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This chapter presents a comparative perspective on the feasibility of “one country, two systems” in solving the problem of Taiwan's political future. Although “one country, two systems” cannot be applied to Taiwan's future as it had developed a unique system different from that of Hong Kong, the broad concept of “one country, two systems” nevertheless can be used to creatively discuss the political destiny of Taiwan. The spirit of “one country, two systems”, characterized by trust, mutual compromise, concessions, and negotiations can be applied to peacefully tackle the political future of Taiwan.

This chapter concludes that mainlandization of HKSAR is inevitable because of the rapid globalization of China and because of the political correctness of Beijing's clientelist rulers and supporters in Hong Kong. And while Hong Kong's “one country, two systems” proved to be turbulent and marked by political mainlandization and convergence with the People's Republic of China, the spirit of HKSAR “one country, two systems” can be creatively applied to resolve and bring about change in the political relationship between Beijing and Taipei.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred from Britain to the People's Republic of China. This handover tested the concept of “one country, two systems”, designed and proposed by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. With Taiwan as the final target of the reunification with China, Deng hoped that the retrocession of Hong Kong would be smooth and would woo Taiwan to return to the PRC orbit. This book discusses the implementation of “one country, two systems” in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). It assesses the issues surrounding the mainlandization of HKSAR. The issues of the economic dependence of HKSAR in PRC, the vulnerability of HKSAR in the NPC's interpretation of the Basic Law, media-censorship, and the differences of HKSAR and PRC in terms of democratic reforms are discussed. This book aims to successfully relate the progress of Hong Kong politics to the future political relationship of China and Taiwan. By offering a broad focus on “one country, two systems” in the process of Sino-British negotiations and their trust building efforts, this book provides a paradigm from which political leaders of China and Taiwan can derive lessons to improve their political relationship.

This chapter presents the political background to the so-called ‘Macau question’. It explores the impact of Hong Kong upon 1986-1987 Sino-Portuguese negotiations, which resulted in the signature of the Macau Joint Declaration. The most sensitive subjects that were tabled during the negotiation process were the date for the transfer of Portuguese administration to the PRC and the nationality issue for Macau's residents in the future Special Administrative Region. The negotiations over the future of Hong Kong served as a template for negotiations over Macau. Portugal's strategy for the talks was predominantly unstructured with a desire to negotiate along co-operative lines. The negotiations highlighted Chinese negotiating patterns, combining charm with ambiguity. Moreover, we learn how charismatic Portuguese leaders had a determining effect in the outcome.

This chapter concentrates mainly on the unique phenomenon of sanlai or sanji Chinese exports, in a bid to isolate the possible size of the Hong Kong components as a contribution to resolving the conflicting claims between China and the United States on trade deficits against each other. This chapter takes stock of Hong Kong's export and import relations with both China and the United States, and gives an account of its quantitative importance in linking China's dealings with the US and the rest of the world at large. Then it offers an overall evaluation of the possible economic and income benefits that Hong Kong has been drawing from serving as a trade mediator between the two economic giants. The chapter concludes with a short remark about how Hong Kong may continue to play its third-party role beyond 1997 within the broader context of Sino-US economic relations.

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong was profitable for Beijing, and for over thirty years, Beijing was happy for it to remain under British administration. Its reversion to China’s sovereignty was put on the agenda by the expiration of a ninety-nine-year lease on Hong Kong’s New Territories. Mounting danger of capital flight led to a visit by Margaret Thatcher to Beijing in 1982. Deng managed to impose China’s terms on London. Beijing enunciated the “one country, two systems” formula under which capitalist, noncommunist-ruled Hong Kong would be an autonomous region of socialist, communist-ruled China. 6-4 led London to push for greater democracy in Hong Kong. Beijing rejected this, and Anglo-Chinese cooperation on reversion collapsed. Mutually face-saving handover ceremonies were arranged, but after reversion Beijing dismantled London’s efforts at democratization.