Abdulaziz Sachedina
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195378504
- eISBN:
- 9780199869688
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378504.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This book undertakes to correlate practical ethical decisions in modern medical practice to principles and rules derived from Islamic juridical praxis and theological doctrines. This study links ...
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This book undertakes to correlate practical ethical decisions in modern medical practice to principles and rules derived from Islamic juridical praxis and theological doctrines. This study links these rulings to the moral principles extracted from the normative religious texts and historically documented precedents. Western scholars of Islamic law have pointed out the importance of the historical approach in determining the rules and the juristic practices that were applied to the cases under consideration before the judicial opinions were issued within a specific social, economic, and political context. These decisions reflected aspects of intellectual as well as social history of the Muslim community engaged in making everyday life conform to the religious values. Ethical decisions are an important part of interpersonal relations in Islamic law. Practical guidance affecting all facets of individual and collective human life, have been provided under the general rules of “Public good” and “No harm, no harassment.” However, no judicial decision that claims to further public good is regarded authoritative without supporting documentation from the foundational sources, like the Qur‘an and the Sunna (the exemplary tradition of the Prophet). Hence, Muslim jurists, in order to infer fresh rulings about matters that were not covered by the existing precedents in the Qur‘an and the Sunna, undertook to develop rational stratagems to enable them to solve problems faced by the community. This intellectual activity led to the systematic formulation of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, which has assumed unprecedented importance in connection with the distinct field of medical ethics in the Islamic world that shares the modern medical technology with the West. The book argues that there are distinct Islamic principles that can serve as sources for Muslim biomedical ethics that can engage in dialogue with both secular and other religiously oriented bioethics in the context of universal medical practice and research.Less
This book undertakes to correlate practical ethical decisions in modern medical practice to principles and rules derived from Islamic juridical praxis and theological doctrines. This study links these rulings to the moral principles extracted from the normative religious texts and historically documented precedents. Western scholars of Islamic law have pointed out the importance of the historical approach in determining the rules and the juristic practices that were applied to the cases under consideration before the judicial opinions were issued within a specific social, economic, and political context. These decisions reflected aspects of intellectual as well as social history of the Muslim community engaged in making everyday life conform to the religious values. Ethical decisions are an important part of interpersonal relations in Islamic law. Practical guidance affecting all facets of individual and collective human life, have been provided under the general rules of “Public good” and “No harm, no harassment.” However, no judicial decision that claims to further public good is regarded authoritative without supporting documentation from the foundational sources, like the Qur‘an and the Sunna (the exemplary tradition of the Prophet). Hence, Muslim jurists, in order to infer fresh rulings about matters that were not covered by the existing precedents in the Qur‘an and the Sunna, undertook to develop rational stratagems to enable them to solve problems faced by the community. This intellectual activity led to the systematic formulation of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, which has assumed unprecedented importance in connection with the distinct field of medical ethics in the Islamic world that shares the modern medical technology with the West. The book argues that there are distinct Islamic principles that can serve as sources for Muslim biomedical ethics that can engage in dialogue with both secular and other religiously oriented bioethics in the context of universal medical practice and research.
Anthony Rudd
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198752189
- eISBN:
- 9780191695063
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752189.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book has now followed Søren Kierkegaard's account of the progress through the stages of life. It has also discussed and endorsed its polemic against objectivism. The book is hoping that it has ...
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The book has now followed Søren Kierkegaard's account of the progress through the stages of life. It has also discussed and endorsed its polemic against objectivism. The book is hoping that it has presented clearly that this does not involve a defence of arbitrariness or of the invention of values by each individual and is believing that Kierkegaard has shown his readers a way out of the sterile conflict between this subjectivism and pseudo-scientific objectivism. The book has also followed the argument for ethics and concluded that there is good reason for making particular commitments and for developing relevant virtues. This book overall has been one of criticism and clarification. Ultimately, however, it is only each individual's felt need for meaning that can determine the choices and commitments that he or she will make.Less
The book has now followed Søren Kierkegaard's account of the progress through the stages of life. It has also discussed and endorsed its polemic against objectivism. The book is hoping that it has presented clearly that this does not involve a defence of arbitrariness or of the invention of values by each individual and is believing that Kierkegaard has shown his readers a way out of the sterile conflict between this subjectivism and pseudo-scientific objectivism. The book has also followed the argument for ethics and concluded that there is good reason for making particular commitments and for developing relevant virtues. This book overall has been one of criticism and clarification. Ultimately, however, it is only each individual's felt need for meaning that can determine the choices and commitments that he or she will make.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. ...
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This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. This indicates that philosophical accounts of moral judgment that eschew the emotions are mistaken. However, the volume also argues that prevailing philosophical accounts that embrace a role for the emotions are also mistaken. The empirical work points to a quite different account of moral judgment than philosophers have considered, an account in which normative rules and emotions make independent contributions to moral judgment. Further, the volume argues that the emotions play an important role in the normative rules that get fixed in the culture. The history of norms indicates that norms that resonate with our emotions are more likely to survive.Less
This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. This indicates that philosophical accounts of moral judgment that eschew the emotions are mistaken. However, the volume also argues that prevailing philosophical accounts that embrace a role for the emotions are also mistaken. The empirical work points to a quite different account of moral judgment than philosophers have considered, an account in which normative rules and emotions make independent contributions to moral judgment. Further, the volume argues that the emotions play an important role in the normative rules that get fixed in the culture. The history of norms indicates that norms that resonate with our emotions are more likely to survive.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of ...
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This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of thought or language. Rather than announcing itself as a sceptical conclusion, the sceptical line of reflection that emerges can be allowed, in Tractarian fashion, to show its truth. It is in this way that the non-objectivist critique emerges as the most powerful means of undermining the cognitivist argument traced so far. Underpinned by a worked-out programme in the philosophy of truth, namely minimalism, non-objectivism is also powered by a distinctive vision of a modern society.Less
This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of thought or language. Rather than announcing itself as a sceptical conclusion, the sceptical line of reflection that emerges can be allowed, in Tractarian fashion, to show its truth. It is in this way that the non-objectivist critique emerges as the most powerful means of undermining the cognitivist argument traced so far. Underpinned by a worked-out programme in the philosophy of truth, namely minimalism, non-objectivism is also powered by a distinctive vision of a modern society.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is ...
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Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.Less
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.
Martin Hollis
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296102
- eISBN:
- 9780191599583
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829610X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Martin Hollis (in one of his last writings before his untimely death) opens up the first section, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, with a fiery defence of Enlightenment universalism and an attack on ...
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Martin Hollis (in one of his last writings before his untimely death) opens up the first section, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, with a fiery defence of Enlightenment universalism and an attack on the relativist who says ‘Liberalism for the liberals; cannibalism for the cannibals.’ Focusing especially on universal claims about human nature, civil society, and the best forms of government, Hollis argues for a substantive and not merely procedural liberalism as a ‘fighting creed with universalist pretensions’ that can justify ‘robust and sharp‐edged moral declarations’. As Hollis argues, universalism works for minorities too. This is because excluded minorities must show that they have been wrongly excluded; they need a standpoint that is ‘not cognitively arbitrary’ to exclude racists and sexists.Less
Martin Hollis (in one of his last writings before his untimely death) opens up the first section, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, with a fiery defence of Enlightenment universalism and an attack on the relativist who says ‘Liberalism for the liberals; cannibalism for the cannibals.’ Focusing especially on universal claims about human nature, civil society, and the best forms of government, Hollis argues for a substantive and not merely procedural liberalism as a ‘fighting creed with universalist pretensions’ that can justify ‘robust and sharp‐edged moral declarations’. As Hollis argues, universalism works for minorities too. This is because excluded minorities must show that they have been wrongly excluded; they need a standpoint that is ‘not cognitively arbitrary’ to exclude racists and sexists.
Andrew Inkpen and Kannan Ramaswamy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195167207
- eISBN:
- 9780199789825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195167207.003.0010
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
This chapter focuses on the issues surrounding global strategy and the ethical dimensions of competing across borders. As globalization continues, managers will find that incorporating international ...
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This chapter focuses on the issues surrounding global strategy and the ethical dimensions of competing across borders. As globalization continues, managers will find that incorporating international ethical dimensions in their decision-making processes is unavoidable. The chapter discusses ethical issues and how they might be identified, analyzed, and linked to global strategy decisions. Creating strategy in the global arena inevitably means that MNEs will have to confront ethical issues. The question of “whose morals and whose ethical standards” confronts MNEs as soon as they cross a border. MNEs must deal with different laws in various countries, and compete against firms from different countries and legal jurisdictions. The chapter considers the ethical concepts of relativism, objectivism, and pluralism and examines some of the means by which firms try to manage ethical challenges. The chapter also consider the advantages and disadvantages of formal corporate ethics programs.Less
This chapter focuses on the issues surrounding global strategy and the ethical dimensions of competing across borders. As globalization continues, managers will find that incorporating international ethical dimensions in their decision-making processes is unavoidable. The chapter discusses ethical issues and how they might be identified, analyzed, and linked to global strategy decisions. Creating strategy in the global arena inevitably means that MNEs will have to confront ethical issues. The question of “whose morals and whose ethical standards” confronts MNEs as soon as they cross a border. MNEs must deal with different laws in various countries, and compete against firms from different countries and legal jurisdictions. The chapter considers the ethical concepts of relativism, objectivism, and pluralism and examines some of the means by which firms try to manage ethical challenges. The chapter also consider the advantages and disadvantages of formal corporate ethics programs.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156484
- eISBN:
- 9781400846320
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions—distinctively moral responses? This book develops an original account ...
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We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions—distinctively moral responses? This book develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. The book offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. It describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. The book explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of this widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. It also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, the book advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.Less
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions—distinctively moral responses? This book develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. The book offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. It describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. The book explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of this widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. It also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, the book advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199226078
- eISBN:
- 9780191594236
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that there is a plausible though non-standard conception of epistemic relativism under which relativism is compatible with objectivism or absolutism. The key element of this ...
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This chapter argues that there is a plausible though non-standard conception of epistemic relativism under which relativism is compatible with objectivism or absolutism. The key element of this conception is that people in different communities can justifiably accept different principles about reasoning. As a result, people with the same first-order (‘material’) evidence for a proposition can have divergent but reasonable attitudes toward it.Less
This chapter argues that there is a plausible though non-standard conception of epistemic relativism under which relativism is compatible with objectivism or absolutism. The key element of this conception is that people in different communities can justifiably accept different principles about reasoning. As a result, people with the same first-order (‘material’) evidence for a proposition can have divergent but reasonable attitudes toward it.
William Taussig Scott and Martin X. Moleski
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195174335
- eISBN:
- 9780199835706
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517433X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
In view of his work in the humanities, Polanyi was transferred from the Chemistry Department at the University of Manchester to a chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies in 1948. Thanks ...
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In view of his work in the humanities, Polanyi was transferred from the Chemistry Department at the University of Manchester to a chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies in 1948. Thanks to his work on the Gifford Lectures (1951–1952) and after ten years of research and writing, Polanyi was able to consolidate his fiduciary program in Personal Knowledge. In this work, he argued that impersonal, objectivist interpretations of science destroy fabric of the scientific community and society as a whole; he proposed that all knowledge is "either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing," so that objectivity is understood as the accomplishment of responsible subjects who strive to serve transcendent ideals of truth.Less
In view of his work in the humanities, Polanyi was transferred from the Chemistry Department at the University of Manchester to a chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies in 1948. Thanks to his work on the Gifford Lectures (1951–1952) and after ten years of research and writing, Polanyi was able to consolidate his fiduciary program in Personal Knowledge. In this work, he argued that impersonal, objectivist interpretations of science destroy fabric of the scientific community and society as a whole; he proposed that all knowledge is "either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing," so that objectivity is understood as the accomplishment of responsible subjects who strive to serve transcendent ideals of truth.
Nicos Stavropoulos
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198258995
- eISBN:
- 9780191681899
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198258995.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as an important topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal ...
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The question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as an important topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. It supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. It then provides a defence against the classical, as well as the less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. The discussion is thoroughly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. The book identifies an important source of resistance to the acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation; a widely held but faulty semantic. It then develops an alternative semantic framework, drawing on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, commonsensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to re-interpret major debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H. L. A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that issue.Less
The question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as an important topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. It supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. It then provides a defence against the classical, as well as the less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. The discussion is thoroughly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. The book identifies an important source of resistance to the acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation; a widely held but faulty semantic. It then develops an alternative semantic framework, drawing on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, commonsensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to re-interpret major debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H. L. A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that issue.
Alan B. Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195175325
- eISBN:
- 9780199784707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195175328.003.0016
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This essay explores the possibility of intersubjective truth in science and religion to present an alternative to metaphysical realism on the one hand, and relativism and constructivism on the other. ...
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This essay explores the possibility of intersubjective truth in science and religion to present an alternative to metaphysical realism on the one hand, and relativism and constructivism on the other. Wallace gives a summary of objectivism — the view that there is a world separate from human perceptions and concepts. As scientific naturalism proceeded to build knowledge of the objective world, religion recoiled against this naturalism as insufficient to account for God or the soul, thus maintaining a sort of mind/matter dualism. Wallace argues that the science of mental phenomena has been largely speculative and not systematically empirical, largely due to the strong emphasis of science on external phenomena. Thus, contemporary cognitive science focuses on the mechanics of mental phenomena instead of the dynamics of the mind. Wallace discusses the pioneering work of William James, suggesting that science could consider the ways that brain and mind influence each other, rather than taking mind to be simply an outcome of brain processes. He asserts that science works with the world of experience, not a world independent of human experience, though truth-claims can be organized according to their intersubjective invariance across multiple frames of experience-based reference. Wallace then discusses how one may validate scientific and religious claims made by those who are highly trained and have opportunities for extraordinary experiences of consciousness — those which outsiders cannot share nor perhaps understand; yet both apply intersubjective empirical and pragmatic criteria to determine the utility of their truths.Less
This essay explores the possibility of intersubjective truth in science and religion to present an alternative to metaphysical realism on the one hand, and relativism and constructivism on the other. Wallace gives a summary of objectivism — the view that there is a world separate from human perceptions and concepts. As scientific naturalism proceeded to build knowledge of the objective world, religion recoiled against this naturalism as insufficient to account for God or the soul, thus maintaining a sort of mind/matter dualism. Wallace argues that the science of mental phenomena has been largely speculative and not systematically empirical, largely due to the strong emphasis of science on external phenomena. Thus, contemporary cognitive science focuses on the mechanics of mental phenomena instead of the dynamics of the mind. Wallace discusses the pioneering work of William James, suggesting that science could consider the ways that brain and mind influence each other, rather than taking mind to be simply an outcome of brain processes. He asserts that science works with the world of experience, not a world independent of human experience, though truth-claims can be organized according to their intersubjective invariance across multiple frames of experience-based reference. Wallace then discusses how one may validate scientific and religious claims made by those who are highly trained and have opportunities for extraordinary experiences of consciousness — those which outsiders cannot share nor perhaps understand; yet both apply intersubjective empirical and pragmatic criteria to determine the utility of their truths.
Steven J. Burton
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195337495
- eISBN:
- 9780199868650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337495.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations
This chapter gives an overview of the book's structure, which emphasizes the goals, tasks, and theories of contract interpretation. There are four main goals: implementing freedom of and freedom from ...
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This chapter gives an overview of the book's structure, which emphasizes the goals, tasks, and theories of contract interpretation. There are four main goals: implementing freedom of and freedom from contract, protecting and enhancing the security of contractual transactions, settling contract disputes in accordance with the Rule of Law, and ensuring that the law is reasonably administrable. The tasks are to identify the terms to be interpreted, to decide whether the governing term is ambiguous, and to resolve any ambiguity. The theories are literalism, objectivism, and subjectivism. The theories tell us how to perform the tasks to further the goals.Less
This chapter gives an overview of the book's structure, which emphasizes the goals, tasks, and theories of contract interpretation. There are four main goals: implementing freedom of and freedom from contract, protecting and enhancing the security of contractual transactions, settling contract disputes in accordance with the Rule of Law, and ensuring that the law is reasonably administrable. The tasks are to identify the terms to be interpreted, to decide whether the governing term is ambiguous, and to resolve any ambiguity. The theories are literalism, objectivism, and subjectivism. The theories tell us how to perform the tasks to further the goals.
B. Alan Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195173109
- eISBN:
- 9780199849833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173109.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Since the Scientific Revolution, claims have been made about science and on behalf of science that include not only scientific but philosophical and theological assertions. When such a wide range of ...
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Since the Scientific Revolution, claims have been made about science and on behalf of science that include not only scientific but philosophical and theological assertions. When such a wide range of issues is included within the category of scientific knowledge, distinguishing science from a religious-like ideology becomes difficult. And when the authority of science is invoked in support of metaphysical positions, further problems arise. Thus, it is crucial to identify the salient features of distinct aspects of the scientific tradition, namely, science itself, the philosophical view known as scientific realism, the metaphysical ideology of scientific materialism, and the dogmatic form of that ideology known as scientism. According to science, empirical data always have the last word and there is no place for dogmas, sacrosanct theories, or a priori statements. Nevertheless, science has progressed together with the ideology of scientific materialism that does embody a number of sacrosanct theories and a priori statements, namely the principles of objectivism, monism, universalism, reductionism, the closure principle, and physicalism.Less
Since the Scientific Revolution, claims have been made about science and on behalf of science that include not only scientific but philosophical and theological assertions. When such a wide range of issues is included within the category of scientific knowledge, distinguishing science from a religious-like ideology becomes difficult. And when the authority of science is invoked in support of metaphysical positions, further problems arise. Thus, it is crucial to identify the salient features of distinct aspects of the scientific tradition, namely, science itself, the philosophical view known as scientific realism, the metaphysical ideology of scientific materialism, and the dogmatic form of that ideology known as scientism. According to science, empirical data always have the last word and there is no place for dogmas, sacrosanct theories, or a priori statements. Nevertheless, science has progressed together with the ideology of scientific materialism that does embody a number of sacrosanct theories and a priori statements, namely the principles of objectivism, monism, universalism, reductionism, the closure principle, and physicalism.
B. Alan Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195173109
- eISBN:
- 9780199849833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173109.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
The seeds of scientific materialism can be found in early Hebrew and Greek religious and philosophical beliefs dating from the 6th century bce or possibly earlier. Scientific realism, an integral ...
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The seeds of scientific materialism can be found in early Hebrew and Greek religious and philosophical beliefs dating from the 6th century bce or possibly earlier. Scientific realism, an integral philosophical premise of scientific materialism, was profoundly influenced by the biblical assertion that God created the rest of the universe before he created humans. The immediate implication of this belief is that the world experienced by humans exists prior to and independently of the human mind. In order for man to comprehend God's creation, he must seek to view the world beyond the confines of his own subjectivity, just as God transcends the natural world. In short, he must seek a purely objective (divine) God's-eye view and banish all subjective (profane) influences from his empirical and analytical research into the objective universe. In this way the seeds of objectivism were introduced into Mediterranean thought by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theology. This chapter examines some of the proximate theological influences on the rise of science and scientific materialism.Less
The seeds of scientific materialism can be found in early Hebrew and Greek religious and philosophical beliefs dating from the 6th century bce or possibly earlier. Scientific realism, an integral philosophical premise of scientific materialism, was profoundly influenced by the biblical assertion that God created the rest of the universe before he created humans. The immediate implication of this belief is that the world experienced by humans exists prior to and independently of the human mind. In order for man to comprehend God's creation, he must seek to view the world beyond the confines of his own subjectivity, just as God transcends the natural world. In short, he must seek a purely objective (divine) God's-eye view and banish all subjective (profane) influences from his empirical and analytical research into the objective universe. In this way the seeds of objectivism were introduced into Mediterranean thought by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theology. This chapter examines some of the proximate theological influences on the rise of science and scientific materialism.
L. W. Sumner
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238782
- eISBN:
- 9780191679773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238782.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Models of the good life (for human beings) are as old as philosophy itself. In the western tradition extending from the Greeks to the present day, ideals which have attracted support have invoked a ...
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Models of the good life (for human beings) are as old as philosophy itself. In the western tradition extending from the Greeks to the present day, ideals which have attracted support have invoked a wide variety of concepts: pleasure, happiness, the satisfaction of desires or preferences, the fulfilment of needs, the achievement of aims or objectives, the development of capacities or potentialities, the maintenance of normal functioning, living a form of life appropriate to one's nature, and doubtless many others besides. This chapter aims to locate the account which works best specifically as a theory of prudential value, the one which is most faithful to our ordinary concept of welfare and our ordinary experience. Accounts are sorted into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories: the subjective and the objective. It argues that there is an interpretation of the subjective/objective distinction such that subjectivity turns out to be a necessary condition of success in a theory of welfare. If proven right, then objective theories can be ruled out of consideration as a category, all of them inadequate precisely because they are objective.Less
Models of the good life (for human beings) are as old as philosophy itself. In the western tradition extending from the Greeks to the present day, ideals which have attracted support have invoked a wide variety of concepts: pleasure, happiness, the satisfaction of desires or preferences, the fulfilment of needs, the achievement of aims or objectives, the development of capacities or potentialities, the maintenance of normal functioning, living a form of life appropriate to one's nature, and doubtless many others besides. This chapter aims to locate the account which works best specifically as a theory of prudential value, the one which is most faithful to our ordinary concept of welfare and our ordinary experience. Accounts are sorted into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories: the subjective and the objective. It argues that there is an interpretation of the subjective/objective distinction such that subjectivity turns out to be a necessary condition of success in a theory of welfare. If proven right, then objective theories can be ruled out of consideration as a category, all of them inadequate precisely because they are objective.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this chapter the fact that desires have a direction of fit which is opposite to that of beliefs is employed to suggest that objectivism with respect to reasons for desire is implausible. Because ...
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In this chapter the fact that desires have a direction of fit which is opposite to that of beliefs is employed to suggest that objectivism with respect to reasons for desire is implausible. Because desires are not formed to fit the world, but are rather formed to make the world fit their content, the idea of value as something desires must fit is not called for. Rather, desires fill their function if their object is something that one can bring about, thus satisfying the desire. It is maintained that this opposition as regards direction of fit explains why practical reasoning consists in the derivation of a desire for something which is sufficient for the end desired, while theoretical reasoning consists in the derivation of a belief whose truth is necessary if the premises are true. Some objectivist theories, e.g., John McDowell’s, are examined and rejected.Less
In this chapter the fact that desires have a direction of fit which is opposite to that of beliefs is employed to suggest that objectivism with respect to reasons for desire is implausible. Because desires are not formed to fit the world, but are rather formed to make the world fit their content, the idea of value as something desires must fit is not called for. Rather, desires fill their function if their object is something that one can bring about, thus satisfying the desire. It is maintained that this opposition as regards direction of fit explains why practical reasoning consists in the derivation of a desire for something which is sufficient for the end desired, while theoretical reasoning consists in the derivation of a belief whose truth is necessary if the premises are true. Some objectivist theories, e.g., John McDowell’s, are examined and rejected.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Many philosophers maintain that common sense is committed to a kind of moral objectivism. This chapter exploits recent empirical work to defend this claim. The chapter also maintains that the account ...
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Many philosophers maintain that common sense is committed to a kind of moral objectivism. This chapter exploits recent empirical work to defend this claim. The chapter also maintains that the account of moral judgment developed in the volume contributes to a familiar Humean argument against moral objectivism. However, even if the commonsense commitment to moral objectivity is wrong, that does not immediately lead to an “error theory” according to which all commonsense moral judgments are false since they all presuppose objectivity. Rather, there are fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind that need to be settled before we can determine whether error theory follows. In any case, recent evidence suggests that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment can be preserved in the absence of a commitment to objectivity.Less
Many philosophers maintain that common sense is committed to a kind of moral objectivism. This chapter exploits recent empirical work to defend this claim. The chapter also maintains that the account of moral judgment developed in the volume contributes to a familiar Humean argument against moral objectivism. However, even if the commonsense commitment to moral objectivity is wrong, that does not immediately lead to an “error theory” according to which all commonsense moral judgments are false since they all presuppose objectivity. Rather, there are fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind that need to be settled before we can determine whether error theory follows. In any case, recent evidence suggests that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment can be preserved in the absence of a commitment to objectivity.
Sam D. Gill
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195115871
- eISBN:
- 9780199853427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195115871.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, World Religions
Existence of academies aims to bridge the gap between actuality and people's comprehension of it, but it is important to note that the reality of academic institutions is made possible by the ...
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Existence of academies aims to bridge the gap between actuality and people's comprehension of it, but it is important to note that the reality of academic institutions is made possible by the subsistence of this chasm. That is why despite the reconciliation efforts, any attempt to invalidate such a link should be eliminated. With these premises in mind, people should operate under objectivism, without compromising their inclination to question the meaning of the universe, its components, processes and structures. Objectivism argues that reality is an absolute truth wherein facts are mutually exclusive of man's emotions and mental templates, that rationality is an individual's tool to analyze reality, that people function in pursuit of their own interest and purpose, and that capitalism (i.e. voluntary exchange of resources) will benefit market actors. All of which are spotted in the narrative accounts of Arrernte, an immense land in Central Australia.Less
Existence of academies aims to bridge the gap between actuality and people's comprehension of it, but it is important to note that the reality of academic institutions is made possible by the subsistence of this chasm. That is why despite the reconciliation efforts, any attempt to invalidate such a link should be eliminated. With these premises in mind, people should operate under objectivism, without compromising their inclination to question the meaning of the universe, its components, processes and structures. Objectivism argues that reality is an absolute truth wherein facts are mutually exclusive of man's emotions and mental templates, that rationality is an individual's tool to analyze reality, that people function in pursuit of their own interest and purpose, and that capitalism (i.e. voluntary exchange of resources) will benefit market actors. All of which are spotted in the narrative accounts of Arrernte, an immense land in Central Australia.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter explains some distinctions which are central in the theory of practical reasons and value, namely the distinction between objectivism and subjectivism, and the distinction between ...
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This chapter explains some distinctions which are central in the theory of practical reasons and value, namely the distinction between objectivism and subjectivism, and the distinction between externalism and internalism. Subjectivist theories take reasons and values to be definable in terms of some relation to desires and/or emotions had under some factually described circumstances. Objectivist theories deny either only the sufficiency of such a condition or both its sufficiency and necessity. By virtue of accepting the necessity of this sort of dependence upon attitudes, subjectivist theories are perforce internalist, whereas objectivist theories could be either internalist or externalist, depending on whether they accept the necessity of this link to attitudes. Objectivism is then distinguished both from inter-subjectivism and realism, which views reasons and values as irreducible.Less
This chapter explains some distinctions which are central in the theory of practical reasons and value, namely the distinction between objectivism and subjectivism, and the distinction between externalism and internalism. Subjectivist theories take reasons and values to be definable in terms of some relation to desires and/or emotions had under some factually described circumstances. Objectivist theories deny either only the sufficiency of such a condition or both its sufficiency and necessity. By virtue of accepting the necessity of this sort of dependence upon attitudes, subjectivist theories are perforce internalist, whereas objectivist theories could be either internalist or externalist, depending on whether they accept the necessity of this link to attitudes. Objectivism is then distinguished both from inter-subjectivism and realism, which views reasons and values as irreducible.
