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In this chapter a new, so-called ‘moderate’ conception of the architecture of empirical warrants is presented. The key aspect of the moderate position is that, contrary to Pryor’s ‘liberal’ one, collateral assumptions are needed in order for one’s current sense experience to constitute a justification for ordinary empirical beliefs. As opposed to Wright’s ‘conservative’ view, in contrast, moderatism does not require the existence of a justification for these collateral assumptions. This allows moderates to avoid trafficking in the dubious notion of entitlement — the kind of non-evidential warrant evoked by Wright in order to avoid the sceptical consequences of the conservative view. In closing, the bearing of moderatism on the cogency of Moore’s proof of an external world, on external world scepticism and its relationship with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty are explored.

This chapter offers a moderate fideistic account of the epistemology of religious belief, one that takes on board the account of the structure of reasons offered by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Like standard forms of fideism, this position holds that the theist's belief in God's existence is lacking in rational support. Unlike standard forms of fideism, however, this position also holds that most religious beliefs can nonetheless enjoy rational support.

This chapter explores Wittgenstein's On Certainty as an entry into the problem of judgment as it is evident in the social and human sciences and their search for grounds of empirical and ethical evaluation and prescription. The argument here, however, is there are no such general answers. Both Wittgenstein and Kuhn state that making judgments is easy, but signifying them always comes down to persuasion within and between social practices. The chapter looks at Wittgenstein's earliest work Tractatus—its criticisms and relationship to his later work, particularly the discontinuities between Tractatus and the Investigations, which Wittgenstein himself stressed. The rest of the chapter analyzes how Wittgenstein's ethics and values serve as basis for a critical evaluation of what is referred to in the social and human sciences as normative theory and inquiry.

This chapter is concerned with the clarification of Thomas Kuhn's controversial account of science, focusing on how it relates to issues in social inquiry and how it exemplifies Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy. The connection between Wittgenstein's and Kuhn's works is not only seen by critics; for instance, Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read argue that Kuhn can be perceived in many respects as a “Wittgensteinian.” Read further emphasized the importance of situating Wittgenstein among the sciences. The parallels between Kuhn's argument and Wittgenstein's On Certainty are almost uncanny, but there is no proof that Kuhn was familiar with that text when he wrote The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It was the Berkeley environment that influenced the argument of Structure; Kuhn worked in the philosophy department at Berkeley with Stanley Cavell and Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend's philosophy, like Kuhn's, is in agreement with Wittgenstein's and speaks to issues in social inquiry.

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is often regarded as the sourcebook of contemporary hinge epistemology. However that may be, this essay argues that Wittgenstein himself was not a hinge epistemologist. He did feel the draw, but in the end, hinge propositions were not part of his considered view. Rather, they characterize one of the competing voices in his treatment of external world skepticism, the so-called voice of correctness (analogous to the Kripkean skeptical solution in the rule-following case), with the voice of temptation represented by Moore, as Wittgenstein understands him (analogous to a straight solution in the role-following case). To support this reading of the first-draft notes collected by the editors into OC, the argument extrapolates from readings of the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations, and the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, supplemented by new biographical and philological work by Brian Rogers on Wittgenstein’s final months.

This chapter focuses on Wittgenstein’s new approach to philosophical issues used later in his life. Wittgenstein’s followers have always contended that his methods are what are important, no matter the subject of discussion. Wittgenstein always emphasized the relevance of understanding things in context; otherwise, what is discussed and understood is flawed. In his later years, Wittgenstein reflected on Moore’s claims regarding certain knowledge, and even discussed them with friends. His notes on this topic were collected and subsequently published as On Certainty. It is therefore useful to determine to which situations Wittgenstein thought Moore’s ideologies applied. He believed that the fundamental consideration in understanding human beings is behavioral and not linguistic; he does not, and cannot, ignore the possibilities of living interaction.

This chapter surveys the range of Wittgenstein’s texts that have been thought relevant to religion. It highlights the importance of differences between key published philosophical texts by Wittgenstein, notes taken by students and friends, and the personal recollections of acquaintances. It questions the philosophical significance of many of the sources to which philosophers of religion have appealed. It notes the almost total lack of reference to religion in the philosophical texts. It argues against placing any heavy reliance on the notes and recollections. Instead, it argues for the indirect relevance of the philosophical texts to the understanding of religion.