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This chapter examines the long-run effects of oil revenue and its volatility on economic growth, as well as the role of institutions in this relationship. We collect annual and monthly data on 17 major oil producers between 1961 and 2013, and use the panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach as well as its cross-sectionally augmented version (CS-ARDL) for estimation. Therefore, in contrast to earlier literature on the resource curse, we take into account all three key features of the panel: dynamics, heterogeneity, and cross-sectional dependence. The results suggest that: (i) oil revenue volatility has a significant negative effect on output growth; (ii) a higher growth rate of oil revenue significantly raises economic growth; and (iii) better fiscal policy can offset some of the negative effects of oil revenue volatility. We therefore argue that volatility in oil revenues combined with poor governmental responses to this volatility drives the resource curse paradox.

Oil-rich countries systematically misallocate public expenditures relative to non-oil countries—by favoring consumption over capital, and within consumption, inefficient subsidies and public sector wages over targeted transfers. Furthermore, for given levels of expenditure, value for money is considerably less in oil-rich countries. This chapter argues that the reason for this inefficiency is that oil revenues go directly to the government without passing through the hands of the citizens, as is the case with tax revenues. As a result, governments in oil countries are less accountable for public expenditure, which leads to inefficient spending. To improve public spending efficiency, we propose that all oil revenues be distributed directly to citizens, and the resources that government needs be raised through taxation. We show that such a scheme improves the efficiency of public spending. We consider possible obstacles to such a reform and show that they have been overcome by technology, politics, and global events.

Chapter 8 evaluates the overall impact of the radical macroeconomic reform processes—launched since the 1980s—on Mexico's quest for high and sustained economic growth. Attention focuses on identifying the macroeconomic reform's limitations and strengths. It examines the effects of privatization on economic efficiency and argues why certain regulatory deficiencies resulted in an undesirable concentration of ownership in some of the privatized areas. It looks too at the effects of trade liberalization on trade flows and pattern of specialization, and at the results of the liberalization of the land market. On this matter it shows that, although there have been some benefits, the overall performance of agriculture and, in particular, peasant agriculture are disappointing. It also argues that the financial boom and bust cycle that led to the banking crisis of 1994–1995 was partly a consequence of financial deregulation and capital market liberalization. It concludes by pointing out key weaknesses of the contemporary Mexican state, standing out among them the fragility of its fiscal structure and heavy dependence on volatile and declining oil incomes and its inability to carry out anticyclical macroeconomic policies.

This chapter analyses the development strategy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The de facto development strategy of the UAE has been at the political level, with economic power concentrated in the hands of the rulers of the seven emirates that constitute the UAE, as well as the rules and policies designed to ensure cooperation from the local or native UAE citizens. Large portions of oil revenue were invested in sovereign wealth funds which now generate significant profits, while the balance of the funds was used to spur domestic investments in tourism and industry. The UAE has been liberal in its use of foreign expertise and skills in domestic industry and has shown tolerance towards the importation of unskilled workers to fuel the growth of the domestic economy.

In 1939, as war broke out in Europe, Russia was Iran's main worry. Communism, a mystery to most Iranians, was generally disliked because it was “godless,” clearly to be shunned and condemned. Its creed ran counter to Iranians' sense of authenticity. The war caught Iran in a bad time. An inflationary spiral had taken hold while salaries had remained fixed. Oil revenues had gone down, retarding industrial growth. The Germans buttered up the shah; the British fought with him. At the time, the only major power the shah was able to pressure was England, because of England's dependence on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The last days of Reza Shah on the throne were traumatic for him and for his son. His policy was to accommodate the Allies while maintaining Iran's neutrality. But he had misread the Russians and particularly the British.

Chapter 9 concludes and offers a speculative outlook. Food security in Gulf countries is about managing import dependence. Self-sufficiency is no longer an option because of water scarcity. Food imports offer the opportunity to import “virtual water” that is embedded in food. Foreign agro-investments in developing countries can be one piece of the puzzle, but they may end up stillborn like previous attempts in Sudan in the 1970s. Win-win situations will only prove possible if the interests of stakeholders in targeted countries are safeguarded. Apart from this, Gulf countries will need to look at other areas to guarantee food security. They can improve cooperation with institutions like the WTO. They can work on international storage solutions in order to prevent a renewed occurrence of export restrictions. They can improve water security with domestic policies. They can also ensure revenue streams by stretching the lifetime of their oil reserves and further economic diversification.

This chapter sets out the economic, social, and political case for Scotland in the UK. Political union means Scotland’s defence and foreign relations are within a bigger and more influential state. It enables full economic union, with a deep domestic market, and entirely free movement of people, goods and capital, together with the banking union that supports sharing the pound Sterling. It allows fiscal union, so public resources are shared across the UK, making for a social union, with common social rights, like pensions and NHS services. These aspects of union are mutually reinforcing, and mean shared UK citizenship alongside Scottish identity. Breaking political union means breaking, notably, the currency and fiscal unions so, if independent, Scotland’s fiscal position becomes unsustainable: public spending is high and oil revenues collapsing. Substantial devolution is however possible within political union, and much more is planned, offering Scots the ‘best of both worlds’.

This chapter introduces Anne Milling, the New Orleans civic activist who founded Women of the Storm. The chapter presents her brief biography before delving into the early history of the formation of the core membership of the still unnamed incipient group. It outlines the processes involved in coming up with group names and establishing its goals, including the mission to invite members of Congress to see the destruction firsthand and a coastal restoration initiative funded through an oil and gas revenue sharing agreement.