Martina Wiltschko
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199654277
- eISBN:
- 9780191746048
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654277.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Syntax and Morphology
This chapter establishes that not all languages have a grammaticized mass/count distinction and consequently we have to distinguish between ontological properties associated with nouns and ...
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This chapter establishes that not all languages have a grammaticized mass/count distinction and consequently we have to distinguish between ontological properties associated with nouns and categorical properties associated with a functional category dominating these nouns. It is argued that the categorical properties associated with the mass/count distinction are tied to a functional category identified as nominal inner aspect. This category can host the feature responsible for the mass/count distinction (i.e, [± bounded]). It is further shown that languages lacking a categorical mass/count distinction come in at least two varieties. They can lack the functional category which may host the [±bounded] feature (Halkomelem). Alternatively, they can associated a different feature with inner aspect. In particular, it is shown that in Blackfoot [±animate] associates with inner aspect. Consequently, in this language, it is animacy, rather than mass/count which serves as the nominal classification device.Less
This chapter establishes that not all languages have a grammaticized mass/count distinction and consequently we have to distinguish between ontological properties associated with nouns and categorical properties associated with a functional category dominating these nouns. It is argued that the categorical properties associated with the mass/count distinction are tied to a functional category identified as nominal inner aspect. This category can host the feature responsible for the mass/count distinction (i.e, [± bounded]). It is further shown that languages lacking a categorical mass/count distinction come in at least two varieties. They can lack the functional category which may host the [±bounded] feature (Halkomelem). Alternatively, they can associated a different feature with inner aspect. In particular, it is shown that in Blackfoot [±animate] associates with inner aspect. Consequently, in this language, it is animacy, rather than mass/count which serves as the nominal classification device.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198778608
- eISBN:
- 9780191853487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter resolves the disagreements which arose in the previous chapter. Metaphysical naturalists believe that there are no ontologically weighty non-natural normative properties and truths. But ...
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This chapter resolves the disagreements which arose in the previous chapter. Metaphysical naturalists believe that there are no ontologically weighty non-natural normative properties and truths. But naturalists can believe that there are some non-ontological normative properties and truths. Some examples are truths about which acts are wrong, and about which facts give us normative reasons. We could justifiably believe that there are such normative truths, since this belief would not add anything mysterious to our ontology. These claims have led to the belief that there are some normative truths of a different kind that have yet to be considered. Furthermore, this wider view avoids or answers all of the previous chapters' objections to Normative Naturalism, such as the normativity and triviality objections, and what is called the soft naturalist's dilemma.Less
This chapter resolves the disagreements which arose in the previous chapter. Metaphysical naturalists believe that there are no ontologically weighty non-natural normative properties and truths. But naturalists can believe that there are some non-ontological normative properties and truths. Some examples are truths about which acts are wrong, and about which facts give us normative reasons. We could justifiably believe that there are such normative truths, since this belief would not add anything mysterious to our ontology. These claims have led to the belief that there are some normative truths of a different kind that have yet to be considered. Furthermore, this wider view avoids or answers all of the previous chapters' objections to Normative Naturalism, such as the normativity and triviality objections, and what is called the soft naturalist's dilemma.
