Alan S. Blinder and Jeremy B. Rudd
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226066950
- eISBN:
- 9780226043555
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226043555.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Previous studies have concluded that the two OPEC shocks, the two roughly contemporaneous food price shocks, and the removal of wage-price controls in 1973–1974 played key roles in the macroeconomic ...
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Previous studies have concluded that the two OPEC shocks, the two roughly contemporaneous food price shocks, and the removal of wage-price controls in 1973–1974 played key roles in the macroeconomic events which constituted the Great Stagflation. This chapter reexamines the supply-shock explanation in the light of new facts, new models, and new econometric findings, and shows that the “old-fashioned” supply-shock explanation holds up quite well. It is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines and slightly modernizes the basic conceptual framework, reexamining it in the light of much new theory and many new empirical findings, while Section 2.3 takes a fresh look at the evidence on the Great Inflation in the United States, once again using new data, new theory, and new econometric findings. Section 2.4 deals with a series of objections to the supply-shock explanation, while Section 2.5 looks beyond the narrow historical confines of the 1972 to 1982 period, considering supply shocks both prior to and after the Great Stagflation; and Section 2.6 concludes.Less
Previous studies have concluded that the two OPEC shocks, the two roughly contemporaneous food price shocks, and the removal of wage-price controls in 1973–1974 played key roles in the macroeconomic events which constituted the Great Stagflation. This chapter reexamines the supply-shock explanation in the light of new facts, new models, and new econometric findings, and shows that the “old-fashioned” supply-shock explanation holds up quite well. It is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines and slightly modernizes the basic conceptual framework, reexamining it in the light of much new theory and many new empirical findings, while Section 2.3 takes a fresh look at the evidence on the Great Inflation in the United States, once again using new data, new theory, and new econometric findings. Section 2.4 deals with a series of objections to the supply-shock explanation, while Section 2.5 looks beyond the narrow historical confines of the 1972 to 1982 period, considering supply shocks both prior to and after the Great Stagflation; and Section 2.6 concludes.
Olivier J. Blanchard and Jordi Galí
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226278865
- eISBN:
- 9780226278872
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226278872.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
This chapter discusses the large output losses and the rises in inflation rates that accompanied the two oil shocks of 1970 in most industrialized countries, and shows the more recent absence of ...
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This chapter discusses the large output losses and the rises in inflation rates that accompanied the two oil shocks of 1970 in most industrialized countries, and shows the more recent absence of analogous effects, even though the rise in oil prices was of a similar magnitude. Using a Value at Risk (VAR) to identify exogenous oil price shocks, the chapter shows that the latter can only account for a relatively small part of the stagflationary episodes of 1970, suggesting that shocks other than oil but coinciding in time with the latter should also be held responsible for the dismal macroeconomic performance of that period. Three alternative explanations for the dampening effects of oil price shocks, that is, a smaller share of oil in production and consumption, more flexible labor markets, and an enhanced credibility of monetary policy are also given and being discussed in this chapter.Less
This chapter discusses the large output losses and the rises in inflation rates that accompanied the two oil shocks of 1970 in most industrialized countries, and shows the more recent absence of analogous effects, even though the rise in oil prices was of a similar magnitude. Using a Value at Risk (VAR) to identify exogenous oil price shocks, the chapter shows that the latter can only account for a relatively small part of the stagflationary episodes of 1970, suggesting that shocks other than oil but coinciding in time with the latter should also be held responsible for the dismal macroeconomic performance of that period. Three alternative explanations for the dampening effects of oil price shocks, that is, a smaller share of oil in production and consumption, more flexible labor markets, and an enhanced credibility of monetary policy are also given and being discussed in this chapter.
Maurice FitzGerald Scott
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198287421
- eISBN:
- 9780191596872
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198287429.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
The build‐up in inflationary pressures in many countries in the late 1960s exploded with the commodity boom and oil shock of 1973. Why did the ensuing wide swings from inflation to deflation result ...
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The build‐up in inflationary pressures in many countries in the late 1960s exploded with the commodity boom and oil shock of 1973. Why did the ensuing wide swings from inflation to deflation result in such a marked slowdown in productivity growth? Many possible explanations are discussed, with mistaken and wasted investment, and the scrapping of assets that still earned positive quasi‐rents, being significant. The main lessons are the importance of stable macroeconomic conditions for growth, of realistic wage expectations, and of the need for strong animal spirits in business.Less
The build‐up in inflationary pressures in many countries in the late 1960s exploded with the commodity boom and oil shock of 1973. Why did the ensuing wide swings from inflation to deflation result in such a marked slowdown in productivity growth? Many possible explanations are discussed, with mistaken and wasted investment, and the scrapping of assets that still earned positive quasi‐rents, being significant. The main lessons are the importance of stable macroeconomic conditions for growth, of realistic wage expectations, and of the need for strong animal spirits in business.
Sungbae An and Kang Heedon
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226386898
- eISBN:
- 9780226386904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226386904.003.0010
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
This chapter describes the oil shocks using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the Korean economy. The Korean economy depends entirely on imports for its acquisition of crude ...
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This chapter describes the oil shocks using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the Korean economy. The Korean economy depends entirely on imports for its acquisition of crude oil, and households, entrepreneurs, and policymakers are interested in knowing to what extent the rise in oil prices affects the economy. Within an Bayesian estimation framework including DSGE-vector autoregressions (VARs), the empirical analysis used is based on Korean aggregate data. Using Bayesian analysis, the model is used to check the importance of each channel that transmits an oil price shock to the economy. It is found that the model economy produces reasonable posterior estimates of the structural parameters and works relatively well compared to impulse responses from the VAR with optimal prior weight from the DSGE model. A more elaborated model on government behavior is anticipated to investigate the pass-through of oil price shocks.Less
This chapter describes the oil shocks using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the Korean economy. The Korean economy depends entirely on imports for its acquisition of crude oil, and households, entrepreneurs, and policymakers are interested in knowing to what extent the rise in oil prices affects the economy. Within an Bayesian estimation framework including DSGE-vector autoregressions (VARs), the empirical analysis used is based on Korean aggregate data. Using Bayesian analysis, the model is used to check the importance of each channel that transmits an oil price shock to the economy. It is found that the model economy produces reasonable posterior estimates of the structural parameters and works relatively well compared to impulse responses from the VAR with optimal prior weight from the DSGE model. A more elaborated model on government behavior is anticipated to investigate the pass-through of oil price shocks.
Juan Antonio Morales and Paul Reding
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- August 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198854715
- eISBN:
- 9780191888915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198854715.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
The chapter explores two significant challenges faced by central banks in LFDCs: fiscal dominance and external shocks. Monetary policy can be dominated by governments that rely on seigniorage ...
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The chapter explores two significant challenges faced by central banks in LFDCs: fiscal dominance and external shocks. Monetary policy can be dominated by governments that rely on seigniorage generated by the central bank or impose other constraints to facilitate the financing of persistent deficits. The chapter discusses and illustrates for several countries the concept of seigniorage, examines the mechanisms of fiscal dominance, and assesses its consequences. External oil and food price shocks also raise several monetary policy challenges. Using a theoretical approach, the chapter explores the trade-off between price and output stabilization that the central bank faces after a commodity price hike. The analysis takes into account whether the country is a net exporter or a net importer and whether it is on fixed or on flexible exchange rates. It also discusses coordination issues between monetary and fiscal policies, in particular when windfall gains accrue to the government.Less
The chapter explores two significant challenges faced by central banks in LFDCs: fiscal dominance and external shocks. Monetary policy can be dominated by governments that rely on seigniorage generated by the central bank or impose other constraints to facilitate the financing of persistent deficits. The chapter discusses and illustrates for several countries the concept of seigniorage, examines the mechanisms of fiscal dominance, and assesses its consequences. External oil and food price shocks also raise several monetary policy challenges. Using a theoretical approach, the chapter explores the trade-off between price and output stabilization that the central bank faces after a commodity price hike. The analysis takes into account whether the country is a net exporter or a net importer and whether it is on fixed or on flexible exchange rates. It also discusses coordination issues between monetary and fiscal policies, in particular when windfall gains accrue to the government.
Daniel J. Sargent
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780195395471
- eISBN:
- 9780199393633
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395471.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century, Political History
US economic and geopolitical interests were entwined in the Middle East in the early 1970s. Prioritizing geopolitical objectives, the Nixon administration bolstered Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional ...
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US economic and geopolitical interests were entwined in the Middle East in the early 1970s. Prioritizing geopolitical objectives, the Nixon administration bolstered Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional clients and cultivated Israel as a Cold War ally. Meanwhile, the declining U.S. share of global oil production made the United States-and the larger Western world-ever-more dependent upon the oil exports of the Middle East. In the context of the Middle East crisis of late 1973, which included an Arab-Israeli war and a major oil crisis, US decision-makers struggled to comprehend and manage the consequences of energy interdependence. Recognizing the damage that surging oil prices were doing to the Western Alliance, Henry Kissinger belatedly set out to manage-and mitigate-the vulnerabilities that economic interdependence created for the West and to stabilize the Middle East through the achievement of a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.Less
US economic and geopolitical interests were entwined in the Middle East in the early 1970s. Prioritizing geopolitical objectives, the Nixon administration bolstered Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional clients and cultivated Israel as a Cold War ally. Meanwhile, the declining U.S. share of global oil production made the United States-and the larger Western world-ever-more dependent upon the oil exports of the Middle East. In the context of the Middle East crisis of late 1973, which included an Arab-Israeli war and a major oil crisis, US decision-makers struggled to comprehend and manage the consequences of energy interdependence. Recognizing the damage that surging oil prices were doing to the Western Alliance, Henry Kissinger belatedly set out to manage-and mitigate-the vulnerabilities that economic interdependence created for the West and to stabilize the Middle East through the achievement of a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.
Ronald I. McKinnon
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199937004
- eISBN:
- 9780199980703
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199937004.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Anticipated dollar depreciations in the 1970s, and again from 2002 to 2008, set off hot money flows into countries on the dollar standard’s relevant periphery: Western Europe and Japan in the 1970s, ...
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Anticipated dollar depreciations in the 1970s, and again from 2002 to 2008, set off hot money flows into countries on the dollar standard’s relevant periphery: Western Europe and Japan in the 1970s, and emerging markets in the noughties. Anxious to prevent its national currency from appreciating precipitately, each national central bank intervened to buy dollars with base money—and lost monetary control. The resulting worldwide inflations arose from a surge in the world’s collective money supply that only affected the United States with a lag. In retrospect, the worldwide inflations of the 1970s are remembered by most people as simply “oil shocks” that were not primarily due to a collective loss of monetary control from dollar depreciations. But the true monetary origin of these earlier oil spikes was revealed by the 2007–8 spike. From 2002 the price of oil rose threefold even though there was no obvious “shock” to oil supplies from the Middle East.Less
Anticipated dollar depreciations in the 1970s, and again from 2002 to 2008, set off hot money flows into countries on the dollar standard’s relevant periphery: Western Europe and Japan in the 1970s, and emerging markets in the noughties. Anxious to prevent its national currency from appreciating precipitately, each national central bank intervened to buy dollars with base money—and lost monetary control. The resulting worldwide inflations arose from a surge in the world’s collective money supply that only affected the United States with a lag. In retrospect, the worldwide inflations of the 1970s are remembered by most people as simply “oil shocks” that were not primarily due to a collective loss of monetary control from dollar depreciations. But the true monetary origin of these earlier oil spikes was revealed by the 2007–8 spike. From 2002 the price of oil rose threefold even though there was no obvious “shock” to oil supplies from the Middle East.
Stephen A. Marglin
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198287414
- eISBN:
- 9780191684548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198287414.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter provides an overview of the historical and theoretical arguments of the book. It differentiates causes and triggers. It notes that conventional wisdom dates the end of the ‘golden age’ ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the historical and theoretical arguments of the book. It differentiates causes and triggers. It notes that conventional wisdom dates the end of the ‘golden age’ by the first oil shock, OPEC I in 1973. The second oil shock, OPEC II in 1979, is conventionally argued to have ushered in the current phase of neoliberalism, monetarism, and the return to the market. However, this book's argument explains that OPEC I and II are not fundamental causes but triggers which set off forces that had deep roots in the internal economies of the industrial countries and in the relationships among them and between them and the Third World. It discusses the relationship between the underlying reasons why different periods of postwar capitalism ended (‘causes’) and the events that sparked off these ends (‘triggers’).Less
This chapter provides an overview of the historical and theoretical arguments of the book. It differentiates causes and triggers. It notes that conventional wisdom dates the end of the ‘golden age’ by the first oil shock, OPEC I in 1973. The second oil shock, OPEC II in 1979, is conventionally argued to have ushered in the current phase of neoliberalism, monetarism, and the return to the market. However, this book's argument explains that OPEC I and II are not fundamental causes but triggers which set off forces that had deep roots in the internal economies of the industrial countries and in the relationships among them and between them and the Third World. It discusses the relationship between the underlying reasons why different periods of postwar capitalism ended (‘causes’) and the events that sparked off these ends (‘triggers’).
Matthew T. Huber
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780816677849
- eISBN:
- 9781452947402
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Minnesota Press
- DOI:
- 10.5749/minnesota/9780816677849.001.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Science, Technology and Environment
If our oil addiction is so bad for us, why don’t we kick the habit? Looking beyond the usual culprits—Big Oil, petro states, and the strategists of empire—this book finds a deeper and more complex ...
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If our oil addiction is so bad for us, why don’t we kick the habit? Looking beyond the usual culprits—Big Oil, petro states, and the strategists of empire—this book finds a deeper and more complex explanation in everyday practices of oil consumption in American culture. Those practices, the text suggests, have in fact been instrumental in shaping the broader cultural politics of American capitalism. How did gasoline and countless other petroleum products become so central to our notions of the American way of life? The book traces the answer from the 1930s through the oil shocks of the 1970s to our present predicament, revealing that oil’s role in defining popular culture extends far beyond material connections between oil, suburbia, and automobility. It shows how oil powered a cultural politics of entrepreneurial life—the very American idea that life itself is a product of individual entrepreneurial capacities. In so doing the author uses oil to retell American political history from the triumph of New Deal liberalism to the rise of the New Right, from oil’s celebration as the lifeblood of postwar capitalism to increasing anxieties over oil addiction. The book rethinks debates surrounding energy and capitalism, neoliberalism and nature, and the importance of suburbanization in the rightward shift in American politics. Today, the text tells us, as crises attributable to oil intensify, a populist clamoring for cheap energy has less to do with American excess than with the eroding conditions of life under neoliberalism.Less
If our oil addiction is so bad for us, why don’t we kick the habit? Looking beyond the usual culprits—Big Oil, petro states, and the strategists of empire—this book finds a deeper and more complex explanation in everyday practices of oil consumption in American culture. Those practices, the text suggests, have in fact been instrumental in shaping the broader cultural politics of American capitalism. How did gasoline and countless other petroleum products become so central to our notions of the American way of life? The book traces the answer from the 1930s through the oil shocks of the 1970s to our present predicament, revealing that oil’s role in defining popular culture extends far beyond material connections between oil, suburbia, and automobility. It shows how oil powered a cultural politics of entrepreneurial life—the very American idea that life itself is a product of individual entrepreneurial capacities. In so doing the author uses oil to retell American political history from the triumph of New Deal liberalism to the rise of the New Right, from oil’s celebration as the lifeblood of postwar capitalism to increasing anxieties over oil addiction. The book rethinks debates surrounding energy and capitalism, neoliberalism and nature, and the importance of suburbanization in the rightward shift in American politics. Today, the text tells us, as crises attributable to oil intensify, a populist clamoring for cheap energy has less to do with American excess than with the eroding conditions of life under neoliberalism.
D. Eleanor Westney
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198288152
- eISBN:
- 9780191684579
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198288152.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
This chapter is a survey of both macro data on national trends and micro data on organizational structures of Japanese R&D. The macro part makes the point that high R&D expenditure by Japanese firms ...
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This chapter is a survey of both macro data on national trends and micro data on organizational structures of Japanese R&D. The macro part makes the point that high R&D expenditure by Japanese firms has been a trend that started long before the first Oil Shock. The micro part, on firm organization, starts with useful history concerning changes in the pattern of division of labour between central, divisional, and factory research labs. The chapter then reviews the accumulated body of information presented in the chapter on research careers, reward structures, professional self-images, the role of Ph.D. research and qualifications, corporate university links, and the relation of all these to research productivity. The chapter finds a strong isomorphic pattern of career and incentive structure between the Japanese manufacturing and R&D organizations. The chapter also discusses trends for major corporations to hive more and more work off to subsidiaries, one of the purposes of which is to introduce salary and security differentials between different functions, and it examines the nature of the links between R&D workers in core firm and those in subsidiaries. The chapter closes by pointing out that research managers of Japanese firms are concerned increasingly with the challenge of building more creative organizations with greater capabilities in basic research and radical product innovations. For that purpose, they are trying to draw on their Western counterparts for organizational technology.Less
This chapter is a survey of both macro data on national trends and micro data on organizational structures of Japanese R&D. The macro part makes the point that high R&D expenditure by Japanese firms has been a trend that started long before the first Oil Shock. The micro part, on firm organization, starts with useful history concerning changes in the pattern of division of labour between central, divisional, and factory research labs. The chapter then reviews the accumulated body of information presented in the chapter on research careers, reward structures, professional self-images, the role of Ph.D. research and qualifications, corporate university links, and the relation of all these to research productivity. The chapter finds a strong isomorphic pattern of career and incentive structure between the Japanese manufacturing and R&D organizations. The chapter also discusses trends for major corporations to hive more and more work off to subsidiaries, one of the purposes of which is to introduce salary and security differentials between different functions, and it examines the nature of the links between R&D workers in core firm and those in subsidiaries. The chapter closes by pointing out that research managers of Japanese firms are concerned increasingly with the challenge of building more creative organizations with greater capabilities in basic research and radical product innovations. For that purpose, they are trying to draw on their Western counterparts for organizational technology.
Eiko Maruko Siniawer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781501725845
- eISBN:
- 9781501725852
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501725845.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
The early 1970s were a sharp pivot point in Japan’s postwar history, as the Garbage War of 1971 and the Oil Shock of 1973 thrust waste and wastefulness into a place of unprecedented visibility. ...
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The early 1970s were a sharp pivot point in Japan’s postwar history, as the Garbage War of 1971 and the Oil Shock of 1973 thrust waste and wastefulness into a place of unprecedented visibility. Concerns about the waste of garbage and resources became acute, fueling environmental protection efforts and calls to “save resources” and “save energy.” The waste of things, resources, and energy came to be seen as tightly interrelated, and provoked reflection about the costs and consequences of mass production and mass consumption. With lamentations about the “throwaway society” and its “culture of disposability,” waste also became a site of reflection about the values and priorities born of high economic growth. In the 1970s, waste consciousness was not about subsistence or about friction to societal changes, but was rather a way to defend the middle-class lifestyles already achieved.Less
The early 1970s were a sharp pivot point in Japan’s postwar history, as the Garbage War of 1971 and the Oil Shock of 1973 thrust waste and wastefulness into a place of unprecedented visibility. Concerns about the waste of garbage and resources became acute, fueling environmental protection efforts and calls to “save resources” and “save energy.” The waste of things, resources, and energy came to be seen as tightly interrelated, and provoked reflection about the costs and consequences of mass production and mass consumption. With lamentations about the “throwaway society” and its “culture of disposability,” waste also became a site of reflection about the values and priorities born of high economic growth. In the 1970s, waste consciousness was not about subsistence or about friction to societal changes, but was rather a way to defend the middle-class lifestyles already achieved.
Giuliano Garavini
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198832836
- eISBN:
- 9780191871306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198832836.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History, World Modern History
Chapter 6 describes the failure of international negotiations between petrostates, key oil consumers, and developing countries during the Conference for International Economic Cooperation (also known ...
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Chapter 6 describes the failure of international negotiations between petrostates, key oil consumers, and developing countries during the Conference for International Economic Cooperation (also known as the North–South dialogue) held in Paris from 1975 to 1977. The chapter concludes with the “second oil shock” of 1979–80 that coincided with the revolution in Iran and the beginning of war between Iraq and Iran, and ends describing the failure of OPEC’s Long Term Strategy sealed at the OPEC Conference in Bali in December 1980.Less
Chapter 6 describes the failure of international negotiations between petrostates, key oil consumers, and developing countries during the Conference for International Economic Cooperation (also known as the North–South dialogue) held in Paris from 1975 to 1977. The chapter concludes with the “second oil shock” of 1979–80 that coincided with the revolution in Iran and the beginning of war between Iraq and Iran, and ends describing the failure of OPEC’s Long Term Strategy sealed at the OPEC Conference in Bali in December 1980.
Giuliano Garavini
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198832836
- eISBN:
- 9780191871306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198832836.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History, World Modern History
Chapter 5 describes the OAPEC oil embargo and then explains the reasons for the “oil shock”, with its fourfold increase in the price of crude oil by December 1973. After the price increases of 1973 ...
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Chapter 5 describes the OAPEC oil embargo and then explains the reasons for the “oil shock”, with its fourfold increase in the price of crude oil by December 1973. After the price increases of 1973 the governments of consuming countries now entered directly the arena of international energy politics with the convening of the Washington Energy Conference of 1974 and then the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) by the end of the same year. This chapter also explains why OPEC strived to present itself as the “spearhead” for Third World countries, hoping to establish a New International Economic Order that would reform international economic institutions and promote a kind of globalization more in line with the needs of raw materials producers and developing countries. The apex of this effort by OPEC was achieved in March 1975 with the convening of the OPEC summit of Algiers.Less
Chapter 5 describes the OAPEC oil embargo and then explains the reasons for the “oil shock”, with its fourfold increase in the price of crude oil by December 1973. After the price increases of 1973 the governments of consuming countries now entered directly the arena of international energy politics with the convening of the Washington Energy Conference of 1974 and then the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) by the end of the same year. This chapter also explains why OPEC strived to present itself as the “spearhead” for Third World countries, hoping to establish a New International Economic Order that would reform international economic institutions and promote a kind of globalization more in line with the needs of raw materials producers and developing countries. The apex of this effort by OPEC was achieved in March 1975 with the convening of the OPEC summit of Algiers.
Brian Woodall
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785259
- eISBN:
- 9780804788571
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785259.003.0009
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
Despite compelling reasons to do so, Japanese policymakers have been reluctant to fully buy into a “green growth” strategy. One might have expected that the triple disasters of March 2011 – ...
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Despite compelling reasons to do so, Japanese policymakers have been reluctant to fully buy into a “green growth” strategy. One might have expected that the triple disasters of March 2011 – earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis – would lead to dramatic policy change. Yet, to date, the changes made have been modest. Also, it is puzzling that Japanese policymakers have yet to forge a national energy strategy that seeks to stimulate investment in renewables, address energy security and climate change concerns, exploit untapped renewable energy resources, and leverage the R&D prowess of Japanese firms. Despite their dominant position in the green car market, Japanese companies tend to under-punch their weight in most clean-tech markets. Why is this so? This country case study traces the evolution of Japan’s energy policymaking process through five stages, highlighting the ways politics, institutional inertia, and path dependencies have shaped and constrained policy change.Less
Despite compelling reasons to do so, Japanese policymakers have been reluctant to fully buy into a “green growth” strategy. One might have expected that the triple disasters of March 2011 – earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis – would lead to dramatic policy change. Yet, to date, the changes made have been modest. Also, it is puzzling that Japanese policymakers have yet to forge a national energy strategy that seeks to stimulate investment in renewables, address energy security and climate change concerns, exploit untapped renewable energy resources, and leverage the R&D prowess of Japanese firms. Despite their dominant position in the green car market, Japanese companies tend to under-punch their weight in most clean-tech markets. Why is this so? This country case study traces the evolution of Japan’s energy policymaking process through five stages, highlighting the ways politics, institutional inertia, and path dependencies have shaped and constrained policy change.
Brian Woodall
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780813145013
- eISBN:
- 9780813145327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813145013.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter traces the evolution of the cabinet system through the “Nixon shocks” and “oil shocks” to the final days of the “1955 system.” In this era of “confederate cabinets,” an already blurry ...
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This chapter traces the evolution of the cabinet system through the “Nixon shocks” and “oil shocks” to the final days of the “1955 system.” In this era of “confederate cabinets,” an already blurry distinction between ruling party and cabinet became even blurrier, and a succession of corruption scandals intensified demands for political reform. Measures were taken to enhance the powers of the prime minister and cabinet, and yet these efforts failed to institutionalize top-down executive leadership. Influential lawmakers in policy tribes assumed a leading role in the fief-like policy sub-governments that characterized a fragmented policymaking environment. This state of affairs exacerbated the difficulties faced by prime ministers and cabinets in giving tactical direction to government policy. Meanwhile, cabinets confronted an array of challenges that included reducing government debt in a slow-growth economy and responding to popular demands to reform a structurally corrupt political order. The failure to fulfill promises of political reform brought down the curtain on nearly four decades of parliamentary dominance under the Liberal Democratic Party.Less
This chapter traces the evolution of the cabinet system through the “Nixon shocks” and “oil shocks” to the final days of the “1955 system.” In this era of “confederate cabinets,” an already blurry distinction between ruling party and cabinet became even blurrier, and a succession of corruption scandals intensified demands for political reform. Measures were taken to enhance the powers of the prime minister and cabinet, and yet these efforts failed to institutionalize top-down executive leadership. Influential lawmakers in policy tribes assumed a leading role in the fief-like policy sub-governments that characterized a fragmented policymaking environment. This state of affairs exacerbated the difficulties faced by prime ministers and cabinets in giving tactical direction to government policy. Meanwhile, cabinets confronted an array of challenges that included reducing government debt in a slow-growth economy and responding to popular demands to reform a structurally corrupt political order. The failure to fulfill promises of political reform brought down the curtain on nearly four decades of parliamentary dominance under the Liberal Democratic Party.
Tamara K. Hareven
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520228177
- eISBN:
- 9780520935761
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520228177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Sociology, Occupations, Professions, and Work
Nishijin cloth is considered informally a cultural property of Japan. The introduction of the jacquard, followed by the spread of the powerloom, revitalized Nishijin's industry and made it supreme in ...
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Nishijin cloth is considered informally a cultural property of Japan. The introduction of the jacquard, followed by the spread of the powerloom, revitalized Nishijin's industry and made it supreme in Japan. Following its recovery after the Korean War, Nishijin enjoyed a decade of prosperity until dwindling markets, resulting from the Oil Shock of the early 1970s, caused its continuing decline. The manufacturers have continued to maintain family businesses, but the larger family concerns have been incorporated into companies. Nishijin's system of production underwent several transformations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, following the introduction of the jacquard mechanism and the powerloom. Nishijin's decline has undermined the weavers' security more dramatically than that of the manufacturers. Many older people who have lived through recessions in Nishijin view the current one as the most serious and irreversible in their experience.Less
Nishijin cloth is considered informally a cultural property of Japan. The introduction of the jacquard, followed by the spread of the powerloom, revitalized Nishijin's industry and made it supreme in Japan. Following its recovery after the Korean War, Nishijin enjoyed a decade of prosperity until dwindling markets, resulting from the Oil Shock of the early 1970s, caused its continuing decline. The manufacturers have continued to maintain family businesses, but the larger family concerns have been incorporated into companies. Nishijin's system of production underwent several transformations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, following the introduction of the jacquard mechanism and the powerloom. Nishijin's decline has undermined the weavers' security more dramatically than that of the manufacturers. Many older people who have lived through recessions in Nishijin view the current one as the most serious and irreversible in their experience.
Manlio Graziano
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780231174626
- eISBN:
- 9780231543910
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231174626.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter explains the likely reasons for the ayatollahs' victory in Iran in 1979
This chapter explains the likely reasons for the ayatollahs' victory in Iran in 1979
Gary Gerstle
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780197519646
- eISBN:
- 9780197628751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197519646.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Political History
Tensions within the New Deal order and Cold War liberalism began to emerge in the 1960s. A re-energized civil rights movement and popular opposition to the Vietnam War undermined Lyndon Johnson’s ...
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Tensions within the New Deal order and Cold War liberalism began to emerge in the 1960s. A re-energized civil rights movement and popular opposition to the Vietnam War undermined Lyndon Johnson’s presidency and fractured the New Deal coalition. The growth of international competition in the 1970s eroded global American economic leadership, prompting American corporations to expand their activities overseas and causing strains in the compact that had been established between labor and business in the postwar years. The oil shocks delivered the final blow to the Keynesian political economy that had underwritten the New Deal order and prompted a search for solutions to the novel problem of “stagflation.” Under the transitional presidency of Jimmy Carter an “incipient neoliberalism” emerged that was energized by hostility to government planning and regulation and the embrace of human rights and consumer sovereignty.Less
Tensions within the New Deal order and Cold War liberalism began to emerge in the 1960s. A re-energized civil rights movement and popular opposition to the Vietnam War undermined Lyndon Johnson’s presidency and fractured the New Deal coalition. The growth of international competition in the 1970s eroded global American economic leadership, prompting American corporations to expand their activities overseas and causing strains in the compact that had been established between labor and business in the postwar years. The oil shocks delivered the final blow to the Keynesian political economy that had underwritten the New Deal order and prompted a search for solutions to the novel problem of “stagflation.” Under the transitional presidency of Jimmy Carter an “incipient neoliberalism” emerged that was energized by hostility to government planning and regulation and the embrace of human rights and consumer sovereignty.