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This introduction is a summary of the themes of this book, which is a collection of previously published essays on the problem of causation in seventeenth-century philosophy. In particular, these essays consider the various philosophical, theological, scientific, and historical aspects of occasionalism and the variations of that doctrine found among Cartesian philosophers.

This chapter presents the two most important views about cosmology held by Muslims in the era of al-Ghazali. The first is the cosmology of the Ash’arite school of Muslim theology, which developed earlier ideas of the Mu’tazilites into what has become knows as occasionalism. Its main components are the atomism of the earlier Mu’tazilites plus the idea that time is a leaped sequence of moments. The latter idea is sometimes called an “atomism of time.” In every moment, God rearranges all the atoms of this world and creates their accidents anew—thus creating a new world every moment that is not causally connected to the one in the moment before. The Muslim philosophers subscribed to a different cosmology where God is regarded as the first cause of all events in this work. Here, God does not act directly on all its creatures but only through the mediation of so-called secondary causes. Every cause is caused by another cause etc. until this chain ends in God, the first cause. The chapter shows how the usual view that these two cosmologies are diametrically opposed to one another cannot be maintained and that al-Juwayni, for instance, al-Ghazali’s teacher, already applies a cosmology where he applies elements of both systems.

The seventeenth discussion in al-Ghazali Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa) has often been regarded as the locus classicus for an occasionalist critique of the concept of causality. Most interpreters, however, disregarded the internal structure of this chapter and didn’t realize that al-Ghazali offers more than one solution for the question of whether what we consider a cause truly has an effect on what we consider an effect. For al-Ghazali, occasionalism is one possible explanation of what we witness with our senses. Yet secondary causality is also considered a possible explanation as long as it does not assume that any cause could stand on its own. All causes depend on other causes, which all go back to one single cause, namely God. This scenario is acceptable for al-Ghazali as long as the particular connection between cause and effect that we witness is not considered necessary. For al-Ghazali, “necessary” means that there would be no conceivable alternative state of affairs. His understanding of “necessary” is different from that of Avicenna. This chapter discusses their differences and comes to the conclusion that secondary causality is acceptable for al-Ghazali as long at it doesn’t imply that this particular world is a necessary creation of God. For al-Ghazali, this world with all its connections between causes and effects God’s contingent creation. God has chosen this world among alternatives. For al-Ghazali these alternatives worlds are conceivable in our mind.

This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological issues and controversies that were of considerable interest and importance for Hume and his contemporaries. Not only does Hume present a skeptical challenge to the fundamental theological doctrines of omnipotence and Creation, he also suggests a comprehensive, integrated naturalism in respect of the causal relations governing matter and thought—doing away with the suggestion that spiritual agents are the only possible source of real activity in the world. In pursuing these various irreligious themes Hume is following a tradition and pattern of “atheistic” thought that was readily identified by his own contemporaries. These specific lines of argument are entirely consistent with the wider irreligious program that Hume pursues throughout the Treatise as a whole.

The chapter begins by offering an explanation of why Calvin chose in the 1559 Institutes to treat the doctrines of providence and predestination separately when they had not been considered separately before then. It is argued this was probably because of the confusion that had arisen between the two in his debate with Pighius. The chapter then considers the views of Thomas Aquinas on providence and predestination, followed by Calvin; it looks at the one place in the Institutes where Calvin critically considers Thomas's views on predestination. Finally, consideration is given to the views of the Puritan John Arrowsmith on providence, which follow Calvin's views closely, though the presentation is more scholastic. The chapter ends by asking why it is that in Puritanism the doctrine of providence was considered in a way that takes no account of either the issue of occasionalism or the beginnings of ‘physico‐theology’.

This chapter introduces and defines the approach of semantic minimalism and contrasts it with the opposing approaches of indexicalism, contextualism, semantic relativism, and occasionalism. It argues that if a theorist decides to move to one of these opposing positions on the grounds of what are known as ‘context-shifting arguments’ then they will ultimately be unable to resist a slide into a full-blown use-based approach to meaning (embodied here by Charles Travis’ occasionalism). For, if one takes the phenomenon thrown up by context-shifting arguments to be semantically relevant, then, it is argued, the middle-ground positions of indexicalism, contextualism and relativism turn out to be theoretically unstable

This chapter considers the medieval and scholastic context of Descartes's theory of causation. It starts with a brief account of the origins of occasionalism in medieval Islamic theology, and then turns to two different alternatives to occasionalism in the later medieval period, namely, the “concurrentism” of Thomas Aquinas, according to which God “concurs” in the action of secondary causes, and the “mere conservationism” of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, according to which God merely creates and conserves secondary causes that act on their own. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the metaphysical framework for efficient causality in the work of the early modern scholastic Francisco Suárez that prepares the way for a transition from a more traditional Aristotelian view of causality to what we find in Descartes.

This chapter concerns the treatment in Descartes's physics of body-body interaction. There is an extended argument against an occasionalist reading of his physics, on which God is the only real cause of changes in motion due to collision. The alternative view here is that Descartes offers a “conservationist” physics on which God's contribution to such changes is restricted to a “concursus” that consists simply in the continued creation of a constant total quantity of motion. Local changes in that motion are to be explained by appeal not to this concursus but rather to the features of bodies that correspond to the “forces” that Descartes posits in his physics.

It has been claimed that Descartes is an occasionalist with respect to body-mind causation, in addition to body-body causal relations. It is important, however, to distinguish the doctrine of occasionalism, which involves constant divine causal activity, from the more general model of occasional causation, of which occasionalism is only a species. Such a distinction provides a more accurate picture of Descartes’s causal theory.

This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first offered by Arnauld in his correspondence with Leibniz, according to which Malebranche’s God acts by way of volitions with general content (or laws), this chapter argues that Malebranche’s God acts constantly and ubiquitously in nature by way of volitions with particular contents, although these volitions are always in accordance with general laws of nature.

Some occasionalists argue that there is an epistemic or cognitive condition for causality, whereby in order to count as the cause of an effect one must know how to bring that effect about. Finite minds do not have the knowledge necessary to move bodies, the argument runs; only God, as an omniscient mind, can adequately fulfill this condition. This unusual epistemic condition for causal power appears primarily in the arguments of Malebranche and Geulincx, which are examined in this chapter.

This chapter is an examination of the nature and extent of Arnauld’s commitment to occasionalism. It is argued that the Cartesian Arnauld, while not a thoroughgoing occasionalist, nonetheless used the doctrine to suit his purposes, particularly to address causal problems in the domain of mind-body relations with which he felt Descartes had not adequately dealt.

There seems to be some disagreement over the extent of La Forge’s commitment to occasionalism. This chapter considers La Forge’s arguments with respect to body-body relations, mind-body relations, and mental events alone, and concludes that La Forge’s occasionalism was only partial, since he allowed for real causal powers in the mind.

This chapter considers some implications of an important argument for occasionalism used by La Forge (and Malebranche). If God, as La Forge’s “continuous creation” arguments runs, is required to continually sustain finite substances in existence, and if this sustenance must extend to the modes or properties of such substances, then it would seem to follow that La Forge is no more entitled to attribute real causal powers to the mind than to the body. The conclusion is that the use of this argument commits a philosopher to a more thorough going occasionalism than he may initially intend.

This chapter looks at the nature and extent of Cordemoy's commitment to occasionalism. It examines the particular arguments that Cordemoy uses in support of the doctrine, and clarifies the unique way in which he, unlike other occasionalists, supports the claim that God is the true cause of the motion of bodies.