Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588374
- eISBN:
- 9780191741487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, ...
More
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.Less
This book examines some recent answers to the questions of how and where to draw the divide between semantics (roughly, features of the literal meaning of linguistic items) and pragmatics (roughly, features emerging from the context within which such items are being used). In particular, the book defends what is commonly known as ‘minimal semantics’ (aka ‘semantic invariantism’ or ‘insensitive semantics’). Minimal semantics, as the name suggests, offers a pretty minimal account of the inter-relation between semantics and pragmatics. Specifically, it holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine (i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive items (e.g. indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers), this is the extent of pragmatic influence within the semantic realm. Minimalism, then, prohibits what are here called ‘free pragmatic effects’: putative effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico‐syntactic item in a sentence. The book opens with an exploration of the current positions in this debate, introducing the main approaches of minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, and occasionalism and offers some initial reasons for being concerned about many of the positions opposing minimalism. The main arguments against minimalism are then explored, looking at the argument that minimal contents are explanatorily irrelevant, the argument that at least some sentences fail to express minimal contents, and the argument that the kinds of word meanings which minimalism requires are either impossible or explanatorily inadequate. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that none of these arguments are compelling and that minimalism in fact provides an attractive and plausible account of the literal meanings of natural language sentences.
Tad M. Schmaltz
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327946
- eISBN:
- 9780199869961
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327946.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book is a systematic study of Descartes's theory of causation and its relation to the medieval and early modern scholastic philosophy that provides its proper historical context. The argument ...
More
This book is a systematic study of Descartes's theory of causation and its relation to the medieval and early modern scholastic philosophy that provides its proper historical context. The argument here is that even though Descartes offered a dualistic ontology that differs radically from what we find in scholasticism, his views on causation were profoundly influenced by scholastic thought on this issue. This influence is evident not only in his affirmation in the Meditations of the abstract scholastic axiom that a cause must contain the reality of its effects, but also in the details of the accounts of body‐body interactions in his physics, of mind‐body interaction in his psychology, and of the causation that he took to be involved in free human action. In contrast to those who have read Descartes as endorsing the “occasionalist” conclusion that God is the only real cause, a central thesis of this study is that he accepted what in the context of scholastic debates regarding causation is the antipode of occasionalism, namely, the view that creatures rather than God are the causal source of natural change. What emerges from the defense of this interpretation of Descartes is a new understanding of his contribution to modern thought on causation.Less
This book is a systematic study of Descartes's theory of causation and its relation to the medieval and early modern scholastic philosophy that provides its proper historical context. The argument here is that even though Descartes offered a dualistic ontology that differs radically from what we find in scholasticism, his views on causation were profoundly influenced by scholastic thought on this issue. This influence is evident not only in his affirmation in the Meditations of the abstract scholastic axiom that a cause must contain the reality of its effects, but also in the details of the accounts of body‐body interactions in his physics, of mind‐body interaction in his psychology, and of the causation that he took to be involved in free human action. In contrast to those who have read Descartes as endorsing the “occasionalist” conclusion that God is the only real cause, a central thesis of this study is that he accepted what in the context of scholastic debates regarding causation is the antipode of occasionalism, namely, the view that creatures rather than God are the causal source of natural change. What emerges from the defense of this interpretation of Descartes is a new understanding of his contribution to modern thought on causation.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. Occasionalism is the doctrine, held by a number of early modern Cartesian thinkers, that created ...
More
This book is a collection of essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. Occasionalism is the doctrine, held by a number of early modern Cartesian thinkers, that created substances are devoid of any true causal powers, and that God is the only real causal agent in the universe. All natural phenomena have God as their direct and immediate cause, with natural things and their states serving only as “occasions” for God to act. Rather than being merely an ad hoc, deus ex machina response to the mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes to his followers (especially Malebranche, Cordemoy, and La Forge), as it has often been portrayed in the past, occasionalism is in fact a full-blooded, complex, and philosophically interesting account of causal relations. These essays examine the philosophical, scientific, theological, and religious themes and arguments of occasionalism, as well as its roots in medieval views on God and causality.Less
This book is a collection of essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. Occasionalism is the doctrine, held by a number of early modern Cartesian thinkers, that created substances are devoid of any true causal powers, and that God is the only real causal agent in the universe. All natural phenomena have God as their direct and immediate cause, with natural things and their states serving only as “occasions” for God to act. Rather than being merely an ad hoc, deus ex machina response to the mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes to his followers (especially Malebranche, Cordemoy, and La Forge), as it has often been portrayed in the past, occasionalism is in fact a full-blooded, complex, and philosophically interesting account of causal relations. These essays examine the philosophical, scientific, theological, and religious themes and arguments of occasionalism, as well as its roots in medieval views on God and causality.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introduction is a summary of the themes of this book, which is a collection of previously published essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. In particular, these ...
More
This introduction is a summary of the themes of this book, which is a collection of previously published essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. In particular, these essays consider the various philosophical, theological, scientific, and historical aspects of occasionalism and the variations of that doctrine found among Cartesian philosophers.Less
This introduction is a summary of the themes of this book, which is a collection of previously published essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. In particular, these essays consider the various philosophical, theological, scientific, and historical aspects of occasionalism and the variations of that doctrine found among Cartesian philosophers.
Nicholas Jolley
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238195
- eISBN:
- 9780191597824
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238193.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of ...
More
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.Less
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.
Frank Griffel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331622
- eISBN:
- 9780199867998
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Islam
This chapter presents the two most important views about cosmology held by Muslims in the era of al-Ghazali. The first is the cosmology of the Ash’arite school of Muslim theology, which developed ...
More
This chapter presents the two most important views about cosmology held by Muslims in the era of al-Ghazali. The first is the cosmology of the Ash’arite school of Muslim theology, which developed earlier ideas of the Mu’tazilites into what has become knows as occasionalism. Its main components are the atomism of the earlier Mu’tazilites plus the idea that time is a leaped sequence of moments. The latter idea is sometimes called an “atomism of time.” In every moment, God rearranges all the atoms of this world and creates their accidents anew—thus creating a new world every moment that is not causally connected to the one in the moment before. The Muslim philosophers subscribed to a different cosmology where God is regarded as the first cause of all events in this work. Here, God does not act directly on all its creatures but only through the mediation of so-called secondary causes. Every cause is caused by another cause etc. until this chain ends in God, the first cause. The chapter shows how the usual view that these two cosmologies are diametrically opposed to one another cannot be maintained and that al-Juwayni, for instance, al-Ghazali’s teacher, already applies a cosmology where he applies elements of both systems.Less
This chapter presents the two most important views about cosmology held by Muslims in the era of al-Ghazali. The first is the cosmology of the Ash’arite school of Muslim theology, which developed earlier ideas of the Mu’tazilites into what has become knows as occasionalism. Its main components are the atomism of the earlier Mu’tazilites plus the idea that time is a leaped sequence of moments. The latter idea is sometimes called an “atomism of time.” In every moment, God rearranges all the atoms of this world and creates their accidents anew—thus creating a new world every moment that is not causally connected to the one in the moment before. The Muslim philosophers subscribed to a different cosmology where God is regarded as the first cause of all events in this work. Here, God does not act directly on all its creatures but only through the mediation of so-called secondary causes. Every cause is caused by another cause etc. until this chain ends in God, the first cause. The chapter shows how the usual view that these two cosmologies are diametrically opposed to one another cannot be maintained and that al-Juwayni, for instance, al-Ghazali’s teacher, already applies a cosmology where he applies elements of both systems.
Frank Griffel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331622
- eISBN:
- 9780199867998
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Islam
The seventeenth discussion in al-Ghazali Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa) has often been regarded as the locus classicus for an occasionalist critique of the concept of ...
More
The seventeenth discussion in al-Ghazali Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa) has often been regarded as the locus classicus for an occasionalist critique of the concept of causality. Most interpreters, however, disregarded the internal structure of this chapter and didn’t realize that al-Ghazali offers more than one solution for the question of whether what we consider a cause truly has an effect on what we consider an effect. For al-Ghazali, occasionalism is one possible explanation of what we witness with our senses. Yet secondary causality is also considered a possible explanation as long as it does not assume that any cause could stand on its own. All causes depend on other causes, which all go back to one single cause, namely God. This scenario is acceptable for al-Ghazali as long as the particular connection between cause and effect that we witness is not considered necessary. For al-Ghazali, “necessary” means that there would be no conceivable alternative state of affairs. His understanding of “necessary” is different from that of Avicenna. This chapter discusses their differences and comes to the conclusion that secondary causality is acceptable for al-Ghazali as long at it doesn’t imply that this particular world is a necessary creation of God. For al-Ghazali, this world with all its connections between causes and effects God’s contingent creation. God has chosen this world among alternatives. For al-Ghazali these alternatives worlds are conceivable in our mind.Less
The seventeenth discussion in al-Ghazali Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa) has often been regarded as the locus classicus for an occasionalist critique of the concept of causality. Most interpreters, however, disregarded the internal structure of this chapter and didn’t realize that al-Ghazali offers more than one solution for the question of whether what we consider a cause truly has an effect on what we consider an effect. For al-Ghazali, occasionalism is one possible explanation of what we witness with our senses. Yet secondary causality is also considered a possible explanation as long as it does not assume that any cause could stand on its own. All causes depend on other causes, which all go back to one single cause, namely God. This scenario is acceptable for al-Ghazali as long as the particular connection between cause and effect that we witness is not considered necessary. For al-Ghazali, “necessary” means that there would be no conceivable alternative state of affairs. His understanding of “necessary” is different from that of Avicenna. This chapter discusses their differences and comes to the conclusion that secondary causality is acceptable for al-Ghazali as long at it doesn’t imply that this particular world is a necessary creation of God. For al-Ghazali, this world with all its connections between causes and effects God’s contingent creation. God has chosen this world among alternatives. For al-Ghazali these alternatives worlds are conceivable in our mind.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological ...
More
This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological issues and controversies that were of considerable interest and importance for Hume and his contemporaries. Not only does Hume present a skeptical challenge to the fundamental theological doctrines of omnipotence and Creation, he also suggests a comprehensive, integrated naturalism in respect of the causal relations governing matter and thought—doing away with the suggestion that spiritual agents are the only possible source of real activity in the world. In pursuing these various irreligious themes Hume is following a tradition and pattern of “atheistic” thought that was readily identified by his own contemporaries. These specific lines of argument are entirely consistent with the wider irreligious program that Hume pursues throughout the Treatise as a whole.Less
This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological issues and controversies that were of considerable interest and importance for Hume and his contemporaries. Not only does Hume present a skeptical challenge to the fundamental theological doctrines of omnipotence and Creation, he also suggests a comprehensive, integrated naturalism in respect of the causal relations governing matter and thought—doing away with the suggestion that spiritual agents are the only possible source of real activity in the world. In pursuing these various irreligious themes Hume is following a tradition and pattern of “atheistic” thought that was readily identified by his own contemporaries. These specific lines of argument are entirely consistent with the wider irreligious program that Hume pursues throughout the Treatise as a whole.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199532186
- eISBN:
- 9780191714580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532186.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The chapter begins by offering an explanation of why Calvin chose in the 1559 Institutes to treat the doctrines of providence and predestination separately when they had not been considered ...
More
The chapter begins by offering an explanation of why Calvin chose in the 1559 Institutes to treat the doctrines of providence and predestination separately when they had not been considered separately before then. It is argued this was probably because of the confusion that had arisen between the two in his debate with Pighius. The chapter then considers the views of Thomas Aquinas on providence and predestination, followed by Calvin; it looks at the one place in the Institutes where Calvin critically considers Thomas's views on predestination. Finally, consideration is given to the views of the Puritan John Arrowsmith on providence, which follow Calvin's views closely, though the presentation is more scholastic. The chapter ends by asking why it is that in Puritanism the doctrine of providence was considered in a way that takes no account of either the issue of occasionalism or the beginnings of ‘physico‐theology’.Less
The chapter begins by offering an explanation of why Calvin chose in the 1559 Institutes to treat the doctrines of providence and predestination separately when they had not been considered separately before then. It is argued this was probably because of the confusion that had arisen between the two in his debate with Pighius. The chapter then considers the views of Thomas Aquinas on providence and predestination, followed by Calvin; it looks at the one place in the Institutes where Calvin critically considers Thomas's views on predestination. Finally, consideration is given to the views of the Puritan John Arrowsmith on providence, which follow Calvin's views closely, though the presentation is more scholastic. The chapter ends by asking why it is that in Puritanism the doctrine of providence was considered in a way that takes no account of either the issue of occasionalism or the beginnings of ‘physico‐theology’.
Oliver D. Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199755295
- eISBN:
- 9780199979486
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755295.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is widely regarded as a philosopher and theologian of the first rank, sometimes even as “America's Theologian.” This study offers a major revisionist account of his views ...
More
Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is widely regarded as a philosopher and theologian of the first rank, sometimes even as “America's Theologian.” This study offers a major revisionist account of his views on the relationship between God and creation, and a fresh analysis of other central issues in Edwardsian philosophical theology, such as the divine nature and attributes, the doctrine of the Trinity, and eschatology. A number of recent Edwards scholars have argued that he reconceived the doctrine of God and creation along dispositional lines—God and the world being dispositions, not substances with attributes. By contrast, this work argues that Edwards was very much a Reformed theologian standing in the tradition of scholastic and Puritan theology. He did not think of his work as a break with this tradition. Instead, he sought to revision Calvinistic theology for an early modern audience using ideas culled from philosophers like Locke, Malebranche, Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists. Ironically, he ended up with a much more exotic picture of the God-world relation than many other Reformed divines. This included his commitment to continuous creationism, occasionalism, an idiosyncratic doctrine of the Trinity that is inconsistent with divine simplicity, panentheism, and a doctrine of theosis. The upshot of this is an interpretation of Edwards's thought that does justice to his theological conservatism while also explaining how he ended up embracing novel, even unusual metaphysical views.Less
Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is widely regarded as a philosopher and theologian of the first rank, sometimes even as “America's Theologian.” This study offers a major revisionist account of his views on the relationship between God and creation, and a fresh analysis of other central issues in Edwardsian philosophical theology, such as the divine nature and attributes, the doctrine of the Trinity, and eschatology. A number of recent Edwards scholars have argued that he reconceived the doctrine of God and creation along dispositional lines—God and the world being dispositions, not substances with attributes. By contrast, this work argues that Edwards was very much a Reformed theologian standing in the tradition of scholastic and Puritan theology. He did not think of his work as a break with this tradition. Instead, he sought to revision Calvinistic theology for an early modern audience using ideas culled from philosophers like Locke, Malebranche, Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists. Ironically, he ended up with a much more exotic picture of the God-world relation than many other Reformed divines. This included his commitment to continuous creationism, occasionalism, an idiosyncratic doctrine of the Trinity that is inconsistent with divine simplicity, panentheism, and a doctrine of theosis. The upshot of this is an interpretation of Edwards's thought that does justice to his theological conservatism while also explaining how he ended up embracing novel, even unusual metaphysical views.
Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588374
- eISBN:
- 9780191741487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter introduces and defines the approach of semantic minimalism and contrasts it with the opposing approaches of indexicalism, contextualism, semantic relativism, and occasionalism. It argues ...
More
This chapter introduces and defines the approach of semantic minimalism and contrasts it with the opposing approaches of indexicalism, contextualism, semantic relativism, and occasionalism. It argues that if a theorist decides to move to one of these opposing positions on the grounds of what are known as ‘context-shifting arguments’ then they will ultimately be unable to resist a slide into a full-blown use-based approach to meaning (embodied here by Charles Travis’ occasionalism). For, if one takes the phenomenon thrown up by context-shifting arguments to be semantically relevant, then, it is argued, the middle-ground positions of indexicalism, contextualism and relativism turn out to be theoretically unstableLess
This chapter introduces and defines the approach of semantic minimalism and contrasts it with the opposing approaches of indexicalism, contextualism, semantic relativism, and occasionalism. It argues that if a theorist decides to move to one of these opposing positions on the grounds of what are known as ‘context-shifting arguments’ then they will ultimately be unable to resist a slide into a full-blown use-based approach to meaning (embodied here by Charles Travis’ occasionalism). For, if one takes the phenomenon thrown up by context-shifting arguments to be semantically relevant, then, it is argued, the middle-ground positions of indexicalism, contextualism and relativism turn out to be theoretically unstable
Tad M. schmaltz
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327946
- eISBN:
- 9780199869961
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327946.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter considers the medieval and scholastic context of Descartes's theory of causation. It starts with a brief account of the origins of occasionalism in medieval Islamic theology, and then ...
More
This chapter considers the medieval and scholastic context of Descartes's theory of causation. It starts with a brief account of the origins of occasionalism in medieval Islamic theology, and then turns to two different alternatives to occasionalism in the later medieval period, namely, the “concurrentism” of Thomas Aquinas, according to which God “concurs” in the action of secondary causes, and the “mere conservationism” of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, according to which God merely creates and conserves secondary causes that act on their own. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the metaphysical framework for efficient causality in the work of the early modern scholastic Francisco Suárez that prepares the way for a transition from a more traditional Aristotelian view of causality to what we find in Descartes.Less
This chapter considers the medieval and scholastic context of Descartes's theory of causation. It starts with a brief account of the origins of occasionalism in medieval Islamic theology, and then turns to two different alternatives to occasionalism in the later medieval period, namely, the “concurrentism” of Thomas Aquinas, according to which God “concurs” in the action of secondary causes, and the “mere conservationism” of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, according to which God merely creates and conserves secondary causes that act on their own. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the metaphysical framework for efficient causality in the work of the early modern scholastic Francisco Suárez that prepares the way for a transition from a more traditional Aristotelian view of causality to what we find in Descartes.
Tad M. Schmaltz
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327946
- eISBN:
- 9780199869961
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327946.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter concerns the treatment in Descartes's physics of body-body interaction. There is an extended argument against an occasionalist reading of his physics, on which God is the only real cause ...
More
This chapter concerns the treatment in Descartes's physics of body-body interaction. There is an extended argument against an occasionalist reading of his physics, on which God is the only real cause of changes in motion due to collision. The alternative view here is that Descartes offers a “conservationist” physics on which God's contribution to such changes is restricted to a “concursus” that consists simply in the continued creation of a constant total quantity of motion. Local changes in that motion are to be explained by appeal not to this concursus but rather to the features of bodies that correspond to the “forces” that Descartes posits in his physics.Less
This chapter concerns the treatment in Descartes's physics of body-body interaction. There is an extended argument against an occasionalist reading of his physics, on which God is the only real cause of changes in motion due to collision. The alternative view here is that Descartes offers a “conservationist” physics on which God's contribution to such changes is restricted to a “concursus” that consists simply in the continued creation of a constant total quantity of motion. Local changes in that motion are to be explained by appeal not to this concursus but rather to the features of bodies that correspond to the “forces” that Descartes posits in his physics.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It has been claimed that Descartes is an occasionalist with respect to body-mind causation, in addition to body-body causal relations. It is important, however, to distinguish the doctrine of ...
More
It has been claimed that Descartes is an occasionalist with respect to body-mind causation, in addition to body-body causal relations. It is important, however, to distinguish the doctrine of occasionalism, which involves constant divine causal activity, from the more general model of occasional causation, of which occasionalism is only a species. Such a distinction provides a more accurate picture of Descartes’s causal theory.Less
It has been claimed that Descartes is an occasionalist with respect to body-mind causation, in addition to body-body causal relations. It is important, however, to distinguish the doctrine of occasionalism, which involves constant divine causal activity, from the more general model of occasional causation, of which occasionalism is only a species. Such a distinction provides a more accurate picture of Descartes’s causal theory.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first ...
More
This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first offered by Arnauld in his correspondence with Leibniz, according to which Malebranche’s God acts by way of volitions with general content (or laws), this chapter argues that Malebranche’s God acts constantly and ubiquitously in nature by way of volitions with particular contents, although these volitions are always in accordance with general laws of nature.Less
This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first offered by Arnauld in his correspondence with Leibniz, according to which Malebranche’s God acts by way of volitions with general content (or laws), this chapter argues that Malebranche’s God acts constantly and ubiquitously in nature by way of volitions with particular contents, although these volitions are always in accordance with general laws of nature.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Some occasionalists argue that there is an epistemic or cognitive condition for causality, whereby in order to count as the cause of an effect one must know how to bring that effect about. Finite ...
More
Some occasionalists argue that there is an epistemic or cognitive condition for causality, whereby in order to count as the cause of an effect one must know how to bring that effect about. Finite minds do not have the knowledge necessary to move bodies, the argument runs; only God, as an omniscient mind, can adequately fulfill this condition. This unusual epistemic condition for causal power appears primarily in the arguments of Malebranche and Geulincx, which are examined in this chapter.Less
Some occasionalists argue that there is an epistemic or cognitive condition for causality, whereby in order to count as the cause of an effect one must know how to bring that effect about. Finite minds do not have the knowledge necessary to move bodies, the argument runs; only God, as an omniscient mind, can adequately fulfill this condition. This unusual epistemic condition for causal power appears primarily in the arguments of Malebranche and Geulincx, which are examined in this chapter.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is an examination of the nature and extent of Arnauld’s commitment to occasionalism. It is argued that the Cartesian Arnauld, while not a thoroughgoing occasionalist, nonetheless used ...
More
This chapter is an examination of the nature and extent of Arnauld’s commitment to occasionalism. It is argued that the Cartesian Arnauld, while not a thoroughgoing occasionalist, nonetheless used the doctrine to suit his purposes, particularly to address causal problems in the domain of mind-body relations with which he felt Descartes had not adequately dealt.Less
This chapter is an examination of the nature and extent of Arnauld’s commitment to occasionalism. It is argued that the Cartesian Arnauld, while not a thoroughgoing occasionalist, nonetheless used the doctrine to suit his purposes, particularly to address causal problems in the domain of mind-body relations with which he felt Descartes had not adequately dealt.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There seems to be some disagreement over the extent of La Forge’s commitment to occasionalism. This chapter considers La Forge’s arguments with respect to body-body relations, mind-body relations, ...
More
There seems to be some disagreement over the extent of La Forge’s commitment to occasionalism. This chapter considers La Forge’s arguments with respect to body-body relations, mind-body relations, and mental events alone, and concludes that La Forge’s occasionalism was only partial, since he allowed for real causal powers in the mind.Less
There seems to be some disagreement over the extent of La Forge’s commitment to occasionalism. This chapter considers La Forge’s arguments with respect to body-body relations, mind-body relations, and mental events alone, and concludes that La Forge’s occasionalism was only partial, since he allowed for real causal powers in the mind.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers some implications of an important argument for occasionalism used by La Forge (and Malebranche). If God, as La Forge’s “continuous creation” arguments runs, is required to ...
More
This chapter considers some implications of an important argument for occasionalism used by La Forge (and Malebranche). If God, as La Forge’s “continuous creation” arguments runs, is required to continually sustain finite substances in existence, and if this sustenance must extend to the modes or properties of such substances, then it would seem to follow that La Forge is no more entitled to attribute real causal powers to the mind than to the body. The conclusion is that the use of this argument commits a philosopher to a more thorough going occasionalism than he may initially intend.Less
This chapter considers some implications of an important argument for occasionalism used by La Forge (and Malebranche). If God, as La Forge’s “continuous creation” arguments runs, is required to continually sustain finite substances in existence, and if this sustenance must extend to the modes or properties of such substances, then it would seem to follow that La Forge is no more entitled to attribute real causal powers to the mind than to the body. The conclusion is that the use of this argument commits a philosopher to a more thorough going occasionalism than he may initially intend.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter looks at the nature and extent of Cordemoy's commitment to occasionalism. It examines the particular arguments that Cordemoy uses in support of the doctrine, and clarifies the unique way ...
More
This chapter looks at the nature and extent of Cordemoy's commitment to occasionalism. It examines the particular arguments that Cordemoy uses in support of the doctrine, and clarifies the unique way in which he, unlike other occasionalists, supports the claim that God is the true cause of the motion of bodies.Less
This chapter looks at the nature and extent of Cordemoy's commitment to occasionalism. It examines the particular arguments that Cordemoy uses in support of the doctrine, and clarifies the unique way in which he, unlike other occasionalists, supports the claim that God is the true cause of the motion of bodies.
