Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate ...
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The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.Less
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176421
- eISBN:
- 9780199872008
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or ...
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Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.Less
Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.
Leon Ehrenpreis
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198509783
- eISBN:
- 9780191709166
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509783.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Mathematical Physics
Radon showed how to write arbitrary functions in Rn in terms of the characteristic functions (delta functions) of hyperplanes. This idea leads to various generalizations. For example, R can be ...
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Radon showed how to write arbitrary functions in Rn in terms of the characteristic functions (delta functions) of hyperplanes. This idea leads to various generalizations. For example, R can be replaced by a more general group and “plane” can be replaced by other types of geometric objects. All this is for the “nonparametric” Radon transform. For the parametric Radon transform, this book parametrizes the points of the geometric objects, leading to differential equations in the parameters because the Radon transform is overdetermined. Such equations were first studied by F. John. This book elaborates on them and puts them in a general framework.Less
Radon showed how to write arbitrary functions in Rn in terms of the characteristic functions (delta functions) of hyperplanes. This idea leads to various generalizations. For example, R can be replaced by a more general group and “plane” can be replaced by other types of geometric objects. All this is for the “nonparametric” Radon transform. For the parametric Radon transform, this book parametrizes the points of the geometric objects, leading to differential equations in the parameters because the Radon transform is overdetermined. Such equations were first studied by F. John. This book elaborates on them and puts them in a general framework.
Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199275984
- eISBN:
- 9780191602214
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019927598X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated ...
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This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated values models and multi-object auction models are described. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived and the optimal auction is characterized to relate the field of mechanism design to auction theory.Less
This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated values models and multi-object auction models are described. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived and the optimal auction is characterized to relate the field of mechanism design to auction theory.
Stephen Handel
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195169645
- eISBN:
- 9780199786732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195169645.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Auditory and visual perception is the construction of meaningful objects in the world. Auditory and visual information is substitutable and tradable, and both exist in a common space/time framework. ...
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Auditory and visual perception is the construction of meaningful objects in the world. Auditory and visual information is substitutable and tradable, and both exist in a common space/time framework. However, the construction of objects is not simply based on local regions or temporal segments, but involves contextual information from cells that encode adjacent temporal segments or distant retinal points.Less
Auditory and visual perception is the construction of meaningful objects in the world. Auditory and visual information is substitutable and tradable, and both exist in a common space/time framework. However, the construction of objects is not simply based on local regions or temporal segments, but involves contextual information from cells that encode adjacent temporal segments or distant retinal points.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199262540
- eISBN:
- 9780191602672
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199262543.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Towards Non-Being presents an account of the semantics of intentional verbs such as ‘believes’, ‘fears’, ‘seeks’, and ‘imagines’. It tackles problems concerning intentional states which ...
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Towards Non-Being presents an account of the semantics of intentional verbs such as ‘believes’, ‘fears’, ‘seeks’, and ‘imagines’. It tackles problems concerning intentional states which are often brushed under the carpet, such as their failure to be closed under deducibility. Drawing on the noneist work of the late Richard Routley (Sylvan), the book proceeds in terms of objects that may be existent or non-existent, at worlds that may either be possible or impossible. Since Russell, non-existent objects have had a bad press in Western philosophy. The book mounts a full-scale defence, and in the process, offers an account of both fictional and mathematical objects as non-existent.Less
Towards Non-Being presents an account of the semantics of intentional verbs such as ‘believes’, ‘fears’, ‘seeks’, and ‘imagines’. It tackles problems concerning intentional states which are often brushed under the carpet, such as their failure to be closed under deducibility. Drawing on the noneist work of the late Richard Routley (Sylvan), the book proceeds in terms of objects that may be existent or non-existent, at worlds that may either be possible or impossible. Since Russell, non-existent objects have had a bad press in Western philosophy. The book mounts a full-scale defence, and in the process, offers an account of both fictional and mathematical objects as non-existent.
José L. Zalabardo (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691524
- eISBN:
- 9780191742262
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book collects nine previously unpublished works on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work. They cover a wide range of aspects of Wittgenstein's early ...
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This book collects nine previously unpublished works on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work. They cover a wide range of aspects of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but they can be broadly clustered as focusing on three areas: the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of representation and Russell's theories of judgment, the role of objects in the tractarian system and Wittgenstein's philosophical method.Less
This book collects nine previously unpublished works on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work. They cover a wide range of aspects of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but they can be broadly clustered as focusing on three areas: the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of representation and Russell's theories of judgment, the role of objects in the tractarian system and Wittgenstein's philosophical method.
C. B. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234103
- eISBN:
- 9780191715570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234103.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter attempts to establish ontologically some of what Einstein established in physics. Einstein was himself driven by ontological forms of argument. Seeing what might have been underneath and ...
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This chapter attempts to establish ontologically some of what Einstein established in physics. Einstein was himself driven by ontological forms of argument. Seeing what might have been underneath and behind some of Einstein's most basic thoughts should teach us something valuable. It presents a model that is not limited to particle-objects-in-space-time; it also fits well for explanations in terms of warps and woofs of space-time as infinitesimal energy-loops or superstrings. It is argued that space-time has properties, yet it is not itself had as a property or even a set of properties, and it could not exist without properties. A propertied space-time is a one-object universe and space-time satisfies the correct definitions of ‘substratum’.Less
This chapter attempts to establish ontologically some of what Einstein established in physics. Einstein was himself driven by ontological forms of argument. Seeing what might have been underneath and behind some of Einstein's most basic thoughts should teach us something valuable. It presents a model that is not limited to particle-objects-in-space-time; it also fits well for explanations in terms of warps and woofs of space-time as infinitesimal energy-loops or superstrings. It is argued that space-time has properties, yet it is not itself had as a property or even a set of properties, and it could not exist without properties. A propertied space-time is a one-object universe and space-time satisfies the correct definitions of ‘substratum’.
Edmund T. Rolls
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199232703
- eISBN:
- 9780191724046
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232703.001.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
This book presents a unified approach to understanding memory, attention, and decision-making. It shows how these fundamental functions for cognitive neuroscience can be understood in a common and ...
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This book presents a unified approach to understanding memory, attention, and decision-making. It shows how these fundamental functions for cognitive neuroscience can be understood in a common and unifying computational neuroscience framework. This framework links empirical research on brain function from neurophysiology, functional neuroimaging, and the effects of brain damage, to a description of how neural networks in the brain implement these functions using a set of common principles. The book describes the principles of operation of these networks, and how they could implement such important functions as memory, attention, and decision-making. The book discusses the hippocampus and memory, reward- and punishment-related learning, emotion and motivation, invariant visual object recognition learning, short-term memory, attention, biased competition, probabilistic decision-making, action selection, and decision-making.Less
This book presents a unified approach to understanding memory, attention, and decision-making. It shows how these fundamental functions for cognitive neuroscience can be understood in a common and unifying computational neuroscience framework. This framework links empirical research on brain function from neurophysiology, functional neuroimaging, and the effects of brain damage, to a description of how neural networks in the brain implement these functions using a set of common principles. The book describes the principles of operation of these networks, and how they could implement such important functions as memory, attention, and decision-making. The book discusses the hippocampus and memory, reward- and punishment-related learning, emotion and motivation, invariant visual object recognition learning, short-term memory, attention, biased competition, probabilistic decision-making, action selection, and decision-making.
Paul Guyer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199273461
- eISBN:
- 9780191706196
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of ...
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The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.Less
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.
Johanna Malt
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199253425
- eISBN:
- 9780191698132
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253425.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
In a speech given in Prague in 1935, André Breton asked, ‘Is there, properly speaking, a left-wing art capable of defending itself?’. But despite his conviction that surrealism did indeed offer such ...
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In a speech given in Prague in 1935, André Breton asked, ‘Is there, properly speaking, a left-wing art capable of defending itself?’. But despite his conviction that surrealism did indeed offer such an art, Breton always struggled to make a theoretical connection between the surrealists' commitment to the cause of revolutionary socialism and the form that surrealist art and literature took. This book explores ways in which such a connection might be drawn, addressing the possibility of surrealist works as political in themselves and drawing on ways in which they have been considered as such by Marxists such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. Encompassing Breton's and Louis Aragon's textual accounts of the object, as well as paintings and the various kinds of objet surréaliste produced from the end of the 1920s, it mobilises the concept of the fetish in order to consider such works as meeting points of surrealism's psychoanalytic and revolutionary preoccupations. Reading surrealist works of art and literature as political is not the same as knowing the surrealist movement to have been politically motivated. The revolutionary character of surrealist work is not always evident; indeed, the works themselves often seem to express a rather different set of concerns. As well as offering a new perspective on familiar and relatively neglected works, this book recuperates the gap between theory and practice as a productive space in which it is possible to recontextualise surrealist practice as an engagement with political questions on its own terms.Less
In a speech given in Prague in 1935, André Breton asked, ‘Is there, properly speaking, a left-wing art capable of defending itself?’. But despite his conviction that surrealism did indeed offer such an art, Breton always struggled to make a theoretical connection between the surrealists' commitment to the cause of revolutionary socialism and the form that surrealist art and literature took. This book explores ways in which such a connection might be drawn, addressing the possibility of surrealist works as political in themselves and drawing on ways in which they have been considered as such by Marxists such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. Encompassing Breton's and Louis Aragon's textual accounts of the object, as well as paintings and the various kinds of objet surréaliste produced from the end of the 1920s, it mobilises the concept of the fetish in order to consider such works as meeting points of surrealism's psychoanalytic and revolutionary preoccupations. Reading surrealist works of art and literature as political is not the same as knowing the surrealist movement to have been politically motivated. The revolutionary character of surrealist work is not always evident; indeed, the works themselves often seem to express a rather different set of concerns. As well as offering a new perspective on familiar and relatively neglected works, this book recuperates the gap between theory and practice as a productive space in which it is possible to recontextualise surrealist practice as an engagement with political questions on its own terms.
Michael I. Posner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199791217
- eISBN:
- 9780199932207
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199791217.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology
The study of attention is central to psychology. This book presents the science of attention in a larger social context, which includes our ability voluntarily to choose and act upon an object of ...
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The study of attention is central to psychology. This book presents the science of attention in a larger social context, which includes our ability voluntarily to choose and act upon an object of thought. The volume is based on fifty years of research involving behavioral, imaging, developmental, and genetic methods. It describes three brain networks of attention that carry out the functions of obtaining and maintaining the alert state, orienting to sensory events, and regulating responses. The book ties these brain networks to anatomy, connectivity, development, and socialization, and includes material on pathologies that involve attentional networks as well as their role in education and social interaction.Less
The study of attention is central to psychology. This book presents the science of attention in a larger social context, which includes our ability voluntarily to choose and act upon an object of thought. The volume is based on fifty years of research involving behavioral, imaging, developmental, and genetic methods. It describes three brain networks of attention that carry out the functions of obtaining and maintaining the alert state, orienting to sensory events, and regulating responses. The book ties these brain networks to anatomy, connectivity, development, and socialization, and includes material on pathologies that involve attentional networks as well as their role in education and social interaction.
Nigel Daw
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199751617
- eISBN:
- 9780199932375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751617.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology
The human visual system consists of a system for inspecting objects, starting with the fovea in the retina, and a system for noticing which objects should be inspected, and directing the eyes to look ...
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The human visual system consists of a system for inspecting objects, starting with the fovea in the retina, and a system for noticing which objects should be inspected, and directing the eyes to look at them. In daylight, the cones are the photoreceptors used, with three types, leading to trichromatic color vision. At night, the rods are active. As the eyes move, the world appears to be stationary, which is accomplished by noticing and carrying forward a limited number of objects from one snapshot to the next. Most aspects of vision are relative—the brightness, color, motion, and depth of an object are all seen relative to the background. Finally, absence of activity in the neurons of the visual system is interpreted as continuity with the rest of the scene, so that lesions in the brain may simply not be noticed.Less
The human visual system consists of a system for inspecting objects, starting with the fovea in the retina, and a system for noticing which objects should be inspected, and directing the eyes to look at them. In daylight, the cones are the photoreceptors used, with three types, leading to trichromatic color vision. At night, the rods are active. As the eyes move, the world appears to be stationary, which is accomplished by noticing and carrying forward a limited number of objects from one snapshot to the next. Most aspects of vision are relative—the brightness, color, motion, and depth of an object are all seen relative to the background. Finally, absence of activity in the neurons of the visual system is interpreted as continuity with the rest of the scene, so that lesions in the brain may simply not be noticed.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time ...
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The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.Less
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so ...
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The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.Less
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.
Alex Kirlik
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199765140
- eISBN:
- 9780199863358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199765140.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Human-Technology Interaction
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the human-technology interaction (HTI) approach. It then explains the rationale behind the compilation of HTI research articles in this ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the human-technology interaction (HTI) approach. It then explains the rationale behind the compilation of HTI research articles in this volume. A recurring theme across these articles was a desire to not merely inform, but to reform. One can read the pieces collected here simultaneously as an extended complaint and, more importantly, a set of recommendations—or at least object lessons—for how HTI research ought to broaden both its perspective and its practical, even moral, aspirations.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the human-technology interaction (HTI) approach. It then explains the rationale behind the compilation of HTI research articles in this volume. A recurring theme across these articles was a desire to not merely inform, but to reform. One can read the pieces collected here simultaneously as an extended complaint and, more importantly, a set of recommendations—or at least object lessons—for how HTI research ought to broaden both its perspective and its practical, even moral, aspirations.
Dan Xu
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199297566
- eISBN:
- 9780191711299
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297566.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Historical Linguistics, Phonetics / Phonology
This new interpretation of the early history of Chinese argues that Old Chinese was typologically a ‘mixed’ language. It shows that, though its dominant word order was subject-verb-object, this ...
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This new interpretation of the early history of Chinese argues that Old Chinese was typologically a ‘mixed’ language. It shows that, though its dominant word order was subject-verb-object, this coexisted with subject-object-verb. This book demonstrates that Old Chinese was not the analytic language it has usually been assumed to be, and that it employed morphological and lexical devices as well as syntactic means. The book describes the typological changes that have taken place since the Han period and shows how Chinese evolved into a more analytic language, supporting this exposition with abundant examples. The book draws where possible on archaeological findings in order to distinguish between versions of texts transmitted and sometimes modified through the hands of generations of copyists. The book focuses on syntactic issues, including word order, verbs, causative structures, resultative compounds, and negation, but also pays close attention to what the book demonstrates are closely related changes in phonology and the writing system.Less
This new interpretation of the early history of Chinese argues that Old Chinese was typologically a ‘mixed’ language. It shows that, though its dominant word order was subject-verb-object, this coexisted with subject-object-verb. This book demonstrates that Old Chinese was not the analytic language it has usually been assumed to be, and that it employed morphological and lexical devices as well as syntactic means. The book describes the typological changes that have taken place since the Han period and shows how Chinese evolved into a more analytic language, supporting this exposition with abundant examples. The book draws where possible on archaeological findings in order to distinguish between versions of texts transmitted and sometimes modified through the hands of generations of copyists. The book focuses on syntactic issues, including word order, verbs, causative structures, resultative compounds, and negation, but also pays close attention to what the book demonstrates are closely related changes in phonology and the writing system.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special ...
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This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.Less
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins by denying that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It goes on to challenge the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, a more unified account of all four types of expression is explored, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. The authors argue that all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The Afterword draws out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198751182
- eISBN:
- 9780191695032
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198751182.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, ...
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All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, space, and time; but a practical mastery does not entail theoretical understanding. It is that understanding which philosophy seeks to achieve. This book sets out to explain and illustrate a certain conception of the nature of analytical philosophy. The author draws on his many years of teaching at Oxford University, during which he refined and developed his route to understanding the fundamental structure of human thinking. Among the distinctive features of his exposition are the displacement of an older, reductive conception of philosophical method (the ideal of ‘analysing’ complex ideas into simpler elements) in favour of elucidating the interconnections between the complex but irreducible notions which form the basic structure of our thinking; and the demonstration that the three traditionally distinguished departments of metaphysics (ontology), epistemology, and logic are but three aspects of one unified enquiry.Less
All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, space, and time; but a practical mastery does not entail theoretical understanding. It is that understanding which philosophy seeks to achieve. This book sets out to explain and illustrate a certain conception of the nature of analytical philosophy. The author draws on his many years of teaching at Oxford University, during which he refined and developed his route to understanding the fundamental structure of human thinking. Among the distinctive features of his exposition are the displacement of an older, reductive conception of philosophical method (the ideal of ‘analysing’ complex ideas into simpler elements) in favour of elucidating the interconnections between the complex but irreducible notions which form the basic structure of our thinking; and the demonstration that the three traditionally distinguished departments of metaphysics (ontology), epistemology, and logic are but three aspects of one unified enquiry.
Carolyn Price
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199242009
- eISBN:
- 9780191696992
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242009.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This book investigates what it means to say that mental states — thoughts, wishes, perceptual experiences, and so on — are about things in the world. The answer to this deep philosophical problem is ...
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This book investigates what it means to say that mental states — thoughts, wishes, perceptual experiences, and so on — are about things in the world. The answer to this deep philosophical problem is a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. This book's teleological account centres on the claim that the content of an intentional state depends both on the information that it is supposed to carry and on the way in which it is used — whether to trigger a simple response, to help keep track of an object or place, to help in planning a route through the environment, or in a sophisticated process of reasoning. Along the way the book defends its view from recent objections to teleological theories, and indicates how it might be applied to some notable problems in the philosophy of mind.Less
This book investigates what it means to say that mental states — thoughts, wishes, perceptual experiences, and so on — are about things in the world. The answer to this deep philosophical problem is a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. This book's teleological account centres on the claim that the content of an intentional state depends both on the information that it is supposed to carry and on the way in which it is used — whether to trigger a simple response, to help keep track of an object or place, to help in planning a route through the environment, or in a sophisticated process of reasoning. Along the way the book defends its view from recent objections to teleological theories, and indicates how it might be applied to some notable problems in the philosophy of mind.
