ‘theory of everything’, or do the various sciences make up a hierarchy corresponding to autonomous levels of reality? Is our conscious human perspective on the universe in the universe or at its limits? What, if anything, makes ordinary truths, truths of the special sciences, and truths of mathematics true? And what is it for an assertion or judgment to be ‘made true’? Answers to these questions are framed in terms of a comprehensive ontology of substances and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, their successors, and their more recent exemplars. Substances are simple, lacking parts that are themselves substances. Properties are modes (tropes), particular ways particular substances are, not universals. Arrangements of propertied substances serve as truthmakers for all the truths that have truthmakers. The deep story about the nature of these truthmakers is addressed by fundamental physics.
G. E. R. Lloyd
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199654727
- eISBN:
- 9780191742088
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654727.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human ...
More
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.Less
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.
Yuri Balashov
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579921
- eISBN:
- 9780191722899
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579921.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being ”wholly present” at all moments of ...
More
Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being ”wholly present” at all moments of time at which they exist? Or do they persist by having distinct ”temporal segments” confined to the corresponding times? Are objects three‐dimensional entities extended in space, but not in time? Or are they four‐dimensional spacetime ”worms”? These are matters of intense debate, which is now driven by concerns about two major issues in fundamental ontology: parthood and location. It is in this context that broadly empirical considerations are increasingly brought to bear on the debate about persistence. The book explores this decidedly positive tendency. It begins by stating major rival views of persistence—endurance, perdurance, and exdurance—in a spacetime framework and proceeds to investigate the implications of Einstein's theory of relativity for the debate about persistence. The overall conclusion—that relativistic considerations favor four‐dimensionalism over three‐dimensionalism—is hardly surprising. It is, however, anything but trivial. Contrary to a common misconception, there is no straightforward argument from relativity to four‐dimensionalism. The issues involved are complex, and the debate is closely entangled with a number of other philosophical disputes, including those about the nature and ontology of time, parts and wholes, material constitution, causation and properties, and vagueness.Less
Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being ”wholly present” at all moments of time at which they exist? Or do they persist by having distinct ”temporal segments” confined to the corresponding times? Are objects three‐dimensional entities extended in space, but not in time? Or are they four‐dimensional spacetime ”worms”? These are matters of intense debate, which is now driven by concerns about two major issues in fundamental ontology: parthood and location. It is in this context that broadly empirical considerations are increasingly brought to bear on the debate about persistence. The book explores this decidedly positive tendency. It begins by stating major rival views of persistence—endurance, perdurance, and exdurance—in a spacetime framework and proceeds to investigate the implications of Einstein's theory of relativity for the debate about persistence. The overall conclusion—that relativistic considerations favor four‐dimensionalism over three‐dimensionalism—is hardly surprising. It is, however, anything but trivial. Contrary to a common misconception, there is no straightforward argument from relativity to four‐dimensionalism. The issues involved are complex, and the debate is closely entangled with a number of other philosophical disputes, including those about the nature and ontology of time, parts and wholes, material constitution, causation and properties, and vagueness.
Matthew Nudds and Casey O'Callaghan (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199282968
- eISBN:
- 9780191712333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282968.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book comprises original chapters that address the central questions and issues that define the emerging philosophy of sounds and auditory perception. This work focuses upon two sets of ...
More
This book comprises original chapters that address the central questions and issues that define the emerging philosophy of sounds and auditory perception. This work focuses upon two sets of interrelated concerns. The first is a constellation of debates concerning the ontology of sounds. What kinds of things are sounds, and what properties do sounds have? For instance, are sounds secondary qualities, physical properties, waves, or some type of event? The second is a set of questions about the contents of auditory experiences and of hearing. How are sounds experienced to be? What sorts of things and properties are experienced in auditory perception? For example, in what sense is auditory experience spatial; do we hear sources in addition to sounds; what is distinctive about musical listening; and what do we hear when we hear speech? An introductory chapter summarises many of the issues discussed, provides a summary of the contributions and shows how they are connected.Less
This book comprises original chapters that address the central questions and issues that define the emerging philosophy of sounds and auditory perception. This work focuses upon two sets of interrelated concerns. The first is a constellation of debates concerning the ontology of sounds. What kinds of things are sounds, and what properties do sounds have? For instance, are sounds secondary qualities, physical properties, waves, or some type of event? The second is a set of questions about the contents of auditory experiences and of hearing. How are sounds experienced to be? What sorts of things and properties are experienced in auditory perception? For example, in what sense is auditory experience spatial; do we hear sources in addition to sounds; what is distinctive about musical listening; and what do we hear when we hear speech? An introductory chapter summarises many of the issues discussed, provides a summary of the contributions and shows how they are connected.
John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199291236
- eISBN:
- 9780191710612
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
John Hawthorne is widely regarded as one of the finest philosophers working today. He is perhaps best known for his contributions to metaphysics, and this book collects his most notable papers in ...
More
John Hawthorne is widely regarded as one of the finest philosophers working today. He is perhaps best known for his contributions to metaphysics, and this book collects his most notable papers in this field. The book offers original treatments of fundamental topics in philosophy, including identity, ontology, vagueness, and causation.Less
John Hawthorne is widely regarded as one of the finest philosophers working today. He is perhaps best known for his contributions to metaphysics, and this book collects his most notable papers in this field. The book offers original treatments of fundamental topics in philosophy, including identity, ontology, vagueness, and causation.
Stewart Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139303
- eISBN:
- 9780199833658
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139305.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of ...
More
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any countably infinite system of objects with a distinguished initial object and a successor relation that satisfies the induction principle. The essence of each natural number is its relation to the other natural numbers. One way to understand structuralism is to reify structures as ante rem universals. This would be a platonism concerning mathematical objects, which are the places within such structures. Alternatively, one can take an eliminative, in re approach, and understand talk of structures as shorthand for talk of systems of objects or, invoking modality, talk of possible systems of objects. Shapiro argues that although the realist, ante rem approach is the most perspicuous, in a sense, the various accounts are equivalent. Along the way, the ontological and epistemological aspects of the structuralist philosophies are assessed. One key aspect is to show how each philosophy deals with reference to mathematical objects. The view is tentatively extended to objects generally: to science and ordinary discourse.Less
The philosophy of mathematics articulated and defended in this book goes by the name of “structuralism”, and its slogan is that mathematics is the science of structure. The subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any countably infinite system of objects with a distinguished initial object and a successor relation that satisfies the induction principle. The essence of each natural number is its relation to the other natural numbers. One way to understand structuralism is to reify structures as ante rem universals. This would be a platonism concerning mathematical objects, which are the places within such structures. Alternatively, one can take an eliminative, in re approach, and understand talk of structures as shorthand for talk of systems of objects or, invoking modality, talk of possible systems of objects. Shapiro argues that although the realist, ante rem approach is the most perspicuous, in a sense, the various accounts are equivalent. Along the way, the ontological and epistemological aspects of the structuralist philosophies are assessed. One key aspect is to show how each philosophy deals with reference to mathematical objects. The view is tentatively extended to objects generally: to science and ordinary discourse.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The four-category ontology is a metaphysical system recognizing two fundamental categorial distinctions — these being between the particular and the universal, and between the substantial and the ...
More
The four-category ontology is a metaphysical system recognizing two fundamental categorial distinctions — these being between the particular and the universal, and between the substantial and the non-substantial — which cut across each other to generate four fundamental ontological categories. The four categories thus generated are substantial particulars (‘objects’), non-substantial particulars (‘modes’), substantial universals (‘kinds’), and non-substantial universals (‘attributes’). This ontology has a lengthy pedigree, with many commentators attributing a version of it to Aristotle on the basis of certain passages in one of his early works, the Categories. Although it has been revived or rediscovered at various times during the history of western philosophy, it has never found widespread favour, perhaps due to its apparent lack of parsimony and its commitment to universals. In pursuit of ontological economy, metaphysicians have generally preferred to recognize fewer than four fundamental ontological categories. This book contends that the four-category ontology has an explanatory power which is unrivalled by more parsimonious systems, and that this counts decisively in its favour. It provides a uniquely powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity, and many other related matters, such as the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. The book is divided into four parts: the first setting out the framework of the four-category ontology, the second focusing on its central distinction between object and property, the third exploring its applications in the philosophy of natural science, and the fourth dealing with fundamental issues of truth and realism.Less
The four-category ontology is a metaphysical system recognizing two fundamental categorial distinctions — these being between the particular and the universal, and between the substantial and the non-substantial — which cut across each other to generate four fundamental ontological categories. The four categories thus generated are substantial particulars (‘objects’), non-substantial particulars (‘modes’), substantial universals (‘kinds’), and non-substantial universals (‘attributes’). This ontology has a lengthy pedigree, with many commentators attributing a version of it to Aristotle on the basis of certain passages in one of his early works, the Categories. Although it has been revived or rediscovered at various times during the history of western philosophy, it has never found widespread favour, perhaps due to its apparent lack of parsimony and its commitment to universals. In pursuit of ontological economy, metaphysicians have generally preferred to recognize fewer than four fundamental ontological categories. This book contends that the four-category ontology has an explanatory power which is unrivalled by more parsimonious systems, and that this counts decisively in its favour. It provides a uniquely powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity, and many other related matters, such as the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. The book is divided into four parts: the first setting out the framework of the four-category ontology, the second focusing on its central distinction between object and property, the third exploring its applications in the philosophy of natural science, and the fourth dealing with fundamental issues of truth and realism.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy ...
More
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.Less
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246298
- eISBN:
- 9780191715181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246297.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who ...
More
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.
John L. Meech
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306941
- eISBN:
- 9780199785018
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306945.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Narrative articulates the self, yet the self is not its narrative. Is there a discourse that is not just another narrative but that can articulate the being of the self? At the end of his ...
More
Narrative articulates the self, yet the self is not its narrative. Is there a discourse that is not just another narrative but that can articulate the being of the self? At the end of his hermeneutics of the self, Ricoeur constructs a multi-layered ontology of the self whose fragmented nature reflects the halting path of the itinerary. Yet after certain extraordinary encounters (like Paul’s encounter with the crucified and resurrected Christ) the community’s story may have to be retold to let the suffering other come into phrases. How does an ontology of the self fare in such encounters? This chapter argues that an ontology of the self is the correlate of a conversation in a community. The real that resists being interpreted otherwise can only be articulated properly when one considers simultaneously the self, the other and the community in which they meet — a community that, correlatively, only appears where self and other meet. Such an ontology of the self in community could be superseded, but only at the expense of a profound challenge to the community’s self-understanding.Less
Narrative articulates the self, yet the self is not its narrative. Is there a discourse that is not just another narrative but that can articulate the being of the self? At the end of his hermeneutics of the self, Ricoeur constructs a multi-layered ontology of the self whose fragmented nature reflects the halting path of the itinerary. Yet after certain extraordinary encounters (like Paul’s encounter with the crucified and resurrected Christ) the community’s story may have to be retold to let the suffering other come into phrases. How does an ontology of the self fare in such encounters? This chapter argues that an ontology of the self is the correlate of a conversation in a community. The real that resists being interpreted otherwise can only be articulated properly when one considers simultaneously the self, the other and the community in which they meet — a community that, correlatively, only appears where self and other meet. Such an ontology of the self in community could be superseded, but only at the expense of a profound challenge to the community’s self-understanding.
John L. Meech
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306941
- eISBN:
- 9780199785018
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306945.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
To correlate the ontology of the self in community with Paul’s communal self is to affirm what we share with Paul while acknowledging our real distance from him. This correlation responds to two ...
More
To correlate the ontology of the self in community with Paul’s communal self is to affirm what we share with Paul while acknowledging our real distance from him. This correlation responds to two interrelated questions. First, how can the ontology help us to understand Paul? Second, how can the ontology help us to let Paul address us again? The chapter responds to these questions, first by correlating Rudolf Bultmann’s account of Pauline anthropology with the ontology of the self in community. How is such a correlation justified? In conversation with Jürgen Moltmann and Robert Jenson, the chapter concludes with a theological account of interpretation in community: Paul can speak again in our interpretations because we live with him in the community of the living and dead in Christ, and because the Spirit of Christ is the subject of the conversation in our community.Less
To correlate the ontology of the self in community with Paul’s communal self is to affirm what we share with Paul while acknowledging our real distance from him. This correlation responds to two interrelated questions. First, how can the ontology help us to understand Paul? Second, how can the ontology help us to let Paul address us again? The chapter responds to these questions, first by correlating Rudolf Bultmann’s account of Pauline anthropology with the ontology of the self in community. How is such a correlation justified? In conversation with Jürgen Moltmann and Robert Jenson, the chapter concludes with a theological account of interpretation in community: Paul can speak again in our interpretations because we live with him in the community of the living and dead in Christ, and because the Spirit of Christ is the subject of the conversation in our community.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245369
- eISBN:
- 9780191598036
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245363.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged ...
More
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.Less
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.
The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.
I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.
A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.
Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.
John Heil
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199259748
- eISBN:
- 9780191597657
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates ...
More
Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates applying truthfully to objects, for instance, are taken to name properties of those objects possessed by every object to which the predicates apply. Such a principle might be thought to follow from a more general ‘truth‐making’ requirement (truths require truth‐makers) together with the idea that truth‐makers entail truths. I argue that truth‐making is not entailment and that the Picture Theory should be jettisoned and replaced by an attitude of ontological seriousness. Freed of constraints imposed by the Picture Theory, we are in a position to see our way through metaphysical difficulties associated with contemporary philosophy of mind. Following Locke (and C. B. Martin), I endorse a conception of properties as modes (or tropes): ways particular objects are. Modes are simultaneously qualities and powers: powerful qualities. Application of this thesis to familiar issues in the philosophy of mind yields surprising results.Less
Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates applying truthfully to objects, for instance, are taken to name properties of those objects possessed by every object to which the predicates apply. Such a principle might be thought to follow from a more general ‘truth‐making’ requirement (truths require truth‐makers) together with the idea that truth‐makers entail truths. I argue that truth‐making is not entailment and that the Picture Theory should be jettisoned and replaced by an attitude of ontological seriousness. Freed of constraints imposed by the Picture Theory, we are in a position to see our way through metaphysical difficulties associated with contemporary philosophy of mind. Following Locke (and C. B. Martin), I endorse a conception of properties as modes (or tropes): ways particular objects are. Modes are simultaneously qualities and powers: powerful qualities. Application of this thesis to familiar issues in the philosophy of mind yields surprising results.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to ...
More
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of sortal logic is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.Less
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of sortal logic is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, ...
More
The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them. Conceiving of experiences this way leaves open many issues that are philosophically controversial, issues such metaphysics of mind, ontology, qualia, consciousness, access versus phenomenal consciousness, and the diaphanousness or transparency of experience.Less
The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them. Conceiving of experiences this way leaves open many issues that are philosophically controversial, issues such metaphysics of mind, ontology, qualia, consciousness, access versus phenomenal consciousness, and the diaphanousness or transparency of experience.
Mathew Humphrey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242674.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter explores the philosophical foundations of ecocentrism, in particular its ontology. It explores the idea of a unity of humanity and nature and the proposition that ecological ‘laws’ ...
More
This chapter explores the philosophical foundations of ecocentrism, in particular its ontology. It explores the idea of a unity of humanity and nature and the proposition that ecological ‘laws’ should inform human morality. Does the quality of autopoiesis endow that natural world with intrinsic value? Can ecocentric principles offer guidance for human behaviour?Less
This chapter explores the philosophical foundations of ecocentrism, in particular its ontology. It explores the idea of a unity of humanity and nature and the proposition that ecological ‘laws’ should inform human morality. Does the quality of autopoiesis endow that natural world with intrinsic value? Can ecocentric principles offer guidance for human behaviour?
Mathew Humphrey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242674.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument ...
More
Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument is its attempt to eliminate political contingency from arguments for nature preservation, such contingency cannot be overcome by appeals to the existence of natural values. The argument is made that the ‘strong irreplaceability’ of natural entities provides sound (but not incontrovertible) grounds for nature preservation, and does so irrespective of any position with respect to the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide in axiology.Less
Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument is its attempt to eliminate political contingency from arguments for nature preservation, such contingency cannot be overcome by appeals to the existence of natural values. The argument is made that the ‘strong irreplaceability’ of natural entities provides sound (but not incontrovertible) grounds for nature preservation, and does so irrespective of any position with respect to the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide in axiology.
