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Chapter 10 sets out a seriously nonreductive alternative to scientific naturalism: near-naturalism. Near-naturalism includes an account of ontological levels in terms of constitution of property-instances. Any instance of any property—intentional, social, legal and so on—is constituted by instances of lower-level properties, down to physical particles. With many comparisons to Kim's views, I try to clear the path for near-naturalism by removing a priori barriers—supported by notions like supervenience and mereology—that serve to squeeze the world rather than to illuminate it. The near-naturalism that remains gives onto a generous reality, with ontological room for us and our first-person perspectives. From the point of view of near-naturalism, the everyday world—the world of getting and spending and of laying waste our powers—is as real as the subatomic world.

Just as different sciences deal with different facts—say, physics versus biology—so we may ask a similar question about normative theories. Is normative political theory concerned with the same normative facts as moral theory or different ones? By developing an analogy with the sciences, this chapter argues that the normative facts of political theory belong to a higher—more coarse-grained—level than those of moral theory. The latter are multiply realizable by the former: competing facts at the moral level can underpin the same facts at the political one. Consequently, some questions that moral theories answer are indeterminate at the political level. This proposal offers a novel interpretation of John Rawls’s idea that, in public reasoning, we should abstract away from comprehensive moral doctrines. The chapter contrasts its distinction between facts at different levels with the distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence, and discusses some implications for the practice of political theory.

The differences and similarities between Porphyry and Iamblichus on the nature of the soul and the role played by philosophy and religion in enabling its purification and ultimate ascent to the One are the major themes examined in this chapter. Whereas Porphyry accentuated a “soteriology of ascent” in which philosophy represented the summit of the soul’s progression toward intelligible reality and the unio mystica, Iamblichus stressed the importance of theurgy and viewed the salvific process as one of descent to the world of becoming. The fine points of the three paths of Porphyry’s system are delineated with respect to the conventional tripartite soul of Platonism. Iamblichus’ letters provide invaluable insight into how Porphyry’s second path trajectory would have been lived out by the novice philosopher. This path required many years of studying mathematics and the dialogues of Plato and most likely required more than one life to complete.